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Lili Yan Ing and Miaojie Yu
Trade shapes and directs the world. In the modern economy, we witness how
trade liberalization has hugely contributed to world economic growth over the
last 70 years. In one of the main economic ideas contained in the Ricardian
model, dating back to 1817, is the observation that “a country’s comparative
advantage is essentially labour productivity that determines the pattern of
world trade” (Ricardo 1817). Paul Krugman (1994) reiterates that “productivity
is not everything, but in the long run, it is almost everything”. Modern trade lit-
erature stresses how trade liberalization affects growth and productivity by
improving firm productivity, either through competition or access to better
quality or lower-priced inputs. Trade also affects real wages and the wages of
skilled labour relative to those of unskilled labour and this will affect employment
creation and movement of labour.
The next 12 chapters of this book explain how trade affects growth, productiv-
ity and employment. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 look theoretically at national sover-
eignty in an interdependent world, how trade competition affects a small
open economy and how trade in services – dividing tangible and intangible
services – affects trade in goods and real wages. The rest of the chapters
present empirical exercises. Starting with Chapter 5, which explains “upstream-
ness” and “downstreamness” in global value chains, Chapters 6 to 10 detail
how trade affects growth through improved firm productivity and through
regional trade growth via industrial agglomeration, improved export quality, orga-
nizational change and firm-to-firm connections. They use very rich disaggregated
data from China, France, Colombia and Indonesia. Chapters 11 to 13 examine
how trade affects employment. The expansion of China has, of course, had a
great deal of attention from trade economists. Chapter 11 examines how the
growing of China’s trade affects US occupational employment. Chapter 12
explores the “China shock” to employment in East and Southeast Asia. The
last chapter develops a spatial economic model and tests it on trade in goods
and migration.
The book starts by discussing trade in the multilateral context. Chapter 2 by
Bagwell and Staiger reexamines the role of multilateral cooperation from the per-
spective of sovereign rights. What are the sovereign rights of nations in an
DOI: 10.4324/9781351061544-1
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interdependent world and to what extent do these rights stand in the way of
achieving internationally efficient outcomes? The chapter proposes answers to
these two questions. Their approach is to formalize the Westphalian norm of
“non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states” in a way that captures
several key features of Westphalian sovereignty emphasized in the international
political economy literature. An important advantage of their approach is that it
is analytically tractable. Using this formalization, Bagwell and Staiger show
how Nash choice problems can be partitioned in a way that allows a characteri-
zation of the degree and nature of sovereignty that governments possess in the
Nash equilibrium. This characterization, in turn, provides a benchmark from
which to formally assess the implications for national sovereignty of international
agreements of various designs.
In the context of the benchmark model of international interdependence,
Bagwell and Staiger find that in principle there is no inherent conflict between
the attainment of international efficiency through international agreements and
preserving national sovereignty. As the benchmark model is general enough to
cover channels of international interdependence that can take a variety of
forms, this finding can be viewed as pointing to important possibilities for elim-
inating conflicts between international efficiency and national sovereignty
through appropriate design of international agreements. Their findings highlight
an important distinction between such agreements that mitigate international
externalities and those that erode national sovereignty and point out that it can
be possible to have the former without the latter.
Bagwell and Staiger find that the harmony in the benchmark model between
international efficiency and national sovereignty is not always present in the uni-
verse of international relations among national governments. Rather, this
harmony depends on the structure of the international externalities that define
the nature of international interdependence and that give rise to the policy inef-
ficiencies under non-cooperative policy setting. Together with other findings,
this last point reinforces the importance of understanding the nature of the inter-
national externalities that are the source of the problem for an international agree-
ment to solve, so that those tensions between sovereignty and efficiency that are
unnecessary can be avoided, while those tensions that are inescapable can be
anticipated and minimized through careful institutional design.
Where tensions between national sovereignty and international efficiency are
inescapable, it may be that further refinements to the notion of national sover-
eignty could help to ease these tensions. A key message of the Bagwell and
Staiger chapter, however, is that such refinements, to the extent they are possible,
can be guided by the formal approach and instructive findings of this analysis. In
this way, the chapter provides a framework for further systematic exploration into
notions of sovereignty and their implications for efficiency.
Chapter 3 by Melitz provides exercises on trade competition and reallocations
in a small open economy based on his highly referenced paper on measuring pro-
ductivity in the heterogenous firm framework. The seminal Melitz (2003) paper
offers elegant predictions on regarding changes in the extensive margin of trade
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in response to trade liberalization, yet it is largely silent on implications for the
intensive margin from such trade liberalizations. To relax the constant markup
feature associated with the constant elasticity of substitution, this chapter devel-
ops a setup of variable elasticities of substitution.
This model with endogenous markups is able to illustrate how trade liberaliza-
tion induces intensive margin reallocations towards more productive firms that
reinforce the extensive margin reallocations of Melitz (2003). When general equi-
librium effects are incorporated, the theory also provides a decomposition of the
impact of trade liberalization into a short-run component and a long-run compo-
nent. In particular, the long-run component that incorporates the effects of firm
entry and relative wage changes further contributes to the intensive margin
reallocation. This extension is a significant milestone in research on firm hetero-
geneity and trade liberalization.
In Chapter 4, Eaton and Kortum examine some important and fundamental fea-
tures of services trade and investigate how well current modelling strategies
capture these features. They propose and quantify extensions to a baseline struc-
tural gravity model that incorporate these features. Their extended model allows
us to handle goods trade and services trade in an encompassing framework.
Using OECD data and World Input-Output Database (WIOD), Eaton and
Kortum explore basic features of services trade, documenting its growing differ-
ential and importance across countries. In particular, services exports now
account for a third or more of the total exports of goods and services of the
United Kingdom and United States but less than 20 per cent for Germany and
Japan. In line with previous studies, they find that a standard gravity formulation
with exporter–importer fixed effects captures bilateral trade both in services
overall and in eight categories of services, nearly as well as trade in goods,
with similar distance elasticities.
Eaton and Kortum then develop a model in which they divide services into
tangible and intangible components. How to treat tangible services seems
standard in the literature, but researchers have taken alternative approaches to
intangibles. As Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2009) point out, to constitute a
source of growth using accumulation of intangibles, it requires information of
a share in the production function just like physical capital, implying rivalry.
Hence Eaton and Kortum include the accumulation of intangible capital as a
source of growth that substantially reduces the “Solow residual” in growth
accounting. The new approach introduced by Eaton and Kortum here, in treat-
ing intangibles as non-rival, considers the accumulation of intangibles as the
source of this residual.
In this Eaton and Kortum service model, they treat tangible services and mer-
chandise trade similarly. Absorption is related to current production and output is
rivalrous. They model the output of the intangible services sector as non-rival
intangible assets that provide technologies for the future production of goods
and tangible services. For producers of tangibles to be able to compensate the
original creators of their technology requires that they charge a mark-up over
the cost of tangible inputs. Their market structure is consequently imperfectly
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competitive. Mark-ups on tangibles thus serve as the source of revenue for the
creators of intangible assets. Finally, Eaton and Kortum implement the model
numerically to explore its implications for trade in manufactures, tangible ser-
vices and intangible assets. The numerical model illustrates how greater diffusion
can benefit all countries, even though it can have negative implications for real
wages in some countries.
Turning to the empirical chapters, in Chapter 5, Antràs and Chor examine var-
iations in countries’ and sectors’ global value chain (GVC) positioning by devel-
oping a GVC theory amenable to quantitative general equilibrium trade
modelling. With a quantifiable model that completely matches global bilateral
trade flows in final goods/services and intermediate goods/services, this chapter
analyzes the underlying forces that drive GVC positioning. The authors focus
on the roles of trade costs and service sectors. Antràs and Chor first review
several key measures of GVC positioning, namely indices to measure ‘upstream-
ness’ and ‘downstreamness’ of a country-sector pair. From the output side, a
country/sector is considered upstream if it sells a small share of its output to
final consumers and mainly sells its output to other sectors that sell little to
final consumers. An upstream country/sector is thus remote from final consumers.
From the input side, a country/sector is considered downstream if it uses a large
share of intermediate inputs in its production and mainly uses inputs produced by
sectors that intensively use intermediate inputs. A downstream country/sector
thus uses little value-added overall.
Antràs and Chor then adopt the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) over
the period 1995–2011 to construct measures of upstreamness and downstream-
ness and document two salient stylized facts: First, across years, an average
country/sector has become more upstream (remote to final consumers) and
more downstream (intensively use intermediate inputs) simultaneously. Second,
across years, the positive correlation between upstreamness and downstreamness
has increased. To interpret these two empirical findings, Antràs and Chor
offer two explanations: trade costs and the rise of service sector. On the
one hand, overall declining trade costs seem to suggest that the positive correla-
tion between upstreamness and downstreamness should weaken over time. On
the other hand, because the service sector is closer to final consumers (less
upstream) and intensively uses primary factors and value-added in its production
(less downstream), the rise of the service sector can generate the rising posi-
tive correlation between upstreamness and downstreamness via a composition
effect.
To formally assess the effects of trade costs and the service sector in driving the
observed variations in GVC positioning, Antràs and Chor develop a Ricardian
model of the global economy with input-output linkages à la Caliendo and
Parro (2015). Essentially, they extend the model by allowing trade costs for
final goods/services to differ from those for intermediate goods/services. This
richer structure of trade costs enables the model to completely match trade
flows in both final goods/services and intermediate goods/services. The authors
then show that counterfactual analysis can be readily performed conditional on
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the observed equilibrium using the “exact hat algebra” approach. In particular,
declines in trade costs for services and the rising importance of the service
sector both contribute to increases in the positive correlation between upstream-
ness and downstreamness.
In Chapter 6, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Li argue that regional comparative
advantage or industry agglomeration is another important reason to explain a
region’s export-growth potential. The impacts of the multilateral rules-based
system (WTO) can be viewed in the following perspectives: First, reductions
in import tariffs on both final goods and imported intermediate inputs can
raise productivity. The gains from output trade liberalization are realized
through competition (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang and Zhang, 2017),
whereas the gains from input trade liberalization are mainly through cost
saving effects (Yu, 2015). Second, the phase-out of multi-fiber agreements
facing China in the US, EU, Japan and other OECD high-income countries
also boosted China’s exports (Khandelwal, Schott and Wei, 2013). Third,
with WTO accession in 2001, China no longer faced the annual US reauthori-
zation investigation of its “most favored nation” status. The phased-out US
reauthorization investigation can significantly reduce trade uncertainty con-
fronting Chinese exporters (Pierce and Schott, 2016; Handley and Limao,
2017; Feng, Li and Swenson, 2017).
However, these are not the only important factors in explaining China’s dra-
matic fast trade growth in the first decade in the new century. The authors
argue that regional comparative advantage or industry agglomeration is another
important reason to explain a region’s export-growth potential. They conduct
their analysis by using disaggregated regional data on Chinese trade to access
the channels through which the country’s exports have surged. Inspired by the
influential work of Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), they found that a simple
Bartik measure is the strongest and most robust predictor of China’s regional
export growth. In particular, the spatial pattern of export growth can be explained
by sectoral dynamic changes at the national level, even after controlling for
reductions in tariff uncertainty, the phase-out of MFA quota eliminations and
actual input and output tariff reductions.
Chapter 7, by Orr, Trefler and Yu, contributes to the literature on how to
measure productivity using firm level data. They first review a number of prom-
inent state-of-the-art methods of estimating firm productivity. The rise of China as
the “world’s manufacturer” has generated a growing interest for trade economists.
Previous studies like Brandt, Van Biesesbroeck and Zhang (2012), Yu (2015), and
Brandt, Van Biesesbroeck, Wang and Zhang (2017) consider the impact of trade
liberalization on firm productivity. Yet, how to precisely estimate Chinese firm
productivity still remains important.
The authors develop an augmented method to estimate Chinese firm productivity
by incorporating China-specific economic characteristics such as the existence of
state-owned enterprises (SOE) and foreign-invested enterprises (FIE). In particular,
they estimate dozens of different specifications for around 30 Chinese industries
for a total of 672 production function estimates using OLS and another five
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proxy-variable methods, by considering both gross output and value-added
approaches with either Cobb-Douglas or translog specific functional forms.
The findings of the chapter of Orr, Trefler and Yu are rich. When comparing
gross-output to value-added production functions, the former exhibits much
less variation in returns to scale. When comparing translog gross-output to the
Cobb-Douglas gross-output approach, estimates of output elasticities and
returns to scale are stable across proxy-variable estimation approaches. Regarding
the log TFP dispersion which is of interest for the macro misallocation and trade
reallocation literature, the Orr, Trefler and Yu chapter finds that TFP dispersion is
much larger for value-added production functions than for gross-output produc-
tion functions. From reviewing many empirical exercises, they conclude that
Chinese firms’ TFP measures using gross-output production functions can
yield the most reliable and sensible results.
In Chapter 8, Ing, Yu and Zhang illustrate the evolution of export quality. They
employ very disaggregated micro-level firm-product-destination-year data to
measure export quality for Indonesia (2008–2012) and China (2000–2013),
employing a new approach based on an endogenous quality choice framework
à la Feenstra and Romalis (2014). The theoretical framework explicitly encom-
passes the roles of production efficiency, consumer preferences, input costs and
per-unit shipping costs in shaping individual firms’ optimal quality choices,
these all being widely recognized in the international trade literature as key
driving forces of quality decisions.
By formalizing these intuitions, Ing, Yu and Zhang develop a procedure to
estimate micro-level firm-product-destination-year export quality. Compared
with the existing demand-side approaches like Khandelwal (2010), extensively
used to infer product quality variations within a destination and a year, this esti-
mation procedure ensures that the measured qualities are comparable both across
destinations and over time. This important feature of the estimated quality allows
for empirical analysis that focuses on quality variations across destinations and
across years.
On empirical exercises, their exercises combine firm-level production data with
transaction-level export data in both Indonesia and China to estimate micro-level
export quality. The estimated export quality is positively associated with sales
across firms within a destination, per capita income and geographic barriers
across destinations. The estimation results show that there is substantial heteroge-
neity in export quality distributions across industries, ownership types and years.
Moreover, goods with better quality are more likely to be sold to high-income
destinations. Finally, when the aggregate weighted-average export quality of
each country is decomposed into the intensive and extensive margins, it is
found that the intensive margin plays a major role in Indonesia’s exports,
while the extensive margin plays a major role in China’s exports. Future research
can aim at understanding the underlying economic mechanisms and forces that
drive these sorts of export quality variations along different dimensions.
Chapter 9 by Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg empirically examines the
effects of exporting on organizational change. Their findings contribute to a
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new perspective on the overall effects of trade liberalizations. Following the the-
oretical framework of Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), their current chapter
first derives the result that exporters are larger and have more organizational
layers than non-exporters.
Using French employer–employee matched data from 2002 to 2007, together
with data on a firm’s exporting activity, Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg
find that exporters are larger, employ more hours of labour, pay higher wages
and have more organizational layers than non-exporters. New exporters are
more likely to add these layers than non-exporters. New exporters that add
layers decrease average wages in existing layers while exporters that do not
add layers increase them. Furthermore, firms that expand significantly as a
result of exporting reduce average wages. In contrast, new exporters that do
not change layers barely expand but do increase wages. The average effect on
wages is positive albeit small. Furthermore, Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-
Hansberg also find that firms that enter the export market and expand substan-
tially reorganize by adding layers of management and hiring more workers in
all pre-existing layers. In contrast, firms that enter the export market and
expand little do not reorganize.
Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg then present some evidence that these
effects have causal explanations using pre-sample variation in the destination
composition of exports, in conjunction with real exchange rate variation across
countries. They find that for firms with one, two, or three layers, exporting
does significantly increase the probability of adding layers. The causal effect of
increases in the number of layers due to better access to foreign markets is to
reduce wages in preexisting layers and to increase the number of employees in
all of them. Overall, their results are consistent with a growing literature using
occupations to study the internal structure of firms and how their organization
responds to opportunities in export markets.
Chapter 10 by Bernard, Bøler and Dhingra examines very interesting and sub-
stantial firm-to-firm connections and the firm-level costs of trade using Colombian
import data. The vast majority of world trade flows is between firms. The rise of a
large literature on heterogeneous firms has recognized the importance of variation
across exporters and to a lesser extent across importers, in determining aggregate
trade flows. However, even in that firm-focused research, detailed trade transaction
data are usually aggregated to the level of individual firms, summed across all
buyers for exporters or, conversely, summed across all sellers for importers,
before being used by researchers. Only very recently have some studies in inter-
national trade started to emphasize the importance of the connections between
exporters and importers both in aggregate trade flows and in the negative relation-
ship between trade and geographic distance. This chapter documents the role of
firm-to-firm connections in trade flows and the formation and duration of these
importer–exporter relationships by exploring the individual matches between
exporters and importers and examining their evolution.
Bernard, Bøler and Dhingra explore a new comprehensive dataset of detailed
firm-to-firm Colombian import transactions covering the period 1995–2014. The
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dataset is rich enough to identify both the exporter and the importer. Moreover,
each import transaction can be linked to a specific seller in a source country
and each Colombian firm’s annual export transactions can be linked to specific
buyers in every destination country. This allows the authors to develop a set of
basic facts about sellers and buyers across markets at a point in time, as well
as the evolution of those buyer–seller relationships over time. They find strong
evidence that the extensive margin of importer–exporter connections is strongly
correlated with aggregate country-level trade flows. In addition, there is substan-
tial heterogeneity across both importers and exporters in terms of the numbers of
partners and the levels of trade flows. Again, the extensive margin is crucial in
explaining the variation in import levels across firms. Large importers do not
import more from each partner but, rather, have many more partners than
smaller importers.
Their study examining firms on both sides of trade transactions has important
implications for policy and academic work on the origins of international trade.
While substantial progress has been made on reducing tariffs on manufactured
goods, especially for flows between higher income nations, empirical evidence
suggests that substantial costs remain. Estimates of fixed and variable costs of
trade are large, even as technology and policy have reduced costs of transport,
communication and tariffs. To engender another round of global integration
with its attendant increases in income, consumption and welfare, research must
put more attention on the nature of the trade costs between the firms that
engage in trade.
Chapter 11 by Del Angel, Goswami and Rodriguez-Lopez contributes to the
literature by estimating the impact of the ‘China shock’ on U.S. occupational
employment from 2002 to 2014. Their work is inspired by the influential
papers of Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson
and Price (2016) and Pierce and Schott (2016). The methodology of their
chapter is similar to Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016), but the
main difference between it and its influential forerunners is that this chapter
further distinguishes occupations according to wage, non-routineness and educa-
tion characteristics by using occupational employment data, which are combined
from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) database, the O*NET data-
base, the United Nations Comtrade database and the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA).
Del Angel, Goswami and Rodriguez-Lopez implement three empirical speci-
fications. First, the authors estimate the overall employment effects of direct
import exposure and of two combined measures of import exposure – the first
combined measure adds just the direct and upstream exposures, while the
second adds the direct, upstream and downstream exposures. Second, this
chapter considers occupational sorting under three criteria, which are real
wage, non-routineness and education. Third, they investigate the effects of
Chinese import exposure on occupational employment across three sectors,
namely, directly Chinese-trade exposed sectors, non-exposed tradable sectors
and non-exposed non-tradable sectors.
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After sorting occupations, Del Angel, Goswami and Rodriguez-Lopez generate
some new findings. First, they find that employment losses from occupational-
level Chinese import exposure are concentrated in low-wage, routine, low-
education occupations within both Chinese-trade exposed and non-exposed
sectors. This finding of employment reductions in lower-indexed occupations
in the non-exposed sectors is quite novel and they argue it to be the consequence
of local labour market effects. What’s more, the authors also find mild evidence
that direct Chinese exposure drives an employment expansion in high-education
occupations. For this effect they provide two possible explanations. The first is
the existence of productivity effects within firms by the replacement of low-
wage employment with imports from China. The second relates to the standard
reallocation effects à la Melitz (2003): Low-productivity firms are washed out
from the market in response to tougher Chinese import competition.
Chapter 12 by Feenstra and Sasahara, by using the Global Input-Output Table
from the EORA database, adopts the demand-side technique proposed by Los,
Timmer and de Vries (2015, 2016) to quantify China’s employment change in
response to China’s growing exports to its neighbors in East Asia, including
Southeast Asian countries and the other most important economic entities –
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (JKT). They find that China’s exports to South-
east Asia, namely ASEAN and the other three economics, contributed 11 per cent
annual employment growth during the period of 1990–2013. Such employment
creation and its associated employment compensation is equivalent to 1.7
per cent of total GDP in the ASEAN + JKT area. They are able to unpack the
job creation in China further to that due directly to trade liberalization and due
to changes in China’s final demand per se. Overall, the contribution of China’s
growing final demand is at least three times larger than that of gains due to
trade liberalization.
As the world’s largest “factory”, China experienced a significant export boom in
the first decade of the new century. In particular, China’s share of global export grew
more than threefold, rising from 4 per cent in 2000 to around 14 per cent in 2016. It
is clearly important to understand how this came about. Previous studies have iden-
tified several key factors in explaining China’s export boom. In addition to the con-
tinued phasing out of restrictions on foreign-invested enterprises (Bai, Krishna and
Ma, 2017), easing credit constraints on firms’ exports (Feenstra, Li and Yu, 2014)
and the reform of state-owned enterprises (Hsieh and Song, 2015), trade economists
have also found a significant impact of China’s WTO accession.
The last chapter, Chapter 13 by Allen and Arkolakis, presents a gravity model of
the movement of goods and labour. Previous literature including Baldwin and
Taglioni (2006), Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), Head and Mayer (2013)
and Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) provide excellent reviews of the develop-
ment of the gravity model. Allen and Arkolakis’s foremost contribution is that they
extend the gravity trade model to a gravity immigration model. They first document
a number of stylized facts on spatial economics. The evidence shows clearly both
the flows of commodities (trade) and labour (migration) exhibit gravity. In partic-
ular, bilateral trade is negatively correlated with distance, regardless of the specific
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functional form with which bilateral distance is modelled. As expected, both origin-
specific “push” factors and destination-specific “pull” factors are strongly corre-
lated with GDP and trade flows within and across countries. Allen and Arkolakis
show that such positive correlations can be predicted by a spatial gravity model
with symmetric trade costs and balanced trade.
More importantly, by constructing labour flow data across U.S. state of birth and
current residing location (from Ruggles, Fitch, Kelly-Hall and Sobek, 2000), Allen
and Arkolakis highlight a new finding that gravity relationships with “push” and
“pull” factors in migration are substantially different for migration and trade. To
shed light on this, inspired by Allen and Arkolakis (2014), they develop an indirect
utility function relying both on the utility realized in the destination and on bilateral
migration disutility to derive the labour demand for the gravity on migration.
Accordingly, places with higher migration costs, places with higher trade costs,
less productive places and lower amenity places will have lower populations.
The authors then take their model to the data by estimating bilateral frictions
and recovering location fundamentals and estimating the model’s related elastic-
ities. After evaluating the related exact hat algebra, Allen and Arkolakis conduct a
counterfactuals exercises and use Interstate Highway System data to serve as an
illustration of their elegant spatial economics to examine trade flows as well as
migration flows under different scenarios.
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2 National sovereignty in an
interdependent world
Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger
Of all the rights possessed by a nation, that of sovereignty is doubtless the most
important.
Emmerich de Vattel in The Law of Nations, as quoted in
Jeremy Rabkin, Why Sovereignty Matters, p. 27
1. Introduction
What are the sovereign rights of nations in an interdependent world, and to what
extent do these rights stand in the way of achieving internationally efficient out-
comes? These questions rest at the heart of contemporary debate over the role and
design of international institutions as well as growing tension between globaliza-
tion and the preservation of national sovereignty. But answers are elusive. This is
attributable in part to the fact that national sovereignty is a complex notion,
reflecting a number of different features. And it is attributable as well to the
fact that nations interact in increasingly complex and interdependent ways,
making it difficult to draw clear distinctions between international and domestic
affairs.
In this chapter, we propose answers to these questions. We do so by first devel-
oping formal definitions of national sovereignty that build on features of sover-
eignty emphasized in the international political economy literature. We then
utilize these definitions to describe the degree and nature of national sovereignty
possessed by countries in a benchmark (Nash) world in which there exist no inter-
national agreements of any kind. And with national sovereignty characterized in
this benchmark world, we evaluate the extent to which national sovereignty is
violated by international agreements with specific design features. In this way,
we delineate the degree of tension between national sovereignty and international
efficiency and describe how that tension can be minimized – and sometimes in
principle even eliminated – through careful institutional design.
We begin by describing a benchmark two-country model of international inter-
dependence. In this benchmark model, an international “externality” variable
defines the interdependence between the two countries, and this variable is
modeled in a way that is general enough to allow the nature of this interdependence
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to take a variety of possible forms, ranging from international trade to the depletion
of a common-pool resource to global climate change. Within this benchmark
model, we develop a working definition of sovereignty.
Our starting point for defining sovereignty is the Westphalian norm of “non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states” (Krasner, 1999, p. 20). To
make this norm operational, we must define “non-intervention” and “internal
affairs.” Building on the notions of sovereignty commonly discussed in the inter-
national political economy literature, we combine elements of several of these
notions and say that a governmental decision problem concerns the country’s
internal affairs whenever its payoff in that decision problem does not depend
on the actions of any extraterritorial agents; otherwise, we say that this decision
problem concerns the country’s “external affairs.” In the context of voluntary
international agreements, we then say that one state has intervened in the internal
affairs of another state, and therefore that a violation of sovereignty has occurred,
whenever an international agreement leads a country to make commitments over
matters that concern its internal affairs or to make commitments that alter the
normal operations of its domestic institutions within the domain of its internal
affairs. We argue that our formal definition of sovereignty captures three key fea-
tures of Westphalian sovereignty emphasized in the international political
economy literature that seem especially relevant in the context of voluntary inter-
national agreements: first, commitments that result from voluntary international
agreements do not necessarily violate Westphalian sovereignty (as when these
commitments pertain only to a country’s external affairs); second, international
commitments over policies that concern “sufficiently domestic” affairs (i.e., inter-
nal affairs) do violate Westphalian sovereignty; and third, international commit-
ments that distort the normal operation of domestic institutions also violate
Westphalian sovereignty.
With our formal definition of sovereignty in hand, we then turn to a character-
ization of the nature and degree of sovereignty that countries possess according to
this definition in various economic environments and institutional settings. We
begin this characterization within our two-country benchmark model. To identify
the degree of sovereignty that countries possess in this environment in the
absence of an international agreement, we show that a government’s policy
choices in the Nash equilibrium can be partitioned into two choice problems: a
choice of the externality variable and the contribution that this country makes
to the determination of the externality variable, given the other government’s pol-
icies; and a choice of how best to use its policy instruments to achieve its objec-
tives while delivering the given contribution level. With this partition, we are able
to associate a country’s external affairs with the first choice problem, and its inter-
nal affairs with the second. Intuitively, when countries are mutually interdepen-
dent, the external affairs of each country consist of that country’s choices over
its contribution to the determination of the externality variable and the equilib-
rium level of the externality variable, since its payoff in this choice problem
depends on the actions of external actors. By contrast, the matters that concern
the internal affairs of each country are that country’s choices among all its
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policy combinations that are consistent with a given contribution to and level of
the externality variable, since its payoff in this choice problem is independent of
the actions of external actors.
We put our definition of sovereignty to work by evaluating according to this
definition the consequences of various forms of international agreements for
national sovereignty. Specifically, we consider first whether it is possible to elim-
inate the inefficiencies that arise in the Nash equilibrium with international agree-
ments that are limited only to the external affairs of each country, and thereby to
navigate all the way to the international efficiency frontier without violating
national sovereignty by means of such agreements. Our first main result is that
this is indeed possible within the benchmark model. That is, we show that it is
always possible within the benchmark model to pick any point on the interna-
tional efficiency frontier that could be achieved by international negotiations
over all policy instruments, and to achieve that point with international negotia-
tions that are limited only to the external affairs of each country, i.e., to the level
of the externality variable and each country’s contribution to it.
We next consider the way in which a country’s sovereignty is violated within
our benchmark model when the country negotiates international commitments
that concern its internal affairs. Such commitments directly violate a country’s
sovereignty, but we show that direct violations of sovereignty can also imply
further indirect violations of sovereignty as well, under which government deci-
sions that are not the subject of international negotiation are nevertheless dis-
torted away from the decisions that would normally have been made under the
domestic institutional arrangements of the country. We argue that this “contami-
nation effect” generally prevents countries from containing violations of sover-
eignty caused by international agreements to narrow subsets of policy
instruments. In fact, we establish as our second main result that within our bench-
mark model any international agreement that involves direct commitments over
matters that are the internal affairs of a country must in general violate that coun-
try’s sovereignty over at least as many policy instruments as it preserves.
Our first two results highlight an important distinction between international
agreements that mitigate international externalities and international agreements
that erode national sovereignty, and indicate that it can be possible to have the
former without the latter and so allow national sovereignty and international effi-
ciency to coexist in harmony. But questions remain as to (i) whether this harmony
is likely to extend to environments beyond those captured by our benchmark
model, and (ii) the degree to which prominent channels of interdependence
between countries can be identified that find representation in the environment
described by our benchmark model. These questions are taken up in the
second half of the chapter.
We consider a variety of settings that go beyond our benchmark model, and
find that the harmony between national sovereignty and international efficiency
does not always survive in these extended settings. For example, we identify a
conflict between national sovereignty and international efficiency that arises
whenever an externality variable is completely determined by the policy
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choices of a single country. This is because in this case the externality variable
becomes this country’s internal affairs according to our definition, and subjecting
the externality variable to the constraints of an international agreement (which
would be necessary to achieve international efficiency in this case) would there-
fore violate the country’s sovereignty.
Another particularly salient extension of the benchmark model that we con-
sider is to a world of “small” countries. When all countries are small in relation
to the externality variable, we show that each county’s contribution to the exter-
nality variable again becomes its internal affairs. This in turn implies that, when
all countries are small, any international agreement that constrains countries from
pursuing their Nash policy choices must violate their sovereignty. Accordingly, as
we demonstrate, whether the harmony between national sovereignty and interna-
tional efficiency described above survives in a world of small countries hinges on
whether governments agree or disagree in the Nash equilibrium over the direction
that they would like the externality variable to move. If all governments agree,
then the Nash equilibrium in the small-country case is inefficient and an interna-
tional agreement will be required to reach the efficiency frontier, implying neces-
sarily that national sovereignty and international efficiency will stand in conflict
in this case. However, if there is disagreement, then the Nash equilibrium in the
small-country case is efficient, and in this case the harmony between national
sovereignty and international efficiency identified above survives in a world of
small countries. Of course, which of these two cases is applicable will depend
on the nature of the externality variable under consideration, but as we later dem-
onstrate, the latter case has special significance in the context of international
trade agreements.
Besides being of interest in their own right, these extensions of our benchmark
model highlight an important feature of our approach: rather than tailoring our
definition of sovereignty on a case-by-case basis so that national sovereignty is
necessarily in harmony with international efficiency in all circumstances, we
propose a formal definition of sovereignty and then evaluate the circumstances
where a tradeoff between sovereignty and international efficiency is unavoid-
able.1 As our benchmark model and its extensions reveal, the range of settings
in which national sovereignty and international efficiency can coexist in
harmony is non-trivial but also not exhaustive.
To explore whether prominent channels of interdependence between countries
can be identified that find representation in the environment described by our
benchmark model, we then consider the issue of national sovereignty within
the particular context of international trade agreements, and we show that the
trade setting fits well within the environment described by our benchmark
model. To this end, we begin by briefly reviewing the two-country two-good
competitive general equilibrium trade model adapted to allow for the possibility
of both tariff and domestic regulatory policy choices as developed in Bagwell and
Staiger (2001). We establish that this model is a special case of our benchmark
model, in which the international externality variable is the terms of trade, and
in which each country’s contribution to the determination of the externality is
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the quantity of imports it demands at a given terms of trade, and so all of the
results described above apply.
This leads to our third main result: when the results of our benchmark model are
interpreted within the context of our trade model, they indicate that the fundamen-
tal principles underlying GATT/WTO market access agreements offer a way to
achieve internationally efficient policies without sacrificing national sovereignty,
and that attaining international efficiency is consistent with maintaining national
sovereignty in this setting regardless of whether (all) countries are big or small.
We also extend our analysis of trade agreements to a multilateral setting, and estab-
lish that agreement to abide by a non-discrimination principle such as the GATT/
WTO MFN rule does not violate a country’s sovereignty. And finally, we identify a
critical role for MFN if countries are to achieve internationally efficient policies
without sacrificing national sovereignty when some (but not all) countries are
small. In particular, we find that a non-discrimination rule can allow countries to
sidestep the efficiency/sovereignty tradeoff that would otherwise exist in this
extended setting, and we suggest that the MFN requirement is therefore “comple-
mentary” to preserving small-country sovereignty in the following sense: the sov-
ereignty of small countries can be preserved under an internationally efficient
agreement only if that agreement abides by the MFN requirement. More
broadly, our results therefore suggest that a non-discrimination rule coupled with
a market access agreement can facilitate the attainment of internationally efficient
outcomes that do not compromise national sovereignty. In light of our findings, we
discuss the basic harmony between the underlying GATT/WTO principles and the
maintenance of national sovereignty, and we suggest that this harmony may be at
risk as a result of changes that are occurring within the WTO.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the two-country bench-
mark model. Section 3 develops our formal definition of sovereignty, character-
izes the nature and degree of sovereignty in the Nash equilibrium, and relates this
characterization to notions of sovereignty in the international political economy
literature. Section 4 considers how national sovereignty is affected under interna-
tional agreements that adopt alternative designs within the benchmark model,
while Section 5 considers the issue of sovereignty within a number of extensions
of the benchmark model. Section 6 establishes that the benchmark model and all
its results can be given a trade interpretation, and extends the modeling environ-
ment to a multilateral setting to consider the implications of a non-discrimination
rule for our sovereignty results. Section 7 concludes. An appendix contains
proofs not included in the body of the chapter.
2. A benchmark model
In this section we describe a benchmark model of international interdependence
that is general enough to allow interdependence to take a wide variety of forms.
Our benchmark model has two countries (territories), referred to respectively as
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reside. Each country has a government, and each government is endowed with a
set of (tax and/or regulatory) policy instruments, represented by the 1 × I vector i
for the home government and the 1 × I* vector i* for the foreign government, that
are applied by each government to activities within its territory. The objectives of
the home and foreign governments are represented by the respective functions
Gði;x~ði; i*ÞÞ and G * i; i**ði;x~ð ÞÞ, with the equilibrium level of the “externality” var-
iable x~ði; i*Þ entering into each government objective function and embodying the
nature of the policy spillovers between the two countries. The ability to represent
government objectives in this way reflects an essential assumption of our bench-
mark model, namely, that there exists a well-defined channel (e.g., the level of a
price or the quantity of a pollutant) through which the effect of each govern-
ment’s policy choices on the other government’s objectives (the externality)
travels.
Aside from global concavity assumptions on the G and G* functions to ensure
that second-order conditions are globally satisfied, the only additional structure
we impose in the benchmark model is that x~ði; i*Þ is a well-behaved function
defined implicitly according to
f ðgði; x **Þ; g ði; xÞ; xÞ ¼ 0;
with fggi ¼ 0 for some k andk ð2:1Þ
fg*gi
* 0 for some m;
m
¼
where here and throughout we use subscripts on a function to denote the partial
derivative of that function with respect to the subscripted argument. In effect, g
represents the home country’s “contribution” to the determination of the equilib-
rium level of the externality variable x~, a contribution that is assumed to be
impacted by at least one policy instrument of the home government (i.e., gik ¼
0 for some k); and this contribution is defined for a given level of the externality
once the home-country policy instruments are determined. An analogous interpre-
tation holds for g*. The function f then aggregates the contributions of the home
and foreign country to determine the equilibrium level of the externality x~ accord-
ing to f (.) = 0, under the assumption that f is impacted by changes in either coun-
try’s contribution (i.e., fg ¼ 0 6¼ fg*).
As we confirm in Section 6, this structure is consistent with a setting in which
the interdependence across countries is purely pecuniary and takes the form of
international trade, with (2.1) then amounting to a market-clearing condition.
But this structure is general enough as well to include many other forms of
interdependence.
For example, x might represent the density of the fish population in a common
fishery, with g representing the home catch when the home fleet operates in
the policy environment i and faces a fish population density x, and with g* rep-
resenting the foreign catch when the foreign fleet operates in the policy environ-
ment i* and faces a fish population density x. In this setting, it would be natural
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that gx > 0 and g
*
x > 0. The equilibrium density of the fish population, given the
policy environment faced by home and foreign fleets, x~ i i*ð ; Þ, is then determined
according to (2.1). Alternatively, x might represent the temperature of the globe,
with g representing the home country’s carbon output when the home industry
operates in the policy environment i and faces a global temperature x, and with
g* representing the carbon output of the foreign country when the foreign indus-
try operates in the policy environment i* and faces a global temperature x. Here it
could be that gx ⋛ 0 and gx
* ⋛ 0 depending on circumstances. The equilibrium
temperature of the globe, given the policy environment faced by home and
foreign industries, x~ði; i*Þ, is then determined according to (2.1). Or, under the
assumption that each government cares about infant mortality within its own
borders but the home government also cares directly about infant mortality in
the foreign country, x could represent the rate of infant mortality in the foreign
country, with g representing the home country’s crib exports to the foreign
country when the home industry operates in the policy environment i and the
foreign infant mortality rate is x, and with g* representing the foreign country’s
crib sales in the foreign market when the foreign industry operates in the
policy environment i* and the foreign infant mortality rate is x. Here again it
could be that gx ⋛ 0 and gx
* ⋛ 0 depending on circumstances. The equilibrium
infant mortality rate in the foreign country, given the policy environment faced
by home and foreign industries, x~ i; i*ð Þ, is then determined according to (2.1).
Importantly, the structure in (2.1) rules out the possibility that fggik = 0 for all k
and/or that fg g
** im = 0 for all m, and thereby excludes cases where the externality
variable x cannot be impacted by the policy instruments of some government. We
will extend the benchmark model to consider such cases in a later section.
In the absence of any international agreements, we assume that each govern-
ment makes choices over its own set of policy instruments, taking as given the
policy levels of the other government. This problem defines, for each govern-
ment, its best-response policy choice problem, and the solution to this problem
defines its best-response policy choices. Specifically, the home government
chooses its best-response policies by solving maxiG i;xði; i*ð ~ ÞÞ taking i* as
given, which using (2.1) we write in the equivalent form




ði; xÞ; g ði; xÞ; xÞ ¼ 0;
;
at the same time that the foreign government chooses its best-response policies by
solving maxi G
*;xði; i*** ði ~ ÞÞ taking i as given, which using (2.1) we write in the
equivalent form
Program 1*: For a given i; maxG* i*; x s:t: f g i; x ; g* i*; x ; x 0:
i*;x
ð Þ ð ð Þ ð Þ Þ ¼
Substituting the constraint into the objective function for each program, the I first-
order conditions associated with Program 1 that define the home government’s
best-response policy choices are given by





19 Sovereignty in an interdependent world 19
while the I* first-order conditions associated with Program 1* that define the
foreign government’s best-response policy choices are given by




¼ 0 for k ¼ 1; :::; I : ð2:3Þ
The joint solutions to (2.2) and (2.3) define the Nash equilibrium of the bench-
mark model, which throughout we assume exists and is unique.
We next characterize the international efficiency frontier and evaluate the effi-
ciency properties of the Nash equilibrium. We define the international efficiency
frontier with respect to the objectives of each government. Accordingly, the inter-
national efficiency frontier solves the following program:
Program 2: max Gði; x
i;i*;x
Þ
s:t: i G i** ; xÞ > G-*ð Þ ð ; and
ðiiÞ f g *ði*ð ði; xÞ; g ; xÞ; xÞ ¼ 0:
Using Program 2, and letting k = 1 denote a domestic and foreign policy instru-
ment for which gik ¼ 0 and gi** ¼ 0, it is direct to derive the first-order conditionsk


















i* þ G G1 i *1 xx~i* þ G*i*Gxx~i 0;1 61 1 :1 ¼ ð2 Þ
along with the complementary slackness conditions ensuring that the Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier on constraint (i) of Program 2 is non-negative:
G Gi fggx fg gx
*
x 1
½ þ * þ fx]
G*f








k 0 for each k for which G
G f
*> i :g *k ¼ 0i* g i1k*
The efficiency properties of the Nash equilibrium may now be assessed. Using
(2.2) and (2.3), whose joint solutions define the Nash equilibrium in our bench-
mark model, we may state:
Proposition 1. The Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model is inefficient if and
only if Gx ¼ 0 and Gx* ¼ 0 at the Nash policy choices.
6 6
6 6
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Proof: See appendix.2
According to Proposition 1, the Nash equilibrium is inefficient – and hence a
potential role for international agreements arises in our benchmark model – if and
only if Gx ¼ 0 and G*x ¼ 0 at the Nash policy choices. We will refer to the case
where Gx ¼ 0 and G*x ¼ 0 at the Nash policy choices as the case where the home
and foreign countries are mutually interdependent. As our central purpose is to
consider the implications of voluntary (i.e., mutually beneficial) international
agreements for national sovereignty, and as the case of mutually interdependent
countries is the only case in which voluntary international agreements can
arise, this case will be a primary focus of the analysis to follow.
3. What is sovereignty?
With the essential elements of our benchmark model described, we now turn to
develop a definition of sovereignty within the context of this model. Defining
sovereignty is not a simple task. On the one hand, to be operational, our definition
of sovereignty must be amenable to formal analysis. On the other hand, to be rel-
evant, our definition of sovereignty must capture elements that feature promi-
nently in the common usage of this term. This latter requirement is particularly
difficult, because the international political economy literature within which sov-
ereignty has been most discussed is not always clear about the precise meaning of
the term and, when clear, does not always adopt a uniform meaning. In fact,
Krasner (1999) identifies four distinct ways in which the term “sovereignty”
has been commonly used in this literature. Krasner refers to these as domestic
sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty and
Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty refers to the organization and
effectiveness of political authority within the state. International legal sovereignty
refers to the mutual recognition of states. Interdependence sovereignty refers to
the scope of activities over which states can effectively exercise control. And
Westphalian sovereignty reflects as its central premise the rule of non-intervention
in the internal affairs of other states.
Our starting point for defining sovereignty is the Westphalian norm of “non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states” (Krasner, 1999, p. 20). To for-
malize this definition, we must define “non-intervention” and “internal affairs.”
What are the internal affairs of a state? One answer might be to equate internal
affairs directly with those matters that no one outside the state cares about. But as
a basis for defining national sovereignty, this approach has limitations, because it
leads to a notion of sovereignty that is defined directly by the preferences of
external actors: if an external actor decides that it cares about an issue over
which a state is making a choice, then that issue is by this definition no longer
an internal affair of the state.3 We therefore look to the international political
economy literature for guidance. In this literature, the internal affairs of a state
are synonymous with its “domestic authority structures,” a phrase that in turn
has been interpreted to mean the state’s authority to determine the institutions
and policies that apply within its territorial boundaries. For example, according
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to Krasner (1999, p. 20), the concept of Westphalian sovereignty can be charac-
terized as
an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two
principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic
authority structures. Rulers may be constrained, sometimes severely, by
the external environment, but they are still free to choose the institutions
and policies they regard as optimal. Westphalian sovereignty is violated
when external actors influence or determine domestic authority structures.
Here Krasner is drawing a distinction between the effectiveness with which control
over outcomes can be exerted on the one hand, and the authority to choose insti-
tutions and policies on the other. The former is a concern of domestic sovereignty
and interdependence sovereignty, but it is the latter that defines the internal affairs
with which Westphalian sovereignty is concerned. In the international political
economy literature, then, a nation’s internal affairs – over which, according to
Westphalian sovereignty, it must enjoy freedom from intervention by external
actors – are considered to be its choice of domestic institutions and the operation
of these institutions to translate the preferences of its citizens into policy choices.
To draw a connection between this notion of internal affairs and our benchmark
model, we observe that our home and foreign government objectives G and G*
respectively can be said to reflect the particular set of “domestic authority struc-
tures” relevant for determining the levels of policy instruments within the terri-
tory of that government. For example, domestic authority may be concentrated
in the hands of one individual, whose preferences are then the government objec-
tive function for that country. If that individual is subjected to lobbying by inter-
est groups, then these interest groups also comprise a part of the domestic
authority structure, and the government objective function for that country will
reflect as well the influence wielded by these interest groups. Alternatively,
domestic authority may be dispersed in the hands of the electorate and take the
form of a direct democracy, in which case under appropriate assumptions the
preferences of the median voter are then the government objective function for
that country. Or domestic authority over different policies may be allocated
across different domestic institutions: as long as coordination across domestic
institutions (e.g., bargaining among them) is possible, our representation of gov-
ernment objectives allows a valid description of the domestic policy environment
in this setting as well. The point is, each government’s objective function as we
have defined it reflects both the underlying preferences of the citizens of that
country and the domestic authority structures under which those preferences
are translated into choices over policy instruments in that country. According
to the meaning of Westphalian sovereignty in the international political
economy literature, then, within the context of our model the internal affairs of
the home (foreign) country are embodied in its choice of G (G*).
As for what constitutes intervention by external actors, Krasner (1999, Chap-
ters 6 and 7) observes that coercion (as in international armed conflict) has
22 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger 22
frequently resulted in constitutional changes that explicitly alter the domestic
institutions of a country and thereby violate its Westphalian sovereignty. Such
explicit changes in domestic institutions could be interpreted within our bench-
mark model as alterations in the G and/or G* functions, reflecting for example
the forced removal of a dictator and the introduction of democratic institutions.
However, our focus here is not on armed conflict, but rather on voluntary inter-
national agreements. Hence, violations of Westphalian sovereignty that would
result in changes in the G and/or G* functions are not our central concern.
But Krasner (1999, p. 22) observes that invitation (as in international contracts
and conventions) can also violate Westphalian sovereignty, not necessarily by
explicitly altering domestic institutions, but by “subjecting internal authority struc-
tures to external constraints.” Rabkin (1998, p. 34) puts the point slightly differ-
ently: (Westphalian) sovereignty is violated by international commitments that
“distort or derange the normal workings of our own system.” In effect, international
commitments need not alter the domestic institutions of a country in order to
violate its Westphalian sovereignty: international commitments that distort the
operation of domestic institutions will also violate Westphalian sovereignty.
Implicit in the above discussion is the notion that specific commitments arising
out of voluntary international agreements would not ordinarily be viewed as viola-
tions of Westphalian sovereignty. For Westphalian sovereignty to be violated by
invitation, a “deeper” intervention into the internal affairs of the state is required.
Even here though, both Krasner (1999) and Rabkin (1998) suggest that there are
limits to the appropriate matters for international agreement, and that a nation’s
Westphalian sovereignty would be violated by negotiated commitments over poli-
cies that cross these limits and stray into “sufficiently domestic” affairs. For
instance, Krasner (1999, pp. 146–148) observes that the IMF routinely violates
the norm of Westphalian sovereignty, in part because “a country entering into nego-
tiations with the IMF could basically consider any aspect of its domestic economic
policy open to discussion.” Similarly, in the Preface to his book, Rabkin (1998,
p. x) states that efforts to delineate the appropriate limits of international commit-
ments are “particularly urgent now because, in the absence of any clear understand-
ings on the matter, we seem to be letting international agreements and international
authorities determine more and more of our policies.” Neither Krasner nor Rabkin
offer a precise method for defining the limits of proper subjects of international
negotiation, though Rabkin (pp. 69–70) proposes several criteria.
In summation, three key features of Westphalian sovereignty that seem espe-
cially relevant in the context of voluntary international agreements can be identified
from our discussion of the international political economy literature to this point:
first, commitments that result from voluntary international agreements do not nec-
essarily violate Westphalian sovereignty; second, international commitments over
policies that concern “sufficiently domestic” affairs (i.e., internal affairs) do
violate Westphalian sovereignty; and third, international commitments that distort
the normal operation of domestic institutions also violate Westphalian sovereignty.
We wish to construct a definition of sovereignty that reflects these three features.
To accomplish this, we maintain as our essential focus the Westphalian norm of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. And below we adopt a
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definition of non-intervention that is well-reflected in the discussion above. But in
proposing a formal definition of internal affairs, we augment the Westphalian
emphasis on authority over the determination of institutions and policies, and
add to this an emphasis on authority and control over the determination of out-
comes and therefore payoffs as well, all evaluated from the perspective of the
Nash policy equilibrium of our model. In effect, our definition of sovereignty
combines elements of authority with elements of control/effectiveness, and in
so doing delivers a notion of sovereignty that exhibits traditional features
(Krasner, 1999, p. 10) of Westphalian sovereignty (authority over institutions
and policies), interdependence sovereignty (effective control over cross-border
activities), and domestic sovereignty (authority and effective control over activi-
ties within the territory). As a result, the characterization of a country’s internal
affairs according to our definition will depend on the nature of interdependence
across countries. With internal affairs so defined, our broad approach is then to
characterize the normal operation of a country’s domestic institutions in the
domain of its internal affairs, and to say that a violation of sovereignty occurs
whenever an international agreement leads the government of a country to
make external commitments over matters that (i) concern the country’s internal
affairs or (ii) alter (and therefore influence/distort/derange) the normal operations
of the country’s domestic institutions within the domain of its internal affairs.
Our approach to defining national sovereignty has both advantages and disad-
vantages. On the minus side, our approach does not conform precisely to any one
of the four notions of sovereignty commonly discussed in the international polit-
ical economy literature: as we noted above, it combines elements of a number of
these notions. On the plus side, however, our approach admits several advan-
tages. First and foremost, as we demonstrate below this approach provides an
analytically tractable way to capture the three key features of Westphalian sover-
eignty identified above. Second, because a country’s internal affairs according to
our definition will depend on the nature of interdependence across countries, as
the nature of interdependence changes so too will the scope of a country’s internal
affairs and hence the domain of its sovereign rights.4 And finally, by augmenting
the Westphalian focus on authority over institutions/policies with a focus as well
on authority over outcomes/payoffs, our approach may facilitate a more direct
link to issues of accountability in an interdependent world than do any of the
existing notions of sovereignty taken separately, and may thus be of some interest
in its own right. For example, a government might maintain authority over its
institutions and policies (and therefore maintain Westphalian sovereignty) and
yet claim that it cannot be held accountable for its choices, as a consequence
of a “race to the bottom” that external constraints have forced upon it. But in
matters where the government maintains control over outcomes/payoffs as well
(and hence in matters that are also the country’s internal affairs according to
our definition), this possibility of avoiding accountability by appealing to external
constraints does not arise. As a consequence, our approach to defining national
sovereignty can be used to forge a tighter link between international agreements
that can be said to avoid an erosion of sovereignty and those that can be said to
avoid an erosion of accountability.
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3.1. Sovereignty defined
We now proceed to develop our formal definitions in detail. To this end, we return
to the benchmark model presented in Section 2, and consider the Nash policy
choices made by each government. It is with respect to Nash choices, unconstrained
by any international commitments, that a nation’s internal affairs can be defined. As
noted above, we adopt a definition of internal affairs that equates the internal affairs
of a country with (i) the choice of domestic authority structures under which the
preferences of its citizens are translated into choices over policy instruments in
that country, as embodied in the home and foreign government objective functions
G and G* respectively, and (ii) the matters in which its government has control or
“sole authority” over outcomes/payoffs (in the Nash equilibrium).
To develop this definition, we consider alternative representations of each gov-
ernment’s best-response policy choice problem (that is, alternative representations
of Program 1 and Program 1* in Section 2) that partition this problem into a
sequence of sub-problems, each of which can be considered a choice problem
of its own, and where the solution to any such representation yields the original
best-response policy choices of the government characterized by (2.2) and (2.3).
Our approach is to use these partitions to identify the maximal set of choice prob-
lems over which a government can be said to exercise sole authority in the Nash
equilibrium, and thereby (together with its choice of government objective func-
tion) identify the country’s internal affairs according to our definition.
We begin by defining a partition of a government’s best-response policy choice
problem:
Definition 1. A partition P of a government’s best-response policy choice
problem is any sequence of choice problems whose solution yields the best-
response policy choices of the government.
According to its definition, each element of P is a choice problem for the govern-
ment, and when the government has solved each of these choice problems it arrives
at the original best-response policies.5 We also need a definition of authority:
Definition 2. A government has sole authority in a choice problem if and only if its
payoff in that choice problem is independent of the actions of “external actors.”
By the actions of external actors, we mean the setting of all policy instruments by
the government of the other country and all decisions by private agents in the
other country. Accordingly, a government has authority in a choice problem pro-
vided that its policy choices, together with the decisions of private agents oper-
ating within its borders, fully determine its payoffs in that choice problem.
We next define internal affairs and external affairs, conditional on the partition
P under consideration:
Definition 3. For any partition P of its government’s best-response policy choice
problem, a country’s P-internal affairs consist of (i) the choice of domestic
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authority structures under which the preferences of its citizens are translated into
choices over policy instruments in that country, as embodied in its government
objective function, and (ii) the collection of choice problems in P over which
the government has sole authority. The country’s P-external affairs are the
remaining choice problems in P.
In other words, conditional on a partition P of its government’s best-response
policy choice problem, a country’s P-internal affairs are its choice of government
objective function and the choice problems over which its policy choices fully
determine its payoffs, and its P-external affairs are the remaining choice prob-
lems in the partition P.
Definition 3 permits any choice problem to be assigned either to a country’s
internal affairs or to its external affairs. But these choice problems are defined rel-
ative to a specific partition of the government’s best-response policy choice
problem, and there are many such partitions. Hence, as a general matter, the inter-
nal affairs of a country as we have defined them in Definition 3 will depend on
the partition under consideration, a dependence we have indicated with the terms
P-internal affairs and P-external affairs.
However, if there exists a way to partition the government’s best-response
policy choice problem so that a minimal set of external affairs can be identified
(in the sense that, as we formalize below, there is no partition under which a
country’s external affairs would be a proper subset of this set), then we prefer
to select this partition among all possible partitions for purposes of defining a
county’s internal and external affairs. The minimal partition, when it exists,
seems the reasonable partition on which to focus, because it would identify the
smallest collection of choice problems over which the government does not
enjoy sole authority in the Nash equilibrium, and by implication as well the
largest collection of choice problems over which the government does enjoy
sole authority in the Nash equilibrium. So in this case, the reference to depen-
dence on the particular partition under consideration can be suppressed, and
we can refer simply to internal and external affairs.
We next develop this preferred definition of internal and external affairs. To state
this definition, we say that a collection of choice problems ŝ contained in the par-
tition P̂ is a subset of the collection of choice problems s~ contained in the partition
P~ provided that there exists a collection of choice problems s~0 such that ffP~ns~g [
s~0g is also a partition of the government’s best-response policy choice problem and
every choice problem in ŝ is also in s~0. Intuitively, ŝ is a subset of s~ if there is a way
to write s~ – which we denote s~0, and with ffP~ s~g [ s0n ~g also a partition of the
government’s best-response policy choice problem – so that ŝ and s~0 can be com-
pared on a choice-problem by choice-problem basis, and when this comparison is
made every element of ŝ (every choice problem in ŝ) is also in s~0; this would
mean that s can f 6~ be thought of as ŝ plus “stuf ”. And we say that a collection of
choice problems ŝ contained in the partition P̂ is equivalent to the collection of
choice problems s~contained in the partitionP~ provided that there exists a collection
of choice problems s~0 such that P~ s~ s~0ff n g [ g is also a partition of the
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government’s best-response policy choice problem and a choice problem is in ŝ if
and only if it is also in s~0.
We may now define a minimal partition:
Definition 4. A minimal partition P̂ of a government’s best-response policy
choice problem is a partition for which the government’s P̂-external affairs are
a subset of its P-external affairs for all P.
And with this we arrive at our preferred definition of internal and external affairs:
Definition 5. If there exists a minimal partition P̂ of its government’s best-
response policy choice problem, then a country’s internal affairs consist of
(i) the choice of domestic authority structures under which the preferences of
its citizens are translated into choices over policy instruments in that country,
as embodied in its government objective function, and (ii) its P̂-internal affairs;
and the country’s external affairs are its P̂-external affairs.
Notice that it is possible that a set of partitions may qualify as minimal parti-
tions, but each partition in this set must (i) be payoff equivalent, because all par-
titions must lead to the same best-response policy choices, and (ii) deliver the
same characterization of internal and external affairs according to Definitions
4 and 5. Hence, this possible non-uniqueness is immaterial for our purposes.7
To make use of Definition 5, we must establish the existence of minimal par-
titions of the home and foreign government best-response choice problems in our
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s:t: f g; g **ð ði; xÞ; xÞ ¼ 0;
where îðg; xÞ is the solution from Step 1 and L is the Step-1 Lagrangean.8 The
Step-1 choice problem in Program 10 is solved conditional on a given level of
the “externality” variable x and the home-country’s “contribution” g to the exter-
nality variable, and has the home government making its preferred choices over
domestic policy instruments i so as to deliver this contribution. The Step-2 choice
problem has the home government then making its preferred choices over g and x
subject to the constraint placed on its choices which is implied by a vector of
foreign policy instruments i*.
Our first result is that Program 10 is indeed an equivalent way of characterizing
the home-government’s best-response policies in Program 1. We record this in:
Lemma 1. Program 10 is a partition of Program 1.
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Proof: See appendix.
We prove Lemma 1 by establishing that the first-order conditions associated
with Program 10 are given by (2.2), the first-order conditions associated with
Program 1, hence the solution of Program 10 yields the best-response policy
choices of the home government. While we have developed this partition from
the perspective of the home government’s problem Program 1, an exactly analo-
gous partition (which we denote henceforth by Program 1*0) can be developed for
the foreign government’s problem Program 1*. For future reference, we denote by
P0 the partition of the home-government’s best-response policy choice problem
defined by Program 10, and by P*0 the partition of the foreign-government’s
best-response policy choice problem defined by Program 1*0.
We next use Program 10 (and the analogous Program 1*0 of the foreign govern-
ment) to assess the internal affairs of each country according to the partitions P0
and P*0 . It is immediate from Program 1
0 that the home government has sole
authority over its payoff in the choice problem defined by Step 1, and hence the
Step-1 choice problem concerns the home-country’s P0-internal affairs for this
alternative partition. We refer henceforth to the home-government’s Step-1
choice problem in the partition P0 as its choices over i(g,x), and as noted above
we denote its Step-1 choices by îðg; xÞ. On the other hand, the home government
would have sole authority over its payoff in the choice problem defined by Step
2 – and hence the Step-2 choice problem would concern the home-country’s
P0-internal affairs for this alternative partition – if and only if the home govern-
ment faced a non-binding constraint it its Step-2 choice problem, which cannot
occur as long as Gx is non-zero.
9 We refer henceforth to the home-government’s
Step-2 choice problem in the partition P0 as its choices over g and x. Completely
analogous statements hold for the foreign government. Hence we have:
Lemma 2. The home country’s P0-internal affairs consist of its choice of G and
its government’s choices over i (g,x), and also its government’s choices over g and
x if and only if Gx = 0 when evaluated at the Nash policy choices. The foreign
country’s P*0 -internal affairs consist of its choice of G
* and its government’s
choices over i*(g*,x), and also its government’s choices over g* and x if and
only if G*x ¼ 0 when evaluated at the Nash policy choices.
Finally, we now establish that the partitions P0 and P
*
0 are minimal partitions
of the home and foreign government best-response choice problems, respectively.
This is stated in:
Lemma 3. The partition P0 is a minimal partition of the home-government’s
best-response choice problem, and the partition P*0 is a minimal partition of
the foreign-government’s best-response choice problem.
Proof: If Gx = 0 and Gx
* ¼ 0 when evaluated at the Nash policy choices, then
according to P0 and P
*
0 there are no choices for either the home- or the foreign-
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partitions in this case. Consider, then, the case in which Gx ¼ 0 when evaluated at
the Nash policy choices. According to P0, the home government’s choices over g
and x are its external affairs in this case. Suppose that P0 is not a minimal partition.
Then there must exist a partition P 0 of the home government’s best-response choice
problem in which the home government’s choices over g and x are not both
included in its external affairs. In the partition P 0, it must then be possible for
the home government to alter either g or x or both g and x in at least one choice
problem contained in its internal affairs. Consider, then, any choice problem con-
tained in the home government’s P 0-internal affairs for which either g or x or
both g and x can be altered. With i* fixed and with fg ¼ 0 by assumption, g and
x cannot be determined independently. Therefore, in this choice problem, the
home government must face a constraint of the form f (g,g*(i*,x),x) = 0 if it
chooses g directly, or a constraint of the form f (g(i,x), g*(i*,x),x) = 0 if it instead
chooses g indirectly through its choice of elements of i. But either way, the con-
straint ensures that the home government does not have sole authority in this
choice problem – and this is inconsistent with the claim that this choice problem
concerns a matter of internal affairs for the home government – as long as Gx ¼
0 when evaluated at the Nash policy choices, which is the case under consideration.
Hence, we have derived a contradiction, and so P0 must be a minimal partition. An
analogous argument holds for the foreign government. QED
As a result of Lemmas 1–3, we may then state:
Proposition 2. If countries are mutually interdependent so that Gx ¼ 0 and
G*x ¼ 0 at the Nash policy choices, then in the benchmark model the home coun-
try’s internal affairs are its choice of G and its government’s choices over i(g,x),
and the foreign country’s internal affairs are its choice of G* and its government’s
choices over i*(g*, x); and choices over g and x (g* and x) represent the external
affairs of the home- (foreign-) country. If countries are not mutually interdepen-
dent, then in the benchmark model: (a) if Gx = 0 at the Nash policy choices, the
home country’s internal affairs include as well its government’s choices over g
and x; and (b) if G*x ¼ 0 at the Nash policy choices, the foreign country’s internal
affairs include as well its government’s choices over g* and x.
According to Proposition 2, when countries are mutually interdependent, the
matters that concern the internal affairs of each country are the domestic authority
structures under which the preferences of its citizens are translated into choices
over policy instruments in that country, as embodied in its government objective
function, and its government’s choices among the set of policy combinations that
are consistent with a given contribution to and level of the externality variable,
since its payoff in this choice problem is independent of the actions of external
actors. Notice that the policy choices made by each government in matters that
concern its country’s internal affairs, namely îðg; xÞ for the home government
and î*ðg*; xÞ for the foreign government, reflect both the underlying preferences
of the citizens of that country and the normal operation of that country’s domestic
institutions under which those preferences are translated into choices over policy
instruments. The external affairs of each country then consist of its government’s
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choices over the country’s contribution to the determination of the externality variable
and the equilibrium level of the externality variable, since its payoff in this choice
problem depends on the actions of external actors. And when countries are not mutu-
ally interdependent, all of their choices may become their internal affairs (and will be,
when both Gx = 0 and Gx
* ¼ 0) according to Proposition 2. In light of Proposition 1,
an implication of Proposition 2 is that countries operating in an environment of
mutual interdependency where a potential role for international agreements exists
can claim national sovereignty only over a diminished range of choices (their internal
affairs) even when they are not part of any international agreement.
In light of Proposition 2, we are now ready to define external intervention as it
relates to voluntary international agreements:
Definition 6. An international agreement subjects the internal affairs of a country
to external constraints if and only if: (i) the government of that country makes
commitments in the agreement over matters that concern its internal affairs;
and/or (ii) the agreement has the effect of altering the choices in any choice
problem that concerns the country’s internal affairs.
With this definition, we then say that a country’s sovereignty is violated by an
international agreement when its internal affairs are subjected to external con-
straints by that agreement.10
Returning now to the three key features that we described in Section 3 regarding
Westphalian sovereignty as it relates to voluntary international agreements, we
observe that our formalization of national sovereignty reflects each of these fea-
tures. First, commitments that result from voluntary international agreements do
not necessarily violate sovereignty since, according to Proposition 1, international
agreements over g, x and g* do not violate sovereignty as long as governments are
mutually interdependent. Second, international commitments over policies that
concern “sufficiently domestic” affairs (i.e., internal affairs) do violate Westphalian
sovereignty since, according to Proposition 2, negotiated commitments over the
elements of îðg; xÞ and/or î* *ðg ; xÞ always violate sovereignty. And third, interna-
tional commitments that distort the normal operation of domestic institutions
also violate sovereignty, if these distortions result in unilateral policy choices
that do not conform to the corresponding elements of î g; x an /or î*ðg*ð Þ d ; xÞ.
4. Sovereignty, international agreements and efficiency
We now make use of our definition of sovereignty. In this section we consider
international agreements of various kinds to explore within our benchmark
model the nature of the tradeoff between the preservation of sovereignty and
the attainment of international efficiency. Throughout we assume that, subsequent
to the conclusion of negotiations of an international agreement, each government
chooses its best-response policies unilaterally given the policies of the other gov-
ernment and subject to the constraints placed on it by the international agreement.
We first consider the possibility that international efficiency might be attained
without violating national sovereignty. When countries are not mutually
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interdependent, it is direct from Propositions 1 and 2 that this is possible, as long
as countries avoid being constrained by any international commitments. This
follows because when countries are not mutually interdependent the Nash equi-
librium is efficient by Proposition 1, and by Proposition 2 all of at least one coun-
try’s choices are its internal affairs. When countries are mutually interdependent,
however, an international agreement is required to achieve efficiency, as Propo-
sition 1 implies. The question is whether an international agreement can in this
case be designed to achieve international efficiency while not violating national
sovereignty. The answer to this question within our benchmark model is affirma-
tive, as we record in the next proposition:
Proposition 3. In the benchmark model, there is no inherent conflict between
international efficiency and national sovereignty. When countries are not mutu-
ally interdependent, they can maintain their national sovereignty and attain inter-
national efficiency by avoiding international commitments. When countries are
mutually interdependent, they can maintain their national sovereignty and
attain international efficiency by negotiating commitments over g, x and g*.
Proof: We focus on the case of mutually interdependent countries. If the home
and foreign government negotiate commitments over g, x and g*, then subsequent
to the conclusion of negotiations the home government will, for the negotiated
level of (g,x), choose its vector of policies i subject to the implied constraint
[g(i,x) – g] = 0, and therefore solve Step 1 of Program 10, and similarly the
foreign government will, for the negotiated level of (g*, x), choose its vector of pol-
icies i* subject to the implied constraint [g*(i*,x) – g*] = 0, and therefore solve
Step 1 of Program 1*0. With L and L* the Step-1 Lagrangeans for the home and
foreign government, respectively, negotiations over g, x, and g* then solve the
following program for some L-*:





s:t: i L i** *ð Þ ð ðg*; xÞ; g ; xÞ > L-*; and
ii f ðg; g*ð Þ ; xÞ ¼ 0:
It is now direct to derive that the first-order and complementary slackness condi-
tions associated with Program 3 are identical to those associated with Program 2,
and given by (2.4)–(2.6) and (2.7) respectively. Hence, negotiations over g, x
and g* achieve the international efficiency frontier without violating national sov-
ereignty. QED
Proposition 3 implies that, in principle, countries need not confront a choice
between preserving their sovereignty and attaining international efficiency
when they negotiate international agreements, as long as they (a) negotiate agree-
ments that impose commitments only on countries with which they are mutually
interdependent, and (b) limit negotiations to direct commitments over the level of
the externality (x) and each country’s contribution to the externality (g and g*).
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Intuitively, the international externality is the source of both the mutual interde-
pendence across countries and the inefficiency associated with their unilateral
policy choices, and it also defines the domain of external affairs in the Nash equi-
librium. Hence, international agreements that are targeted directly to addressing
the international externality can solve the policy inefficiencies associated with
the externality while avoiding intrusion on the internal affairs of either country.
In this sense, Proposition 3 highlights an important distinction between interna-
tional agreements that mitigate international externalities and international agree-
ments that erode national sovereignty, and points out that it can be possible to
have the former without the latter.
We next characterize the violation of national sovereignty that occurs in the
benchmark model when international agreements involve direct commitments
over elements of i(g,x) and i*(g*,x). In particular, we will show that the indirect
encroachment on sovereignty associated with such commitments can be more
extensive than the direct violations themselves.
When international agreements involve direct commitments over elements of
i(g,x) and/or i*(g*,x), a country’s sovereignty may be violated in two ways accord-
ing to our definition. First, sovereignty is violated whenever a government makes
such commitments in an international agreement, since the elements of i(g,x) and
i*(g*,x) are matters that concern its internal affairs. In what follows, we say that the
home (foreign) country’s sovereignty over a policy instrument in i(g,x) (i*(g*,x)) is
violated directly by an international agreement whenever limits on this policy
instrument are determined directly as a result of international negotiations. But a
more subtle violation of sovereignty may also occur, if direct international commit-
ments over elements of i(g,x) and/or i*(g*,x) result in unilateral choices over the
remaining (non-negotiated) policy instruments that do not conform to the corre-
sponding elements of îðg;xÞ and/or î* g*ð ;xÞ, and therefore do not reflect the
normal operation of a country’s domestic institutions in the domain of its internal
affairs. We will say that the home (foreign) country’s sovereignty over a policy
instrument is violated indirectly by an international agreement whenever the coun-
try’s sovereignty over this instrument is not violated directly by the international
agreement but the government’s unilateral choice for this policy instrument
differs from the corresponding element of î * *ðg;xÞ (̂i ðg ;xÞ) evaluated at the level
of (g,x) ((g*,x)) delivered under the agreement. Finally, we say that a country’s sov-
ereignty over a policy instrument is violated (preserved) whenever its sovereignty
is violated directly or indirectly (neither directly nor indirectly).
As we next establish, direct violations of sovereignty typically imply further
indirect violations as well, a feature that generally prevents governments from
containing violations of sovereignty caused by international agreements to
narrow subsets of policy instruments. In fact, as we now establish, this “contam-
ination effect” implies that when an international agreement involves direct com-
mitments over even a single element of i(g,x) or i*(g*,x), the number of policy
instruments for which the agreement violates the associated country’s sovereignty
must be at least as great as the number of policy instruments for which the coun-
try’s sovereignty is preserved under the agreement.
6
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To establish this, we first introduce a notion of “interrelatedness” between pol-
icies. Taking the perspective of the domestic government, and recalling that L
denotes the Step-1 Lagrangean for Program 10, we say that two policies u and
v are interrelated if Luv ¼ 0 when L is evaluated at the maximized Step-1
choices îðg;xÞ. In words, when u and v are interrelated, a change in v alters the
level of u preferred by the domestic government for delivering a given level of
contribution g to the (given level of the) externality variable x. An exactly anal-
ogous interpretation applies for the foreign government.
We may now state:
Proposition 4. An international agreement that specifies levels for a subset of the
elements of i(g,x) and i*(g*,x) must (generically), for each country, violate that
country’s sovereignty over at least as many policy instruments as it preserves,
provided that: (i) the agreement specifies at least one policy instrument for
each government at a level different from its best-response level; and (ii) all pol-
icies are interrelated.
Proof: Consider an international agreement that specifies the levels for a subset
of the elements of i(g,x) and i*(g*,x). We adopt the perspective of the domestic
government. Let the elements of i(g,x) that are not determined directly by the
international agreement be contained in the set H. If H is empty, then it is imme-
diate that the statement of the proposition is satisfied, since in this case the sov-
ereignty over all home-country instruments is violated (directly). If instead H is
non-empty, then the proposition is proved if it can be established that, to preserve
the sovereignty of m home-country policy instruments, at least m home-country
policy instruments must be directly negotiated (and therefore the home country’s
sovereignty over these instruments is violated directly). Let h be the vector of
non-negotiated home-country policies, and let n- be the vector of negotiated
home-country policies whose levels are specified by the international agreement.
Given any foreign policies i*, the home government’s unilateral best-response
choice of h must solve the program:
Program 4: For a given i*; maxGðh;n-;x~ðh;n-; i*ÞÞ:
h
The first-order conditions for Program 4 are given by the analogue of (2.2) for the
home government’s instrument choices contained in H. Now consider the parti-
tion of this program into the alternative 2-step program:
Program 4
0
: Step 1: For a given ðg; xÞ : max Gðh;n-; x
h
Þ
s:t: ½gðh;n-; xÞ - g] ¼ 0:
Step 2: For a given i*: max Qðĥðg; x;n-Þ;n-; g; x
g;x
Þ
s:t: f ðg; g*ði*; xÞ; xÞ ¼ 0;
where ĥðg; x;n-Þ is the solution from Step 1 and Q is the Step-1 Lagrangean.
Arguments identical to those in the proof of Lemma 1 establish that Program 40
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is a partition of Program 4. Hence, to complete the proof we need only observe
that: (i) preserving the sovereignty of m home-country policy instruments
requires that, with (g,x) set at the level delivered under the agreement, it must
be possible to satisfy the Step-1 first-order conditions when evaluated at the cor-
responding m elements of îðg; xÞ, with îðg; xÞ itself evaluated at the level of (g,x)
delivered under the agreement; and (ii) with all policies interrelated, this in turn
requires (generically) that there exist at least m policy instruments that are directly
negotiated and can be used to “target” m of these Step-1 first-order conditions.11
The only exception to this requirement occurs if the agreement fails to specify
at least one policy instrument for each government at a level different from its
best-response level, an exception that is ruled out by the condition (i) of the prop-
osition. An analogous argument applies to the foreign government. QED
Hence, according to Proposition 4, if governments negotiate international
agreements that encroach on the domain of their internal affairs with direct com-
mitments over policy instruments in i(g,x) and i*(g*, x), national sovereignty will
be violated, and the indirect erosion of sovereignty induced by these direct com-
mitments may be greater and more far-reaching than the loss of sovereignty
caused by the direct commitments themselves.
Moreover, Proposition 4 implies that, if national sovereignty has been violated
in an international agreement by a direct commitment, the loss of sovereignty is
not necessarily monotonic in the “depth” of the agreement, when depth is mea-
sured by the number of policy instruments in the domain of each country’s inter-
nal affairs that the agreement subjects to direct commitments. This is because,
once the first commitment that falls within the domain of a country’s internal
affairs has been added to an international agreement and hence violates directly
the country’s sovereignty, the indirect violations of the country’s sovereignty
induced by this direct commitment can be wide-spread (possibly covering all
of the country’s policy instruments), and the introduction of further commitments
in the agreement on policies that fall within the domain of the country’s internal
affairs can then reduce the overall (direct plus indirect) violations of national
sovereignty if those commitments reduce the number of policy instruments
over which the country’s sovereignty is violated indirectly by the agreement.
We record this in:
Corollary 1. If national sovereignty has been violated in an international agree-
ment by a direct commitment, the loss of sovereignty is not necessarily increasing
in the depth of the agreement.
5. Sovereignty and international agreements in an extended model
In the previous section we established that, in principle, countries need not con-
front a choice between preserving their sovereignty and attaining international
efficiency when they negotiate international agreements (Proposition 3). This is
a striking result, derived within our benchmark model of Section 2, and important
questions remain as to (i) whether the result is likely to extend to environments
beyond those captured by our benchmark model, and (ii) the degree to which
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prominent channels of interdependence between countries can be identified that
find representation in the environment described by our benchmark model. We
devote this and the next section to providing answers to these two questions.
As we noted in Section 2, the structure in (2.1) rules out the possibility that
fggik = 0 for all k and/or that fg*gi
* ¼ 0 for all m, and thereby excludes cases
m
where the externality variable x cannot be impacted by the policy instruments
of some government. The question we consider in this section is how our
results are impacted when the possibility ruled out by (2.1) arises. To this end,
we now consider several extensions of the benchmark model that do not
conform to the structure imposed by (2.1).
5.1. Small countries
An important possibility that is excluded from our benchmark model is that a
country might be “small” in relation to its contribution to the externality variable
x: if the home country is small in this sense, it would imply that gi ¼ 0 for all kk
(and hence fggi 0 for all k), while if the foreign country is small this wouldk ¼
imply gi
* ¼ 0 for all m (and hence fg*gi* ¼ 0 for all m).m m
We now consider an extension of the benchmark model in which there are
many home and many foreign countries, each of which individually is small in
the sense described just above. Formally, we subdivide the territory of the
home country into N home countries and now assume that the overall contribu-
tion of the home countries to the externality is given by
1XN




Similarly, we subdivide the territory of the foreign country into N foreign coun-
tries and now assume that the overall contribution of the foreign countries to the
externality is given by
1XN
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* j ¼ 0 for all m. An immediate implication is then that, as N goes to infinity,
im
no single government acting alone can alter x with its policy choices: that is,
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x~ ji ¼ 0 and x~ ji* ¼ 0 for all j and all k. For simplicity, we assume that each home
k k
country is identical, and that each foreign country is identical, so that we may
refer to “representative” home and foreign governments, but this is not essential
for our results. All other features of the benchmark model remain the same.
It is direct to confirm two important implications of this extension of the
benchmark model. First, suppressing the j superscript, the Nash policy choices
of a representative home and foreign government solve Gi ¼ 0 for k = 1, …, Ik
and G* 0 for k = 1 …, I*i* ¼ , . And second, letting ι denote the vector of policies
k
of all home governments [i1 i2…iN] and ι* denote the vector of policies of all
foreign governments [i*1 i*2…i*N], and with i j the vector of policies of the jth
home government and with ι−j the vector of policies of all home governments
other than j, [i1 i j−1 i j+1 iN], and finally with g−j(ι−j,x) g(ι,x) − g j(i j… … = ,x),
the minimal partition of the representative home government’s best-response
policy choice problem is:




Step 2: For a given ι-j and ι*: max Zðî jðx
x
Þ; xÞ
s:t: f jðg i;jð x g-j *Þ þ xÞ; g*ðι-;j ðι; xÞ; xÞ ¼ 0;
where î jðxÞ is the solution from Step 1 and Z is the Step-1 Lagrangean. The
Step-2 determination of x is a trivial choice problem in Program S, because x
is fully determined by the constraint once ι−j and ι* are given owing to the
small size of country j. An analogous Program S* defines the minimal partition
of the representative foreign government’s best-response policy choice problem.
According to Programs S and S*, each country’s contribution to the externality
variable x is a matter of its internal affairs when this contribution is vanishingly
small. To see why, consider home government j. As compared to the minimal par-
tition P0 described by Program 1
0 in the benchmark (large-country case) model,
the key difference in the case of small countries is that g and hence f is unaffected
by the choice of g j, and so the home-government j s choice of g j’ can be moved
from Step 2 to Step 1 without affecting the validity of the partition. This results in
a minimal partition for the small-country case – described by Program S – that
treats the choice of g j as the internal affairs of home country j. An analogous
interpretation applies for foreign country j. In essence the externality variable x
is completely out of government j’s control owing to the vanishingly small
impact of its contribution g j, and government j has sole authority over everything
else that matters for its objective function. As a consequence, when all countries
are small, any international agreement that moves governments from their Nash
policy choices must violate their sovereignty.
Together, these two implications lead to the following:
Proposition 5. When all countries are small in relation to their contribution to
the externality variable x, attaining international efficiency is consistent with
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maintaining national sovereignty if and only if (i) governments are not mutually
interdependent, or (ii) governments are mutually interdependent and sign½Gx] 6¼
sign½G*x ] when evaluated at the Nash policy choices. Under either condition
(i) or condition (ii), the harmony between international efficiency and national
sovereignty is preserved when small countries avoid making international
commitments.
Proof: As implied by Programs S and S*, when all countries are small in rela-
tion their contribution to the externality variable x, sovereignty demands that each
government be left to select its Nash policy choices. Hence, attaining interna-
tional efficiency is consistent with maintaining sovereignty in the small-country
case if and only if the associated Nash policy choices are efficient. If governments
are not mutually interdependent, then arguments analogous to the proof of Prop-
osition 1 establish that the Nash policy choices are efficient in the small-country
case. Suppose, then, that governments are mutually interdependent. Evaluating
the conditions for efficiency at the Nash policy choices of a representative
home- and foreign- government, defined by Gi I and G
*
k
¼ 0 for k = 1, …, i*
k
¼
0 for k = 1, …, I*, it is direct to confirm that (2.4)–(2.6) and the bottom line
of (2.7) are satisfied, while the top line of (2.7) is satisfied if and only if
sign½Gx] 6¼ sign½G*x ]. QED
The interesting feature of Proposition 5 relates to the condition in part (ii).
According to this condition, whether the apparent harmony between national sov-
ereignty and international efficiency identified in Proposition 3 survives in a
world of small countries hinges on whether governments agree or disagree in
the Nash equilibrium over the direction that they would like the externality var-
iable x to move. If all governments agree, then the Nash equilibrium in the small-
country case is inefficient and an international agreement will be required to reach
the efficiency frontier, implying necessarily that national sovereignty and interna-
tional efficiency will stand in conflict in this case. However, if there is disagree-
ment, then the Nash equilibrium in the small-country case is efficient, and in this
case the harmony between national sovereignty and international efficiency iden-
tified in Proposition 3 survives in a world of small countries, though in this case
as with condition (i) small countries must avoid international commitments to
preserve this harmony. Of course, which of these two cases is applicable will
depend on the nature of the externality variable x under consideration, but as
we demonstrate in the next section, the latter case has special significance in
the context of international trade agreements.12
5.2. Authority over an externality variable
At the opposite extreme of the small-country case considered above is the possi-
bility that one country’s policy choices completely determine the externality var-
iable, so that either fg = 0 or fg* = 0, a possibility that is ruled out in our
benchmark model by (2.1). This possibility might arise, for example, if the
foreign government determines the degree of religious freedom within its
6 6 6 6
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borders and the home-country government welfare is negatively impacted by reli-
gious persecution wherever it occurs.13
To capture this possibility, let us suppose that the objectives of the home and
foreign governments are now represented by the respective functions
G i;x~ i; i* ;y~ i* and G i*;x~ i; i**ð ;y~ði*ð Þ ð ÞÞ ð ð Þ ÞÞ, with the equilibrium level of the exter-
nality variable x~ i; i*ð Þ determined as before according to (2.1) whereas the equi-
librium level of the externality variable y~ i* is completely by i*ð Þ determined , the
policy vector of the foreign government. And let us suppose further that the home
and foreign countries are mutually interdependent with respect to both x and y, so
that Gx 0 and G*x¼ ¼ 0 and also Gy ¼ 0 and G*y ¼ 0 at the Nash policy choices. It
is easy to show that the Nash policy choices of the two governments are interna-
tionally inefficient, and in this case each of the externality variables is a source of
inefficiency in the Nash equilibrium.
The minimal partition of the home government’s best-response choice problem
is now
Program A : Step 1: For a given ðg; x; yÞ : max Gði; x; y
i
Þ
s:t: ½gði; xÞ - g] ¼ 0:
Step 2: For a given i*: max Lðîðg; x; yÞ; g; x;y~
g;x
ði*ÞÞ
s:t: f ðg; g*ði*; xÞ; xÞ ¼ 0;
where îðg; x; yÞ is the solution from Step 1 and L is the Step-1 Lagrangean.
Program A implies that g, x and y comprise the home country’s external affairs
and hence could be subjected to constraints in an international agreement
without violating the home country’s sovereignty.
By contrast, the minimal partition of the foreign government’s best-response
choice problem is given by the following program:
Program A*: Step 1: For a given ðg*; xÞ : max G* *ði; x;y~ði*
i
ÞÞ*
s:t: ½g*ði*; x g*Þ - ] ¼ 0:
Step 2: For a given i: max L* * * *
g x
ð̂i ðg ; xÞ; g; x;y~ði ÞÞ*;
s:t: f ðgði; xÞ; g*; xÞ ¼ 0;
where î*ðg*; x *Þ is the solution from Step 1 and L is the Step-1 Lagrangean.
Program A* implies that g* and x – but not y – comprise the foreign country’s
external affairs. From this we may conclude that any commitment made by the
foreign country in an international agreement beyond commitments to levels of
g* and/or x would violate its sovereignty. In particular, if national sovereignty
is to be preserved, then the foreign government can make no commitments
over i* and hence y~ i*ð Þ, indicating that this source of international inefficiency
in the Nash equilibrium must then go unaddressed. This points to an unavoidable
tension between national sovereignty and international efficiency in this case.
6
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We summarize with:
Proposition 6. The harmony between national sovereignty and international effi-
ciency breaks down whenever one country’s policies completely determine the
level of an international externality variable.
5.3. A pure externality
A final case that we consider where the harmony between national sovereignty
and international efficiency indicated by Proposition 3 can break down is when
there exists an international externality variable that represents a “pure external-
ity,” in the sense that the country generating the externality with its policy choices
is not impacted by the externality variable. In our benchmark model with one
externality variable, we allowed for this possibility (e.g., Gx ¼ 0 ¼ Gx*) and
showed that it implied an efficient Nash equilibrium under the conditions of
our benchmark model (Proposition 1; see also note 2). But with multiple exter-
nalities, the required conditions for inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium are
weakened, and the harmony between national sovereignty and international effi-
ciency can be disrupted in the presence of pure externalities as a result. Here we
consider a simple extension of our benchmark model to illustrate the point.
In particular, we introduce a second externality variable, y, whose determina-
tion can be characterized in an analogous fashion to the determination of x, but
we assume that y is a concern only to the foreign government. And we now
assume that the externality variable x is a concern only to the home government.
That is, in this extension of the benchmark model, the objectives of the home and
foreign governments are represented by the respective functions G i;x~ i; i*ð ð ÞÞ and
G i*;y~ði; i* * **ð ÞÞ, with the two externality variables x~ði; i Þ and y~ði; i Þ defining the
nature of the interdependence between the two countries. The new externality
variable y~ði; i*Þ is a pure externality imposed by the home government’s policy
choices on the foreign country, and it could, for example, represent the level of
water pollution which flows in one direction from the “upstream” home
country (who is therefore not affected by the polluted water) to the “downstream”
foreign country (who is affected by the polluted water). And similarly, we are
assuming that the externality variables x~ i; i*ð Þ is now also a pure externality
imposed by the foreign government’s policy choices on the home country, and
it could for example represent the level of air pollution which flows in one direc-
tion from the “upwind” foreign country (who is therefore not affected by the pol-
luted air) to the “downwind” home country (who is affected by the polluted air).
In analogy with the benchmark model and (2.1), the externality variables x~ði; i*Þ
and y~ *ði; i Þ are defined implicitly according to
f ðg i; x ; g **ð Þ ði; xÞ; xÞ ¼ 0; and
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where in analogy with the benchmark model we impose fggik ¼ 0 and now also
cqqi ¼ 0 for some k and fg*g 0 andk i** ¼ now also cq **q for some m. We alsom i*m ¼ 0
impose Gx ¼ 0 and Gy* ¼ 0, but note that the home and foreign countries are not
mutually interdependent with regard to either x or y (because Gy ¼ 0 *¼ Gx ).
By construction, in this extension of the benchmark model the home govern-
ment’s best-response policy choice problem can be represented by Program 10 as
in the benchmark model, and so it is direct to confirm that the home country’s
external affairs continue to be its choices over g and x, and do not include its
choices over q and y. In an analogous fashion, it is direct to confirm that the
foreign government’s external affairs in this extended benchmark model are its
choices over q* and y, and do not include its choices over g* and x.
In this setting, it is easy to see that a requirement for international efficiency is
that the home government’s policy instruments must be set so that the home gov-
ernment is indifferent to small changes in its policies that leave the externality
variable y unaltered (since the foreign government would be indifferent to such
changes). Formally, and letting k = 1 denote a domestic policy instrument for
which gi 0k ¼ and qik ¼ 0, this condition may be written as:" # " # " #
Gxfg gi qi gg
i Gx ½g k ki ] x ¼ qi x G k i1i - i - ð5:11 k½fgg k kx g x] gi q1 i g
Þ*þ f gx* þ f 1 i1
for k ¼ 2; 3; :::I :
But as we have just observed, the external affairs of the home government are
limited to its choices over g and x. Consequently, the international commitments
that the home government can take on without violating its sovereignty are
limited to commitments over g and x, and result in unilateral choices over its
instruments i in light of any such commitments that solve Step 1 of Program 10




s:t: ½gði; xÞ - g] ¼ 0:




i - ¼ 0 for kk g ¼ 2; 3; :::I : ð5:2Þi1
Consider now the home government’s Nash policy choices. These choices
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satisfy (5.2). But these choices then violate (5.1), and must therefore be inefficient




i x - ¼ 0 for k ¼ 2; 3; :::I ; ð5:3k g q Þi1 i1
which is to say unless all adjustments of the home-government policies that leave x
unchanged also leave y unchanged. Intuitively, the home government will only be
indifferent in the Nash equilibrium over small changes in its policies that leave y
unchanged if these same policy changes leave x unchanged, because the home gov-
ernment cares about changes in x, but does not care about changes in y. But in fact,
since (5.2) must hold for the domestic choices of i given any level of (g,x), it
follows that any international agreement that commits the home government to a
level of (g,x) must fail to attain the international efficiency frontier unless (5.3)
holds. With the sovereignty of the home government violated by any international
agreement that goes further than commitments over g and x, and with (5.3) violated
except by chance, a conflict between national sovereignty and international effi-
ciency is effectively unavoidable.
We summarize with:
Proposition 7. The harmony between national sovereignty and international effi-
ciency can break down in the presence of international externalities that take the
form of pure externalities.
6. Sovereignty, international trade agreements
and the GATT/WTO
We now return to our benchmark model and ask: Can prominent channels of
interdependence between countries be identified that find representation in the
environment described by our benchmark model? To some extent we have
already answered this question in the affirmative, by offering in Section 2 a
number of specific illustrations of interdependencies that can be captured
within the structure implied by (2.1). In this section we develop in detail the
implications of our results in the particular context of international trade as a
source of interdependence between countries. We begin in the next subsection
by briefly reviewing the two-country two-good competitive general equilibrium
trade model adapted to allow for the possibility of both tariff and domestic reg-
ulatory policy choices as developed in Bagwell and Staiger (2001). We establish
that this model is a special case of the benchmark model developed in Section 2,
and so all the results of Sections 2–4 apply. We then show that when these results
are interpreted within the context of our trade model, they indicate that the fun-
damental principles underlying GATT/WTO market access agreements offer a
way to achieve internationally efficient policies without sacrificing national sov-
ereignty, and that attaining international efficiency is consistent with maintaining
national sovereignty in this setting regardless of whether (all) countries are big or
ð
̃
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small. We also extend our analysis of trade agreements to a multilateral setting,
establish that agreement to abide by a non-discrimination principle such as the
GATT/WTO MFN rule does not violate a government’s sovereignty, and identify
a critical role for MFN if governments are to achieve internationally efficient pol-
icies without sacrificing national sovereignty when some (but not all) countries
are small.14
6.1. Sovereignty in the basic two-country trade model
We first describe the essential features of the two-country trade model of Bagwell
and Staiger (2001). The home country exports good y to the foreign country in
exchange for imports of good x. The local price of good x relative to good y in
the home (foreign) country is denoted by p (p*). The “world price” (i.e., relative
exporter price or terms of trade) is denoted by pw, and international arbitrage links
each country’s local price to the world price in light of its (non-prohibitive) tariff
according to p = τpw p(τ, pw) and p* = pw/τ* p*(τ*,pw *= = ), where τ (τ ) is one plus
the ad valorem import tariff of the home (foreign) country. In addition to its tariff,
each country also imposes a vector of local regulations, r (with length R) for the
home country and r* (with length R*) for the foreign country, that may impact
local production and/or consumption decisions at given prices. Each country’s
vector of local regulations therefore acts as a vector of “shift” parameters in its
import demand and export supply functions, and we assume that these functions
are differentiable in their respective regulation levels.
Incorporating each country’s vector of regulations into its import demand and
export supply functions, we denote these functions for the home country by
M(r, p, pw) and E(r, p, pw) and for the foreign country by M*(r*, p*, pw) and
E*(r*, p*, pw), respectively. The home and foreign budget constraints, which
must hold for any pw, may then be written as
pwMðr; p; pw r; p; pwÞ ¼ Eð Þ 6:1Þ
M *ðr*; p*; pw pwE* r*; p*; pwÞ ¼ ð Þ: ð6:2Þ
The equilibrium world price, pw(r,τ,r*,τ*), is determined by the x-market-clearing
requirement
Mðr; pðτ; pwÞ; pw *Þ ¼ E* r*; p* w wð ðτ ; p Þ; p Þ; ð6:3Þ
where we have made explicit the dependence of the local prices on the tariffs and
the world prices, and market clearing for good y is then implied by (6.1), (6.2)
and (6.3).
Finally, we represent the objectives of the home and foreign governments with
the general functions W(r, p, p~w) and W*(r*, p*, p~w), respectively. These objective
functions reflect an important assumption: governments care about the regulatory
(and tariff) choices of their trading partners only because of the trade impacts of
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equilibrium world price pw). We assume that, holding its regulations and its local
price fixed at levels that do not imply autarky, each government would prefer an
improvement in its terms of trade,




w r*~ ; p
*;pw *ð ~ > 0 for ðr*; p*Þ M ; pw : ðÞ > 0 Þ
According to (6.4), governments like transfers of revenue from their trading part-
ners. In the case of autarky, a change in the terms of trade holding its regulations
and local price fixed should be irrelevant to a government, since there is no trade
volume and continues to be no trade volume after the change, and so we assume
as well that




w~ ðr*; p*;p~wÞ ¼ 0 for M* r* p*ð ; ; pw
ÞÞ ¼ 0: ð
We leave government objectives otherwise unrestricted, and observe that these
objectives are consistent with a wide variety of models of government behavior
(see Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2002).
To establish that the trading environment we have just described is a special
case of the benchmark model described in Section 2, we define i = [r τ] and
i* = [r* τ*], and then define
Gði;p~w r; pðτ;p~ Þ;p~wÞ = W wð Þ
G i** ;p~w *ðr*; p*ðτ*ð Þ = W ;p~wÞ;p~wÞ
and define
mði; pwÞ = M r wð ; pðτ; pwÞ; p Þ
m ** * w wði; pw * * *Þ = M ðr; p ðτ ; p Þ; p Þ:
We then substitute (6.2) into (6.3) to rewrite the x-market-clearing requirement as
pwmði; pw m i** ; pwÞ - ð Þ ¼ 0: ð6:6Þ
It is now direct to confirm that (6.6) is a special case of (2.1) in which x = pw,
g(i,x) = m(i,pw), g*(i*,x) = m*(i*,pw), and where
f ðg * * * *ði;xÞ; g ði; xÞ; xÞ = ½xgði; xÞ - g ði; xÞ];
with pw > 0 and with the natural restrictions on the import demand functions










¼ 0 for some k and fg*gi ¼ 0 for some h, as required for the bench-h
mark model under (2.1). In words, our two-country trade model is a special case
of our benchmark model in which the international externality variable is the
terms of trade, in which each country’s contribution to the determination of the
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externality is the quantity of imports it demands at a given terms of trade, and in
which these contributions are aggregated according to a market-clearing condi-
tion to determine the equilibrium level of the externality.
The minimal partition of the home government’s best-response policy choice
problem in the international trade setting, corresponding to Program 10 in the
benchmark model, is then:
Program 1
0 ðTradeÞ: Step 1: For a given wðm; p Þ: max Gði; pw
i
Þ
s:t: ½mði; pwÞ - m] ¼ 0:




s:t: pwm m i**½ ; pw- ð Þ] ¼ 0;
where îðm; pwÞ is the solution from Step 1 and L is the Step-1 Lagrangean. The
analogous minimal partition for the foreign government’s best-response policy
choice problem in the international trade setting is:
Program 1
0* Trade : Step 1: For a given m*; pw *ð Þ ð Þ: max G ði*; pw
i
Þ*
s:t: m* i*; pw *½ ð Þ - m ] ¼ 0:
Step 2: For a given i : max L* î* m*; pw ;
m w
ð ð m*; pw
p
Þ Þ*;
s:t: ½pwmði; pw m*Þ - ] ¼ 0;
where î*ðm*; pwÞ is the solution from Step 1 and L* is the Step-1 Lagrangean.
Provided governments are mutually interdependent, which according to
(6.4) and (6.5) will be the case in this setting if and only if they trade
positive amounts in the Nash equilibrium, we may then conclude from Proposi-
tions 1–4 that, when the nature of interdependence across countries takes the form
of international trade: (i) if governments negotiate commitments over policy
instruments in i and i*, their sovereignty will be violated, and the extent of the
violation will in general not be limited only to those policy instruments that
are directly negotiated; and (ii) governments may negotiate commitments over
m, pw and m* which then hold the home (foreign) government to policy
choices satisfying [m(i, pw) − m] = 0 ([m*(i*,pw) − m*] = 0) and attain a position
on the international efficiency frontier without violating their sovereignty.
Consider now what these findings suggest regarding the implication for
national sovereignty of commitments negotiated in the GATT/WTO. In
Bagwell and Staiger (2001), we observed that, when a government agrees to
“bind” a tariff in a GATT/WTO negotiation, this government is not making a
commitment that (i) holds it rigidly to its bound tariff level in the future and
(ii) implies no obligations regarding future choices over its remaining policy
instruments. Rather, the government is making a market access commitment,
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which is interpreted in the GATT/WTO as a commitment by the home (foreign)
government to establish and maintain certain “conditions of competition for
exporters into the domestic market.” Two important observations follow. First,
a government can in principle fulfill a market access commitment with any com-
bination of policy instruments that implies the agreed-upon conditions of compe-
tition for exporters into the domestic market.15 And second, a commitment to
certain conditions of competition for exporters into the domestic market
implies in turn a commitment to an import level m (m*) in the home (foreign)
market when exporters price at pw, and hence subjects the home (foreign) govern-
ment to an implied constraint of the form [m(i, pw) − m] = 0 ([m*(i*, pw) − m*] = 0)
when making its policy choices. From these two observations, we may conclude
that the fundamental commitments negotiated in the GATT/WTO are best inter-
preted as commitments over m, pw and m* rather than as commitments over
policy instruments in i and i* (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2002, for further elabo-
ration on the interpretation of GATT/WTO market access commitments along
these lines).16
Under this interpretation, then, Propositions 1–4 lend some formal support to
the fundamental approach that rests at the heart of the GATT/WTO, in the sense
that the negotiation of market access commitments can in principle allow govern-
ments to attain the international efficiency frontier without sacrificing national
sovereignty.17 We summarize this finding in:
Proposition 8. A market access agreement between the home and the foreign
government can achieve the international efficiency frontier without violating
the sovereignty of either country.
Proposition 8 is related to Propositions 3 and 4 of Bagwell and Staiger (2001), but
recasts these results from the perspective of the formal definitions of national sov-
ereignty that we develop here.
Finally, we observe that the harmony between national sovereignty and inter-
national efficiency survives in a world of (all) small countries when the nature
of interdependence across countries takes the form of international trade.
To see this, note that by our definitions we have Gpw w~ ¼ τWp þWp~ and
Gp
*
w~ ¼ ð1=τ*ÞWp** þWp*w~ . When the two-country trade model is extended to
allow for many small home and foreign countries as in the analogous
Section 5.1 extension of our benchmark model, it is direct to show that the
Nash equilibrium policy choices satisfy Wp = 0 (Wp
** ¼ 0) for a representative





w ¼ W w~ ~ when evaluated at the Nash equilibrium. But using (6.4) and
(6.5), Proposition 5 then implies that, when the nature of interdependence across
countries takes the form of international trade, the harmony between national sov-
ereignty and international efficiency survives in a world of (all) small countries:
focusing on case (ii) of Proposition 5 where countries are mutually interdepen-
dent, the key point is that, in the international trade setting, governments
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generally disagree in the Nash equilibrium over the direction they would like the
terms of trade (the externality variable) to move, as (6.4) indicates, and so in a
world of small countries the Nash equilibrium is efficient and national sover-
eignty can be preserved at no cost with the avoidance of international
commitments.
Together with Proposition 8, this last result is suggestive of a broad compati-
bility between maintaining national sovereignty and achieving international effi-
ciency in trade matters. However, these findings fall short of establishing this
claim in the multilateral setting in which real trade agreements (e.g., the
GATT/WTO) operate, where some countries may be large, others small, and
the non-discrimination (MFN) rule plays a prominent role. In the next section,
we extend our two-country trade model to a three-country model in order to con-
sider these issues.
6.2. MFN and sovereignty in a three-country trade model
We now consider a three-country trade model analogous to Bagwell and Staiger
(1999), extended to include standards. The home country exports good y to
foreign countries 1 and 2 and imports good x from each of them. For simplicity,
we do not allow trade between the two foreign countries, and so only the home
country has the opportunity to set discriminatory tariffs across its trading partners.
The local price of good x relative to good y in the home country (foreign country j)
is denoted by p (p* j, j = 1, 2). The “world price” (i.e., relative exporter price) for
trade between the home country and foreign country j is denoted by pwj, and inter-
national arbitrage links each country’s local price to the relevant world price in
light of its (non-prohibitive) tariff according to p = τ jpwj p(τ j, pwj), and p* j =
pwj
=
/τ* j * j wj * j j * j= p (p ,τ ) for j = 1, 2, where τ (τ ) is one plus the ad valorem
import tariff that the home country (foreign country j) applies to the imports
from foreign country j (the home country). This implies in turn that world







We note in particular that an MFN rule requires τ1 = τ2 τ and therefore implies
pw1 w
=
= p 2 = pw by (6.7). As in the two-country trade model above, in addition to
its tariff, each country also imposes a vector of local regulations, r (with length R)
for the home country and r* j (with length R* j) for foreign country j, that may
impact local production and/or consumption decisions at given prices. Each coun-
try’s vector of local regulations will therefore act as a vector of “shift” parameters
in its import demand and export supply functions, and as before we assume that
these functions are differentiable in their respective regulation levels. For future
reference, we denote the home government’s vector of policy instruments by
i = [r τ1 τ2], and we denote the vector of policy instruments for foreign govern-
ment j by i* j *= [r* j τ j].
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Incorporating each country’s vector of regulations into its import demand and
export supply functions, we denote functions for the home country by M(r,p,T )
and E(r,p,T ) and for foreign country j by M* j(r* j,p* j,pwj) and E* j(r* j,p* j,pwj),
respectively, where T is the home-country’s multilateral terms of trade, and is
defined by
X2
T r*1; p*1; r*2; p*2; pw1; pw2 s*k r*1; p*1; r*2; p*2; pw1; pw2ð Þ = ð Þ x pwk
k¼1
with
j j j wj
s* j *1 *1 *2 *2 w1 w2
E* *ðr ; p* ; p Þðr ; p ; r ; p ; p ; p Þ =P2 for j ¼ 1; 2:*k r*k ; p*k pwkk 1 E ð ; Þ¼
Observe that an MFN rule requiring τ1 = τ2 implies pw1 = pw2 = T = pw by (6.7).
In any event, with T defined, the home and foreign budget constraints may then
be written as
T xMðr; p; TÞ ¼ Eðr; p; TÞ; and ð6:8Þ
M* j pwj pwjðr* j; p* j; Þ ¼ E* jðr* j; p* j; pwjÞ for j ¼ 1; 2: ð6:9Þ
The pair of equilibrium world prices, pwj(i,i*1,i*2~ ) for j = 1, 2, are then determined
by the linkage condition (6.7) together with the requirement of market clearing
for good x,
X2
Mðr; p; T E*k r*kÞ ¼ ð ; p*k ; pwkÞ; ð6:10Þ
k¼1
with market clearing for good y then implied by (6.8) and (6.9).
Finally, in analogy with the two-country trade model, we represent the objec-
tives of the home and foreign government j = 1, 2 with the general functions
W (r,p,T ) and W* j (r* j, p* j, p~wj), respectively. As before, we assume that,
holding its regulations and its local price fixed, and provided that its regulations
and local price do not imply autarky, each government would prefer an improve-
ment in its terms of trade:
WTðr; p; TÞ < 0 for Mðr; p; TÞ > 0; and
W * j r* j; p*j;p~wj > 0 for M* j jpwj~ ðr*ð Þ ; p*j; pwjÞ > 0:
For simplicity in this section we consider only the case where Nash policy
choices do not imply autarky. We leave government objectives otherwise
unrestricted.
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In the Nash equilibrium of the three-country trade model, the home govern-
ment chooses its best-response policies by solving
Program 5: For a given i*1 and i*2; maxW ðr; pðτ ;j p~wjÞ; TÞ;
i
at the same time that foreign government j , for j = 1, 2, chooses its best response
policies by solving
Program 5* j: For a given i and i*-j; maxW * jðr* j; p* jðτ* j;p~wj wjÞ;p~ Þ:
i* j
We next show that the Nash policy choices defined by the simultaneous solutions
to Program 5 and Program 5* j may be written in an equivalent form in which
each government’s best-response program is partitioned into a two-step choice
problem.
Because foreign countries 1 and 2 each trade with only one partner (the home
country), they each face a single international externality variable (p~wj), and so
the minimal partition of Program 5* j into a two-step choice problem is completely
analogous to Program 1*0, the minimal partition of the foreign country in the two-
country trade model of the previous section. However, the international externality
faced by the home country is more complicated, owing to the possibility that it
trades with two trading partners at two different bilateral world prices.
Nevertheless, as we now demonstrate, an analogous 2-step partition can be
developed for the home government’s best-response problem. In particular, con-
sider the following 2-step program for the home government:
Program 5
0
: Step 1: For a given ðM ; TÞ : maxW r; p; T
r;p
ð Þ
s:t: ½Mðr; p; TÞ -M ] ¼ 0:




s:t: M E*kðr*k ; p*k½ - ðτ*k ; pwk ; pwkÞ Þ] ¼ 0;
k¼1
where r̂(M, T(.)) and p̂(M, T(.)) are the solutions from Step 1 and Y is the Step-1
Lagrangean, and where T( ) denotes T(r*1, p*1 w 1), r*2, p*2(pw1, τ*1. (p 1, τ* ), pw1,
pw2). Observe that a value for T is determined for given i*1 and i*2 once pw1 and
pw2 are determined, and so the Step-2 choice problem over M, pw1 and pw2 deter-
mines a value for M and T, which are each taken as given in the Step-1 choice
problem. We first state:
Lemma 4. Program 50 is a minimal partition of the home-government’s best-
response choice problem defined by Program 5.
Proof: See appendix.
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According to Lemma 4, we may conclude that the external affairs of the home
country are its government’s choices over M, pw1 and pw2 (and by implication M
and T). In analogy with the two-country trade model, these choices can be inter-
preted as determining the level of market access that the home country affords to
each of its trading partners (as defined by the volume of imports it would accept
at a particular multilateral terms of trade). The matters that concern the home
country’s internal affairs are then its choice of G and its government’s choices
over r(M,T(.)) and p(M,T(.)). However, observing that p = τ1pw1 = τ2pw2, we
may restate the home government’s choice over p(M,T(.)) equivalently as a
choice over τ1(M,T,pw1) and τ2(M,T,pw2) where τ1(M,T,pw1) w1 and
τ2
= p(M,T)/p
(M,T,pw2) = p(M,T)/pw2. Recalling now that the MFN rule requires τ1 = τ2
τ and hence pw1 = pw2 = w
=
T = p by (6.7), but that the MFN rule leaves the
level of τ and therefore p unrestricted, it follows that the MFN rule places restric-
tions on the home country’s external affairs (its Step-2 choices) but places no
restrictions nor introduces any distortions in the home country’s internal affairs
(its Step-1 choices). We may therefore state:
Proposition 9. Abiding by the non-discrimination rule does not violate national
sovereignty.
Proposition 9 reflects the following intuition. Discriminatory tariffs make pos-
sible certain market access choices that would be impossible under MFN. But
market access (Step-2) choices are the external affairs of a country, and so restric-
tions can be placed on these choices through voluntary international agreement
without violating national sovereignty. And given any market access choices
that would be feasible under MFN, discriminatory tariffs do not create any addi-
tional possibilities for delivering these market access levels. This feature is
reflected in the fact that the Step-1 choices of Program 50 may be expressed as
choices over domestic regulations r and the domestic price level p, and for
these choices the MFN restriction has no bearing. Hence, a country’s sovereignty
is violated neither directly nor indirectly when it agrees to abide by the MFN
rule.18
According to Proposition 9, an agreement to abide by the MFN rule in the
three-country trade model does not violate the sovereignty of any country. But
once the MFN rule is imposed, it is direct to show that the three-country trade
model is a straightforward extension of the two-country trade model, and exhibits
all the same properties. In particular, it then follows by Propositions 8 and 9 that a
market access agreement between the home and foreign governments in the three-
country trade model that also imposes an MFN requirement can achieve the inter-
national efficiency frontier without violating the sovereignty of any country. This
falls short of the stronger claim that the MFN rule is required to make the attain-
ment of internationally efficient outcomes compatible with the maintenance of
national sovereignty. But as we next show, this stronger claim can be made
when the three-country trade model is extended to allow that some (but not
all) countries are small.
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To see this, let us suppose that foreign country 2 in the three-country trade
model is now decomposed into a region of small foreign countries as with our
small-country extension in Section 5.1, so that no single government k in
foreign region 2 can, acting alone, alter p~w2 with its policy choices. As we estab-
lished in Section 5.1, small countries must avoid international commitments in
order to maintain their sovereignty, and so any international agreement that
moves the governments in foreign region 2 from their best-response policy
choices must violate their sovereignty. It is easy to see from Program 5* j that
the best-response policy choices of a representative government in foreign
region 2 (suppressing the individual country superscript k) solve
W *2 2 2:p*2 ¼ 0 and W *r*2 ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1; 2; :::R* ð6:11
i
Þ
The question, then, is whether the home government and foreign government 1
can undertake commitments that (i) do not violate their sovereignty and
(ii) attain a position on the international efficiency frontier when the governments
in foreign region 2 choose policies that satisfy (6.11).
We first establish:
Proposition 10. An international agreement can attain a point on the international
efficiency frontier and satisfy (6.11) if and only if it satisfies the MFN rule.
Proof: See appendix.
As we establish in the appendix, to achieve international efficiency and satisfy
(6.11), the home government and foreign government 1 must adopt policies that
abide by the MFN rule and satisfy
W 0 W *1p ¼ ¼ p*1 ; Wr ¼ 0 and W *1 *1:i ri*1 ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1; 2; :::R ð6:12Þ
Referring to market access agreements that achieve the market access levels
implied by (6.11), (6.12) and the MFN restriction as non-discriminatory politi-
cally optimal market access agreements, and utilizing Propositions 8–10, we
may now state:
Proposition 11. If some (but not all) countries are “small,” then achieving inter-
national efficiency and preserving national sovereignty are mutually consistent
goals of an international agreement if and only if the agreement satisfies the
MFN requirement. In particular, non-discriminatory politically optimal market
access agreements provide the unique path to achieving international efficiency
while preserving national sovereignty in this setting.
In effect, if small countries are asked to make market access commitments,
their sovereignty will be violated. If this is to be avoided, then small countries
must be left unconstrained to choose their best-response policies in any interna-
tional agreement. This requirement, though, is consistent with international effi-
ciency only when tariffs also conform to the MFN requirement, as indicated by
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Proposition 10. As a consequence, in an international trade setting Proposition 11
suggests that a non-discrimination rule is “complementary” to preserving the
national sovereignty of small countries in the following sense: the sovereignty of
small countries can be preserved under an internationally efficient agreement only
if that agreement abides by the MFN requirement. More broadly, and in light of
our finding in Proposition 9 that the MFN requirement itself involves no compro-
mise of national sovereignty, our three-country results suggest that a non-discrimi-
nation rule coupled with a market access agreement can facilitate the attainment of
internationally efficient outcomes that do not compromise national sovereignty.
6.3. Sovereignty, GATT and the WTO
When viewed together, the results from the previous two subsections have poten-
tially important implications for the design of the WTO and its predecessor, the
GATT. The GATT/WTO has from its inception been concerned most fundamen-
tally with non-discriminatory market access commitments, and it has traditionally
sought to anchor these commitments with negotiations over border measures (e.g.,
tariffs) that are “multilateralized” through the MFN requirement. But this tradition
is being eroded on two fronts. First, the extent and importance of discriminatory
trade agreements (permitted by GATT/WTO exceptions to its MFN requirement)
has increased dramatically in recent decades. And second, increasingly the WTO
is thought of as a potential forum for the negotiation of international commitments
on a host of non-border policies that are deemed to have important market access
consequences, ranging from labor standards to environmental regulations to
domestic subsidies to competition policy. Our results highlight the fundamental
implications of these developments for the potential conflicts between international
efficiency and national sovereignty within the WTO. Specifically, when interna-
tional externalities flow only through world prices, the further the WTO departs
from facilitating agreements that take the form of non-discriminatory market
access commitments, the more it is likely to pose a (direct and indirect – and in
principle, unnecessary) threat to the sovereignty of its member countries.
7. Conclusion
What are the sovereign rights of nations in an interdependent world, and to what
extent do these rights stand in the way of achieving internationally efficient out-
comes? In this chapter, we have proposed answers to these two questions. Our
answers, of course, depend on the definition of national sovereignty. Sovereignty
is a complex concept with many features, and any definition has advantages
and disadvantages. Our approach is to formalize the Westphalian norm of
“non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states” in a way that we
believe captures several key features of Westphalian sovereignty emphasized in
the international political economy literature, features that seem especially
relevant in the context of voluntary international agreements. An important
advantage of this approach is that it is analytically tractable. Using this formali-
zation, we show how Nash choice problems can be partitioned in a way that
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allows a characterization of the degree and nature of sovereignty that govern-
ments possess in the Nash equilibrium. This characterization, in turn, provides
a benchmark from which to formally assess the implications for national sover-
eignty of international agreements of various designs.
In the context of our benchmark model of international interdependence, we
find that in principle there is no inherent conflict between the attainment of inter-
national efficiency through international agreements and preserving national sov-
ereignty. As our benchmark model is general enough to cover channels of
international interdependence that can take a variety of forms, we view this
finding as pointing to important possibilities for eliminating conflicts between
international efficiency and national sovereignty through appropriate design of
international agreements. Our findings here highlight an important distinction
between international agreements that mitigate international externalities and
international agreements that erode national sovereignty, and point out that it
can be possible to have the former without the latter.
In the particular case of international trade relations, which we argue is cap-
tured well by our benchmark model, we find that a number of the foundational
aspects of the GATT/WTO, such as its emphasis on market access commitments
and the MFN rule, offer a possible means of achieving international efficiency
without eroding national sovereignty. In this regard, we give formal support to
the observation of Rabkin (1998, pp. 85–86):
Probably the single most effective and consequential international program
of the postwar era has been the mutual reduction of trade barriers under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, initiated in 1947. Reasonable
questions may be raised about certain aspects of the World Trade Organiza-
tion, established in 1995 to help administer GATT norms. But, fundamen-
tally, the trading system is quite compatible with traditional notions of
sovereignty. It was developed on the foundations of much older sorts of
international agreement, which would have been quite recognizable to the
Framers of the Constitution.
However, our results suggest that the maintenance of this compatibility depends
crucially on being true to these fundamental principles: the further away the WTO
moves from a market-access focus and adherence to MFN, the more likely will
conflicts arise within the WTO between international efficiency and national
sovereignty.
Importantly, we also find that the harmony in our benchmark model between
international efficiency and national sovereignty is not always present in the uni-
verse of international relations among national governments. Rather, as the
various extensions to our benchmark model illustrate, this harmony depends
on the structure of the international externalities that define the nature of
international interdependence and that give rise to the policy inefficiencies
under non-cooperative policy setting. Together with our other findings, this last
point reinforces the importance of understanding the nature of the international
externalities that are the source of the problem for an international agreement
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to solve, so that those tensions between sovereignty and efficiency that are unnec-
essary can be avoided, while those tensions that are inescapable can be antici-
pated and minimized through careful institutional design.
Where tensions between national sovereignty and international efficiency are
inescapable according to our formal analysis, it may be that further refinements
to the notion of national sovereignty, perhaps tailored to the case at hand,
could help to ease these tensions. A key message of our chapter, however, is
that such refinements, to the extent they are possible, can be guided by our
formal approach and instructive findings. In this way, our analysis provides a
framework for further systematic exploration into notions of sovereignty and
their implications for efficiency.
At the same time, in circumstances where a tension between national sover-
eignty and international efficiency is inescapable, our formal analysis leaves
unanswered an important question: in such circumstances, is the preservation
of national sovereignty worth the sacrifice of international efficiency? At a
general level, there are two ways that this question might be approached.
First, if as we assume the general government objectives in our formal analysis
capture all relevant considerations for the associated countries, then there is a
clear case for governments to pursue international efficient agreements, even if
national sovereignty as we define that term is violated. From this perspective,
the contribution of our analysis is to identify settings in which international effi-
ciency can be achieved without violating national sovereignty.
Second, if there are explicit costs associated with the erosion of national sov-
ereignty that are not captured in our formal analysis, then a formal answer to this
question would require introducing those costs into the model. For example, such
costs might arise if the quality of information depreciates with the distance
between the decision-maker and those most directly impacted by the decision.
Alternatively, the erosion of national sovereignty might have direct utility
costs, if governments and their constituents have a preference for maintaining
sovereignty aside from any economic benefits they may enjoy. In either case,
once these costs were introduced into the model, there would again be a clear
case for governments to pursue internationally efficient agreements even if
national sovereignty as we define that term is violated, though in the latter
case efficiency would be defined relative to government objective functions
that include national sovereignty as an argument and hence sovereignty would
become an explicit goal to be weighed against the other goals that governments
also value. Introducing such micro-foundations for concerns about violations of
sovereignty is an important area for further research.
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1 As we discuss later (see notes 4 and 13), in his reconsideration of the concept of sov-
ereignty Jackson (2003) takes the first approach, and proposes a notion of “sover-
eignty modern” that according to Jackson is capable of maintaining harmony
between sovereignty and international efficiency in the context of modern sensibilities.
2 The required conditions for inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium in the benchmark
model would be weakened if the ability to make explicit international transfers
were introduced. This can be done without changing the nature of any of our
results, but we prefer to keep explicit international transfer instruments out of our
model for simplicity. We also consider several extensions of the benchmark model
in a later section where the Nash inefficiencies take more complicated forms.
3 For a related discussion of the practical difficulties associated with the implementation
of Mill’s “harm principle,” see, for example, Gray (1991).
4 In arguing for the need to update the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty,
Jackson (2003) states:
Much has been said and written about “globalization”; despite being an ambiguous
term of controversial connotation, it is reasonably well understood to apply to the
exogenous world circumstances of economic and other forces that have developed
in recent decades owing, in major part, to the sharply reduced costs and time
required for the transport of goods (and services), and similar reductions in costs
and time requirements for communication. These circumstances have led to new
structures of production; they, in turn, have resulted in greatly enhanced (and some-
times dangerous) interdependence, which we can do little to remedy and which
often renders the older concepts of “sovereignty” or “independence” fictional. …
these circumstances often demand action that no single nation-state can satisfacto-
rily carry out, and thus require some type of institutional “coordination” mecha-
nism. In some of these circumstances, therefore, a powerful tension is generated
between traditional core “sovereignty,” on the one hand, and the international insti-
tution, on the other hand.
(Jackson, 2003, p. 784, footnotes omitted)
Jackson’s approach is to propose an updated concept of Westphalian sovereignty that he
terms “sovereignty-modern,” and which is meant to be more consistent with interna-
tional efficiency and the need for international policy coordination in the modern
world. Our approach provides a formal definition of sovereignty which achieves some
of what Jackson has in mind, in that according to our definition the domain of sover-
eignty will evolve as the nature of international interdependence evolves; but we do
not tailor our definition of sovereignty on a case-by-case basis to necessarily be in
harmony with international efficiency, and instead evaluate formally the circumstances
when a tradeoff between maintaining national sovereignty and achieving international
efficiency can be avoided versus when this tradeoff will necessarily arise.
5 Notice that, as the home government’s best-response policy choices are defined by the
vector of domestic policies i that solve 2.2, the choice problems in any partition P of
the home government’s best-response policy choice problem cannot include (trivial or
otherwise) choices over foreign policies in i*, and similarly the choice problems in any
partition P of the foreign government’s best-response policy choice problem cannot
include (trivial or otherwise) choices over home policies in i.
6 Note that according to our definition, it is possible that ŝ is a subset of ~s and yet the
cardinality of ŝ is greater than the cardinality of ~s. This possibility would simply reflect
that ŝ had not been written in a form that had allowed direct comparison with s on a
choice-problem by choice-problem basis (and that by such rewriting it became possi-
ble to show that in fact ŝ was a subset of s according to our definition).
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7 As a general matter, we do not have an existence proof for a minimal partition, which
is why we state the definition of internal and external affairs conditional on the exis-
tence of a minimal partition. But as we next show, we are able to establish existence in
the formal setting of our benchmark model.
8 It should be understood that the set of g and x for which Step-1 is solved are those for
which there exists a vector of instruments i such that [g(i, x) − g] = 0 is satisfied.
9 Forming the Lagrangean associated with the home government’s Step-2
problem, it is direct to confirm that the expression for the Lagrange multiplier is
λ = Gx/[fggx + fg*g*x + fx], from which the statement above can be confirmed.
10 A distinction may be made between explicit and tacit agreements. We focus here on
how sovereignty might be violated by an explicit agreement. A related possibility is
that governments may achieve a tacit agreement that emerges from repeated interac-
tion, for example. We do not explore that possibility here.
11 The qualifier to generic cases in Proposition 4 refers to the possibility that optimal uni-
lateral choices for some instruments might by chance happen to correspond to the
policy levels needed for “targeting” other first-order conditions as described in the
proof of the proposition.
12 To state Proposition 5 we have adopted a binary distinction between the limiting case
of small countries that individually make a zero contribution to the externality variable
and “non-small” countries that individually make a non-zero contribution to the exter-
nality variable. If countries were defined to be non-small only when their individual
contributions to the externality variable exceeded some de-minimis level, then coun-
tries falling below this de-minimis level could not accept international commitments
without violating their national sovereignty, and the potential conflicts between
achieving international efficiency and maintaining national sovereignty described in
Proposition 5 would be amplified.
13 This possibility could also include, for example, the sorts of actions described by
Jackson (2003, p. 790) that might have been included in the original definition of
Westphalian sovereignty (“the nation-state’s power to violate virgins, chop off
heads, arbitrarily confiscate property, torture citizens and engage in all sorts of
other excessive and inappropriate actions”). As we discussed above in note 4, Jack-
son’s approach is to update the definition of sovereignty so that there is no tradeoff
between sovereignty and international intervention to address these kinds of
actions. Our approach is to not tailor our definition of sovereignty on a case-by-
case basis so that tradeoffs between sovereignty and international efficiency never
exist, but rather to point out where such tradeoffs will be unavoidable, a result that
is reported for this case in our Proposition 6.
14 The other important non-discrimination rule in the GATT/WTO is that of “national treat-
ment,” which applies to non-border measures. In our formal model, the MFN rule would
apply to tariffs, while the national treatment rule would apply to regulations. We focus
here on the implications of the MFN rule for national sovereignty, but we conjecture that
analogous findings could be formalized with regard to national treatment.
15 We say “in principal” because, as pointed out in Bagwell and Staiger (2001), under
current GATT/WTO practice the flexibility to fulfill market access commitments
with any combination of policy instruments is not unlimited, and in particular
would not be sufficient in certain circumstances to achieve internationally efficient
outcomes in the way that we describe here. See also Bagwell, Mavroidis and
Staiger (2002) for a more detailed discussion on this point and proposals that
would introduce the required additional flexibility.
16 In interpreting GATT/WTO commitments as commitments over m, pw, and m*, we are
implicitly conditioning on economic fundamentals (preferences, technologies, endow-
ments); but the same statement applies to our efficiency characterizations, so this
seems the appropriate reference point.
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17 This is not to say that the GATT and now the WTO poses no threat to the national
sovereignty of its member countries. Rather, our claim here is simply that market
access commitments are consistent with the preservation of national sovereignty,
and that the GATT/WTO can in principle steer clear of violations of the sovereignty
of its members by adhering closely to the market access approach. Even then, in prac-
tice the process by which market access commitments are interpreted and enforced
may place the sovereignty of members at risk in ways that are not captured by our
formal modeling. For example, Keohane (2002, p. 8) points out that “the classic con-
ception of [Westphalian] sovereignty prohibits a government from agreeing to rules
defining a process, over which it does not have a veto, that can confer obligations
not specifically provided for in the original agreement,” and Barfield (2001, pp. 42–
69) argues that in practice the WTO Dispute Settlement Body may pose just such a
threat to the Westphalian sovereignty of its members (though see also Keohane,
2002, p. 17, for a more qualified view). While such threats to sovereignty may
indeed be real in practice, it is clear that in principle the WTO is designed not to
pose such a threat: as Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
states, “Recommendations and rulings of the [WTO Dispute Settlement Body]
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements.”
18 We also note that Proposition 9 is in line with Rabkin (2004, pp. 131–134) who,
arguing from an historical and legal perspective, concludes that MFN obligations
are consistent with the preservation of national sovereignty.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide proofs of all lemmas and propositions that are not
proved in the body of the chapter.
Proposition 1. The Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model is inefficient if and
only if Gx ¼ 0 and Gx* ¼ 0 at the Nash policy choices.














¼ k ::: : A2
f gx fg g
¼ 1; 2; I ð
g x
*þ * þ fx
With (A1) and (A2), it is direct to show that the Nash conditions (2.2) and (2.3)
imply efficiency conditions (2.4) and (2.5). Further, substituting the Nash condi-
tions (2.2) and (2.3) into efficiency condition (2.6) yields
G*xx~i*Gxx~i11 ¼ 0;
which is violated at the Nash policy choices if and only if Gx ¼ 0 and Gx* ¼ 0 at
these policy choices. Finally, it may be confirmed that (2.7) will be satisfied at the
Nash policy choices if either Gx = 0 or Gx
* = 0 at these policy choices. QED
Lemma 1. Program 10 is a partition of Program 1.
Proof: We prove this by establishing that the first-order conditions associated
with Program 10 are equivalent to the first-order conditions associated with
Program 1, given by (2.2). Letting λ1 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the constraint in Step 1 of Program 10, and letting λ2 denote the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the constraint in Step 2 of Program 10, the first-order
conditions associated with Step 1 are given by
Gik - l1gik ¼ 0 for k ¼ 1; 2; :::; I ; ðA3Þ
6 6
6 6
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while the first order conditions associated with Step 2 are given by
l - l f ¼ 0; and1 2 g
A4
G l1 x - l
ð
x 2
*- g ½ f Þg*gx þ fx] ¼ 0:
Eliminating λ1 and λ2 from (A3)–(A4) yields (2.2). QED
Lemma 4. Program 50 is a minimal partition of the home-government’s best-
response choice problem defined by Program 5.
Proof:We first establish that Program 50 is a partition of Program 5 (Part I). We
then argue that it is a minimal partition (Part II).
Part I: The first-order conditions associated with Program 5 are
Wr þ τ j
@p~wj dT
Wp x þWT x ¼ 0 for i A5dr ¼ 1; 2; :::;R; andi @r ð Þi i
W jp þ y WT ¼ 0 for j ¼ 1; 2; ðA6Þ
where y j dT
j=dτ . Observe that by (6.7), τ1[ pw1/ r ] = τ2[ pw2=
dp j
/ r ], and so (A5)
=dτ
@~ @ i @~ @ i
may be equivalently evaluated for either j = 1, 2. The first-order conditions asso-
ciated with Step 1 and Step 2 of Program 50, with γ1 and γ2 denoting the Lagrange
multiplier on the constraints in Step 1 and Step 2, respectively, are
Wr þ g1Mr ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1; 2; :::;R;i i ðA7Þ
Wp þ g1Mp ¼ 0; ðA8Þ






Wp þ 1τ Mp þ ½WT þ g1MT ] x τ*1 @p*1 þ @pw1 ðA10Þ{ [
1
g E*1 *1- 2 p*1 þ Epw1 ¼ 0; andτ*1
{ [ { [
1 @T @T 1
g MT
*2 *½W 2T þ 1 ] x þ E2 g E 0: A11τ* @p*2 @pw 2 τ*2 p*2 pw22 - þ ¼ ð Þ
By using (A9) and (A11) to derive an expression for γh i 1 and noting that
dT 1 @T @T
dpw2
¼




p þ 2 dT xW 0M T ¼ : ðA12E Þp*w2 - T dpw2
58 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger 58










@τ2 p~w1 dT @τ1




pw1~ @τ12 ¼ x h i : ðA13
dpw2 p
Þ
~w2 þ τ2 @pw2~ 2@τ





2 may be derived which, when substituted into (A13), yield@τ @τh i




Therefore, by substituting (A14) into (A6) and observing that the resulting expres-
sion is identical to (A12), we may conclude that (A9), (A11), and (A8) imply (A6).
Similarly, we use (A9) and (A10) to derive an alternative expression for γ1, which
allows (A7) to be written as" # { [ " #
M
Wr þ τ1W ri
dT Mr
p x 1 þW iT x x 1 ¼ 0: ðA15i E Þp* 1w -Mpw dpw1 1 Ep*w1 -Mpw1
Now using (6.7) and (6.10), we may derive that" #
@p~w1 Mri¼ *1 : A1r ð 6@ Þi Epw1 -Mpw1
Substituting (A16) into (A15) yields an expression identical to (A5). Hence, we
may conclude that (A9), (A10), and (A7) imply (A5).
Part II: The proof that Program 50 is a minimal partition of Program 5 proceeds
in the same way as the proof of Lemma 3. QED
Proposition 10. An international agreement can attain a point on the international
efficiency frontier and satisfy (6.11) if and only if it satisfies the MFN rule.
Proof: To prove this proposition, we first characterize the efficiency frontier of
the three-country model (that is, for notational simplicity, we treat the foreign gov-
ernments in region *2 as if they were all identical, but this is not essential for
the result). To this end, fix foreign welfare levelsW- * j for j = {1, 2} and define













p* j þ τ r* j* jW
ð* j @ ¼ W *jp* j τ* jW * j
Þ
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for i = 1, 2, …, R* j and j = {1, 2}. We may now define
T- r* j ; τ* j ; W- * j T r* j ; p* j τ* j;p~wj r* j * j * j wj * j * j * jðf g f g f gÞ = ðf g f ð ð ; τ ; W- ÞÞg; fp~ ðr ; τ ; W- ÞgÞ;
and observe that, by the market-clearing condition (6.10), a value of p is implied,
which we denote by -p(r, r* j, τ* j,W- * j). We may thus write domestic government
welfare as a function of the domestic regulatory choices, the foreign regulatory
choices and foreign tariffs, and the foreign welfare levels, or
W r;p- * j * j *j *j * j * jð ðr; r ; τ ; W- Þ; T-ðfr g; fτ g; fW- gÞÞ: ðA18Þ
Fixing foreign welfare levels and choosing domestic and foreign regulations and
foreign tariffs to maximize domestic welfare given by (A18) then defines a point
on the efficiency frontier. The first order conditions that define the efficiency fron-
tier are
@p-
Wr þWp ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1; 2; :::;R;i ðA19@r Þi
@p- @T-
Wp j þW jT- j ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1; 2; :::;R* and j ¼ 1; 2; and ðA20@r Þi* @ri*
@p- @T-
W A21p þWT o 2τ* j Þ¼ 0 f r i@τ -*j ¼ 1; :@ ð
Now consider the efficiency properties of policy choices that satisfy (6.11) and also
(6.12). By (A19)–(A21), these policies are efficient if and only if
@T- @T-
j ¼ 0 for ¼ r i 1; 2; :::;R
*j and j 1; 2: A22
@ i
* @τ
ð* j ¼ ¼ Þ





i A23½p p~ T- jwj - ] ¼ 0 *
M
½p~wj - T-] for i * j
M
ð Þ¼ ¼ 1; 2; :::;R and j ¼ 1; 2:
Hence, by (A23), policy choices that satisfy (6.11) and (6.12) are efficient if and
only if the tariffs conform to MFN (so that pwj~ – T- for j = 1, 2). Further, at policies
satisfying (6.11), (A17)–(A23) can be used to show that efficiency requires that
these policies satisfy (6.12) as well and abide by MFN. Hence, an international
agreement can attain a point on the international efficiency frontier and satisfy
(6.11) if and only if it satisfies the MFN rule. QED
3 Trade competition and reallocations
in a small open economy
Marc Melitz
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a simple model of firm heterogeneity with endogenous
markups. The endogenous markups stem from preferences that feature variable
elasticities of substitution (VES) in a monopolistically competitive environment.
Although the model is kept general along some key dimensions (both preferences
and technology heterogeneity are left un-parametrized), I show how it is still ame-
nable to simple, mostly graphical, comparative statics analyses of asymmetric
trade liberalization (for either imports or exports) by applying these to the case
of a “small” open economy.1 The comparative statics analyses for trade liberaliza-
tion are applied to describe both short-run and long-run effects of liberalization –
where the latter allows for a response of firm entry to liberalization. These effects
are described both in a partial equilibrium setting where wages in a given sector
are fixed and trade need not be balanced; as well as in a general equilibrium
setting where wages across countries adjust to balance trade. Although the prefer-
ences are left un-parametrized, they are restricted to a broad class of additively
separable preferences that generates predictions for markups under monopolistic
competition that are consistent with a large set of established empirical patterns.
These patterns include evidence for markup differences across firms (larger
firms set larger markups), as well as for changes in markups associated with
incomplete pass-through of cost changes into prices.2
A substantial portion of the theoretical trade literature analyzing the response
of heterogeneous exporters assumes constant markups – based on the assump-
tions of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences along with monop-
olistic competition.3 These models do a good job of capturing the extensive
margin of trade: the selection effects that determine which products are sold
where. However, those models cannot capture the intensive margin reallocations –
between producers selling in the same market – stemming from trade, even
though there is growing empirical evidence for this phenomenon.4 The current
model with endogenous markups highlights how trade liberalization induces
such intensive margin reallocations towards more productive producers that reen-
force the extensive margin reallocations that are stressed by models with exoge-
nous markups – because they do not feature intensive margin reallocations. This
DOI: 10.4324/9781351061544-3
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generates another channel for the productivity enhancing effects of trade
liberalization.5
2. Closed economy
I start with a description of a closed economy with monopolistic competition, het-
erogeneous producers and endogenous markups.6 This introduces the key equilib-
rium concept of competition in a market, which in turn shapes the whole
distribution of producer markups. I develop both a general equilibrium version
with a single differentiated good sector for the whole economy, and a partial equi-
librium version focusing on a single sector among many in the economy. In the
latter, I also introduce a short-run version where entry is restricted (general equi-
librium is inherently a long-run scenario). This closed economy setup is also used
to examine an initial globalization scenario for an integrated world economy with
no trade costs – captured by an overall increase in market size.
Consider a sector with a single productive factor, labor. I will distinguish
between two scenarios. The first is the standard general equilibrium (GE) setup
with a single sector. The exogenous labor endowment L indexes both the
number of workers Lw with inelastic supply and consumers Lc. I choose the
endogenous wage as the numeraire. Thus, all revenue and expenditure flows
are measured in units of the wage.7 Aggregate expenditures are then given by
the exogenous labor endowment. In the partial equilibrium (PE) scenario, I
focus on the sector as a small part of the economy. I take the number of consum-
ers Lc as well as their individual expenditures on the sector’s output as exoge-
nously given. The supply of labor Lw to the sector is perfectly elastic at an
exogenous economy-wide wage. This involves a normalization for the measure
of consumers Lc in that sector: Aggregate accounting then implies that this nor-
malized number of consumers Lc represents a fraction of the labor endowment L.8
2.1. Consumer optimization
There is a continuum of differentiated varieties indexed by i 2 [0, I], where I is
the measure of products available. The demand for differentiated varieties qi is
generated by the Lc consumers who solve:9Z I Z I
max u q
qi>0
ð iÞdi s:t: piqidi ¼ 1:
0 0
So long as
0 00ðA1Þ uð0Þ ¼ 0; u ðqiÞ > 0; and u ðqiÞ < 0 for qi > 0
this leads to a downward sloping inverse demand function (per consumer)Z
u0 q I
pðq ð iÞi; l ; where l 0Þ ¼ l ¼ u ðqiÞqidi > 0 ð1Þ0
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is the marginal utility of income (spent on differentiated varieties). Given the
assumption of separable preferences, this marginal utility of income λ is the
unique endogenous aggregate demand shifter. Higher λ shifts all residual
demand curves inward, which represents an increase in competition for a given
level of market demand Lc.
Strict concavity of u(qi) ensures that the chosen consumption level from (1)
also satisfies the second order condition for the consumer’s problem. This resid-
ual demand curve (1) is associated with a marginal revenue curve
u0 q u00 q q
ϕðqi; l
ð iÞ þ ð iÞ i :
l
ð2ÞÞ ¼
Let εp(qi) = −p0(qi)qi/p(qi) and εϕ(qi) = −ϕ0(qi)qi/ϕ(qi) denote the elasticities of
inverse demand and marginal revenue.10 Thus εp(qi) > 0 is the inverse price elas-
ticity of demand (less than 1 for elastic demand), capturing the sensitivity of price
to changes in quantities. εϕ(qi) captures the sensitivity of marginal revenue to
changes in quantities, which combines both the response of the price of the mar-
ginal unit as well as the impact on revenue from the change in price on infra-
marginal units. Additional demand restrictions imposed later will ensure that
this sensitivity measure is non-negative for profit maximizing firms.
Although the demand and marginal revenue curves are residual (they depend
on λ), their elasticities are nonetheless independent of λ. These preferences nest
the case of CES preferences where the elasticities εp(qi) and εϕ(qi) are constant.
11
2.2. Firm optimization
The market structure is monopolistically competitive. There is an unbounded set
of entrants who can pay a sunk entry cost fE (in units of labor) for a variety blue-
print with uncertain productivity. After this cost is incurred, the productivity φ of
the blue print is revealed as a draw from a common continuous differentiable dis-
tribution G(φ) with support over [0, 1).12 This productivity is the inverse unit
labor requirement for producing this variety, which can also be thought of as
product quality.13 Producing and selling this variety in the domestic market
also entails a fixed cost f – assumed to be common across firms. Technology
therefore exhibits increasing returns to scale at the product level. This production
structure can also be extended to incorporate multi-product firms, as developed in
Mayer et al. (2016).
A firm with productivity φ that produces positive output and faces market com-
petition λ chooses an output level that maximizes operating profit per-consumer:
pðφ; lÞ ¼ max p
q
½ ]ðqi; lÞqi - qi=φ ; ð3Þ
i
qðφ; lÞ ¼ arg max p
q
½ ]ðqi; lÞqi - qi=φ : ð4Þ
i
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The first order condition for this optimization problem is the well known equal-
ization of marginal revenue with marginal cost:
ϕðqðφ; lÞ; lÞ ¼ 1=φ: ð5Þ
In order to ensure that the solution to this problem exists (for at least some φ > 0)
and is unique, I further restrict the specification of preferences to satisfy:
ðA2Þ 2u00ðqi u000Þ þ ðqiÞqi < 0 for qi > 0:
This assumption ensures that marginal revenue φ(qi; λ) is decreasing for all
output levels and positive for at least some output levels (as q ! 0). It also guar-
antees that demand is elastic along a top portion of the demand curve. One can
also measure a firm’s output using its generated revenues per consumer:
rðφ; lÞ ¼ qðφ; lÞpðqðφ; lÞ; lÞ: ð6Þ
Note that all these performance measures (operating profit, output, sales) are
increasing in firm productivity φ and decreasing in the endogenous competition
level λ: More productive firms are larger and earn higher profits than their less
productive counterparts; and an increase in competition λ lowers production
levels and profits for all firms.
A firm with productivity φ earns total – across consumers – net profit
P cðφ; lÞ ¼ L pðφ; lÞ - f :
This is also increasing in firm productivity, leading to a unique cutoff productivity
φ* satisfying
P φ*ð ; lÞ ¼ 0: ð7Þ
Firms with productivity below this cutoff do not produce: they shut down in the
short run, and exit in the long run. Tougher competition thus leads to tougher
selection: only a proper subset of higher productivity firms survive.
2.3. Free entry in the long run
In the long run when entry is unrestricted, the expected profit of a prospective
entrant adjusts to match the sunk cost:Z 1
Pðφ; lÞdGðφÞ ¼ fE: ð8Þ
φ*
This free entry condition, along with the zero cutoff profit condition (7), jointly
determine the equilibrium cutoff φ* along with the competition level λ. The
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number of entrants NE, which includes some firms with productivity below
the cutoff φ* that do not produce, is then determined by the consumer’s budget
constraint:Z 1
NE rðφ; lÞdGðφÞ ¼ 1: ð9Þ
φ*
These conditions hold in both the GE and PE scenarios.
Aggregating employment over all firms yields the aggregate labor demanded:] [Z 1
Lw NE f f Lc¼ E þ ½ ]þ qðφ; lÞ=φ dGðφÞ :
φ*
As the free entry condition (8) entails no ex-ante aggregate profits (aggregate
revenue is equal to the payments to all workers, including those employed to
cover the entry costs), this aggregate labor demand Lw will be equal to the
number of consumers Lc. This ensures labor market clearing in the GE scenario.
In the PE scenario, this implies that the endogenous labor supply adjusts so that it
equals the normalized number of consumers (recall that this is an exogenous frac-
tion of the economy-wide labor endowment).14 Thus, in this closed economy
setup, the determination of the endogenous cutoff φ* and competition λ will be
identical in both long-run scenarios (GE and PE). This equivalence will be
broken in the open economy where the two scenarios feature different wage
responses.
2.3.1. Graphical representation of equilibrium
The determination of the long run equilibrium cutoff is represented in Figure 3.1
below. Consider a plot of total firm profit Π(φ, λ) as a function of productivity φ
for any given level of competition λ. In Figure 3.1, the productivity levels are
rescaled to an index between 0 and 1 using the distribution G(φ). The cutoff
Figure 3.1 Graphical representation of equilibrium
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productivity φ* from (7) is given by the intersection of the curve with the hori-
zontal axis. This curve is strictly increasing for all firms with productivity
above this cutoff. (The dashed line represents the hypothetical total profit from
the maximization of operating profit from (3); unlike the case of CES preferences
operating profits may be zero for firms with low productivity and marginal cost
above a choke price.) Firms with productivity below the cutoff φ* do not produce
and earn zero total profit. Given our rescaling of productivity, the area below the
profit curve (up to the maximum productivity index G(φ) = 1) represents the
average profit (and hence the expected profit) from the left-hand side of
the free entry condition (8). At the equilibrium level of competition λ, this area
must be equal to the sunk entry cost – represented in the graph by the rectangle
above the axis up to the fE line. Or, rearranging, the two shaded areas in the graph
must be equalized. The area above the fE line to the right represents the post-entry
gains by firms with high productivity while the area below the line to the left cap-
tures the post-entry losses by the low productivity firms. This includes firms that
exit as well as some that produce. In the latter case, the firms’ total profit Π(φ, λ)
is positive, but below the sunk entry cost.
2.4. Short-run equilibrium
I now consider an alternative short-run situation in which the number of incum-
bents is fixed at N- in the PE scenario (with the same exogenous distribution of
ex-ante productivity G(φ)). In this case, free entry (8) no longer holds: firms with
productivity above the cutoff φ* in (7) produce while the remaining firms shut-
down. However, the budget constraint (9) still holds with the exogenous
number of incumbents N- now replacing the endogenous number of entrants
NE. Together with the zero cutoff profit (7), those two conditions jointly deter-
mine the endogenous cutoff φ* and competition level λ.
2.5. Aggregate productivity
As previously mentioned, the symmetric representation for quantities in the pref-
erences assumes that those quantities have been adjusted for quality (in order to
equate utility in the consumer’s eye). A theoretical aggregation of productivity
can therefore sum the quantity produced per worker:R1
q ; l
F
* ðφ Þdφ mðφÞ¼ ;
Lw
where μ(φ) = NEG(φ) represents the cumulative mass of producing firms. This is
a theoretical measure however, as the correspondence between physical and
quality-adjusted units is not observed (even physical quantities are often poorly
measured). Typically, labor productivity is measured as deflated aggregate sales
(or value-added, when intermediates are used in production) per worker; where
percentage changes in the price deflator capture expenditure weighted percentage
66 Marc Melitz 66
changes in individual prices. The best representation of such a productivity
measure within the structure of the model is:R1
* rðφ; lÞdmðφÞ=P^ φq ¼ ;
Lw
where the price deflatorR1
* rðφ; lÞpðq dφ ðφ; lÞ; lÞ mðφ
P R Þ¼ 1
r
φ* ðφ; lÞdmðφÞ
is defined as the revenue-weighted average of firm-level prices.
3. Curvature of demand
Up to now, I have placed very few restrictions on the shape of (residual) demand
that the firms face, other than the conditions (A1)–(A2) needed to ensure a unique
monopolistic competition equilibrium. The shape of demand determines how
tougher competition λ (an inward shift of residual demand) impacts firm prices
and markups. At their chosen production level q(φ, λ), a firm sets a markup
μ(qi) (the ratio of price to marginal cost) that is tied down (inversely) by the
price elasticity of demand: μ(qi) = 1/(1 − εp(qi)). Thus, the response of
markups is tied to changes in the price elasticity of demand (along the residual
demand curve). If, moving up residual demand, demand becomes more elastic,
εp
0 ðqiÞ > 0, then tougher competition λ leads to a lower markup (and hence
price) for any given firm with productivity φ.15 And conversely, if demand
becomes more inelastic (again, moving up the demand curve), then tougher com-
petition leads to higher markups and prices. Although theoretically possible, this
latter case seems counter-intuitive. Indeed, this case was excluded by Marshall
(1890) in his original exposition defining demand curves; it is often referred to
as “Marshall’s Second Law of Demand” (MSLD)16 – that elasticity of demand
increases with price along a demand curve, or alternatively that the demand
curve is log-concave in log-price.17 This is also the main demand assumption
made “without apology” by Krugman (1979) (in order to yield “reasonable
results”) in his seminal paper on trade with economies of scale.
Violations of MSLD would also directly contradict the evidence on markups
and pass-through that were mentioned in the introduction. Within a monopolistic
competition framework (required for a well-defined residual demand curve),
MSLD is equivalent to the property that more productive firms set higher
markups. It is also equivalent to the property of incomplete pass-through: that
a change to marginal cost is passed-on less than one-for-one into prices – with
the remaining variation absorbed into the markup. Under CES preferences,
markups are constant, both across firms and with respect to changes in competi-
tion λ. Changes to marginal costs are passed on one-for-one into prices, and pass-
through is therefore complete. Lastly, the endogenous markups generated by
MSLD demand also induce a pattern of endogenous trade elasticities that are
broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.18
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Under MSLD, the elasticity of inverse demand εp(qi) increases with output qi.
Since marginal revenue is everywhere below the inverse demand, its
elasticity – on average – must also increase with output. A slightly stronger
assumption than MSLD is that the elasticity of marginal revenue εφ(qi) smoothly
increases with output: ε0ϕðqiÞ > 0. I refer to this assumption as MSLD’, which
implies MSLD. Figure 3.2 depicts a log-log graph of the inverse demand and
marginal revenue curves satisfying these restrictions. On its own, MSLD is equiv-
alent to the concavity of the demand curve in log-log space. MSLD’ is equivalent
to the concavity of the marginal revenue curve in that space (relative to MSLD, it
eliminates the possibility of inflection points in the marginal revenue curve).19
From here on out, I assume that MSLD’ holds (ε0ϕðqiÞ > 0), which implies that
MSLD (ε0pðqiÞ > 0) also holds. I am tempted to add “without apology,” but
instead will lean on the accumulated empirical research in the intervening
30 years since Krugman (1979) and point out that violations of this demand-
side restriction would generate counterfactual predictions against overwhelming
empirical support on firm markup differences and how they respond to various
shocks.20
Given MSLD’, an increase in competition induces a downward shift in
markups (lower markup at any given productivity level φ) as firms are pushed
up their demand curves. This increase in price elasticities also results in a reallo-
cation of output (and hence labor), revenue and operating profit towards more
productive firms. Put another way, for any two firms with productivity φ1 and
φ2 < φ1, the ratios q(φ1, λ)/q(φ2, λ), r(φ1, λ)/r(φ2, λ), π(φ1, λ)/π(φ2, λ) increase
with competition λ (so long as both firms produce after the increase in competi-
tion). This intensive margin reallocation of resources towards more productive
firms generates an increase in aggregate productivity for a given set of producing
firms. There is also an extensive margin effect that contributes to aggregate pro-
ductivity changes. If selection toughens (higher cutoff φ*), then this margin also
contributes to an aggregate productivity increase; and conversely weaker selec-
tion (lower cutoff φ*) contributes to lower aggregate productivity.21
This MSLD’ restriction on preferences excludes the very common case of CES
preferences where the elasticities εp(qi) and εϕ(qi) are constant – and hence all
Figure 3.2 Graphical representation of demand assumptions
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firms share the same constant markup. In this case, no intensive margin realloca-
tions are possible: the output, revenue and operating profit ratios q(φ1, λ)/q(φ2, λ),
r(φ1, λ)/r(φ2, λ), π(φ1, λ)/π(φ2, λ) no longer vary with competition λ: they only
depend on the productivity differential φ1/φ2 and exogenous parameters. In an
open economy setting, such a model emphasizes the impact of trade (and trade lib-
eralization) at the extensive margin (firm selection). The model developed in this
chapter with MSLD’ preferences will feature similar extensive margin predictions,
but adds another important channel operating through intensive margin realloca-
tions. In the following globalization scenarios, I will emphasize how these inten-
sive margin reallocations generate a more robust prediction linking globalization to
increased aggregate productivity.
4. Market size
Before developing the open economy version of the model and analyzing various
trade liberalization scenarios, I examine the impact of increased market size. This
corresponds to a globalization scenario for an integrated world economy (with no
additional frictions to international trade). I consider first the short-run response to
an increase in the number of consumers Lc with a fixed number of producers (no
entry). On impact (keeping the competition level λ fixed), an increase in market
size increases firm net profit Π(φ, λ) = Lcπ(φ, λ) − f even though the operating
profit per consumer π(φ, λ) does not change. This is represented by the change
from the solid line to the dotted line in Figure 3.3. This implies that some firms
that previously entered and found production to be unprofitable (with productivity
below the cutoff φ*) now find it profitable to produce. This, in turn, increases com-
petition λ leading to a short-run equilibrium with both higher competition λ and a
lower cutoff φ* as depicted by the dashed line in the figure. More formally, it is
straightforward to show that this is the comparative static implied by the cutoff
(7) and budget constraint (9) conditions for the short run.22
The short-run equilibrium depicted in Figure 3.3 clearly violates the free entry
condition: Average firm profit – the area below the net profit curve – increases
from its long-run equilibrium level matching the sunk entry cost (this is repre-
sented by the area below the solid line). This increase in average net profit in
Figure 3.3 Increased market size: short run
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Figure 3.4 Increased market size: long run
the short run induces entry in the long run. This entry further raises the compe-
tition level λ. Figure 3.4 shows the new long-run equilibrium profit curve (dashed
curve) along with the same old long-run equilibrium profit curve (solid curve).
The new net profit curve now satisfies the free-entry condition: so long as the
area between the two profit curves – above and below their intersection – are
equal, the total area below the new profit curve will be equal to the entry cost
fE (as is also the case for the old equilibrium profit curve). As depicted in the
figure, the new profit curve must be steeper than the old one, and must intersect
it only once, given that the ratio of operating profit π(φ1, λ)/π(φ2, λ) increases
(with competition λ) for any two producing firms with φ 231 > φ2. This further
implies that the cutoff φ* rises indicating tougher selection. As I previously dis-
cussed, this new long run equilibrium applies to both the GE and PE versions of
the model in a closed world economy (the same cutoff and free entry condition
applies in both cases). Lastly, I note that the demand assumptions play a critical
role in generating this prediction for selection. Under CES preferences, changes
in competition λ would not affect the steepness of the profit curves, and the new
long-run equilibrium curve would coincide with the old equilibrium curve: only
the number of firms would change.24
Thus, we see how more realistic demand assumptions strengthen the link
between this initial globalization scenario and aggregate productivity. In both
the short- and long-run, an increased market size for the world economy
induces an increase in competition that generates intensive margin reallocations
towards more productive firms. As production resources (labor in this one-factor
model) are reallocated towards more productive firms, aggregate productivity
increases. In the long run, the impact on aggregate productivity is compounded
by the extensive margin reallocations triggered by tougher selection. In the
short run, the extensive margin reallocations go in the opposite direction as selec-
tion weakens (the productivity cutoff φ* decreases). Aggregate productivity
increases so long as the impact of the intensive margin reallocations dominate.
These predictions for aggregate productivity contrast with the case of CES pref-
erences and exogenous markups where productivity remains constant in the long-
run and decreases in the short run (only the extensive margin effect is operative).
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5. Small open economy
In order to analyze globalization scenarios in a world that is not completely inte-
grated, I now develop an open economy with trade frictions. For simplicity, I con-
sider the same domestic economy that was previously developed along with a
unique foreign trading partner (F). This “rest of the world” economy is structured
in the same way as the domestic economy. It features a market size indexed by LcF
consumers and an equilibrium level of competition λF. Thus, a foreign firm with
productivity φ will earn an operating profit per-consumer in F, π(φ, λF), given by
the same optimization problem (3) as was solved by firms in the domestic
economy – though these profits are denominated in units of the foreign wage
(just like the domestic profits are denominated in units of the domestic wage).
Note that this per-consumer operating profit function – and the associated
output and revenue per-consumer given by (4) and (6) – depends only on prefer-
ences, which we assume to be identical across countries.25
Domestic firms can export to F but then incur both a per-unit “iceberg” trade
cost τ > 1 as well a fixed export market access cost fX (denominated in units of
domestic labor). Thus, if a domestic firm with productivity φ exports to F, it
would earn an operating profit per-consumer in F (in units of the foreign
wage) given by π(w τ−1F φ, λF), where wF indexes the relative wage difference
in F (the foreign wage divided by the domestic wage).26 Converting this
export profit to the domestic wage numeraire then yields total (across consumers)
net export profits
PX ðφ; l w cF pðw 1Þ ¼ FLF Fτ- φ; lFÞ - fX :
This is increasing in firm productivity, leading to a unique export cutoff produc-
tivity φ*X satisfying
PX ðφX* ; lFÞ ¼ 0: ð10Þ
Firms with productivity below this cutoff do not export.
As in the closed economy, a domestic firm with productivity φ would also earn
a total net profit from domestic sales given by
PDðφ; lÞ ¼ Lcpðφ; lÞ - f ;
where λ still indexes the level of competition in the domestic market. The same
cutoff condition also holds:
PD
*ðφ; lÞ ¼ 0: ð11Þ
Firms with productivity below this cutoff cannot profitably operate in their
domestic market and do not produce. Here, we have assumed that market condi-
tions in the export market are not so favorable relative to the trade costs that firms
would find it profitable to export and not produce for their domestic market.
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Hence, we assume that selection into the export market is tougher, φ*X > φ
*, so
that some firms with productivity in between those two cutoffs produce for the
domestic market but do not export.27 Total net profit for a firm with productivity
φ then reflects both selection decisions and can be written:
Pðφ; l; lFÞ ¼ 1 *½φ * ð ; Þ þ 1 ð ; Þ:>φ ]PD φ l ½φ>φ
X
]PX φ lF ð12Þ
As previously mentioned, the foreign economy is structured in the same way as
the domestic economy, though with its own set of parameters. There are NEF
entrants with a productivity distribution GF(φ). These foreign firms can then
export into the domestic economy, subject to per-unit trade costs τF > 1 and
an overhead fixed costs fF,X (in units of foreign labor). As with the domestic
economy, the foreign firms sort into production and exports given cutoffs φ*F
and φ*F;X .
5.1. Small open economy restriction
In order to analyze asymmetric trade liberalization scenarios with the simple
graphical tools developed for the closed economy, I additionally assume that
the domestic economy is small relative to its rest-of-the-world trading partner. I
follow Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) in defining a small open
economy with product differentiation and monopolistic competition. This
amounts to assuming that changes in the domestic economy do not have repercus-
sions for market aggregates in the foreign economy (other than its trade with the
domestic economy). Thus, from the perspective of the domestic economy, the
number of entrants NEF , the production cutoff φ
*
F , and the level of competition
λF in foreign are all fixed and do not respond to domestic changes (including
all trade costs to/from the domestic economy). The only foreign variables that
remain endogenous are the relative wage wF and the export cutoff into the domes-
tic economy φ 28*F;X.
5.2. Long-run equilibrium
In the long run with free-entry, average post-entry profits for all firms must still
match the sunk entry cost, yielding the same free-entry condition (8) as for the
closed economy – except that profits in the open economy now involve the poten-
tial for export profits as shown in (12).
In the PE version of the model, the relative wage wF is fixed as the wage in
the sector is fixed relative to the economy-wide wage in both countries. Since
the competition level λF in F is exogenous, the export cutoff condition (10)
then independently determines the export cutoff φX
* . Given this cutoff, one
can solve for the domestic economy cutoff φ* and competition λ using the
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free-entry condition (8) and domestic cutoff condition (11). Given a domestic
competition level λ, one can then sequentially solve for the foreign export







*ðw F;X ; lÞ - fF;X ¼ 0: ð13Þ
Lastly, the number of domestic entrants is then determined by the budget con-
straint: Z 1 Z 1





In the GE version of the model, the relative wage wF is endogenous and adjusts
to balance trade:Z 1 Z 1





with the aggregate domestic exports on the left-hand side and the aggregate
foreign exports on the right-hand side. Together with the five equilibrium condi-
tions from the PE version – budget constraint (14), free-entry (8) and three cutoff




X ,wF). Since the relative wage appears in all but
one of the 6 conditions, these variables can no longer be solved sequentially as
in the PE equilibrium.
5.3. Short-run equilibrium
As was the case in the closed economy, the short-run equilibrium features a fixed
number of firms N- with the same exogenous distribution of ex-ante productivity
G(φ) and the free-entry condition no longer applies. This exogenous number of
firms then replaces the endogenous number of entrants in the budget constraint
(14). Again, I only consider the PE version in the short run (the GE relative
wage adjustments are inherently a long-run phenomenon). Given an exogenous
relative wage wF, the export cutoff φ*X is again independently determined by
its cutoff condition (10). The remaining three endogenous variables (domestic
cutoff φ*, foreign export cutoff φ*F;X , competition λ) are solved using the remaining
two cutoff conditions (11,13) and the budget constraint (14) with the exogenous
number of firms.
6. Globalization scenarios
One of the main advantages of the small open economy that I have just described
is that it is easily amenable to the analysis of asymmetric trade liberalization. In
order to build the intuition for those comparative statics, I begin with a simpler
Figure 3.5 Opening the economy to imports
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setup where trade runs in a single direction: only imports into or exports out of
the small open economy. I will then discuss how the asymmetric trade liberaliza-
tion scenarios with two-way trade feature very similar predictions. By construc-
tion, a scenario with one-way trade applies only to the PE case of an individual
sector – and not the GE version that is economy wide. (Clearly, balanced trade
cannot be imposed with one-way trade.)
6.1. One-way trade
6.1.1. Imports only
I start by describing the impact of opening the PE version of the closed economy
to imports. Firms in the small open economy cannot export (again, this relates to
a specific sector), so there are no export profits and no associated export cutoff.29
The free-entry condition for average profits thus only includes profits from
domestic sales; and hence depends only on the domestic cutoff φ*. Along with
its associated cutoff condition (11), those conditions solve for that cutoff φ*
and the domestic competition level λ. Given this competition level, the foreign
export cutoff condition (13) then solves for that cutoff φF
*
;X . In the short run,
those two cutoff conditions (11, 13) along with the budget constraint (14)
jointly solve for those cutoffs φ*, φF
*
;X and the competition level λ.
Now consider the short-run impact of opening up the closed economy to
import competition. The new imports reduce the market share of domestic
firms below one (in the domestic consumers’ total expenditure). This, in turn,
must lead to an increase in competition λ for the domestic economy.30 The
impact of the increase in competition λ on the domestic firms’ profit curve is
shown in figure 3.5 (the change from the solid curve to the dotted one). As
depicted in the figure, this increase in competition is then associated with an
increase in the domestic cutoff φ*: the least productive firms are forced to
shut-down in the short run.
The solid profit curve in Figure 3.5 represents the domestic firms’ profits
before opening to imports in the closed economy long run equilibrium. The
free-entry condition then holds so that the area below this solid curve (average
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profits) is equal to the sunk entry cost. The short-run response to the import
competition (dotted curve) clearly violates free-entry as the average profits are
driven down. In the long run, this leads to reduced entry, which then results in
lower competition λ. This process unfolds until the free-entry condition is re-
established: the average profits are driven back up to equal the sunk entry cost.
As the figure makes clear, this occurs when the increase in competition λ from
the short run is fully reversed to its previous long-run competition level: this is
the competition level that satisfies free-entry. Another way of seeing this is to
note that the same free-entry and cutoff profit condition for domestic production
φ* hold in both the closed economy and the open economy with imports. They
must then both exhibit the same competition level λ and cutoff φ*.
Note that the impact of opening the economy to imports is very different than
the impact of reducing the size of the domestic economy in terms of the number
of consumers Lc. The latter would be associated with lower competition in both
the short- and long-run. In both cases, the domestic sales are reduced. But in the
case of import competition, a higher level of competition is sustained because the
lost domestic sales and associated product variety is compensated from the con-
sumer’s perspective with increased imports and the associated imported product
variety.
Starting in this economy open to imports, the impact of further import
liberalization – a reduction in either the per-unit or fixed import costs τF and
fF,X – will be similar to the impact of opening up from the closed economy that
was just described. In other words, there are no discontinuities for the impact of
lower import costs, starting with a limiting case when they are arbitrarily large
and imports are non-existent: Decreases in those trade costs lead to increased com-
petition λ and tougher selection in the short run; in the long run, decreases in entry
reverse this increase in competition and it returns to its initial level. These effects
also apply to a decrease in the relative wage wF, which also induces an increase in
imports – just like reductions in import trade costs.
Thus, we see how asymmetric import trade liberalization generates a force
towards increased productivity. In the short run, increased competition from
imports generates both extensive margin reallocations (shut-down of least pro-
ductive firms) as well as intensive margin reallocations towards more productive
firms. This second channel is not operative in a model with CES preferences and
exogenous markups. The model predicts that these productivity gains are erased
in the long run. I will show later that this reversal no longer holds in the GE
version featuring an adjustment in the relative wage. Furthermore, even in the
PE version, the long-run transition can unfold very slowly implying a substantial
net present value effect for the productivity gain.
6.1.2. Exports only
I now describe the impact of opening the small open economy to exports – with
no foreign imports. As was previously noted, the exogenous relative wage wF in
this PE version implies that the export cutoff φX
* is independently determined by
Figure 3.6 Opening the economy to exports
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its cutoff condition (10). Given this cutoff, one can then solve for the domestic
economy cutoff φ* and competition level λ using the free-entry condition (8)
and domestic cutoff condition (11). In the short run, the budget constraint
(14) – which now only includes domestic sales and depends only on the domestic
cutoff φ* and competition λ – replaces the free entry condition; and determines
the equilibrium levels of those variables (along with the domestic cutoff
condition).
Now consider the impact of opening up the closed economy to exports. The
new export opportunities increase the total profits Π(φ, λ, λF) for high productiv-
ity firms with φ > φ*X who start exporting. This is shown in Figure 3.6 along with
the domestic profits ΠD(φ, λ) (dotted curve) for all producing firms. The export
profits ΠX(φ, λF) are represented by the difference between the other two profit
curves. In the short run, these increased profits do not affect the domestic
cutoff φ* and competition λ, which are still determined by the same budget con-
straint and domestic cutoff condition.
The dotted profit curve in Figure 3.6 also represents total firm profits before
opening to exports in the closed economy long run equilibrium. The free-entry
condition then holds so that the area below this dotted curve (average profits)
is equal to the sunk entry cost. The short-run response in total profits (solid
curve), which includes the new export profits, clearly violates free-entry as the
average profits are driven up. In the long run, this leads to increased entry,
which then results in increased competition λ. This process unfolds until the
free-entry condition is re-established: The average profits are driven back down
to equal the sunk entry cost. This is depicted in Figure 3.7, where the areas
between the new total profit curve (including export profits) in the solid line
and the old domestic profit curve in the dotted line are equal.
Predictions for the impact of further export liberalization – a reduction in either
the per-unit or fixed export costs τ and fX – will be similar to the impact of
opening up from the closed economy that was just described. In other words,
there are no discontinuities for the impact of lower export costs, starting with a
limiting case when they are arbitrarily large and exports are non-existent:
Decreases in those trade costs do not affect competition in the domestic market
in the short run. Aggregate productivity increases nonetheless as market shares
Figure 3.7 Opening the economy to exports in the long run
are reallocated towards more productive firms who export.31 This is an extensive
margin effect driven by changes in the set of markets served by a given firm.
In the long run, decreases in the export costs induce entry into the domestic
market, along with increased competition λ and tougher selection. This generates
additional extensive margin reallocations (shut-down of least productive firms) as
well as new intensive margin reallocations: increased competition shifts domestic
sales towards more productive firms. Again, this intensive margin channel is not
operative in a model with CES preferences and exogenous markups. All of these
effects also apply to an increase in the relative wage wF, which also induces an
increase in export and the associated profit (just like reductions in export trade
costs).
6.2. Two-way trade
I now return to the model with two-way trade that was developed in the previous
section and describe the impact of asymmetric trade liberalization (for both
imports and exports).
6.2.1. Exogenous relative wage (PE)
When the relative wage wF is fixed, both import and export liberalization will
have the same effects in an economy open to two-way trade as in the special
case of one-way trade that we just analyzed. The consequences for aggregate
productivity – including both extensive and intensive margin reallocations –
will therefore also be identical.
Consider first the case of import trade liberalization. Unlike the case of one-
way import trade, the export profits will play a role in determining the equilib-
rium levels of competition λ and production cutoff φ* in the domestic
economy. However, changes in import costs τF or fF,X then do not have any
impact on those export profits. Thus, the effects of this liberalization will
unfold just like the case of one-way trade: Increased imports from Foreign
raises competition λ and induces tougher selection in the short run; these
effects are then reversed in the long run with decreased entry.
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Now consider the case of export trade liberalization. Unlike the case of one-
way export trade, the imports from Foreign will play a role in determining the
equilibrium levels of competition λ and production cutoff φ* in the domestic
economy. In the short run, however, changes in export costs τ or fX will have
no impact on those imports from Foreign – because those trade costs do not
affect the competition level λ in the domestic economy. The lower export costs
induce higher export profits for domestic firms and the entry of new exporters
(lower export cutoff φ*X ), but this only feeds back into the determination of the
equilibrium competition level λ in the domestic economy in the long run. The
increased export profits then induce increased entry into the domestic
economy, raising competition λ and generating tougher selection (higher cutoff
φ*). This increase in competition λ then induces a decrease in foreign imports
and fewer foreign exporters (higher cutoff φ*F;X ). However, there is no feedback
from those reduced imports to the determination of the competition level λ in
the long run: that level is determined by the free-entry (8) and cutoff profit
(11) conditions.32
6.2.2. Endogenous relative wage (GE)
As discussed in the previous section, the relative wage wF connects all but one of
the equilibrium conditions, and these can no longer be solved sequentially as was
done for the PE version in the long run. Although this makes a formal solving of
the full equilibrium cumbersome, the direction of the comparative statics in
response to asymmetric trade liberalization are nonetheless straightforward –
because the direction of change for the relative wage is known in these cases.
This relative wage must adjust to rebalance trade following an asymmetric liber-
alization. If imports are liberalized (which induces an increase in imports and no
change in exports for the domestic economy at a constant relative wage), then the
relative wage wF must increase in order to rebalance trade. When exports are lib-
eralized (which induces an increase in exports and a decrease in imports for the
domestic economy at a constant relative wage), then the relative wage wF must
decrease in order to rebalance trade.
Consider first the case of import liberalization. At a constant relative wage wF,
the small open economy returns to a long-run equilibrium with the same compe-
tition level λ and domestic cutoff φ* (see previous subsection). However, this
leads to a (negative) trade imbalance and an ensuing increase in the relative
wage wF. This relative wage adjustment increases export profits for the domestic
firms, and induces similar effects to a decrease in export costs (as was previously
discussed). Relative to the long-run equilibrium with a constant relative wage,
this implies higher domestic entry associated with increased competition λ and
tougher selection (higher production cutoff φ*). Since import liberalization
does not affect the equilibrium in the long run at a given relative wage, the addi-
tional relative wage adjustment in GE must therefore induce increases in compe-
tition and tougher selection in response to import liberalization in the long run.
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Consider now the case of export liberalization. At a constant relative wage wF,
the increased export profits generate additional entry in the domestic economy
and tougher competition and selection. This leads to a (positive) trade imbalance
and an ensuing decrease in the relative wage wF. This decrease in the relative
wage partially offsets the increase in export profits (for any given firm); it also
induces an increase in imports from foreign (and new foreign exporters). These
effects dampen – but cannot overturn – the entry response into the domestic
economy. Therefore, the same qualitative predictions hold as with the case of
an exogenous relative wage in PE: Increased export liberalization leads to
tougher competition and selection in the domestic market (as well as increased
exports and new exporters).
Thus, we have just seen how both import and export trade liberalization lead to
tougher competition and selection in the small open economy; and higher export
profits and new domestic exporters. This involves some extensive margin reallo-
cations towards more productive producers: the exit of the least productive firms
and reallocations towards more productive exporters. These effects would all be
present in a model with CES preferences and exogenous markups.33 However,
the current model with endogenous markups also features additional intensive
margin reallocations towards more productive producers – driven by the increase
in competition in the domestic market. Those intensive margin reallocations
further contribute to an aggregate productivity increase in response to asymmetric
trade liberalization in either direction.
7. Conclusion
I have just developed a simple model of firm heterogeneity with endogenous
markups. Those endogenous markups stem from preferences that feature variable
elasticities of substitution. These preferences are left un-parametrized within a
broad class that generates empirical predictions for markups that are consistent
with a large set of established empirical patterns. On the production side, the
shape of the productivity distribution for firms is also left un-parametrized. By
appealing to the concept of a small open economy, I have shown how comparative
statics for the impact of asymmetric trade liberalization can be easily obtained
without imposing any further parametric assumptions. Relative to a model with
constant elasticities (CES) and exogenous markups, the current model highlights
how trade liberalization – in either direction – induces intensive margin realloca-
tions towards more productive producers that reenforce the extensive margin real-
locations that are stressed by models with exogenous markups (because they do
not feature intensive margin reallocations). Both of these reallocation margins gen-
erate aggregate productivity gains in response to asymmetric trade liberalization –
especially when relative wage responses are incorporated. The predictions for the
impact of trade liberalization are decomposed into a short-run response and then a
long-run version that further incorporates the response of entry and potentially
changes in relative wages induces by trade imbalances.
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1 Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) show how to extend the standard competitive
version of a small open economy to the case of product differentiation and imperfect
competition with heterogeneous producers. This is the same version that is applied
here.
2 See the evidence reviewed in De Loecker and Goldberg (2014), Burstein and Gopi-
nath (2014).
3 See Melitz and Redding (2014) for a survey.
4 In those models with constant markups and CES preferences, the relative market share
of two firms in any market is determined by the productivity ratio between those two
firms. Mayer et al. (2016) reviews this evidence and also provides some additional
empirical support for intensive margin product reallocation by French firms.
5 Dhingra and Morrow (2018) analyze the efficiency properties of a monopolistic com-
petition equilibrium with similar additively separable preferences. They show how the
new intensive margin reallocations induced by the endogenous markups generate an
additional channel for the gains from trade (increased market size).
6 The closed economy is a simplified version of the model developed in Mayer et al.
(2016) without multi-product firms; it is also very similar to the model developed
by Zhelobodko et al. (2012).
7 In the closed economy, this is equivalent to normalizing the wage and per-consumer
expenditure to 1. In the open economy, I will introduce a relative wage across
countries.
8 I will be using additively separable preferences that are non-homothetic. Thus,
changes in consumer income will have different effects than changes in the number
of consumers Lc. I focus on this functional form for tractability and do not wish to
emphasize its properties for income elasticities. As summarized in Deaton and Muell-
bauer (1980, chapter 5, section 3, pp. 138–140), additively separable preference imply
a specific relationship between price and income elasticities that does not fit empirical
consumption patterns well. I emphasize the properties of demand for those price elas-
ticities. Thus, I analyze changes in the number of consumers Lc holding their income
fixed. This is akin to indexing the preferences to a given reference income level.
9 Note that the symmetric representation for these preferences assumes that these quan-
tity units have been implicitly normalized to equate utility (and hence adjusted for
quality); these quantity units should therefore not be interpreted as physical units
for heterogeneous goods.
10 Note that ϕ(qi;λ) = p(qi ;λ)[1 − εp(qi)].
11 In the case of CES preferences, the marginal utility of income λ is an inverse mono-
tone function of the CES price index.
12 This assumption of infinite support is made for simplicity only to rule out the possi-
bility of an equilibrium without any firm selection.
13 I leave the concept of a physical unit of the product undefined. The units for the
product are the ones that equate utility in the consumer’s eye based on the symmetric
preferences. Thus, higher productivity can also represent the production of a good
with more utility units per worker.
14 This sector-level adjustment for labor supply is very similar to the case of CES
product differentiation within sectors and Cobb-Douglas preferences across sectors.
In the latter case, the sector’s labor supply adjusts so that it is equal (as a fraction
of the aggregate labor endowment) to the exogenous Cobb-Douglas expenditure
share for the sector. See Melitz and Redding (2014) for an example of those prefer-
ences with firm heterogeneity.
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15 Recall that firm output per consumer q(φ, λ) is decreasing in competition λ.
16 Marshall’s First Law of Demand is that it is downward sloping; this too can be vio-
lated with rational utility maximizing consumers.
17 Several other terms have been used to describe MSLD demand in the literature on
monopolistic competition with endogenous markups. Zhelobodko et al. (2012)
describe those preferences as exhibiting increasing “relative love of variety” (RLV);
Mrázová and Neary describe this as the case of “sub-convex” demand; and Bertoletti
and Epifani (2014) use the term “decreasing elasticity of substitution.”
18 It is the key characteristic of the demand systems analyzed by Spearot (2013), Novy
(2013), and Arkolakis et al. (2018) in order to explain the empirical variations in the
trade elasticity (at the intensive product margin).
19 u(qi) quadratic, leading to linear demand p(qi) is a simple functional form satisfying
MSLD’ (and hence MSLD).
20 Mayer et al. (2016) reviews this evidence and also provides some additional empirical
support for MSLD’ based on the pattern of intensive margin product reallocation for
French firms.
21 Dhingra and Morrow (2018) show how these productivity gains induced by both
intensive and extensive margin reallocations under endogenous markups generate
additional welfare gains – over and above the standard channels for welfare gains
under exogenous markups.
22 Assume that competition λ were to decrease following an increase in market size Lc.
Then, from (7), the export cutoff φ* must decrease. This would then violate the budget
constraint (9) as spending must then rise. So competition λ must increase; and given
this, the cutoff φ* must decrease to satisfy the budget constraint (9).
23 One can choose the firm at the intersection of the two curves as the reference firm to
show this directly.
24 See Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Redding (2014) for a more detailed discussion of
the equilibrium with CES preferences.
25 In other words, the same per-consumer performance functions π(φ, λ), q(φ, λ) and
r(φ, λ) apply to both the domestic and foreign economy.
26 Note that the productivity shifter wFτ
−1 in the operating profit function represents the
unit-cost differential between a Foreign and domestic firm with productivity φ.
27 If this were not the case, we would then need to account for the overhead production
cost – a portion of the fixed cost f – into the fixed export cost fX and remove that
portion from the fixed cost of serving the domestic market f.
28 This is identical to assuming an exogenous foreign wage level and an endogenous
domestic wage. If we pick the foreign wage as numeraire, then the domestic wage
would be 1/wF.
29 Alternatively, one can think of this as a case where the export costs and foreign com-
petition level λF are such that no domestic firms find it profitable to export.
30 This can be shown by contradiction. A (weak) decrease in competition λ, given the
cutoff conditions for domestic sales and foreign export sales would necessarily
violate the budget constraint (14).
31 If only the fixed export costs fX are reduced, then the market share of existing export-
ers does not change. Only the new exporters expand their market share. The impact on
aggregate productivity will nonetheless be positive so long as those new exporters are
more productive than the industry average: φ*X > F.
32 Only equilibrium entry into the domestic market is affected by those reduced imports
in the long run (given the budget constraint).
33 Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) develop such a model with CES preferences
for a small open economy (in GE with a relative wage adjustment to balance
trade). The predictions for the relative wage change and all the cutoffs are identical
to the model developed here.
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4 Trade in goods and trade in services
Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum
1. Introduction
Structural gravity modeling has advanced substantially in the last two decades.
Trade in merchandise, particularly in manufactures, has either explicitly or
implicitly inspired most modeling approaches. In fact, manufactures constitute
the largest component of trade, but, according to data reported to the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), trade in services has
grown enormously in the last several decades, to the point where it now consti-
tutes about a quarter of total trade involving OECD countries. Our goal in this
chapter is to examine basic features of services trade and to ask how well
current modeling strategies capture these features. We then propose and quantify
extensions to a basic structural gravity model that we think incorporate these fea-
tures. Our extended model allows us to handle goods trade and services trade in
an encompassing framework.
Modeling such trade is daunting because traded services include such diverse
activities as tourism, financial services, wholesale and retail trade, innovation and
artistic creation. In an attempt to systematize thinking, the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) classifies ser-
vices exports into four modes of supply:
Mode 1 constitutes a cross-border export. The service is provided by resources
located in the exporting country and delivered to a consumer in the
importing country. An example would be technical help provided by a
customer service representative in India to a U.S. household whose com-
puter has been infected by a virus.
Under mode 2 a person from the importing country travels to the exporting
country to consume the service. An example is U.S. college students on
spring break traveling to Cancun to buy margaritas at a Mexican bar.
Under mode 3 the exporter provides a commercial presence in the importer.
An example is German technology brought to the BMW plant in Spar-
tanburg, South Carolina.
Under mode 4 (the opposite of mode 2), a natural person from the exporter
travels to the location of the consumer to provide the service. An example
is the Rolling Stones visiting the United States on a concert tour.1
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These different modes have different implications for introducing services
trade into a general equilibrium economic model. Much services trade under
modes 1, 2 and 4 would appear to resemble trade in merchandise in two respects.
For one thing, the consumption of the service by the importer involves the recent
or contemporaneous employment of factors in the exporter (e.g., the Mexican bar-
tender serving a drink to the inebriated U.S. student). For another, the exports are
rival (only one student can sip the margarita at a time). Under mode 3, however,
the consumption of the service could occur much later than its production. The
research and development (R&D) investment behind BMW’s engineering tech-
nology may have occurred years ago. Moreover, BMW could use the same tech-
nology in its plant in Germany or in South Africa.
To capture these distinctions we follow Hill (1999) in classifying services
exports into two categories, tangible and intangible. Tangible services exports
are produced in the exporting country in the same period in which they are con-
sumed in the importing country and they are rival. Intangible services exports
could have been produced in the origin long before their use in the destination
and are nonrival.
An example illustrating both of these distinctions is that viewers in nearly 200
destinations can simultaneously watch The Big Sleep on Netflix, enjoying the
efforts of Humphrey Bogart, Lauren Bacall, Howard Hawks and William Faulk-
ner from seven decades ago, but generating export revenues for Netflix and
Warner Brothers even now. We treat the streaming from the Netflix library as a
tangible service export. We treat the rights to the The Big Sleep as an intangible
asset created by Warner Brothers in 1946. It constitutes an intangible asset that
Netflix uses for its tangible services export.
Reinsdorf and Slaughter (2009) and Robbins (2009) discuss the thorny
accounting issues that trade in intangibles raises. Until recently, producing intan-
gibles has been treated as an intermediate expense for investors, but in 2013 the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) began treating research and develop-
ment spending by firms as equivalent to their investment spending on tangible
capital assets.2 As with physical capital, the effort involved in creating intangible
assets represents current economic activity (e.g., composing a rock song is like
building a house), whether it’s counted as investment or intermediate production,
but earning income from the asset may involve little or no current resources
(earning royalties when the rock song is played on the radio or renting out the
house). One distinction between capital and intangible assets, however, is that
physical capital is typically rival while intangible assets are not. In contrast to
our Big Sleep example, if Lufthansa rents a Boeing 777 from Ireland’s GE
Capital Aviation Services, that airplane is not available for Air Canada.
Another distinction in the national accounts is that, while returns to a country’s
physical and intangible capital used abroad contribute to its GNP, they are part
of its GDP only for intangible assets or physical capital that is “moveable,”
e.g., a French-owned aircraft in Ireland but not a U.K. family’s vacation apart-
ment in Torremolinos.
Of course, how we model trade in services relates to how we model the pro-
duction and consumption of services generally. How to treat tangible services
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doesn’t seem to generate controversy. They’re like merchandise. But researchers
have taken alternative approaches to intangibles. Corrado et al. (2009), in partic-
ular, propose a (closed economy) accounting framework in which intangibles
receive the same treatment as physical capital in three respects: (1) investment
(whether construction of capital or creation of intangibles) constitutes a contem-
poraneous contribution to GDP on the production side; (2) earnings on the assets
(whether tangible or intangible) constitute a contemporaneous contribution to
GDP on the income side; and (3) the accumulation of assets (whether tangible
or intangible) constitute a “source of growth” based on the change in the stock
of the asset and its share in production.
While the approach we take to intangible assets here is consistent with the first
two characteristics, with the third it is not. As Corrado et al. (2009) point out,
for the accumulation of intangibles to constitute a source of growth requires that
they have a share in the production function just like physical capital, implying
rivalry. Hence their respecification of the accounts to include the accumulation
of intangible capital as a source of growth substantially reduces the “Solow resid-
ual” in growth accounting. In contrast, our approach, in treating intangibles as non-
rival, considers the accumulation of intangibles as the source of this residual.3 In
turning to trade in intangibles, McGrattan and Prescott (2010) and Ramondo
(2014) follow Corrado et al. (2009) in treating intangibles as rival, in contrast to
our approach here.
We begin with an exploration of data on services trade, documenting its
growing and differential, importance across countries. In particular, services
exports now constitute a third or more of the total exports of goods and services
of the United Kingdom and United States, but less than 20 per cent for Germany
and Japan. In line with previous studies, we find that a standard gravity formula-
tion with exporter–importer fixed effects captures bilateral trade both in services
overall and in eight categories of services, nearly as well as trade in goods, with
similar distance elasticities.
We then develop a model of trade in goods and services, where we divide ser-
vices into a tangible and intangible component. We treat tangible services and
merchandise similarly. Absorption is related to current production, and output
is rival. We model the output of the intangible services sector as nonrival intan-
gible assets that provide technologies for the future production of goods and tan-
gible services. For producers of tangibles to be able to compensate the original
creators of their technology requires that they charge a markup over the cost of
tangible inputs. Our market structure is consequently imperfectly competitive.
Markups on tangibles thus serve as the source of revenue for the creators of intan-
gible assets.
We implement the model numerically to explore its implications for trade in
manufactures, tangible services and intangible assets. The numerical model illus-
trates, for example, how greater diffusion can benefit all countries, even though it
can have negative implications for real wages in some countries.
The next section reviews some basic facts about services trade. In Section 3 we
present our model of trade in goods and in services. Section 4 presents some
quantitative implications of the model. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
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2. Basic facts
According to OECD data, goods continue to dominate services in international
trade, but trade in services is growing and for some countries now constitutes
a major source of export revenue. Table 4.1 reports services exports (as a share
of total exports) and services imports (as a share of total imports) for 20
OECD countries for 1985, 2000 and 2015.4 Only for Luxembourg in 2000 and
in 2015 does services constitute the majority of trade, but the share of services
in trade grew in all but a handful of cases. For some large economies, such as
the United Kingdom and United States, services exports represent more than a
third of the total.5 But for others, such as Japan and Germany, the services
share is less than 20 per cent.
Services trade comprises a wide ranging set of activities. To get a more detailed
breakdown of services trade we turn to the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD).6 The WIOD reports annual amounts of production, absorption, and
bilateral trade among 43 countries, partitioning economic activity into around
50 sectors. Table 4.2 provides a list of the different subcategories of services in
Table 4.1 Services trade
Country Services exports Services imports
(% of total exports) (% of total imports)
1985 2000 2015 1985 2000 2015
Australia 16.5 23.0 21.9 23.7 22.0 22.2
Austria 30.8 26.9 29.2 17.0 20.7 24.6
Canada 10.8 12.2 16.3 15.4 15.0 18.8
Denmark 24.6 33.0 38.4 20.3 33.5 39.9
Finland 12.9 14.9 30.3 17.2 23.3 33.5
France 24.4 22.2 28.4 20.7 19.1 28.0
Germany 10.9 13.8 17.3 20.0 23.0 22.4
Greece 26.8 55.9 48.4 11.3 23.1 19.5
Iceland 31.3 37.0 48.3 29.7 31.4 36.4
Israel 33.6 34.4 39.4 24.7 26.4 29.0
Italy 20.4 20.2 17.9 15.5 20.6 20.5
Japan 11.6 12.5 19.6 20.3 25.1 20.3
Korea 15.4 15.2 12.3 11.8 16.8 19.9
Luxembourg 37.2 73.2 85.1 25.4 58.9 82.0
Netherlands 16.2 20.4 22.8 17.5 24.3 27.3
Norway 27.5 23.2 29.3 28.8 31.8 36.7
Sweden 17.5 19.3 32.1 20.0 26.6 31.4
Switzerland 27.9 33.1 28.1 17.9 24.8 27.4
United Kingdom 24.7 30.5 44.2 17.6 23.7 25.9
United States 25.0 27.3 33.9 17.7 15.0 17.9
Notes:
German data before 1991 are estimated based on today’s boundaries.
Total trade (exports or imports) designates goods and services.
Source: OECD National Accounts Data (all OECD countries with complete data as of 1985).
Table 4.2 Industry correspondence
Category Industry description
Omitted Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Omitted Water collection, treatment and supply
Omitted Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials
recovery; remediation activities and other waste management services
Construction Construction
Wholesale Retail Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Wholesale Retail Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Wholesale Retail Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Transportation Land transport and transport via pipelines
Transportation Water transport
Transportation Air transport
Transportation Warehousing and support activities for transportation
Transportation Postal and courier activities
Accommodation Accommodation and food service activities
Communication Publishing activities
Communication Motion picture, video and television program production, sound
recording and music publishing activities; programming and
broadcasting activities
Communication Telecommunications
Communication Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; information
service activities
Professional Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding
Professional Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social
security
Professional Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities
Professional Real estate activities
Professional Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; management
consultancy activities
Professional Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
Professional Scientific research and development
Professional Advertising and market research
Professional Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary
activities
Administration Administrative and support service activities
Other Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
Other Education
Other Human health and social work activities
Other Other service activities
Omitted Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and
services-producing activities of households for own use
Omitted Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies
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the WIOD. For the purposes of our analysis here we aggregate them into eight
categories indicated on the first column of the table (with some codes omitted
from our categorization).
Table 4.3 provides a breakdown of total services exports into the eight catego-
ries for 43 countries in 2010 based on the WIOD. They demonstrate some strik-
ing patterns of specialization. For France, 37.6 per cent of services exports are in
wholesale and retail trade, while communications constitute 39.6 per cent of
India’s services exports. While call centers may explain India’s revealed compar-
ative advantage in communications, other patterns may reflect differences in how
different countries classify different activities.7
To what extent does services trade resemble trade in merchandise, for which
data have been available much more comprehensively? Let’s first gauge the
extent to which services are traded across countries compared with merchandise
and manufactures. Based on the WIOD for 2010, we calculate, for each sector,
the sum of what’s traded between countries relative to total world production,
which equals total world absorption. Specifically, denoting sales in sector j to des-
tination n from source i as X jni; we calculate:P
O Pi;n;i6¼nX jnijni ¼ j :
i;nXni
The bottom row of Table 4.4a, labeled “off diagonal ratio,” reports the results
(repeated in Tables 4.4b and 4.4c for convenience) . For goods, what’s interna-
tionally traded is 21 per cent of total production and the traded share for manu-
factures is slightly higher. In contrast, the share for total services is only 3
per cent. Only for transportation is the traded share even one third of what it is
for all goods or for manufactures.
To the extent that services are traded internationally, do geographic barriers
such as distance play the same role in services trade as in merchandise trade?
For decades the standard gravity model has been the workhorse tool for describ-
ing bilateral trade patterns. We use WIOD data from 2010 to look at patterns of
bilateral trade in all goods, manufactures, services and our eight categories of
services.8 We relate destination n’s imports from source i in sector j, X jni; n 6¼ i;
to a fixed effect S ji for sector j in source i, to a fixed effect D
j
n for sector j in desti-
nation n, and to characteristics connecting origin i and destination n, Our bilateral
indicators indexed by k; ikni; are the log of the distance between n and i and fixed
effects for countries n and i sharing a common language, common border and
former colonial connection, all taken from the CEPII website. We estimate three
versions of a gravity specification found in the literature.
Table 4.4a reports the results of estimating the equation:
X
ln X jð S j kni g jÞ ¼ i þ ε ji þ Djn þ k ni ni ð1Þ
k
Table 4.3 Services export shares
Country Code Construction Wholesale retail Transportation Accomodation Communication Professional Administration Other
Australia AUS 1.6 35.6 26.6 6.2 2.3 16.0 4.9 5.6
Austria AUT 2.2 31.9 21.2 6.4 6.4 16.9 3.4 2.6
Belgium BEL 4.2 27.3 18.8 1.1 5.7 28.1 4.8 1.6
Bulgaria BGR 5.6 9.1 29.7 0.6 9.1 20.7 3.8 1.3
Brazil BRA 2.0 7.2 15.7 2.8 2.6 43.3 14.9 7.0
Canada CAN 1.5 14.9 15.8 12.1 7.1 18.8 15.2 7.8
Switzerland CHE 0.2 16.5 10.6 3.8 4.4 50.1 4.1 3.0
China CHN 0.4 3.0 29.6 2.9 1.4 50.0 − 10.9
Cyprus CYP 0.8 2.6 56.8 0.2 2.7 26.3 6.6 1.2
Czech Republic CZE 5.0 9.2 27.5 1.0 14.4 20.7 3.1 2.0
Germany DEU 1.2 33.1 10.7 2.3 9.2 29.1 4.9 1.7
Denmark DNK 3.9 27.9 34.8 0.2 5.0 12.5 5.4 3.1
Spain ESP 2.2 29.6 19.6 9.0 8.6 13.8 8.9 3.0
Estonia EST 3.5 4.1 44.1 0.3 8.0 15.5 8.4 0.8
Finland FIN 0.3 7.2 25.7 0.6 7.7 31.2 14.2 5.4
France FRA − 37.6 15.6 − 4.8 19.2 15.7 2.8
United Kingdom GBR 0.2 30.7 4.9 1.4 8.7 32.9 13.2 4.5
Greece GRC 2.8 3.8 69.6 0.0 5.1 12.5 1.5 1.5
Croatia HRV 3.3 0.3 28.7 0.2 12.9 31.3 1.8 7.4
Hungary HUN 1.7 32.4 23.0 1.1 11.8 14.7 8.4 1.2
Indonesia IDN 1.8 0.0 15.2 18.2 13.0 30.5 10.1 8.9
India IND 0.2 1.2 4.5 39.6 20.4 − 34.2
Ireland IRL 0.1 4.7 5.3 1.5 32.1 37.0 16.8 2.5
Italy ITA 1.4 26.7 17.3 0.1 12.7 21.5 13.5 3.2
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Japan JPN 0.0 5.1 44.1 10.1 2.9 25.0 6.7 4.6
Korea KOR 0.2 29.0 21.4 1.8 1.9 35.9 5.6 2.7
Lithuania LTU 1.8 14.3 58.9 1.0 4.5 8.8 1.2 0.9
Luxembourg LUX 1.8 5.6 3.5 0.1 9.9 70.8 5.7 1.2
Latvia LVA 3.0 12.7 48.6 0.2 3.8 16.4 5.3 0.7
Mexico MEX − 70.5 24.9 − 0.7 3.1 0.0 −
Malta MLT 0.5 1.9 5.4 0.3 1.6 63.8 4.6 21.4
Netherlands NLD 1.8 34.7 17.7 0.1 4.0 20.0 14.2 1.4
Norway NOR 1.6 1.3 27.1 0.1 7.4 38.8 15.0 3.6
Poland POL 8.5 53.7 14.4 0.1 4.0 12.7 1.1 1.6
Portugal PRT 3.3 13.8 45.0 4.5 5.8 13.2 6.4 1.3
Romania ROM 7.1 8.7 46.0 3.7 9.1 12.3 0.9 6.7
Russia RUS 0.1 45.3 51.3 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.2 0.1
Slovakia SVK 5.6 35.2 25.5 0.2 6.7 12.7 4.5 3.1
Slovenia SVN 4.1 7.9 38.7 0.1 8.2 19.9 1.5 1.2
Sweden SWE 0.8 28.9 26.0 0.1 8.5 22.7 9.0 0.8
Turkey TUR 9.5 34.3 41.1 0.2 0.8 5.6 4.5 1.5
Taiwan TWN 0.0 46.8 29.8 3.3 1.3 11.0 3.6 4.0
United States USA 0.0 7.6 19.5 0.3 15.7 32.0 14.6 1.8
Export share is taken as a share of total export of services.
Source: World Input-Output Tables, 2010.
Table 4.4a Gravity model estimates (ordinary least squares)
Industry Merchandise Manufactures Services Construction Wholesale Transportation Accomodation Communication Professional Administration Other
retail
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Distance (logarithm) −1.376*** −1.334*** −1.363*** −1.010*** −1.370*** −1.500*** −1.691*** −1.472*** −1.362*** −1.372*** −1.197***
(−39.69) (−38.91) (−26.86) (−12.83) (−21.52) (−22.25) (−21.88) (−22.11) (−19.29) (−16.30) (−16.33)
Contiguity 0.336*** 0.331*** 0.135 0.588** 0.0482 0.130 0.205 0.184 −0.0808 −0.00583 0.315
(3.84) (3.83) (1.06) (3.00) (0.30) (0.76) (1.06) (1.09) (-0.45) (-0.03) (1.74)
Common language 0.203* 0.223** −0.101 −0.0646 0.0614 −0.224 −0.231 −0.222 −0.0533 −0.130 0.0783
(2.24) (2.48) (-0.76) (-0.31) (0.37) (-1.27) (-1.13) (-1.28) (-0.29) (-0.60) (0.41)
Common colonizer 1.137*** 1.254*** 0.867** 0.865 0.620 1.440*** 1.637*** −0.155 0.987* 2.411*** 0.732
(5.47) (6.09) (2.85) (1.91) (1.65) (3.56) (3.43) (-0.39) (2.33) (4.55) (1.70)
Constant 20.64*** 19.63*** 19.54*** 12.27*** 18.21*** 19.76*** 19.58*** 17.14*** 16.88*** 15.49*** 14.80***
(49.30) (47.43) (31.90) (12.94) (23.76) (24.28) (20.99) (21.33) (19.81) (15.30) (16.73)
Origin fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1806 1806 1806 1676 1783 1806 1654 1805 1806 1704 1756
Zero trade observation 0 0 0 130 23 0 152 1 0 102 50
R-sq 0.914 0.917 0.875 0.791 0.933 0.740 0.770 0.748 0.741 0.794 0.730
Off diagonal ratio 0.210 0.221 0.03 0.004 0.051 0.086 0.016 0.042 0.032 0.070 0.007
The dependent variable is the logarithm of a destination country’s imports from an origin country.
t statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
Table 4.4b Gravity model estimates (Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood)
Industry Merchandise Manufactures Services Construction Wholesale Transportation Accomodation Communication Professional Administration Other
retail
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Distance (logarithm) −0.885*** −0.872*** −0.639*** −1.153*** −0.817*** −0.747*** −1.130*** −0.762*** −0.452*** −0.495** −0.450***
(−25.13) (−24.44) (−14.59) (−6.01) (−12.60) (−14.19) (−11.75) (−9.45) (−5.92) (−2.83) (−5.26)
Contiguity 0.461*** 0.410*** 0.0719 −0.0579 0.167 0.167 0.781*** −0.118 0.00228 −0.521 0.817***
(6.33) (5.97) (0.66) (−0.21) (1.55) (1.36) (3.45) (−0.69) (0.01) (−1.08) (4.07)
Common 0.146 0.222** 0.390** 0.0730 0.501** 0.136 0.0959 0.365* 0.404* 0.475 0.321
Language (1.46) (2.63) (2.72) (0.33) (2.63) (1.06) (0.42) (2.11) (2.42) (1.14) (1.37)
Common colonizer 0.0466 0.149 0.582 1.980*** −0.230 1.056 1.460*** 0.531 0.301 1.809 −1.236
(0.18) (0.56) (1.50) (4.37) (-0.67) (1.62) (3.32) (0.93) (0.61) (1.75) (-1.31)
Constant 17.08*** 15.81*** 12.68*** 14.66*** 13.45*** 12.71*** 15.70*** 10.83*** 8.681*** 7.526*** 8.138***
(33.40) (32.79) (20.66) (7.55) (14.86) (20.63) (16.12) (12.25) (9.02) (3.82) (7.40)
Origin fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1806 1806 1806 1722 1806 1806 1680 1806 1806 1722 1764
Zero trade observation 0 0 0 84 0 0 126 0 0 84 42
R-sq 0.912 0.932 0.806 0.549 0.827 0.746 0.898 0.800 0.731 0.558 0.690
Off diagonal ratio 0.210 0.221 0.03 0.004 0.051 0.086 0.016 0.042 0.032 0.070 0.007
The dependent variable is the level of a destination country’s imports from an origin country.
t statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
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Table 4.4c Gravity model estimates (multinomial pseudo maximum likelihood)
Industry Merchandise Manufactures Services Construction Wholesale retail Transportation Accomodation Communication Professional Administration Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Distance (logarithm) −1.070*** −1.066*** −0.838*** −0.857*** −1.0006*** −0.922*** −1.273*** −0.788*** −0.788*** −0.591*** −0.193
(−23.05) (−23.33) (−9.28) (−5.16) (−9.73) (−12.10) (−12.89) (−8.40) (−7.85) (−4.15) (−1.13)
Contiguity 0.455*** 0.430*** 0.235 0.530 0.0828 0.466** 0.377* −0.437 0.00752 −0.457 1.376***
−5.32 −5.36 −0.89 −2.06 (0.36) −1.67 −2.33 −2.58 (−0.03) (−0.80) −4.51
Common language 0.263* 0.261* 0.0405 0.283 0.537 0.142 0.0648 0.39 −0.232 0.281 0.354
−2.34 −2.34 (−0.12) −1.19 −1.41 (−0.90) (−0.36) −1.85 (−0.73) −0.52 −1.16
Common colonizer 0.879** 0.946*** 1.644*** 1.982*** 0.582 2.991*** 2.172*** 0.543 1.014* 2.292*** 0.799
−3.06 −3.43 −5.57 −4.67 −1.49 −8.24 −3.48 − −0.79) −1 ( 4.24 −1.25
Constant 5.086*** 4.501*** 0.129 −1.64 2.641 2.650** 6.006*** −0.996 −0.927 −2.839 −7.112***
−9.02 −8.63 −0.12 (−0.87) −1.84 −2.58 −6.07 (−0.95) (−0.79) (−1.61) (−3.44)
Origin fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1806 1806 1806 1722 1806 1806 1680 1806 1806 1722 1764
Zero trade observation 0 0 0 130 0 0 152 1 0 102 50
R-sq 0.831 0.852 0.496 0.815 0.526 0.75 0.836 0.639 0.597 0.479 0.881
Off diagonal ratio 0.210 0.221 0.03 0.004 0.051 0.086 0.016 0.042 0.032 0.070 0.007
The dependent variable is the logarithm of a destination country’s imports from an origin country.
t statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
***p < 0.001
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by ordinary least squares (OLS). Here g jk is the coefficient on the relevant bilateral
indicator ik and ε jni ni is an error term reflecting idiosyncratic components of exports
from source i to destination n in sector j. With 43 countries there are a total of
1806 (= 432 − 43) observations of bilateral trade. For several of the services cat-
egories we have had to drop observations for which X jni ¼ 0; reducing the number
of observations accordingly (as reported in the row labeled “N”).
Note first that the coefficients on distance are very similar for all goods, man-
ufactures and services. Trade decays with distance with an elasticity around 1.33
to 1.38. Somewhat surprisingly, services appear slightly less sensitive to the
trading partners’ sharing a common border or language.
Note also that, with the exception of wholesale and retail trade, gravity is less
robust for services. The R2’s for goods and manufactures are solidly above 0.9 but
with services dip as low as 0.73. But for services as a whole the R2 is 0.875. The
overall picture is that gravity plays nearly as strong a role in services trade as it
does in goods trade.
To avoid the loss of information in removing observations of zero trade in OLS
estimation, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose estimating the gravity
equation:  !X
X j k jni ¼ exp S j ji þ D jn þ gkini þ εni ð2Þ
k
by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). Table 4.4b reports the results
of applying this estimation strategy to our data. Some observations still have to
be dropped (in increments of 42) if a country doesn’t report any exports or any
imports in some category (which prevents estimation of the corresponding
exporter or importer fixed effect).
Eaton et al. (2013), henceforth EKS, derive a theory of zeros in the trade
data due to a finite number of firms. They propose estimating the gravity
equation:  !
X j Xni exp S j D j g jik j¼ i þ n þ ni þ εni ð3X kj Þn k
by multinomial pseudo maximum likelihood (MPML). Table 4.4c presents the
results of applying this estimation strategy to our data.
In almost all sectors the distance elasticities are lower using PPML and some-
where in between using MPML. Otherwise the results are very similar.
Despite the lower overall tradability of services, as we saw in Table 4.1, ser-
vices account for a large share of exports from certain countries (related to the
large share of services in their GDP). To explore relative specialization in services
versus manufactures Figures 4.1 to 4.3 report the exporter fixed effects from
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Figure 4.1 Gravity exporter effects (top 5 for services)
three-letter country code indicated in Table 4.3). Specifically, for each country i
we calculate:
C j




for j corresponding to services (S) and to manufactures (M), using the results from
OLS estimation (Table 4.4a). To accommodate the vast size differences across
countries we organize the countries in descending order of their gravity exporter
effects CSi into three different charts. Note the different scales across the three
figures.
Figure 4.1 reveals a striking degree of specialization across the largest export-
ers. The United States, United Kingdom and Canada contribute much more to
services exports while China and Germany are heavily skewed toward manufac-
tures. The remaining figures reveal similarly strong patterns of specialization for
smaller countries.
To summarize, while services are much less traded than goods or manufac-
tures, gravity provides a good statistical description. Exporter fixed effects
reflect surprising degrees of specialization. We now turn to a model designed
to capture these patterns.
3. A model of trade in goods and services
We build on Eaton and Kortum (1999), henceforth EK (1999); Eaton and Kortum
(2001), henceforth EK (2001); Eaton and Kortum (2002), henceforth EK (2002);
Bernard et al. (2003), henceforth BEJK (2003); Eaton and Kortum (2007),
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Figure 4.3 Gravity exporter effects (bottom 18 for services)
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henceforth EK (2007); Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), henceforth RR-C
(2013); and Arkolakis et al. (2014), henceforth ARR-CY (2014). As in EK
(1999) and EK (2007) intangible ideas emerge from a process of invention.
These ideas, each associated with a potential production technology, diffuse over
time across countries, with the original inventors earning royalties from the use
of their ideas around the world. These royalties constitute earnings on intangibles,
a component of services exports. EK (1999) ignored international trade, so that the
correlation of productivities around the world implied by the use of the same tech-
nology in different countries was irrelevant. EK (2007) assumed that diffusion led
to perfect correlation of efficiency across borders, which made their model difficult
to apply to multicountry data. RR-C (2013) and ARR-CY (2014) assumed instan-
taneous diffusion, but allow for positive but imperfect correlation.
Our model of production and trade reflects the fact that services can sometimes
take the form of a rival service currently provided by inputs in the selling country
to consumers in the buying country. It may also reflect the return on nonrival
intangible assets produced in the past by what we will call the “intangibles
sector.”
We consider an arbitrary integer number N of countries, indexed by i (as inno-
vators), by l (as producers) and by n (as destinations). Each country has three
sectors, (tangible) manufactures M, (tangible) services S and intangibles I. In
each tangible sector there are a unit continuum of varieties. The output of each
tangible sector is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate over its
varieties, with elasticity of substitution σ j, j 2 {M, S}. Final absorption consists
entirely of tangibles, with manufactures having a Cobb-Douglas share αM and ser-
vices a share αS = 1 − αM in preferences.9 The intangibles sector is the source of
new production technologies, which we turn to next.
3.1. Technologies
Each sector produces output by combining, in a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion, three rival inputs: labor and intermediates from each of the two tangible
sectors. For sector j0 2 {M, S, I}, we denote the output elasticity of the sector j
intermediate by β j
0 j, j 2 {M, S}. Due to constant returns to scale, the output elas-
ticity of labor is:
b j
0L 1 b j
0M b j
0S¼ - - :
Production of each variety in each tangible sector also requires a non-rival
input, which we call the production technology. While we treat the output elas-
ticities of rival inputs as common across the continuum of varieties within a tan-
gible sector, the production technology varies across varieties and countries.
A production technology is the output, at some date in the past, of the intan-
gible sector in some country i, which we assume maintains property rights
over it. We distinguish a technology by this origin country, by the sector and
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variety to which it applies, and by whether it’s exclusively available in country i
or has diffused everywhere.10 We can ignore the age of a technology, since its
value is based on its productive efficiency relative to other available technologies.
As this description makes clear, a technology is an intangible asset and, as we
describe later, producers will pay for the right to use one.11
Consider first technologies for producing varieties in tangible sector j that were
developed in country i and remain exclusive to it, so that i is the only possible
producer (i.e., l = i). These intangibles do not generate services exports for
country i since the technology can only be used domestically.
As we show in appendix equation (27), our assumptions about the stochastic
arrival of ideas imply that the number of such technologies to produce a
variety with efficiency above z is distributed Poisson with parameter:
lj;Ei ðz -Þ ¼ Tj;E y
j
i z : ð4Þ
Here the parameter Tj;Ei reflects the size of country i’s pool of exclusive technology
in sector j. The probability distribution of country i’s most efficient exclusive tech-
nology for a variety in sector j, delivering output per bundle of inputs Zj;Ei , is thus:
Pr Zj;E z exp j;Ei z
j
i T
-y½ 5Þ< ] ¼ ð- Þ; ð
which is the Poisson probability that no technology better than z is available. Real-
izations are independent across source countries i for these exclusive technologies.
We now turn to technologies from country i that have diffused everywhere.
Since these technologies may be used by producers in other countries, these
intangibles can generate services exports for country i.
A diffused technology delivers a different efficiency in each potential produc-
tion location l, but we allow for that efficiency to be correlated across countries.
Furthermore, following RR-C (2013) and Ramondo (2014), we assume that dif-
fusion of a technology from an origin country i to a producer in location l dimin-
ishes its productivity there by a factor h jli > 1, where we normalize h jii ¼ 1. These
parameters, which we call iceberg transfer costs (for technology), moderate the
level of intangible services exports much like iceberg transport costs (introduced
in the next section) moderate the level of goods and tangible services exports.
As we show in appendix equation (28), our assumptions about the diffusion of
ideas imply that the number of technologies diffused from i for producing a
variety with efficiency above zl in at least one location l is distributed Poisson
with parameter:  !X 1 jN -r
y j 1 r jlj;D z ; z ; :::; z T j;D z h - =ð - Þ 6i 1 2 N l liÞ : ð Þð Þ ¼ i ð
l¼1
Here Tj;Di reflects the size of country i’s pool of diffused ideas in sector j and
ρ j 2 [0, 1) reflects the correlation across locations of the efficiency delivered
by a diffused technology.
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Consider the most efficient such technology from the perspective of a producer
of a variety in a given location l, delivering output per bundle of inputs Zj;Dli . The
joint distribution of the Zj;Dli across all potential production locations is:
Pr D1i < z1; Zj;D j;D½Zj; 02i < z2; :::; ZNi zN !< ] ð71 ÞX ( ) 1 r jN -@ y j 1 r jexp z jlh - =ð - Þ¼ -Tj;D Ai li ;
l¼1
which is the Poisson probability that no technology better than zl, for any location
l, is available. Realizations are still independent across source countries i, but are
correlated across production locations l, with the correlation increasing in ρ j. For
a given set of Nf gzl l 1, the probability (7) is increasing in the technology transfer¼
costs, since a larger h jli reduces the likelihood that a technology from i will yield
high efficiency when used in any location l 6¼ i.
3.2. Costs
We denote the price index of tangible sector j output in country l as
pjl ; j 2 fM ; Sg. With a wage wl , the cost of a bundle of inputs to produce
sector j 0 2 {M, S, I} output in production location l is thus:
j0 ( )b j 0M ( )S b 0Sb j b j 0LMl ¼ pl pl ð Þwl :
Later, we will connect the price indices p jl to these input bundle costs, technol-
ogies and market structure. For now, we simply take them as given to focus on
unit production costs in locations l, and costs of delivery to a destination n,
which inherit a distribution from the technologies underlying these costs.
The unit cost of producing a variety of tangible sector j in country l is b j jl =Zl ,
where Z jl is the random level of efficiency of the best available technology. We
posit an iceberg transport cost d jnl > 1 to deliver a unit to n from l. The unit
cost of producing a variety of tangible sector j in country l after delivery to des-





C nlnl ¼ j :Zl
For location l to be able to provide the variety at a cost C jnl < c thus requires




Z nll : ð Þ> 8c
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Applying equation (4), the number of exclusive technologies from l that exceed






( )-y¼ nl cy jl : ð9c l b jl d j Þ
For a diffused technology that originated in country i to serve destination n at a
cost below c its efficiency in at least one production location l must also satisfy (8).
From (6), the number of such technologies is distributed Poisson with parameter:( )  !1 r j





j j XN -j j
l N
dnN; ; :::; Tj;D b jd j j -y =ð1-r Þi h c
y j : 10
c c c
¼ i l li ð Þð nl Þ
l¼1
Since technologies from different countries, and those that are exclusive and dif-
fused, are all independent of each other, the number of technologies that can
provide a sector j variety to destination n at unit cost below c, regardless of
source or diffusion status, is distributed Poisson with parameter:( ) ( )XN b j Xj j;E l d j Nl nl 1d j j jc lj;D b j j jl n1 bþ ; 2dn2 bi ; :::; NdnN j y jnð Þ ¼ l c c c c ¼ Fnc ð11Þ
l¼1 i¼1
where:  !X 1N j X r jN XN -j j
F j T j;E b jd j -y Tj;D b j j j -y =ð1-r Þn ¼ 12l ð l nlÞ þ i l dnlhli : ð Þð Þ
l¼1 i¼1 l¼1
We can now derive the distribution of the lowest cost of a tangible sector j
variety available in country n (produced in any location l using technologies
from any source i). The probability that all costs are above c (hence the lowest
as well) is the probability that no cost is below c. The distribution of this
lowest cost C jn is: ( )
Gj C j jðcÞ ¼ Pr y jn ½ n < c] ¼ 1- exp -Fnc ; ð13Þ
which is 1 minus the Poisson probability that no cost is below c. The distribution
of costs in n depends, through F jn, on all iceberg transport costs into n and on all
iceberg transfer costs between every pair of countries.
3.3. Sources of production and technology
We now turn to which location l can serve market n at the lowest cost with a tech-
nology originating from i. We start with the probability that a technology origi-
nating from i supplies n at the lowest cost.
First consider technology that’s exclusive to i, so that l = i. The probability that
such a technology is lowest cost in supplying n is the ratio of the Poisson param-






ni ¼ F j :
ð14Þ
n
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Note how c cancels. This share is like that in EK (2002), as country i’s share
depends on its pool of exclusive technology downweighted by its cost of
inputs and the iceberg transport cost of delivering tangible goods to country
n. The response of the share to these costs is governed by θ j. The new piece
is in the denominator (12), which includes terms capturing the possibility that
n is supplied using a technology that is not exclusive to any country.
For technology that’s diffused from i, the probability that such a technology is
lowest cost in supplying n (from any location l0) is the ratio of the Poisson param-
eter (10) to the Poisson parameter (11):( ) r j
T ;D
P 1N j jj b j d j - =i h j y -ð1-r Þl
pj
0 ð 0 0 Þ
;D
0¼1 l nl l i
n.i ¼ F j ;n
where the dot in the subscript indicates that the production location l could be any-
where. Here, country i’s share (in supplying the technology) depends on its pool of
diffused technology downweighted by the iceberg transfer cost of getting the tech-
nology from i to any of the potential producing countries l 0 together with the cost of
inputs in l0 and the iceberg transport cost of shipping goods from l 0 to n.
As we show in appendix equation (30), the probability that country l is the sup-




b jd j j - =ð1-r Þ
pj;Dnl i P ð l nl liÞ¼ ;j N b j d j h j -y j=ð1 j-r Þl0 1 ð l0 nl0 l0 iÞ¼
where the vertical bar in the subscript indicates conditioning on a diffused tech-
nology from i being used to supply n. In this expression, since each producing
country has access to the same technologies that diffuse from i, the shares do
not depend on pools of technology. Instead l’s share depends on its access to
i’s diffused technology (as governed by the iceberg transfer cost), its cost of
inputs and its access to country n (as governed by the iceberg transport cost).
The response of this share to these costs is governed by θ j/(1 − ρ j), which is
increasing in the correlation parameter ρ j. If the efficiency in different production
locations of the same diffused technology is quite similar (ρ j near 1), slight dif-
ferences in input or transport costs across locations will have a large effect on
which location ends up producing with such technologies.
The probability that country l supplies n using a technology that diffused from i
is the product of the probability that such a technology provides the lowest cost in
n and the probability that country l is the lowest cost location for using it, when
serving destination n:
pj;D j;D Dnli ¼ p pj;n i ( ).. nl i 15
j;D P ð Þj jj j 1 rT N ( )b j d j h j -y =ð1-r -Þ jb jd j h j -y j=i l 1 l nl l i ð1-r Þ0 0 0 0¼ P ð l( )nl liÞ¼ j . N b j y j :F jj j - =n d h ð1-r Þl0 1 0 nl0 0¼ l l i
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Combining (15) and (14), the probability that a variety purchased in n is pro-
duced in l using an idea from i is:
p jnli ¼ dlipj;E j;Dni þ pnli ð16Þ
where δli = 0 if l 6¼ i and δli = 1 if l = i. We now have a full description of how
technology from different sources is used in different production locations to
serve different markets. Since country n is necessarily supplied (with a variety
of tangible sector j) by some country l using a technology from some country
i, the probabilities satisfy:
XN XN
p jnli ¼ 1:
i¼1 l¼1
3.4. Market structure and markups
We treat the difference between revenues and costs in using a technology as a
return to the creator of the technology, which we refer to as a royalty. Deriving
the royalty share of revenues requires our characterizing the distribution of the
markups, which we turn to now.
We assume that potential producers of a tangible variety engage in Bertrand
competition in each market n where they sell, regardless of whether the buyer
is another producer or a household. A result of this competition is that the
low-cost producer of a variety serves the market and its price equals either the
cost of the second lowest-cost potential supplier of that variety to market n or
the monopoly price, whichever is lower.
This market structure leads to random markups M- jn for a variety of tangible
sector j supplied to country n. As we show in appendix equation (31), the distri-
bution of these markups takes the very convenient form of a truncated Pareto
distribution: ([ ] 1- m-y j 1 m < m- j
Pr M- jn < m
<¼ ;
1 m ¼ m- j




s j - 1
This distribution of markups, together with the distribution of costs (13), deter-
mines the distribution of tangible sector j prices in country n.
3.5. The price index
Until this point, our derivations applied to a particular variety (such as the prob-
ability p jnli that a variety of tangible sector j is supplied to n by l using a
)
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technology from i). In deriving the price index, however, we need to integrate
across varieties, so it’s convenient to give them an index. Let P jnðoÞ denote the
price in country n of variety ω in tangible sector j. The price index is thus:( )Z [ ] 11
nðo
-s j
ð1-s j1 = Þ
p jn ¼ P j Þ do :
0
By treating the individual prices as random variables, as we show in appendix
equation (34), we obtain an expression connecting this price index to the param-
eter of the cost distribution (12):( )
p
1=j - y jj j




y j s 1
=ð -s jj (
j - ð 1 1=ð1-s
jÞ Þ
-y jg
- Þ s j - j¼ G j 1þ j ð Þm- :y y - ðs j - 1Þ
The CES parameter σ j matters (in this model) only through the constant γ j.
3.6. Royalties
Tangible goods are sold in country n at a markup over the cost of the inputs used
to produce them (including any transport cost to deliver them). We interpret the
resulting wedge between revenue and tangible cost as the value of the intangible
services embodied in country n’s absorption. Ultimately, this value of intangible
services will flow in the form of royalties to the country whose intangible sector
generated the intangible assets.
As we show in appendix equation (35), the value of intangible services X j;In
embodied in country n’s absorption of tangible sector j goods is:
1
X j;I X jn ¼ 1 jþ y n :
We return to the trade shares to track how the payments for these intangible ser-
vices flow as royalties earned by the owners of the intangible assets that generate
them.
Since there are a continuum of varieties in each tangible sector, the probability
p jnli that a variety consumed in n was produced in l using a technology from i is
also the share of spending on such varieties in n. An implication is that the share
of l’s production in n’s sector j absorption (without regard to the source of the
technology i) is:
XN
pj;T p jnl ¼ nli; ð18Þ
i¼1
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where the T superscript indicates that this term is the share of n’s spending on
tangible sector j goods imported from country l.
The share of origin i’s technologies used in n’s sector j absorption (without
regard to the production location l) is:XN
pj;I. p
j
n i ¼ nli; ð19Þ
l¼1
where the I superscript indicates that this term is the share of n’s absorption of
intangible services (embodied in n’s spending on tangible sector j) ultimately
paid as royalties to country i.
The royalties earned by country i’s sector j technologies used for production in
l and absorbed in destination n is:
X j;I j X j;I
1
p p j X jnli ¼ nli n ¼ nli n :1 y jþ
We treat royalty income as collected at the point of production rather than at
the point of absorption, so that if a producer in l uses a technology from i to
supply a consumer in n, we count i as exporting the intangible to country l
not to n. In this case sector j intangible services exports from origin i to location
l are: XN
X j;I X j;Ili ¼. nli :
n¼1
Summing over production locations (including country i itself), royalty income
of country i from sector j technologies is:XN
R j j;Ii ¼ X.li :
l¼1
Summing over sectors, country i’s total royalty income is:X




3.7. Production and absorption
We denote the gross output of sector j 0 in country l as Y j
0
l ; j
0 2 fM ; S; Ig: For the
two tangible sectors, j 2 {M, S}:XN
Y j jl p
;T¼ nl X jn :
n¼1
!
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Sector j tangible absorption in country n consists of final demand X j;Fn
plus intermediate demand, so that total absorption of tangible sector j by
country n is:
X j 0
X j X j;F bIjY I b j
0 j y j 0
n ¼ n þ n þ Y
1f gS þ y j
0 n :
j 02 M ;
Final demand for sector j output in country n is a share α j of total final absorp-
tion, which itself consists of labor income wnLn, royalty income Rn from intan-
gibles, less what’s invested in intangibles Y In together with any net exports Nn:( )
X j;F ¼ a jn wnLn þ R Y In - n - Nn : ð21Þ





w Ln j Y
j¼ n þ bILY In :
j S 1þ2f gM ; y
3.8. Equilibrium
We can combine these various pieces to form three systems of equations. The first
system gives absorption of each country’s tangibles in each sector given final sec-
toral demand and trade shares:
X Xy j 0 N
X j X j;F bIjY I b j
0 j p j
0 ;T
l ¼ l þ l þ j 0 nl X j
0
n : ð22Þ
j 0 f gM ;S 1þ2 y n¼1
The second system gives labor income in terms of sectoral absorption:
X X
IL I jL y
j N
w L b Y b pj;TX jl l ¼ l þ 1 j nl n : ð23Þj þ2f gM ;S y n¼1
Incorporating (21) and (20) into (22) gives:
( ) X XN j 0
X j a j w L R Y I I- N 0- þ bIjl þ Y j j
y j 0 ;T j
l ¼ l l l l l þ b pnl Xn
j 0 M ; 1þ y j( ) 0S n¼1
a j w L Y I Ijl N
2f g I¼ l - l - lX þ b Yl ð24X ÞN
j 0 ;I j 0 j y
j 0
a j
1 j 0 ;T j 0þ
1 y j
0 pn 0 pnl X.l þ b :
j 0 S n¼1 þ 12f gM ; þ y j n
6
!
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Given wages, prices are determined by the third system of equations, for j 2 {M, S}
and j0 ¼ j: X jN ( )( ) jjj 0 -yjj( )
p
-y
g Tj E w1 b
jj jj ( ) bj j ; -0 0-
l
- -b j b j
n ¼ p jl l pl dnl
l¼1  X j 1 rN X j 1N ( )( ) j= 25( ) b jj ð Þ0 y -ð -r Þ
g j T j;D w1
b jj
-
jj jj -0 0--b -b
l p
j jþ i l p j jl dnlhli :
i¼1 l¼1
Together, the system of equations (23), (24) and (25) determine wages wl, price
indices p jl ; and final absorption X
j;T
n ; j 2 {M, S}, given each country’s production
of intangibles Y Il , which we take as exogenous in this static analysis.
3.9. International income accounts
Having laid out the model, we can now discuss how it maps into an international
system of accounts with trade in services and intangibles. Doing so will help to
connect the model to the data. Two additional definitions will make this task
easier.
First, we define the concept of sectoral value added. For the intangible sector,
value added is standard:
yI Ii - bIMY I I Ii ¼ Y IS IL Ii - b Yi ¼ b Yi ¼ wiLi :
where Lji denotes labor employed in sector j 2 {M, S, I}. Since there is no physical
capital in the model, and since we have assumed that the intangible sector does
not itself use specific technologies to invent new ones, value added reduces to
labor income earned in the sector. For the two tangible sectors, j 2 {M, S},
we include intangible inputs in value added since they represent a return on intan-
gible assets:
j j jM y
j y j
y b Y jS ji ¼ Y ji -
1 y j i
- b j Yþ 1þ y i
y j jL j 1 j j 1 j¼ Y
1þ y j b Yi þ w L Y :1þ y j i ¼ i i þ 1 y j iþ
Our treatment of the services of intangibles in value added (for the tangible goods
sectors) is parallel to how we would treat physical capital (if it were included in the
model) where the value of capital services is part of value added even if the sector
rents the capital from elsewhere.
Second, since there is no final demand for intangibles, we define demand for
intangibles used in tangible good production in country l as:X
I 1Xl ¼ l
j2f g; 1þ y j
Y j:
M S
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To complete the accounts for intangibles, we can define bilateral trade in intangi-
bles by:
X
X I jli ¼ X ;I. :. li
j2f gM ;S
Using this expression for bilateral trade, demand for intangibles by country l
satisfies:
XN
X Il ¼ X I.li;
i¼1
and royalty income of country i satisfies:
XN
R Ii ¼ X li:.
l¼1
3.9.1. Income side
We let yi denote GDP of a country i. From the income side, GDP is measured as
payments to the two factors, wage income to rival labor and royalty income to
non-rival technology assets:
y w LI w LM w LS RM Si¼ i i þ i i þ i i þ i þ Ri
¼wiLi þ Ri:
3.9.2. Production side
From the production side, we can sum sectoral value added of a country l to get:
I M S I M 1 LS
1
yl þ yl þ yl ¼wlL Ml þ wlLl þ Y w YS1þ yM l þ l l þ 1þ yS l
1 1¼wlL Sl þ YM Y1þ yM l þ 1 yS lþ
Ll þ X I¼wl l :
We can therefore express GDP in country l as:
y yI yMl y
S
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where the last term is country l’s net exports of intangibles:XN XN
NIl ¼ Rl - X I X Il ¼ l0l - X I :. .li
l0¼l i 6¼l
3.9.3. Expenditure side
Since we do not model physical investment, spending on investment In in country
n is equal to its intangible sector output In Y
I¼ n . Spending on consumption
(broadly interpreted) is final demand for tangible goods:X
C X j;Fn ¼ n
j2f gM ;S (X S
X j bIjY I bMj
yM
YM bSj
y¼ - n - 1 n - S Y
S
n M n :
j M ;S þ 12f g y þ y
Thus, from the spending side:(X
C Mj




I IM I IS I
n þ In¼ Xn - b yM Y1 n - b YM ;S 1 S
Yn þ Yn - b Yn - b n
j þ þ2f g y(X S
X j Mj
yM Sj yb YM b YS yI¼ n - 1 yM n - nj2f gM ;SX þ 1þ yS n
þ
( )¼ X jn - Y jn þ y j yIn þ n
j2f gM ;S X ( )
yIn þ yMn yS j j¼ þ n þ Xn - Yn :
j2f gM ;S
We can therefore express GDP in country n as:X ( )
y Cn In þ R I j jn ¼ þ n - Xn þ Yn - Xn
j2f gM ;S
¼ Cn þ In þ Nn;
where, recall, Nn is country n’s total net exports across all three sectors.
4. Quantitative experiments
As a first step in exploring the quantitative implications of this model, we have
developed a numerical version of it using Matlab for a world of three hypothetical
countries. We label the countries the United States, Germany and China since our
parameterization is meant to capture some key features of these economies. The
numerical implementation allows us to examine the model’s general equilibrium
implications for trade in manufactures, tangible services and intangible services
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as well as for sectoral employment, aggregate income and welfare. Of particular
interest is understanding how these outcomes vary as we change deep parameters
in the model.
Table 4.5 reports our baseline values for parameters that are common across
countries (such as θ j and ρ j). Table 4.6 reports baseline values for parameters
that are country specific (such as L and Tj;Ei i ). Table 4.7 displays key outcomes
generated by our baseline parameters. The first row of the table shows labor
income. World income (normalized to 100) serves as our numéraire.
Where possible we have chosen parameter values that are common in the
literature (such as θM = 4) or that can be calibrated directly to data (such as
βMS = 0.16 based on Input-Output Tables). The relative size of the three econo-
mies is largely determined by Li, with China’s labor force twelve times Ger-
many’s and four times that of the United States. We have chosen the iceberg
costs (dMnl ¼ 1:7 and dSnl ¼ 3:0, for n 6¼ l) so that the model yields plausible out-
comes for the fraction of manufacturing output (22 per cent) and services output
(3 per cent) that is traded. In some cases the parameters are new to this model
(such as rM ¼ 0:8; hM Sli ¼ 1:7; hli ¼ 2:0 for l 6¼ i), and we get little direct guidance
from data without a more formal calibration strategy, which is beyond the scope
of this chapter.
The technology parameters (Tj;Ei and T
j;D
i ) play a central role in our analysis,
and the model helps us understand the mapping between them and basic observ-
able outcomes. These parameters vary along three dimensions, which we consider
in turn. Along the country dimension, we have chosen the technology parameters
to deliver the large real income advantage of the United States over China, while
keeping Germany slightly below the level of the United States. We report these
outcomes in the second to fourth rows of Table 4.7. Real income adds royalty
income to wage income, while real consumption, in turn, subtracts investments
in intangibles. Along the industry dimension, we have chosen the technology
parameters to deliver Germany and China’s specialization in manufacturing rela-
tive to the United States. These outcomes appear in the sectoral employment
shares in Table 4.7. The final dimension is between exclusive and diffused
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Table 4.6 Country-specific parameters
United States Germany China
Labor endowment 3.00 1.00 12.00
Investment in intangibles 1.50 0.20 0.50
Aggregate trade deficit 0.00 0.00 0.00
Exclusive technology:
manufacturing 10.00 10.00 0.50
services 8.00 5.00 0.25
Diffused technology:
manufacturing 4.00 1.00 0.25
services 2.00 0.50 0.02
Iceberg costs:
manufacturing (importer):
United States 1.00 1.50 1.50
Germany 1.50 1.00 1.50
China 1.50 1.50 1.00
services (importer):
United States 1.00 4.00 4.00
Germany 4.00 1.00 4.00
China 4.00 4.00 1.00
Diffusion costs:
manufacturing (receiving):
United States 1.00 1.70 1.70
Germany 1.70 1.00 1.70
China 1.70 1.70 1.00
services (receiving):
United States 1.00 2.00 2.00
Germany 2.00 1.00 2.00
China 2.00 2.00 1.00
technology. Here we gave the United States an advantage in diffused technology
to capture the large magnitude of U.S. intangible services exports. The outcomes
for international trade in Table 4.7 show the United States running a large trade
deficit in manufacturing and a large surplus in intangible services.
Having described our baseline, we now consider some numerical experiments.
The first moves exclusive U.S. manufacturing technologies to U.S. diffused tech-
nologies. Specifically, we hold all other parameters at their baseline values while,
for the United States, we lower TM,E from 10 to 0 while raising TM,D from 4 to 14.
China is the big beneficiary of this shift, as China’s low wage allows it to exploit
manufacturing technology originating in the United States. China’s real wage
increases nearly 20 per cent. The U.S. real wage doesn’t fall, and real income
actually rises by 3 per cent as royalties rise. While income effects are positive,
the US manufacturing sector shrinks dramatically. The manufacturing share of
employment falls by 3 percentage points and U.S. exports of manufactures
shrivel.
111 Trade in goods and trade in services 111
Table 4.7 Baseline outcomes
United States Germany China
Aggregate labor income 48.9 16.0 35.1
Real income per worker 7.6 6.6 1.6
Real consumption per worker 6.0 6.0 1.4
Real wage 5.1 4.3 1.2
Sectoral employment shares (%):
manufacturing 17.0 22.0 25.0
services 64.0 70.0 66.0
intangibles 19.0 7.7 8.8
International trade:
manufacturing:
imports 8.1 5.3 4.2
exports 4.2 5.0 8.5
tangible services:
imports 1.0 0.9 0.0
exports 0.2 0.1 1.6
intangible services:
imports 0.0 0.1 5.9
exports 4.8 1.3 0.0
The correlation of diffused technology ρ is a prominent (yet elusive) parameter
in our model. To explore its role, we repeat the first experiment, but now with
ρM = 0 (rather than ρM = 0.8). In this scenario, diffused technology will have
very different realizations depending on where it is put to use in production.
With ρM = 0 we find that U.S. income is even higher and the U.S. manufacturing
sector remains more competitive in world markets. China experiences roughly the
same increase in its real wage, and Germany’s also rises a bit. The lower value of
ρM raises the benefit of diffusion since ideas experience a greater transformation
as they spread. A diffused idea is thus less substitutable across locations.
5. Conclusion
While we have applied our framework to a hypothetical three-country, three-
sector world, the apparatus is flexible enough to deal with an arbitrary number
of countries and alternative sectoral breakdowns. We’ve kept the analysis here
static, but activity in the intangibles sector could be tied to the expectation of
future royalty earnings as in EK (1999), EK (2001) and EK (2007).
These extensions are conceptually fairly straightforward. A barrier to future
quantitative work in these directions is the remaining gap between key concepts
in the theory and the data that are reported. The availability of data on services
trade has improved dramatically in the last few years, but separating its tangible
and intangible components remains a daunting challenge. Overcoming that
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challenge is essential to understanding the role of creativity in driving growth in
the world economy.
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1 According to Reinsdorf and Slaughter (2009), whether a transaction under this fourth
mode constitutes a service export depends on the length of stay of the natural person.
If she stays over a year she becomes a resident of the destination so her service is con-
sidered part of the gross domestic product of the destination.
2 See Santacreu (2016).
3 Corrado et al. (2009) include in their definition of intangible investment both worker
training and advertising, which are quantitatively important in the U.S. economy. The
assets created by such investments, human capital in the first case and firm goodwill
in the second, would seem rival. While we don’t model either training or advertising
here, we would exclude such investments and subsequent assets from our concept of
intangibles. We think of worker training, like education in general, as contributing to
the supply of skills to be treated in the accounts accordingly. The goodwill a
company creates through advertising, while an asset to the investing firm, is also a lia-
bility for its competitors. We treat the net contribution as zero. We have trouble envision-
ing an economy that could grow simply through the proliferation of ads, unless we take
the view that an ad can make a consumer happier with a given physical allocation.
4 We extracted these figures from the OECD National Accounts. The sample are the 20
countries with data going back to 1985. Lipsey (2009) provides a depressing account
of myriad conceptional and practical problems associated with the measurement of
service trade. In particular he documents how services trade in earlier periods may
have been more severely underreported, rendering the apparent rise in services
trade illusional. Borga (2009) reports how the United States Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) has changed how it measures U.S. trade in three service sectors.
5 Reported figures may significantly understate U.S. service exports. See in particular
Mutti and Grubert (2009), Robbins (2009), Moris (2009), McGrattan and Prescott
(2010) and Guvenen et al. (2017) . A reason is that U.S. tax policy makes it advan-
tageous for U.S. corporations to shift profits overseas, creating an incentive to under-
report exports of intangible services. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis reports
U.S. foreign investment receipts of a similar magnitude to U.S. service exports, sug-
gesting a large upper bound on the degree of underreporting.
6 See Timmer et al. (2015) for a description of the data.
7 To quote van der Marel and Shepherd (2013a), “It is well known that services data
become increasingly inaccurate as they are disaggregated.”
8 We are, of course, not the first to apply gravity analysis to trade in services. Without
needing data on bilateral trade flows in services, Jensen and Kletzer (2005) assess
the tradability of different service sectors by looking at the concentration of occupa-
tions employed extensively in these sectors across U.S. Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (inferring that greater concentration is made possible by greater tradability).
Lejour and Verheijden (2007) make use of bilateral data on services trade from
the Canadian provinces and the European Union to estimate a gravity model for ser-
vices. Egger et al. (2012) use data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development to estimate a structural gravity model of trade in goods and ser-
vices. Anderson et al. (2014) compare the role of distance and national borders in
trade in goods and services among Canadian provinces and between individual prov-
inces and the United States. Anderson et al. (2016) use OECD data to estimate a
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structural gravity equation for 12 individual service sectors. Van der Marel and
Shepherd (2013a, 2013b) examine how regulation affects the tradability of services
using a dataset developed by Francois and Pindyuk (2013), combining data from
Eurostat, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the OECD and United Nations.
Gervais and Jensen (2013) estimate a model of services trade among U.S. states
based on differences between demand and supply at different U.S. BEA labor
market areas. Miroudot et al. (2016) examine the effect of services trade on mea-
sured productivity in services.
9 Pursuing the example above, we treat a current Netflix viewer of the Big Sleep as con-
suming the tangible services of Netflix and Netflix as purchasing the intangible ser-
vices of Warner Brothers as an input into its streaming services.
10 One can conceive of much more complex patterns of diffusion. For simplicity we stick
here with this simple dichotomy.
11 Consider the iPhone. While various rival inputs are used to produce it and deliver it to
consumers (production labor, glass, aluminum and employees at the Apple store),
much of its value is due to the non-rival intangible assets embodied in it (engineering,
software and sleek design). The abstraction of our model is to lump these multiple
dimensions of the non-rival inputs into a single intangible that we call the
“technology.”
12 As discussed in Arkolakis et al. (2014), for ρ = 0, an idea provides an efficiency Ql > ql
in only one location l. Everywhere else the efficiency is q :
l 0
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Appendix A
Deriving the efficiency distributions
Here we derive the distributions of efficiency posited in the text from more prim-
itive assumptions about the discovery and diffusion of ideas, extending the model
in EK (2001) to incorporate technology diffusion.
Creators in country i generate ideas about how to produce some variety in some
sector j 2 {M, S} at different locations l in the world. By date t the number of ideas
originating in country i for a variety in sector j is distributed Poisson with parameter
aT- ji;t. In what follows we consider a particular variety within a particular sector j at a
particular date t and, for parsimony, drop the j superscript and t subscript.
Once diffused, an idea from origin i enables the variety to be produced in differ-
ent countries l with efficiencies Qli, for l = 1, …, N. As in Arkolakis et al. (2014),
we assume that these efficiencies are realizations from the joint distribution:
Pr½Q1i < q1;Q2i < q2; :::;QNi < qN ] ¼ FDi ðq1; q2; . . . ; qNÞ !X 1N -r
-1 y=
Þ- ð1-r ð26Þ¼ 1- a- ð Þqlhli ;
l¼1
where ρ 2 [0, 1) and hli > 1 with hii = 1. To insure that this distribution is nonneg-
ative we assume that it is defined only for
ql > qli ¼ q=hli
where:
q a--1=yN ð1-rÞ=y¼ :
Note that:
FDi ðq ; q ; . . . ; q 0:1i 2i NiÞ ¼
Sending ql0 ! 1, l 0 ¼ l, the marginal distribution is:
FD --li ðqlÞ ¼ 1- a- 1ð Þqlh yli :
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Evaluating the marginal distribution at the lower bound:
FD -ð1-rÞli ðq Þ ¼ 1- N ;li
implying a mass at the lower bound of the marginal distribution.12
Upon its creation, an idea may not be immediately available for production.
The technology diffuses over time to ever greater sets of countries. While the
dynamics of diffusion could be quite general, for our purposes here we’ve
limited diffusion to a one-step process. An idea is initially “exclusive” and avail-
able only in the country where it originated. Then, at some random date, it “dif-
fuses,” becoming available to all countries. The date at which it diffuses is
independent of the values of the Ql’s the idea delivers. Hence the distribution
of the Ql’s is the same regardless of whether the idea has diffused or not.
Say that the probability that an idea from i has diffused is pi. Defining TDi ¼
piTi and T
E
i ¼ ð Þ1- pi Ti, it follows that the number of ideas that have diffused
is distributed Poisson with parameter aT- Di while the number that remain exclusive
is distributed Poisson with parameter aT- Ei . The efficiencies of these two sets of
ideas are independent of one another.
An idea from i that’s diffused has an efficiency distribution FDi ðq1; q2; . . . ; qNÞ
given by (26). An idea from country i that has not diffused, since it is only avail-
able for use in country i, has an efficiency distribution derived from (26) by
letting ql ! 1 for all l 6¼ i; that is:
FE -yi ðqÞ ¼ 1- a--1q ;
for q −1/θ> a- .
The number of exclusive ideas from i with efficiency above z is distributed
Poisson with parameter:[ ]
aT- E FE E yi 1
-- i ðzÞ ¼ Ti z ; ð27Þ
so that a- cancels out. By letting a- ! 1 we get full support z > 0.
We can follow a similar strategy to derive the joint distribution of the best ideas
that have diffused from country i. With probability 1- FDi ðz1; z2; :::; zN Þ an idea
from i has efficiency exceeding z1, z2, …, zN in at least one location l. Hence the
number of ideas from i that provide efficiencies above z1, z2, …, zN in at least one
location is distributed Poisson with parameter: ![ ] X 1N -r
a-TDi 1 z
D- FD -y=ð1-rÞi ð 1; z2; :::; zN zl : ð28ÞÞ ¼ Ti ð Þhli
l¼1




If country n obtains a variety of tangible sector j produced using technology that
diffused from country i, what is the probability that country l is the producer of
this variety for country n? Since different countries l0 may find the very same
technique to be the lowest cost, our approach in the text, which relied on indepen-
dent Poisson distributions, won’t work in this context. Instead, this derivation
starts from the joint complementary distribution of costs across producing coun-
tries l when using technology that’s diffused from i.
Denote the lowest cost, using a technology diffused from i to serve n from
location l, by Cj;Dnli . From (7), their joint complementary distribution across pro-
duction locations l is:
G-
j;D
n i ðc1; c2; :::c. NÞ¼Pr Cj;D > c ;Cj;D > c ; :::;Cj;DnNi > c{½ n1i 1 n2i 2 N ]
b jd j b jd j b j d j¼Pr Zj;D 1 n1 ; Zj;D 2 n21i < 2i < ; :::; Zj;D N N1c1 c Ni
<
2 c0 N ÞXN ( ) 1-r j1 ð29j j j j¼ exp@ Tj;D b j d j h j -y =ð1-r Þi 0 l0 i cy =ð1-r Þ- Al0 nl l0 :
l0¼1
Differentiating (29) with respect to its l’th argument and evaluating at cl0 = c for
l0 = 1, …, N, we get:
0  ! 11 r j
@G-j;Dn.i ðc; c; :::; c XN -j jÞ exp Tj;D ( )@ b j d j h j -y =ð1-r Þ cy jA
@c
¼ - - i l0 nl0 l0i
l l0¼1 !X jN -
1 r j T j;D
( ) rj j
b j d j 1l h
j -y =ð1-r Þ j- r =
i nl l i c
y j j-ð Þrxð Þ- 0 0 0
l0¼1( ) j
b j d j h j
-y j=ð1-r jÞ y y j=ð1-r jÞ-1x l0 nl0 l0 i c ;1 r j-
[
!
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which simplifies to: 0  !1 r j 1
@G-j;Dn.i ðc; c; :::; c XN -@ j;D ( ) jÞ exp Tj b j d j h j -y =ð1-r Þ y j¼ - - A
@c i l
0 nl0 l0 i c
l l0 !¼1XN y j 1 ( )r j( ) -r j y j 1 j
T j;D b j d j h j
- =ð - Þ
b j d j h j
- =ð -r Þ
nl l y
j j
i l nl l i l c
y
i
-1x 0 0 0 0 0 0
l0¼1( ) y j j
b j d j h j
- =ð1-r Þ




j j -y =ð1-r Þ
¼ nl0hl0i
where, we define: 0  !X 1 r j 1N -j j
G-j;D
( )
i ðcÞ ¼ exp@n -T b j =ð1j;D j d h j -y -r Þ cy jA0 0 0 :. i l nl l i
l0¼1
Since G-j;Dn.i ðcÞ is itself a complementary distribution (the probability that all the
Cj;D , for l 0 = 1, , N, exceed c), we can see that G-j;D 0 1 and G-j;Dnl0 i … n i ð Þ ¼ n i ð1Þ ¼ 0.




’th argument in 0, we comple-
mentary distribution of Cj;D( )nli :
G-j;D
( ) j












is the corresponding density.
The probability that l is the lowest cost supplier, conditional on delivering to n
at unit cost c, is:
j;D @G-
j;D cðc n.i ðc; ; :::; cÞ=@cp lnli Þ ¼ - j;D :gnli ðcÞ
Unconditionally, the probability that l is the lowest cost supplier is therefore:Z
pj;D
1
pj;D c gj;Dnl i ¼ ð ð Þdcj nli Þ nli c
0Z 1 @G-j;Dn Þ.i ðc; c; :::; c¼ - dc
0 @cl( ) j
b j d j h j
-y j=ð1-r Þ Z 1 dG-j;D ð30ÞP l0 c¼ - N ( )nl0 l0i n i ð Þ.j jb j d j j -y =ð1-r Þ 0 dcl0 nl0 l0¼1 l0 h i
j y j- r jjðbl d jnlh =ð1- Þ¼P ( )liÞ y j 1 r j :N j =ð - Þ






Deriving the distribution of markups
Denote the unit cost of the lowest cost supplier of a variety to market n as Cn
ð1Þj
and the unit cost of the second-lowest cost (potential) supplier as Cð2Þjn : If σ
j < 1









If σ j > 1 the monopoly price is a markup:
s j
m- j ¼ ;
s j - 1
over Cð1Þjn . The markup the seller will charge is thus:{ }
M- jn ¼ min M jn ;m- j :
To derive the distribution of this markup, it’s useful to condition on a cost c2
such that Cð1n





M~ 2n ¼ ;
C 1Þjn
ð
the distribution of M~ under this condition is:
Pr½M~ n < m]( ) [ ]( ) h ij
F j 1
j-- m y cy j2 exp -F jn n 1
j-- m y cy j j. exp -F y2 nðc2=mÞ¼ [ ]
exp -F j y j j y j :nc2 . Fnc2
Looking at the right-hand side, the first term in the numerator is the probability of
exactly one cost in the interval between m−1c2 and c2. The second term in the
numerator is the probability that Cð1Þjn > c2=m: The term in the denominator is
the probability that Cð1Þjn < c2 < C
2 j
n
ð Þ : Simplifying, this expression becomes:
Pr½M~ n < m] ¼ 1- m-y
j
:
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Key for what follows is that this distribution does not depend on c2. It follows
that the distribution of M jn is:[ ]
H Þ ¼ Pr M jðm n < m ¼ 1 y
j- m- ; ð31Þ
which is independent of Cð2Þj: Taking account of the upper bound m- jn , we get the
distribution of M- jn.
Appendix D
Deriving the price index
To derive the price index consider the price of a variety of tangible sector j, with
second lowest cost Cð2Þjn (we return to our convention of dropping the variety













The independence of M j 2 jn and Cn








n ¼ dGðn ðcÞ . y m-y
j-1dm sþ y jm-jð1-s jÞ m j y j- -2dm (32)
0 1 m j-




ð2Þj lies below a cost c only if there
are two or more below c, this distribution is:
Gð2Þjn ðcÞ ¼ Pr½Cð2Þjn < c] ¼ 1- expð-F j ync









2Þ ¼ y F jn c2y
j-1expð-F jncy
jÞdc:
Attacking the first expression in (32):Z 1 Z
c1-s
j
dGð2Þjn ðcÞ ¼ y j
( )2 1
F j c2y
j s jexp F jcy
j-
n ð- n Þdc
0 ( )0
2y j s j 1
ð33Þ
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where Gða 1Þ ¼
0
xa-1e-xdx is the gamma function. Attacking the second term in




y m y - ð1-sÞ s
j-y -1dm mj m -y
j 2 j -- y yþ dm ¼ ð1- ð Þm- Þ þ j ð Þm- j -y
1 mj- y j- ðs - 1Þ
s j¼ 1 - 1 j -y jþ j m-y - ðs j ð Þ- 1Þ





where: ( ) jj 1=j ð1-s Þ( 1=ð1-s j2y s j j
g G
- ðs - 1 Þj Þ 1 - 1 j
y j
m
-y¼ j þ ð Þ- :y s j- ð - 1Þ
Appendix E
Deriving the royalty share
Having derived the price index for sector j in destination n, we now turn to the
royalties generated there. Consider a variety ω in sector j in country n with a
price P(ω). Our CES demand system implies that its sales there are:




n ¼ :p j1 j-sn
Here X jn is total absorption of sector j. The cost of tangible inputs to produce this
variety are:
X
Iðo ðoÞÞ ¼ :
M- ðoÞ











Þ j -s j
n ð Þm- MMðo ðoÞ > m- :Þ
Integrating across varieties ω, using (33), input costs in sector j in country n are:"Z mj1 Z - Z
j
I A c1 s
j
1
j j - ð2Þ
n ¼ n dGn ðcÞ m-1dHðm - -ð Þmj sÞ þ ms
j-1dHðmÞ




- ðs j jj
G
- 1Þ j - 1 j
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Combined with the price index (17), this complicated expression reduces to:




It follows that intangible services (embodied in n’s absorption of tangible sector j
goods) are:
j
X j;I X j
y
n n - 1þ y j X







5 On the measurement of
upstreamness and downstreamness
in global value chains
Pol Antràs and Davin Chor
1. Introduction
In 2017, international trade economists celebrated the 200th anniversary of the
birth of their field, as marked by the publication of David Ricardo’s On the Prin-
ciples of Political Economy and Taxation. This treatise is widely recognized to
contain the first lucid exposition of the concept of comparative advantage.
Although the notion of comparative advantage is as relevant today as it was
200 years ago, the nature of international trade flows has dramatically changed
in recent decades. Technological, institutional, and political developments in
the last 30 years have led to a sharp disintegration of production processes
across borders, as firms found it more and more profitable to organize production
on a global scale. Countries are no longer exchanging “cloth for wine”, to quote
Ricardo’s famous example. Instead, world production is now structured into
global value chains (GVCs, hereafter) in which firms source parts, components,
or services from producers in several countries, and in turn sell their output to
firms and consumers worldwide.
By dramatically altering the international organization of production, the rise
of GVCs has placed the specialization of countries within GVCs at center
stage. Where in GVCs are different countries specializing? What are the determi-
nants of a country’s positioning in GVCs? What are the real income implications
of moving up or down GVCs? Although we still lack definitive answers to these
questions, a recent body of work in international trade has contributed to our
understanding by developing measures of the positioning of countries and indus-
tries in GVCs (see Fally, 2012, Antràs et al., 2012, Antràs and Chor, 2013, Alfaro
et al., 2017, Miller and Temurshoev, 2017, Wang et al., 2017, Fally and Hillberry,
2018).1 The intellectual foundation and computation of these measures is based
on Input-Output (I-O) analysis. The application of Input-Output techniques by
trade economists has in turn been reciprocated by an increased interest by
Input-Output practitioners on the global dimension of inter-industry linkages.
Indeed, a big contributing factor to the popularization of the literature on GVC
positioning has been the construction and widespread availability of Global
Input-Output Tables, which provide a detailed picture of inter-industry commod-
ity flows both within and across countries.
DOI: 10.4324/9781351061544-5
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A key limitation of existing approaches to measuring the positioning of coun-
tries in GVCs is that they lack a theoretical foundation within the realm of
modern general equilibrium models of international trade. With information on
the various entries of a Global Input-Output Table, a researcher can compute
the implied upstreamness or downstreamness of specific industries and countries.
But without knowledge of what shapes these I-O entries, a researcher cannot
tease out the primitive determinants of GVC positioning or elucidate how
changes in the economic environment (e.g., changes in trade costs) are likely
to affect the specialization of countries within GVCs. To be clear, we do not
mean to imply that the literature on GVCs has been atheoretical in nature. On
the contrary, in recent years, various theoretical frameworks have been developed
highlighting the implications of the rise of GVCs for the workings of general
equilibrium models of international trade.2 Nevertheless, the vast majority of the-
oretical models developed to date are too stylized to easily map to Global Input-
Output Tables.3
This chapter makes four contributions to the literature on GVCs. First, we
provide a succinct overview of various measures developed in the literature to
capture the upstreamness or downstreamness of industries and countries in
GVCs. Second, we employ data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)
to document the empirical evolution of these measures over the period 1995–
2011. Third, we develop a theoretical framework – which builds on Caliendo
and Parro (2015) – that provides a structural interpretation of all the entries of
the WIOD in a given year. Fourth, we then resort to a calibrated version of the
model to perform counterfactual exercises that: (i) sharpen our understanding of
the independent effect of several factors in explaining the observed empirical pat-
terns between 1995 and 2011; and (ii) provide guidance for how future changes in
the world economy are likely to shape the positioning of countries in GVCs.
The key measures of upstreamness explored in this chapter are introduced in
Section 2. These measures envision a world in which production in GVCs fea-
tures some element of sequentiality.4 We first consider a measure of distance or
upstreamness of a production sector from final demand which was developed
independently by Fally (2012) and Antràs and Chor (2013), and consolidated
in Antràs et al. (2012). This measure (which we label U) aggregates information
on the extent to which an industry in a given country produces goods that are sold
directly to final consumers or that are sold to other sectors that themselves sell
disproportionately to final consumers. A relatively upstream sector is thus one
that sells a small share of its output to final consumers, and instead sells dispro-
portionately to other sectors that themselves sell relatively little to final consum-
ers. A second related measure, originally proposed by Fally (2012), captures the
distance or downstreamness of a given sector from the economy’s primary factors
of production (or sources of value-added). According to this measure (which we
denote by D), an industry in a given country will appear to be downstream if its
production process uses little value-added relative to intermediate inputs, and par-
ticularly so when it purchases intermediate inputs from industries that themselves
use intermediate inputs intensively. In addition, we also discuss simpler versions
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of these two measures of GVC positioning: the first reduces the measure in
Antràs et al. (2012) to simply the share of a country-industry’s output that is
sold directly to final consumers (denoted by F/GO), while the second reduces
the Fally (2012) measure of distance from value-added to simply the share of a
country-industry’s payments accounted for by payments to primary factors
(denoted by VA/GO).
Although these measures were initially developed at the industry-level with
National Input-Output Tables in mind, we show that it is straightforward to
define them and compute them at the country-industry level with data from
Global Input-Output Tables, as in the recent work of Miller and Temurshoev
(2017) and Fally and Hillberry (2018). Similarly, taking weighted averages of
these indices across sectors, one can easily compute the average upstreamness
or downstreamness of specific countries in GVCs, which we will adopt as
summary measures of countries’ GVC positioning.
With these definitions in hand, in Section 3 we use data from the WIOD to
compute these measures for the period 1995–2011. We unveil two systematic
and somewhat surprising facts. First, countries that appear to be upstream accord-
ing to their production-staging distance from final demand (U) are at the same
time recorded to be downstream according to their production-staging distance
from primary factors (D). This puzzling finding is also observed when working
with the simpler F/GO and VA/GO measures. More specifically, countries that
sell a disproportionate share of their output directly to final consumers (thus
appearing to be downstream in GVCs according to U) tend to also feature high
value-added over gross output ratios, reflecting a limited amount of intermediate
inputs embodied in their production (thus appearing to be upstream in GVCs
according to D). Our second main empirical finding relates to the evolution of
these measures. Not only is the puzzling positive correlation between U and D
(and between F/GO and VA/GO) present in all the years in our sample, but it actu-
ally appears to have intensified between 1995 and 2011. While we first illustrate
these results using the GVC measures aggregated at the country level, we further
show that these positive correlations (as well as their increase over time) are also
observed in the GVC measures as originally computed at the country-industry
level.
In Section 4, we provide a tentative investigation of the possible causes behind
these salient and puzzling facts from the data. We first explore the role of trade
costs. Note that in a closed economy, value-added coincides with final consump-
tion as a national accounting identity; thus, in a cross-section of closed economies
that differ in their value-added intensity in production, one would expect to record
a perfect positive correlation between F/GO and VA/GO. This suggests that the
observed positive correlation between these measures (and between U and D)
might reflect the persistence of large trade barriers across countries. When applying
the Head and Ries (2001) approach to back out implied trade costs, we indeed find
these costs to be substantially high, even towards the end of our sample. Neverthe-
less, we also find that average trade barriers fell significantly in the period 1995–
2011 (especially prior to the Global Financial Crisis), while the positive correlation
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between the various pairs of country-level GVC measures actually intensified. This
suggests that other mechanisms must have been in play to explain the puzzling
facts unveiled in Section 3. As a second candidate explanation, we provide evi-
dence for the importance of compositional effects related to the differential (and
growing) importance of services. Intuitively, service sectors feature short produc-
tion chain lengths, with both a high ratio of sales to final consumers and little use
of intermediate inputs in production. The cross-country variation in our measures
of upstreamness (as well as the positive correlation among U and D) thus partly
reflects variation in the importance of service sectors in the production structure
of different countries.5
In order to better elucidate the quantitative importance of these alternative
explanations, and also to be able to interpret the data in a structural manner,
we turn in Section 5 to develop a theoretical model. We begin by reviewing
Caliendo and Parro’s (2015) extension of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) Ricardian
model of trade. In its closed economy version, the Cobb-Douglas structure of the
demand and production sides of this model are closely related to the framework
in Acemoglu et al. (2012). As is well known, the demand and technological
Cobb-Douglas parameters of that model can easily be recovered from expenditure
shares reported in National Input-Output Tables. In the type of open-economy
equilibrium corresponding to a Global Input-Output Table, cross-country and
cross-industry expenditure shares are less straightforward to map structurally to
a model because they are the outcome of competition across potential sources,
and are thus shaped by differences in productivity and trade costs across coun-
tries. Caliendo and Parro (2015) showed, however, that a variant of the Eaton
and Kortum (2002) framework could be used to interpret structurally the share
of purchases of a given type of industry good originating from different source
countries.
We develop in Section 5 an extension of the Caliendo and Parro (2015) model
that features a more flexible formulation of trade costs, in order to be able to fully
match all entries of a World Input-Output Table (WIOT) that relate to trade in
intermediate inputs and trade in goods/services designated for final consumption.
In its original form, the Caliendo and Parro (2015) model does not allow these
“trade shares” to vary depending on the identity of the purchasing entity, that
is, depending on whether they are sold to final consumers or to different indus-
tries as inputs. Instead, the model (implicitly) imposes certain restrictions on
these entries that need not (and typically do not) hold in the actual data. Given
our objective of providing a structural interpretation of the GVC measures
described in Section 2, it is instead desirable to correctly match both the
intermediate-use and final-use trade shares, since the implied values of upstream-
ness and downstreamness will clearly depend on the extent to which a sector’s
output is sold to final consumers or to other industries.6 For the extension we
develop, we further show – in line with Dekle et al. (2008) and Caliendo and
Parro (2015) – that in order to perform various counterfactuals, all that is required
are: (i) initial trade shares available from a WIOT; (ii) demand and technological
Cobb-Douglas parameters easily recoverable from the same WIOT; and (iii) a
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vector of sectoral parameters shaping the elasticity of trade flows (across source
countries) to trade barriers.
In Section 6, we leverage this result to undertake several counterfactual exer-
cises. We first attempt to trace the relative contribution of trade cost reductions
and the growing share of final consumption of services for explaining the puz-
zling increase in the key correlations between F/GO and VA/GO (and between
U and D) over the 1995–2011 period. Our quantitative results confirm that declin-
ing trade costs tend only to aggravate the high-correlation puzzle. On the other
hand, we find that changes in final consumption shares did contribute – but
only modestly – to the observed increase in the correlation between these
GVC measures. We next use our model to shed light on the potential future evo-
lution of the positioning of industries and countries in GVCs. We do so by exper-
imenting with possible scenarios involving different trade cost reductions, as well
as further increases in the share of countries’ spending on services. Interestingly,
we find that a trade cost reduction that is disproportionately larger for services
than for goods industries can induce a further increase in the correlation
between F/GO and VA/GO (and between U and D); this is because a change in
trade costs of this nature would tend to reinforce initial patterns of specialization
for countries with comparative advantage in services.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the
empirical measures of GVC positioning. In Section 3, we compute these measures
using data from the WIOD for the period 1995–2011 and discuss several patterns
that emerge. In Section 4, we explore two possible explanations for these patterns.
In Section 5, we turn to a theoretical model to interpret the data structurally, and,
in Section 6, we use the framework to perform counterfactual exercises. Last, in
Section 7, we offer some concluding comments (the appendix contains some tech-
nical details of our model).
2. An overview of four measures of GVC positioning
In this section, we develop the main measures of GVC positioning we will work
with throughout the chapter.7 Our unit of analysis is a country-industry pair such
as Electrical and Optical Equipment in Australia. The goal is to devise measures
of the extent to which a country-industry is relatively upstream or downstream in
global value chains. These measures are built with the type of data available from
Global Input-Output Tables. We shall refer to a World Input-Output Table as a
WIOT, and Figure 5.1 provides a schematic version of one such WIOT.
The WIOT in Figure 5.1 considers a world economy with J countries (indexed
by i or j) and S sectors (indexed by r or s). In its top left J × S by J × S block, the
WIOT contains information on intermediate purchases by industry s in country j
from sector r in country i. We denote these intermediate input flows by Zrsij . To the
right of this block, the WIOT contains an additional J × S by J block with infor-
mation on the final-use expenditure in each country j on goods originating from
sector r in country i. We denote these final consumption flows by Frij. The sum of
Figure 5.1 The structure of a World Input-Output Table
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the (J × S) + J terms in each row of a WIOT represents the total use of output of
sector r from country i, and naturally coincides with gross output in that sector
and country (denoted by Y ri ). More formally, we have
XS XJ XJ XS XJ
Y r ri ¼ Zrs rs rij þ Fij ¼ Zij þ Fi ; ð1Þ
s¼1 j¼1 j¼1 s¼1 j¼1
where we will hereafter denote the total final use of output originating from sectorPJ
r in country i by Fr Fri ¼ ij .
j¼1
As illustrated by the two bottom rows of the WIOT, gross output in industry s
in country j is also equal to the sum of: (i) all intermediate purchases made from
source sectors r in countries i; and (ii) country j’s value-added employed in the
production of industry s itself (the latter denoted by VAsj ). More formally:
XS XJ
Y sj ¼ Zrsij þ VAsj : ð2Þ
r¼1 i¼1
As described, the WIOT contains information on linkages in a full production
network, where each country-industry could potentially be traversed in a large
number of production chains. In this complex setting, the measures of GVC posi-
tioning described below will seek to capture the average position of each country-
industry in the production chains in which it is involved. The first two measures
introduced below will take as a point of reference the sources of final demand at
the end of each production chain, and compute the upstreamness of the country-
industry relative to final use. The second set of measures will instead capture the
downstreamness of each country-industry from where production processes com-
mence, namely from sources of value-added by primary factors.
2.1. Upstreamness from final use
How upstream or downstream in GVCs is a given sector r from a given country i?
A first possible approach to tackling this question is to consider the extent to
which a country-industry pair sells its output for final use to consumers world-
wide or instead sells intermediate inputs to other producing sectors in the
world economy. The idea is that a sector that sells disproportionately to final con-
sumers would appear to be downstream in value chains, while a sector that sells
little to final consumers is more likely to be upstream in value chains. Invoking
equation (1), a simple measure of this notion of GVC positioning is the ratio
Fri =Y
r
i ; which equals the share of gross output in sector r in country i that is
133 Upstreamness and downstreamness 133
sold to final consumers. We will refer to this measure as F/GO. Note that a lower
value of this ratio is associated with a higher upstreamness from final use.
An unappealing feature of the simple measure F/GO is that it does not capture
variation in the upstreamness of country-industry pairs that goes beyond the
extent to which their output is directly sold to final consumers or to other indus-
tries. In order to transition to a more satisfactory measure, let us first define
ars rsij ¼ Zij =Y sj as the dollar amount of sector r’s output from country i needed to
produce one dollar worth of industry s’s output in country j. With this notation,
equation (1) becomes:
XS XJ
Y r arsij Y
s
j þ Fri ¼ i : ð3Þ
s¼1 j¼1
Iterating this identity, we can express industry r’s output in country i as an infinite
sequence of terms which reflect the use of this country-industry’s output at differ-
ent positions in global value chains, starting with its use as a final good/service, as
a direct input in the production of final goods/services in all countries and indus-
tries, as a direct input of a direct input in the production of final goods/services in
all countries and industries, and so on:
XS XJ XS XJ XS XJ
Y r Fr rsij F
s rs
i ¼ i þ a j þ aij astjkFtk þ . . . ð4Þ
s¼1 j¼1 s¼1 j¼1 t¼1 k¼1
Building on this identity, Antràs and Chor (2013) suggested computing the
(weighted) average position of a country-industry’s output in global value
chains by multiplying each of the terms in (4) by its respective production-










s¼1 j¼1 t¼1 k¼1 ð5r i Þ
i ¼ x Y r þ x Y r þ x Y r þ . . .i i i
It is clear that Uri > 1, and that larger values are associated with relatively higher
levels of upstreamness of the output originating from sector r in country i.
Although computing (5) might appear to require computing an infinite powerPS Pseries, provided that J rsr 1 i 1 aij < 1 for all j-s pairs (a natural assumption), the¼ ¼
numerator of the above measure is actually equal to the ((i − 1) × S + r)-th
element of the J × S by 1 column matrix [I − A]−2 F; here, A is a J × S by
J × S matrix whose ((i − 1) × S + r, (j − 1) × S + s)-th element is arsij , while F
is a column matrix with Fri in its ((i − 1) × S + r)-th row. Using the fact that the
stacked column matrix of gross output also satisfies Y = [I − A]−1 F – which
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is easily verified from (3) – the numerator is thus also equal to the ((i − 1) × S +
r)-th element of the J × S by 1 matrix [I − A] −1 Y, where Y is a J × S by 1 column
matrix with Y ri in its ((i − 1) × S + r)-th row. Because a WIOT provides direct
information on A and Y, computing the upstreamness of output of each sector
r in each country i thus amounts to a straightforward matrix inversion.8
Fally (2012) instead proposed a measure of upstreamness (or distance from
final use) based on the notion that industries selling a disproportionate share of
their output to relatively upstream industries should be relatively upstream them-
selves.9 In particular, he posited the following linear system of equations that
implicitly defines upstreamness for each sector r in country i:XS XJ
U~ ri ¼ 1 rsþ b U~ sij j ; ð6Þ
s¼1 j¼1
where note that brs Zrs=Y r arsY sij ¼ Y r¼ ij i ij j = i is the share of total output of sector r in
country i that is purchased by industry s in country j. Again, it is clear that
U~ r 1. Less obviously, one can demonstrate using matrix algebra that U~ ri > i and
Uri are in fact equivalent; this is the key theoretical result in Antràs et al. (2012).
2.2. Downstreamness from primary factors
We next turn to alternative measures of GVC positioning based on a country-
industry pair’s use of intermediate inputs and primary factors of production.
These measures are based on the identity in (2), which describes the technology
for producing output in industry s in country j. Other things equal, it seems plau-
sible that production processes that embody a larger amount of intermediate
inputs relative to their use of primary factors of production will be relatively
downstream in value chains. Conversely, if an industry relies disproportionately
on value-added from primary factors of production, then it would appear that this
industry is relatively upstream. In light of equation (2), a simple measure to
capture such GVC positioning is the ratio VAsj=Y
s
j ; with large values of this
measure being associated with higher upstreamness or lower downstreamness.
We will refer to this measure as VA/GO.
As in the case of the sales-based measure of F/GO, a limitation of VA/GO is
that it does not take into account potential heterogeneity in the upstreamness of
the inputs used in the production process of a country-industry pair. With that
in mind, we next develop a more informative measure of downstreamness
from primary factors of production. Recall that brs rs rij ¼ Zij =Yi denotes the share
of sector r’s output in country i that is used in industry s in country j. Then equa-
tion (2) can be written as:XS XJ
Y s rs¼ bij Y ri þ VAsj j :
r¼1 i¼1
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Iterating this identity, we can express:XS XJ XS XJ XS XJ
Y s s rs r tr rs tj ¼ VAj þ bij VAi þ bkibij VAk þ . . .
r¼1 i¼1 r¼1 i¼1 t¼1 k¼1
Notice that the first term captures the direct use of primary factors in the produc-
tion of industry s in country j. The second term reflects the use of intermediate
inputs that are themselves produced directly with primary factors. The third
term captures intermediate input purchases produced with inputs produced with
primary factors, and so on. The larger are the terms associated with further iter-
ations, the more intensive is that country-industry’s use of inputs far removed
from primary factors, and thus the more downstream is production relative to
these primary factors.
Building on Antràs and Chor (2013), Miller and Temurshoev (2017) propose
the following measure of downstreamness of a given country-industry pair
from primary factors of production:XS XJ XS XJ XS XJ
brs tr rs t
VAs ij
VAri bkibij VAk
Ds 1 j 2 r¼1 i¼1 3 r¼1 i¼1 t
ð¼1 k¼1 7







As in the case of Uri , it is clear that D
s
j > 1, with larger values being associated
with relatively higher levels of downstreamness of industry s in country j. Given
the similar structure of Uri in (5) and D
s
j in (7), it should come as no surprise that
one need not approximate the infinite sum in (7) to compute Dsj . By defining a
matrix B analogous to the matrix A invoked in the construction of Uri and com-
puting [I − B]−1 Y, the various elements of the numerator of Dsj are easily
retrieved. Furthermore, there is an analogous foundation for the measure Dsj
building on the following recursive definition:XJ XS
D~sj ¼ 1þ ars ~ij Dri : ð8Þ
i¼1 r¼1
This system of equations defining downstreamness D~sj was first suggested by
Fally (2012), who associated it with the average number of production stages
embodied in a sector’s output. As pointed out by Miller and Temurshoev
(2017), D~s in (8) and Ds 10j j in (7) are in fact mathematically equivalent.
2.3. Aggregation
So far we have developed measures of GVC positioning at the country-industry
level, but for some applications a researcher might be interested in the average
position of countries in GVCs. An example of such a focus on the country
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dimension rather than the country-industry dimension is provided by Antràs and
de Gortari (2017).
In principle, there are two alternative ways to compute country-level measures
of upstreamness/downstreamness. First, one can take a WIOT and simply col-
lapse its entries at the country-by-country level. More specifically, one can
compute the total purchases of intermediate inputs by country j from country iP
as Z S
PS rs
ij ¼ r¼1 s 1 Z¼ ij , and then generate a J × J block matrix with elements
Zij. Similarly, a J × J block matrix of aggregate final-use sales can be computedP
with entries F Sij ¼ r Fr1 ij. With this collapsed country-level WIOT, it is then¼
straightforward to compute country-level variants of the measures of upstream-
ness and downstreamness developed above. A second potential approach main-
tains the country-industry level dimension of the data and the GVC positioning
measures, but instead computes a weighted-average measure of upstreamness/
downstreamness at the country level by averaging the industry-level values of
those measures within a country.
For the two basic measures F/GO and VA/GO, it turns out that these two
approaches deliver the exact same country-level positioning numbers when
using the shares of a country’s gross output accounted for by different industries
as weights in the second approach. To see this equivalence result for the F/GO
measure, note that:
XS










where the left-hand side is the gross-output weighted-average of final-use shares,
while Fi/Yi (in the right-hand side) is the aggregate ratio of final use to gross
output in country i; the latter is naturally the ratio F/GO that would be computed
with a WIOT collapsed at the country level. Similarly, for the measure VA/GO, we
have:
XS
VAsXS VAs jj Y sj s VA¼1 j
Y
¼ XS ¼ ;s xXS Y ð10Þ




where the right-hand side term, VAj/Yj, would naturally be the value for the
country-level value-added over gross output ratio resulting from a WIOT col-
lapsed at the country level.
When considering the more involved measures U and D, such an equivalence
result between the two aggregation approaches no longer holds. In the empirical
analysis to be performed in the next section, we have nevertheless found the two
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approaches to deliver extremely highly correlated country-level indices of GVC
positioning (see, in particular, footnote 16).11
Finally, one might also be interested in computing a worldwide average
measure of GVC positioning. A natural way to do so would be to compute a
weighted sum of the respective measures, F/GO, VA/GO, U, and D, with
weights given by gross output in each country-industry. From simple inspection
of (9) and (10), it is straightforward to see that the worldwide averages for F/GO
and VA/GO will coincide with the ratio of aggregate world final consumption to
aggregate world gross output and the ratio of aggregate world value-added
to aggregate world gross output, respectively. Furthermore, because the world
as a whole is a closed economy, the aggregate world value of final-use expendi-
tures is necessarily equal as an accounting identity to the aggregate payments
made to primary factors. Denoting these aggregates with upper bars, we thus
have F-=GO ¼ VA=GO at the level of the world economy. There is a similar
though far less obvious relationship connecting the world measures of U and
D. More specifically, Proposition 1 in Miller and Temurshoev (2017) establishes
that the gross-output weighted-average U- value across country-industries is in
fact exactly equal to the corresponding gross-output weighted-average D-.12
This suggests that one should not interpret these world averages as measures of
GVC positioning. Instead, these world averages should be viewed as measures of
the complexity of world production patterns, as captured by the extent to which
production processes are sliced across industries and countries. When U- = D- is
large (or F-=GO ¼ VA=GO is low), GVCs are more complex in the sense that
world production uses inputs far removed from final use, but also highly pro-
cessed inputs far removed from the primary factors that initiated production. Con-
versely, a world with a low value of U- = D- and a high value of F-=GO ¼ VA=GO
is a world with little intermediate input use and short production chains.
3. The empirical evolution of GVC positioning
We turn now to the annual World Input-Output Database (WIOD) to compute the
four measures of GVC positioning defined in the previous section, and document
how these have evolved in recent decades. The WIOD is well-suited for this exer-
cise: It contains detailed information on country-industry production linkages and
final-use expenditures for a large panel of J = 41 countries (including a rest-of-
the-world aggregate), a common set of S = 35 consistently-defined industries
in each country, at an annual frequency, as described in Timmer et al. (2015).
We work with the 2013 edition of the WIOD, which covers the years 1995–
2011. This is in practice a very large dataset. Looking at the entries that corre-
spond to input purchases across country-industry pairs (i.e., the Zrsij ’s in the sche-
matic in Figure 5.1), there are already a total of (35 × 41)2 = 2,059,225 such data
points in any single year. Looking at the entries that report the value of each
country’s purchases for final-use from each country-industry source (i.e., the
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Frij’s in Figure 5.1), this yields an additional 35 × 41
2 = 58,835 observations per
year.13
In terms of practical implementation, we calculate the four GVC measures for
each industry r in each country i in each year, after first performing a “net inven-
tory” correction. For expositional purposes, equation (1) presented earlier had
simplified the components of gross output, Y ri : Apart from the value of that
output that is purchased for intermediate and final uses (the Zrsij ’s and F
r
ij’s),
gross output in the Input-Output accounts includes an additional third component
equal to the net value that is inventorized (which we denote by Nr 14i ). To fully
account for how these net inventories affect the measurement of production
staging, one would need to observe the identities of the industries s that undertake
this inventorization. However, a breakdown of Nri by the identity of purchasing
industries is not available in the WIOD. We therefore follow Antràs et al.
(2012) in applying a “net inventory” correction that apportions Nri across pur-
chasing countries and industries, in proportion to the corresponding breakdown
seen in the intermediate use entries (i.e., the Zrsij ’s). This correction boils down
to rescaling each Zrsij and F
r
ij term by a multiplicative factor equal to Y
r= Y ri ð i -
Nri Þ before we compute the GVC measures at the country-industry level.15
To more succinctly illustrate the broad trends in countries’ GVC positioning
over time, we will find it useful to begin by working with a collapsed version
of the World Input-Output Tables (WIOT), in which we aggregate out the indus-
try dimension – by summing over all industry entries for each source-by-
destination country pair – to obtain a panel of country-by-country Input-Output
Tables, as described in Section 2.3. From this collapsed WIOT, one can
compute a set of country-level measures of F/GO, VA/GO, U, and D (with a
corresponding net inventory correction based on country-level aggregate invento-
ries) to summarize the GVC positioning of each country, and more easily illus-
trate how this has evolved over time.16
3.1. The GVC positioning of countries over time
Figure 5.2 provides an overview of how GVCs have evolved for the world
economy as a whole. Here, we have taken two of the country-level measures
of GVC positioning, namely F/GO and U, computed the gross-output
weighted-average of each measure (across the 41 countries in the 2013
WIOD), and plotted these over time.
The upper panel reveals that the final-use share in gross output in the world
economy (F-=GO) has been on the decline over this period. While the magnitude
of this change was fairly small (from 0.526 in 1995 to 0.486 in 2011), the drop
was nevertheless perceptible and steady, particularly after 2002. Put otherwise,
production and trade in intermediate inputs has risen relative to that in final
goods, which would be consistent with a rise in GVC activity around the
world. The lower panel corroborates this interpretation. There, we see that the
world average upstreamness U- has been on the uptick, suggesting that produc-
tion processes have become fragmented into more stages.
What about the other two measures of GVC positioning? Remember from
Section 2.3 that the aggregate world value of final-use expenditures is equal to
the aggregate world payments made to primary factors. A plot of VA=GO over
time would thus be identical to the upper panel in Figure 5.2. As previously dis-
cussed, the gross-output weighted-average U value is in fact also equal to the
gross-output weighted-average of D, and thus a separate figure for the evolution
of D- over time would also be redundant.
In Figure 5.3, we take a more detailed look at these aggregate patterns, by plot-
ting the respective GVC measures for the countries at the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentiles of the cross-country distribution in each year. Note that the worldwide
equivalence between F/GO and VA/GO, as well as that between U and D, no
longer holds for individual countries, so we can now meaningfully examine the
evolution of the four separate GVC measures. The plots in the left column of
Figure 5.3 verify that the downward trend in F/GO, and the converse upward
trend in U, both hold across these different percentiles of the cross-country dis-
tribution. Viewed from the perspective of these two GVC measures, it appears
that countries have been broadly moving more upstream relative to final
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Figure 5.2 GVC positioning over time (world average)
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Figure 5.3 GVC positioning over time (25th, 50th, 75th country percentiles)
other hand, the plots in the right column indicate that the value-added to gross-
output ratio (VA/GO) has been falling over this period, while the measure of pro-
duction staging relative to sources of value-added (D) has been rising. The dis-
tribution of countries’ GVC positioning has thus simultaneously become more
downstream in relation to primary factors. Taken together, these observations
suggest that GVCs have become more complex, as the average global production
chain “length” from primary factors to a particular country, and onward from that
country to final demand, have both increased.
It is useful to discuss how the above stylized facts relate to the broader empir-
ical literature on GVC positioning. We are admittedly not the first to document
the gradual rise in U and D over time: Miller and Temurshoev (2017) have
also reported this pattern both across countries and across industries in the
2013 WIOD. In the regression analysis that we present below, we will extend
this finding by showing that these trends are present too when examining the
within country-industry variation in these GVC measures (see Table 5.2). In con-
trast, Fally (2012) has documented a fall over time in the number of production
stages from primary factors to industries, i.e., in the D measure, using U.S. Input-
Output Tables that span 1947 to 2002. Nevertheless, the bulk of the decline doc-
umented by Fally (2012) occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s, prior to the
period considered in this chapter, and thus prior to the explosion in GVC activity.
Furthermore, in the ongoing revision of his work, Fally documents an uptick in D
over the period 1997–2007, which is consistent with our findings.
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While Figures 5.2 and 5.3 point to broad trends that apply across the country
sample, these may mask significant movements in individual countries’ GVC
positioning. A simple rank correlation test nevertheless indicates that each coun-
try’s position in GVCs vis-à-vis other countries has remained remarkably stable.
In particular, we obtain Spearman coefficients in excess of 0.75 for each of the
country-level GVC measures when comparing their cross-country rank order in
1995 against that in 2011. Table 5.1 confirms that there is a striking persistence
in countries’ GVC position over time, even in the tail ends of the rank order. For
example, focusing on the left half of the table, China, Luxembourg, and the
Czech Republic were among the five most upstream countries relative to final
demand in both 1995 and 2011, based on either the country rank by F/GO or
U. On the other hand, Brazil, Greece, and Cyprus have remained in the five
most downstream countries over this period in their proximity to final-use. A
similar persistence can also be seen in the right half of Table 5.1, which
reports the rank order of countries in terms of their GVC position relative to
primary factors (based on either VA/GO or D).
The above discussion has described patterns in the evolution of GVC position-
ing across countries, in terms of the broad decline in F/GO and VA/GO, as well as
the accompanying rise in U and D over time. We next establish that these patterns
are also borne out when focusing instead on variation within countries – and more
specifically, within country-industry – over time. For this, we turn to the more
disaggregate GVC measures computed at the country-industry level. To tease
out the desired “within”-variation, we run a series of regressions of the following
form:
GVCs s sj;t ¼ b1Yeart þ FEj þ ej;t: ð11Þ
On the left-hand side, GVCsj;t denotes the GVC measure for industry s in country j
during year t. We will use each of the four measures (F/GO, VA/GO, U, and D) as
this dependent variable; summary statistics for these country-industry GVC mea-
sures are presented in appendix Table 5.A1. On the right-hand side, the FEsj ’s
denote country-industry fixed effects. The variable Yeart then seeks to pick up
whether there is a simple linear time trend in the evolution of GVCsj;t within
country-industry. In more detailed specifications, we will replace Yeart with a
full set of year dummies to trace the year-by-year evolution in the respective
GVC measures. We report conservative standard errors that are multi-way clus-
tered by country, industry, and year, to accommodate possible correlation in
the esj;t’s along each of these dimensions (Cameron et al. 2011).
Table 5.2 reports the results from this regression exercise. These confirm that
the broad patterns documented earlier are present too in the evolution of GVC
positioning within country-industry: Both the final-use share in gross output
( F GO sð = Þj;t, Columns 1–2) and the value-added share in gross output
( VA GO sð = Þj;t, Columns 3–4) have declined steadily over time. Conversely,
upstreamness relative to final demand has been rising (Usj;t, Columns 5–6), as
Table 5.1 Country-level GVC position by rank (top and bottom five)
Rank: F/GO (1995) F/GO (2011) Rank: VA/GO (1995) VA/GO (2011)
1. China 0.384 Luxembourg 0.296 1. China 0.373 China 0.325
2. Luxembourg 0.388 China 0.340 2. Czech Rep. 0.403 Luxembourg 0.362
3. Slovakia 0.394 Korea 0.377 3. Slovakia 0.416 Korea 0.372
4. Czech Rep. 0.408 Taiwan 0.396 4. Estonia 0.430 Czech Rep. 0.383
5. Russia 0.444 Czech Rep. 0.401 5. Romania 0.454 Bulgaria 0.401
37. Denmark 0.558 Brazil 0.557 37. Austria 0.563 Brazil 0.561
38. Brazil 0.572 USA 0.569 38. Turkey 0.575 USA 0.562
39. Turkey 0.605 Mexico 0.586 39. Brazil 0.575 Mexico 0.581
40. Greece 0.625 Cyprus 0.637 40. Greece 0.576 Cyprus 0.586
41. Cyprus 0.709 Greece 0.668 41. Cyprus 0.625 Greece 0.628
Rank: U (1995) U (2011) Rank: D (1995) D (2011)
1. Cyprus 1.451 Greece 1.546 1. Cyprus 1.662 Greece 1.657
2. Greece 1.611 Cyprus 1.617 2. Brazil 1.748 Cyprus 1.763
3. Turkey 1.666 Mexico 1.737 3. Turkey 1.758 Mexico 1.779
4. Brazil 1.755 USA 1.786 4. Greece 1.759 Brazil 1.806
5. Denmark 1.810 Brazil 1.824 5. Austria 1.800 USA 1.808
37. Russia 2.185 Czech Rep. 2.358 37. Romania 2.155 Luxembourg 2.348
38. Luxembourg 2.242 Taiwan 2.463 38. Estonia 2.209 Bulgaria 2.370
39. Czech Rep. 2.331 Korea 2.544 39. Slovakia 2.306 Czech Rep. 2.444
40. Slovakia 2.389 Luxembourg 2.581 40. Czech Rep. 2.344 Korea 2.534
41. China 2.535 China 2.819 41. China 2.591 China 2.900
Notes: Rank order based on the respective GVC measures computed at the country level, i.e., based on the WIOD aggregated to a country-by-country panel of Input–
Output Tables. The top and bottom five countries in the rank order are reported, for both 1995 and 2011.
Table 5.2 Evolution of GVC measures within country-industries over time




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year −0.0009* −0.0017*** 0.0064*** 0.0084***
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0015] [0.0017]
Dum: Year=1996 −0.0002 −0.0012 −0.0060 0.0019
[0.0025] [0.0026] [0.0083] [0.0079]
Dum: Year=1997 −0.0015 −0.0024 0.0026 0.0061
[0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0068] [0.0062]
Dum: Year=1998 0.0026** 0.0002 −0.0129*** −0.0085*
[0.0010] [0.0015] [0.0032] [0.0043]
Dum: Year=1999 0.0029*** −0.0005 −0.0086*** −0.0073***
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0010] [0.0025]
Dum: Year=2000 −0.0015 −0.0094*** 0.0140*** 0.0311***
[0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0045] [0.0045]
Dum: Year=2001 −0.0022 −0.0122*** 0.0182*** 0.0394***
[0.0020] [0.0021] [0.0065] [0.0053]
Dum: Year=2002 −0.0010 −0.0091*** 0.0069 0.0218***
[0.0024] [0.0022] [0.0069] [0.0054]
Dum: Year=2003 −0.0033 −0.0102*** 0.0204** 0.0334*
[0.0027] [0.0022] [0.0082] [0.0059]
Dum: Year=2004 −0.0052 −0.0135*** 0.0346*** 0.0490***
[0.0030] [0.0025] [0.0100] [0.0079]
Dum: Year=2005 −0.0061* −0.0153*** 0.0421*** 0.0657***
[0.0031] [0.0032] [0.0099] [0.0101]
(Continued)
Table 5.2 (Continued)
Dependent variable: (F/GO)s, sj t (F/GO)j,t (VA/GO)









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dum: Year=2006 −0.0084** −0.0208*** 0.0598*** 0.0919***
[0.0033] [0.0036] [0.0117] [0.0115]
Dum: Year=2007 −0.0119*** −0.0237*** 0.0797*** 0.1103***
[0.0038] [0.0039] [0.0137] [0.0133]
Dum: Year=2008 −0.0130*** −0.0287*** 0.0894*** 0.1333***
[0.0044] [0.0048] [0.0159] [0.0154]
Dum: Year=2009 −0.0075 −0.0164*** 0.0562*** 0.0746***
[0.0052] [0.0052] [0.0171] [0.0150]
Dum: Year=2010 −0.0102* −0.0211*** 0.0738*** 0.1027***
[0.0055] [0.0053] [0.0180] [0.0167]
Dum: Year=2011 −0.0111* −0.0226*** 0.0822*** 0.1110***
[0.0055] [0.0054] [0.0179] [0.0168]
Country-Industry FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 24,076 24,076 24,395 24,395 24,395 24,395 24,395 24,395
R2 0.9709 0.9709 0.9491 0.9495 0.9632 0.9636 0.9444 0.9460
Notes: The sample comprises all countries (41), industries (35), and years (17) in the WIOD. Standard errors are multi-way clustered by country, industry, and year; ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variables are respectively the GVC measures computed at the country-industry
level for each year. All columns control for country-industry (i.e., j-s) pair fixed effects; columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) further include year fixed effects, with the omitted
category being the dummy for 1995.
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has been its production-staging distance from primary factors (Dsj;t, Columns 7–
8). The estimates in the odd-numbered columns point to a significant linear
time trend, this being negative in the case of F/GO and VA/GO, while positive
in the case of U and D. Inspecting more closely the coefficients of the year
dummies in the even-numbered columns, most of the movement over time in
these GVC measures appears to have kicked in starting in 2000.17,18
In sum, the decline in F/GO and VA/GO, and the rise in U and D, appear to be
pervasive phenomena. These patterns are clearly visible in how the country-level
measures of GVC positioning have moved over time. They also emerge robustly
from more formal regressions that exploit within country-industry movements in
the GVC measures.
3.2. Puzzling correlations
The findings in the previous subsection hint at interesting patterns of co-
movement among the GVC positioning measures. We explore this dimension
of the data more carefully now, specifically the correlation between F/GO and
VA/GO (respectively, U and D) across countries, and how this correlation has
behaved over the period 1995–2011.
As GVCs have grown in importance as a mode of production, one might have
imagined that individual countries would have gradually positioned themselves
(on average) in particular segments of these GVCs in which they have compar-
ative advantage. For example, one might have expected that countries with com-
parative advantage in natural resources or basic parts and components would
have increasingly specialized in early stages of production processes, and
would have consequently experienced a downward shift in F/GO and an increase
in VA/GO. Conversely, countries with comparative advantage in production
stages that are closer to final assembly would have been expected to experience
a rise in F/GO and a decline in VA/GO.19 If such a scenario had indeed played
out, this should have led any positive correlation between F/GO and VA/GO to
weaken over time, and perhaps even turn negative.
Figure 5.4 reveals, however, that the actual patterns in the data are surprisingly
at odds with this prior intuition. The upper row in this figure plots the country-
level measures of F/GO against VA/GO in 1995 and 2011 respectively. A positive
relationship between these two measures stands out in both years, and this rela-
tionship actually appears to have tightened around the line of best fit by the end of
the period. The plots in the bottom row demonstrate that a similarly strong pos-
itive relationship has persisted between the country-level measures of U and D.
These observations are moreover consistent with what was seen earlier in the
country rank lists in Table 5.1. We saw there that countries such as China and
Luxembourg were among the bottom-five according to both F/GO and VA/GO
across the sample period. Similarly, countries such as Brazil, Greece, and
Cyprus were consistently ranked in the top-five of both of these GVC measures.
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Figure 5.4 GVC positioning measures and their correlation over time
feature that would be more consistent with a world in which trade costs have
remained relatively high. Recall in particular from the discussion in the Introduc-
tion that in the extreme case of autarky, the cross-country correlation between
F/GO and VA/GO would a perfect one. Taken at face value, this suggests that
trade costs have perhaps not fallen enough to cause any significant dampening
in this positive correlation.
Taking a more detailed look at the annual data, Figure 5.5 shows that these cor-
relations are not anomalous or specific to 1995 or 2011. The upper panel here
plots the pairwise correlation between F/GO and VA/GO at the country level
for each year in the sample. The correlation was already strong at the beginning
of the period (equal to 0.825 in 1995), and contrary to what we might expect in an
age of rising GVC activity, it in fact strengthened gradually over time (0.925 by
2011). The bottom panel provides a closely related illustration. There, we have
run a simple bivariate regression of the country-level measures of F/GO
against VA/GO, separately for each year between 1995 and 2011. The estimates
of the coefficient of VA/GO have been plotted, together with their associated 95
per cent confidence interval bands. The positive partial correlation between the
final-use and the value-added shares of gross output is always precisely esti-
mated, with the slope coefficient itself hovering around 1 in each year. In sum,
the positive correlation between F/GO and VA/GO has shown no sign of
waning over time.
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Figure 5.5 FU/GO and VA/GO over time
An analogous set of correlations can be documented between the country-level
measures of U and D. As seen in Section 2, the definition of U would lead us to
expect that it would be inversely correlated with F/GO, as the more upstream a
country is from sources of final demand, the lower would be the share of
country output that goes directly to final-use. Similarly, D exhibits a negative cor-
relation with VA/GO, so that the more downstream a country is from primary
factors, the lower would be the share of gross output that goes towards direct pay-
ments to those factors.20 We therefore obtain a positive correlation in Figure 5.6
between U and D in each year, in line with what was seen earlier for F/GO and
VA/GO. We find once again that there are no clear signs of a weakening in the
positive U-D correlation in more recent years (upper panel), while the bivariate
slope coefficient is positive and relatively stable over time (lower panel).
The positive association between F/GO and VA/GO, as well as that between
U and D, are robust features even when we turn to the more detailed country-
industry measures of GVC positioning. Toward this end, we have run a series
of regressions of the form:
F GO sj t b
sðVA sð ¼ GO s= Þ ; 1 = Þj;t þ FEj þ FE þ ej;t; ð12Þ
to uncover how the country-industry measures of F/GO and VA/GO are correlated
in any given year t. In the interest of space, we have reported the findings for t =
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Figure 5.6 U and D over time
1995 and t = 2011 in Table 5.3, but the results for other years are very similar. For
each year, the table reports the estimates from three different specifications,
namely: (i) a simple bivariate regression with no fixed effects, to assess the
unconditional cross-sectional correlation between F/GO and VA/GO; (ii) a
second regression that then controls for country fixed effects (FEj); and (iii) a
last regression that further includes industry fixed effects (FEs) as in (12)
above. These results are presented in the upper row of Table 5.3, while the
bottom row performs the analogous exercise from regressing U against D.
(The standard errors in the table are two-way clustered, by country and industry.)
Even in the simple bivariate regressions, we already find a positive association
between F/GO and VA/GO (respectively, between U and D) in the raw cross-
section (Columns 1, 4, 7, 10). The R2’s for these regressions range from 0.1–
0.2, pointing to a fair bit of unexplained variation in the data, but the highly sig-
nificant slope coefficient estimates clearly point at a positive correlation. Control-
ling for country fixed effects (Columns 2, 5, 8, 11), and further for industry fixed
effects (Columns 3, 6, 9, 12), successively reduces the magnitude of this slope
coefficient, but it always remains statistically significant except in Column 3
for the relationship between F/GO and VA/GO at the start of the sample
period. In short, the positive associations between F/GO and VA/GO, as well
as between U and D, are present even when we focus on these different
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Table 5.3 Correlation between country-industry GVC measures











1995 1995 1995 2011 2011 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(VA/GO) sj,t 0.5438*** 0.5196** 0.0775 0.6543*** 0.6373*** 0.2647***
[0.1815] [0.1924] [0.0543] [0.1647] [0.1740] [0.0527]
Country FE? N Y Y N Y Y
Industry FE? N N Y N N Y
Observations 1,417 1,417 1,417 1,414 1,414 1,414
R2 0.1285 0.1488 0.8392 0.1927 0.2033 0.8479





s (U) (U) sj,
s
t j,t j,t
1995 1995 1995 2011 2011 2011
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(D) sj,t 0.5308*** 0.4820** 0.2413*** 0.6213*** 0.5707*** 0.3772***
[0.1640] [0.1902] [0.0604] [0.1454] [0.1698] [0.0617]
Country FE? N Y Y N Y Y
Industry FE? N N Y N N Y
Observations 1,435 1,435 1,435 1,435 1,435 1,435
R2 0.1350 0.1742 0.8264 0.1946 0.2232 0.8325
Notes: The sample comprises all countries (41), industries (35), and years (17) in the WIOD. Standard errors are multi-way clustered by country and industry; ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variables are GVC measures computed at the country-industry level for each year.
The upper row reports regressions of F/GO against VA/GO, while the lower row reports regressions of U against D. Regressions are run for both 1995 and 2011; for each
year, three specificatons are reported: (i) with no fixed effects; (ii) with country fixed effects; and (iii) with country and industry fixed effects.
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sources of variation in the measures of GVC positioning at the country-industry
level.21
4. Proximate explanations
The correlations that we have just documented warrant closer investigation, as
their persistence runs counter to what one might expect in an era of global pro-
duction fragmentation. We take a first look in this section at two proximate expla-
nations that could account (at least qualitatively) for these puzzling correlations,
before turning to a model-based investigation in Sections 5 and 6.
4.1. Trade costs
A first possibility is that trade costs might not in actuality have fallen as much as
commonly perceived. If cross-border trade frictions have remained relatively
high, this would provide an immediate explanation for the significant and persis-
tent correlation between F/GO and VA/GO (and by extension, between U and D).
One could naturally argue that high cross-border trade costs would in principle
discourage rather than facilitate the formation of GVCs. But for the sake of argu-
ment, let us for now suspend that concern and instead examine what the data tell
us about trade costs over this sample period.
We make use of the Head and Ries (2001) index as a measure of these cross-
border trade costs, since this can readily be computed from information that is
already contained in the WIOD. The Head-Ries index is usually constructed at
the country level to yield a measure of bilateral trade costs. We extend this
concept to the country-industry level, to capture trade costs from country i to j
in industry r, and moreover distinguish between trade costs that are incurred
when the good/service from industry r is being used as an intermediate input
and when it is destined instead for final-use. Specifically, for each i 6¼ j, we
compute:  ! 1
ZrsZrs
-2y





: 14ij ¼ Fr ðiiFr
Þ
jj
Note that τrsij denotes the trade costs associated with exporting sector-r intermedi-
ates from country i to country j when these are purchased as inputs by industry s.
On the other hand, τrFij captures the corresponding trade costs incurred when the
exports in question are purchased for final-use. From the above formulae, one can
see that the Head-Ries index infers the magnitude of cross-border trade costs
from the observed values of bilateral trade flows relative to domestic absorption.
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The θ that appears in the exponent in (13) and (14) is the familiar trade elasticity
with respect to iceberg trade costs, which we assume satisfies θ > 1. Intuitively,
the greater is the level of cross-border trade relative to domestic absorption, the
lower would be the inferred iceberg trade costs; moreover, the greater is the trade
elasticity, the lower will be the trade costs required to rationalize a given ratio of
cross-border to domestic sales.
As is well-known, the Head-Ries index is an exact way to back out the
iceberg trade cost when bilateral flows are characterized by a gravity equation
with a constant trade elasticity θ, subject to two further assumptions. First,
within-country trade costs are uniformly equal to 1; in our context, this
amounts to normalizing τrs rFii ¼ 1 and τ ii ¼ 1 for all countries i and industry
pairs r and s. Second, cross-border trade costs are directionally symmetric; in
other words, we have τrsij ¼ τrsji and τrFij ¼ τrFji for all industries r and s, so that
the cost of exporting for intermediate-use (respectively, for final-use) is equal
regardless of whether one is exporting from country i to j or from j to i. The
latter assumption in particular is more restrictive. As we shall see in Section 5,
it potentially limits the flexibility of the model there to fully match all entries of
a WIOT. That said, absent more direct measures of trade costs, the Head-Ries
index provides a convenient empirical handle to assess how trade costs have
been moving on average.
To get a sense of aggregate trends, we first use the country-by-country version
of the WIOT (i.e., with the industry dimension collapsed out) to calculate the
standard Head-Ries index of bilateral trade costs between country pairs.22 We
adopt a baseline value of θ = 5 for the trade elasticity. We take for each year a
simple average of the Head-Ries index over all country pairs with i < j
(bearing in mind the symmetric nature of the index), and then plot the trends
over time in Figure 5.7. This is done separately for intermediate-use and final-
use trade costs.23
Several observations emerge from Figure 5.7. Trade costs remain high in
absolute levels, with the average iceberg friction still roughly 300 per cent in
ad valorem equivalent terms even at the end of the sample period. That said,
the overall trend between 1995 and 2011 has been one of declining trade
costs, this being especially marked in the first half of the sample period.24
Absent other forces, this fall in trade costs is difficult to reconcile with the per-
sistence over time in the positive correlation between F/GO and VA/GO (as well
as between U and D). Interestingly, while trade costs have fallen for both
intermediate- and final-use, the average level of trade frictions faced by interme-
diate inputs has been lower than that for final-use throughout this period. This is
consistent with a “tariff escalation” intuition: there is less incentive to impose
barriers on trade in intermediates, since a country may end up bearing a
portion of these trade costs if the inputs are embodied in final goods/services
that the country eventually consumes.
This message of a broad decline in trade costs is reinforced when we examine
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Figure 5.7 Head-Ries τ’s (country-level) over time
and (14). With these measures, we find that even within narrowly defined
country-industry pairs, there is strong evidence of a downward trend over time
in trade costs. More specifically, we regress the log of each Head-Ries index
against a linear time trend (Yeart) and an extensive set of fixed effects, as follows:
ln τrsij;t ¼ b Year rs0 t þ FErsij þ eij;t; and ð15Þ
ln τrF r rij;t ¼ b0Yeart þ FEij þ eij;t: ð16Þ
In the first regression involving trade costs for intermediate inputs, we include a
full set of source country-industry by destination country-industry dummies
(FErsij ), this being the most comprehensive set of fixed effects that can be used
while allowing us to identify the coefficient of the time trend. Similarly, in the
second regression explaining trade costs for final-use, we include a full set of
source country-industry by destination country dummies (FErij). The above
regressions thus seek to isolate what could be called the pure “within” component
of the time variation in these trade costs. The findings from estimating (15) and
(16) are reported in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 respectively, based on Head-Ries indices
calculated once again using a common value of θ = 5. Given the directional sym-
metry described earlier, we include in Table 5.4 only those trade cost observations
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Table 5.4 Head-Ries trade costs for intermediate inputs over time
Dependent variable: log trade costs for intermediate inputs
Industries: (1) All (2) All (3) Goods (4) Goods (5) Services (6) Services
Year −0.0164*** −0.0181*** −0.0150***
[0.0022] [0.0024] [0.0026]
Dum: Year=1996 −0.0052 −0.0211* 0.0085
[0.0093] [0.0108] [0.0142]
Dum: Year=1997 −0.0782*** −0.0982*** −0.0609***
[0.0048] [0.0075] [0.0061]
Dum: Year=1998 −0.1108*** −0.1503*** −0.0768***
[0.0039] [0.0077] [0.0055]
Dum: Year=1999 −0.1129*** −0.1598*** −0.0725***
[0.0048] [0.0074] [0.0063]
Dum: Year=2000 −0.1562*** −0.1850*** −0.1313***
[0.0056] [0.0079] [0.0086]
Dum: Year=2001 −0.1653*** −0.2021*** −0.1336***
[0.0067] [0.0093] [0.0099]
Dum: Year=2002 −0.1594*** −0.1936*** −0.1299***
[0.0064] [0.0079] [0.0107]
Dum: Year=2003 −0.1778*** −0.2141*** −0.1465***
[0.0100] [0.0123] [0.0154]
Dum: Year=2004 −0.2019*** −0.2219*** −0.1846***
[0.0097] [0.0115] [0.0155]




Dependent variable: log trade costs for intermediate inputs
Industries: (1) All (2) All (3) Goods (4) Goods (5) Services (6) Services
Dum: Year=2006 −0.2491*** −0.2781*** −0.2241***
[0.0107] [0.0154] [0.0152]
Dum: Year=2007 −0.2629*** −0.2895*** −0.2400***
[0.0108] [0.0153] [0.0157]
Dum: Year=2008 −0.2697*** −0.3055*** −0.2387***
[0.0122] [0.0158] [0.0182]
Dum: Year=2009 −0.2727*** −0.2991*** −0.2499***
[0.0123] [0.0146] [0.0188]
Dum: Year=2010 −0.2425*** −0.2989*** −0.1939***
[0.0124] [0.0146] [0.0188]
Dum: Year=2011 −0.2544*** −0.3157*** −0.2016***
[0.0125] [0.0148] [0.0190]
Input Country-Industry by Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination Country-Industry FE?
Observations 17,491,215 17,491,215 8,101,928 8,101,928 9,389,287 9,389,287
R2 0.8602 0.8604 0.7408 0.7414 0.8806 0.8808
Notes: The left-hand side variable is the Head-Ries index (computed with θ = 5) associated with trade costs for intermediate inputs, from industry r in country i purchased
by industry s in country j, for trade costs that correspond to input purchases that lie above the main diagonal of the WIOT in each year. Standard errors are multi-way
clustered by source country-industry (i,r), destination country-industry (j,s), and year; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All
columns control for source country-industry by destination country-industry fixed effects. Columns (3)–(4) restrict to the subsample of trade costs where the industry r is
from the goods sectors, while Columns (5)–(6) restrict to the subsample where the industry r is from the services sectors.
Table 5.5 Head-Ries trade costs for final-use over time
Dependent variable: log trade costs for final goods/services
Industries: (1) All (2) All (3) Goods (4) Goods (5) Services (6) Services
Year −0.0212*** −0.0231*** −0.0196***
[0.0039] [0.0041] [0.0051]
Dum: Year=1996 −0.0217 −0.0510* 0.0029
[0.0332] [0.0278] [0.0550]
Dum: Year=1997 −0.1123*** −0.1306*** −0.0968***
[0.0104] [0.0146] [0.0115]
Dum: Year=1998 −0.1588*** −0.2095*** −0.1161***
[0.0099] [0.0116] [0.0168]
Dum: Year=1999 −0.1479*** −0.1910*** −0.1115**
[0.0193] [0.0090] [0.0441]
Dum: Year=2000 −0.2001*** −0.2445*** −0.1628***
[0.0257] [0.0162] [0.0456]
Dum: Year=2001 −0.2370*** −0.2708*** −0.2084***
[0.0233] [0.0245] [0.0360]
Dum: Year=2002 −0.2295*** −0.2589*** −0.2047***
[0.0179] [0.0238] [0.0359]
Dum: Year=2003 −0.2500*** −0.2825*** −0.2225***
[0.0251] [0.0251] [0.0423]
Dum: Year=2004 −0.2814*** −0.2951*** −0.2699***
[0.0304] [0.0303] [0.0435]




Dependent variable: log trade costs for final goods/services
Industries: (1) All (2) All (3) Goods (4) Goods (5) Services (6) Services
Dum: Year=2006 −0.3260*** −0.3652*** −0.2930***
[0.0307] [0.0372] [0.0425]
Dum: Year=2007 −0.3470*** −0.3764*** −0.3223***
[0.0317] [0.0399] [0.0429]
Dum: Year=2008 −0.3524*** −0.3858*** −0.3244***
[0.0391] [0.0386] [0.0555]
Dum: Year=2009 −0.3588*** −0.3964*** −0.3272***
[0.0392] [0.0397] [0.0547]
Dum: Year=2010 −0.3250*** −0.3899*** −0.2704***
[0.0413] [0.0380] [0.0576]
Dum: Year=2011 −0.3421*** −0.4137*** −0.2818***
[0.0421] [0.0437] [0.0585]
Source Country-Industry by Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination Country FE?
Observations 487,900 487,900 223,040 223,040 264,860 264,860
R2 0.9002 0.9005 0.7109 0.7119 0.9140 0.9143
Notes: The left-hand side variable is the Head-Ries index (computed with θ = 5) associated with trade costs for final-use sales, from industry r in country i purchased by
country j, for all i < j. Standard errors are multi-way clustered by source country-industry (i,r), destination country (j), and year; ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns control for source country-industry by destination country fixed effects. Columns (3)–(4) restrict to the subsample of
trade costs where the industry r is from the goods sectors, while Columns (5)–(6) restrict to the subsample where the industry r is from the services sectors.
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corresponding to input-use purchases that lie above the main diagonal of the
matrix of Zrsij ’s in the WIOT in any given year, while we include in Table 5.5
only observations for which the country index satisfies i < j. Even so, the regres-
sion sample is very large, especially in Table 5.4: For trade costs related to inter-
mediate inputs, we will report results for specifications with close to 17.5 million
observations, with more than 1 million fixed effects used!
Turning now to these results, we obtain coefficients on Yeart that are negative
and highly significant in Column 1 in both Tables 5.4 and 5.5. (The standard
errors are multi-way clustered by source country-industry, destination country-
industry, and year in Table 5.4, while clustered by source country-industry, des-
tination country, and year in Table 5.5.) For trade in intermediates, the point esti-
mate indicates an average fall in trade costs of about 1.6 per cent per year. The
corresponding fall has been slightly faster for final-use trade costs, namely a
2.1 per cent decrease per year. A very similar pattern emerges in Column 2,
when replacing the linear time trend with a full set of year dummies. Over the
course of 1995–2011, the average within-category fall in intermediate input
trade costs was a cumulative 25.4 per cent, while the corresponding decline for
final-use trade costs was 34.2 per cent.
We have also explored whether there are differences in the manner of these trade
cost movements across goods versus service industries, given that this sectoral dis-
tinction will play an important part in the next subsection. This is done in the
remaining columns of Tables 5.4 and 5.5, which look at trade in goods
(Columns 3–4) versus trade in services (Columns 5–6). From these columns, it
is clear that the decrease in trade costs is a feature shared by both goods and
service industries. Separately, we have found similar patterns when allowing for
differences across industries in the trade elasticity used to compute the Head-
Ries indices, specifically when using the industry-level estimates of θ from
Caliendo and Parro (2015) matched to the WIOD industry categories.25 The con-
clusion of a broad decline in trade costs is also robust to dropping the largest 1
per cent, 5 per cent, 10 per cent, 25 per cent, and even 50 per cent of the trade
cost observations in each table (results available on request), so that the patterns
are unlikely to be driven by observations that correspond to small trade flows.26
Ceteris paribus, the widespread decrease in cross-border trade costs would in
principle have spurred GVC activity, which in turn might lead us to expect that
the link between F/GO and VA/GO would have weakened. It is thus difficult to
rationalize the persistence in the correlation between F/GO and VA/GO (as
well as that between U and D) on the basis of the observed movements in
trade costs alone. We are left to conclude that other forces must have been at
play that account for these puzzling correlations between the GVC measures.
4.2. Composition of industries: goods versus services
As a second proximate explanation, we explore the possibility of shifts in the
underlying composition of industrial activity. This is motivated by the
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observation from appendix Table 5.A1, that there are distinct differences between
goods and service industries in the nature of their GVC positioning. Goods-
producing industries feature on average a lower share of their output going
directly to final-use and are more upstream relative to final demand when com-
pared against service industries, likely reflecting that the manufacturing process
for goods can be more easily fragmented into stages involving separate parts
and components. At the same time, goods industries also exhibit a lower share
of payments to primary value-added and are more downstream relative to
primary factors than service industries, presumably because payments to labor
comprise a larger share of the production costs in service industries. Goods indus-
tries thus appear to be positioned in “longer” production chains – with more
stages both upstream and downstream – than service industries.
This raises a potential explanation for the positive correlation between F/GO
and VA/GO at the country level: Suppose that countries differ in their comparative
advantage across goods versus services. Countries with comparative advantage
in services would then feature low final-use and value-added shares in gross
output (“short” GVCs), with the converse being true for countries that have
comparative advantage in goods-producing industries (“long” GVCs). In the
cross-section of countries, this would manifest itself as a positive correlation
between F/GO and VA/GO (as well as between U and D). Pursuing this logic
further, a decline in cross-border trade costs of the type documented in Figure 5.7,
applying broadly to both goods and services, would reinforce this pre-existing
pattern of comparative advantage, and could even strengthen these positive
correlations.
To explore whether such a mechanism may have been at play, we examine how
patterns of specialization across countries in goods versus services have evolved
over time. We do so by looking at the service sector’s share of gross output within
each country. (Recall from footnote 17 that industries 17–35 in the WIOD are
classified as services, while industries 1–16 are goods-producing.) This services
share has been on the rise, from an average across countries of 59.5 per cent in
1995 to 65.6 per cent in 2011. At the same time, this secular rise in recorded
service activity was accompanied by a mild increase in dispersion in the services
share across economies. This is illustrated in Figure 5.8, where we have plotted
these services shares after demeaning by the cross-country average in each
respective year. The figure points to an increase between 1995 and 2011 in the
observed spread in the services share: Countries such as Luxembourg, Cyprus,
and Great Britain that initially were relatively specialized in services have
become even more so, while economies such as China, Korea, and Taiwan
have become more skewed towards producing goods.27 These compositional
shifts in output between goods and services thus appear to be moving in the
right direction to help account for the cross-country correlation puzzle among
the GVC measures. Admittedly, however, our empirical results so far cannot
help us elucidate the extent to which the shifts observed in Figure 5.8 are directly
related to the trade cost reductions documented in Figure 5.7. We will return to
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Figure 5.8 Services share of gross output over time
Can the rise of services help to account too for the correlation puzzle at the
country-industry level? Figure 5.9 plots the relationship between F/GO and
VA/GO, constructed at the country-industry level, for the goods and services
sectors separately; a third subplot illustrates the relationship when pooling
across all industries. While the figures are drawn for 2011, the message is
similar if one were to look at 1995 instead. A quick comparison of the first
two subplots confirms that goods industries tend to feature lower final-use and
value-added to gross-output ratios than service industries. The respective lines
of best fit (drawn with 95 per cent confidence interval bands) moreover demon-
strate that it is the service industries that are driving the overall positive correla-
tion between F/GO and VA/GO; the corresponding correlation when looking at
goods industries is in fact weakly negative. Figure 5.10 performs the analogous
exercise for the country-industry measures of U and D. In line with appendix
Table 5.A1, the service industries are on average more proximate to final-use,
as well as to primary factors, when compared to the goods industries. The raw
correlation between U and D is now slightly positive when examining just the
industries in the goods sector. But this relationship is particularly marked for
the service sector, which ultimately contributes to the strong positive slope
seen between U and D when pooling across all industries. Put otherwise,
absent the service industries, the correlations between F/GO and VA/GO (as
well as between U and D) would clearly be much weaker.
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Figure 5.9 Correlation between F/GO and VA/GO: goods versus services
We round off this subsection by further documenting that there has been a
compositional shift away from goods and towards services over the sample
period. This is important for translating the positive correlations described
above at the country-industry level into a corresponding set of correlations at
more aggregate levels (say when aggregating over all industries within a
country). More specifically, we show that over time: (i) services have risen as
a share of final-use expenditures; and (ii) service inputs have risen as a share
of gross-output value.





PJ Pditures of country j as: Sa s sj ¼ ð i¼ ijÞ=ð i 1 s j ’s¼1 F¼ ijÞ. Pooling these a over
all years t in the WIOD, we then explore how these shares have evolved over time
with the following regression:
ln asj;t ¼ b s0Yeart þ FEj þ esj;t: ð17Þ
As before, the use of the FEsj fixed effects means that we are estimating the Y eart
coefficient off time variation within the industry-by-country bins. Table 5.6 pre-
sents these regression results; multi-way clustered standard errors (by country,
industry, and year) are reported. Since the asj;t’s sum up to 1 in any given
country and year, any increases over time in the expenditure shares on particular
goods or services would need to be offset by decreases in the shares spent on
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Figure 5.10 Correlation between U and D: goods versus services
other industries; in line with this, we find no significant time trend on average
when pooling across all industries (Columns 1–2). However, a distinct pattern
emerges when we separate goods from services and re-run (17): There has
been a significant decline in the goods industries’ shares in final demand over
time (Columns 3–4), and this has been accompanied correspondingly by an
increase in the expenditure shares on services (Column 5–6). While the coeffi-
cient on the linear time trend in Column 5 is marginally insignificant, the more
flexible specification with year dummies in Column 6 uncovers a positive
effect over time (albeit one that has tapered off slightly in the last few years).
Turning to (ii), we take a similar look at how the importance of goods versus
service inputs has shifted. This is done by computing (once again from the
WIOD) the following measures of the share of sector-r inputs in the value ofP
gross output of industry s in country j, namely: grs J ZrsÞ=ðY sj ¼ ð i 1 j Þ. We¼ ij
focus on the variation over time within each r-by-s-by-j bin using:
ln grsj;t ¼ b0Year rs rst þ FEj þ ej;t; ð18Þ
where FErsj denotes a full set of industry-pair by destination country fixed effects.
The results in Table 5.7 highlight the rising importance of services versus goods,
this time as an input in production processes. There is no distinct pattern seen in
these input purchase shares over time when looking over all inputs (Columns 1
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Table 5.6 Final-use expenditure shares over time
Dependent variable: log expenditure shares, α sj
Industries: (1) All (2) All (3) Goods (4) Goods (5) Services (6) Services
Year −0.0038 −0.0127*** 0.0037
[0.0025] [0.0037] [0.0025]
Dum: Year=1996 0.0016 −0.0087 0.0104
[0.0148] [0.0183] [0.0200]
Dum: Year=1997 −0.0078 −0.0230* 0.0050
[0.0117] [0.0127] [0.0137]
Dum: Year=1998 −0.0139 −0.0493*** 0.0160**
[0.0081] [0.0158] [0.0059]
Dum: Year=1999 −0.0070*** −0.0633*** 0.0405***
[0.0022] [0.0077] [0.0036]
Dum: Year=2000 0.0028 −0.0497*** 0.0470***
[0.0060] [0.0130] [0.0086]
Dum: Year=2001 −0.0013 −0.0718*** 0.0582***
[0.0099] [0.0119] [0.0155]
Dum: Year=2002 −0.0123 −0.0991*** 0.0609**
[0.0144] [0.0104] [0.0231]
Dum: Year=2003 −0.0192 −0.1171*** 0.0633**
[0.0159] [0.0134] [0.0222]
Dum: Year=2004 −0.0165 −0.1130*** 0.0648***
[0.0185] [0.0250] [0.0212]
Dum: Year=2005 −0.0136 −0.1123*** 0.0697***
[0.0216] [0.0344] [0.0232]
Dum: Year=2006 −0.0207 −0.1164** 0.0601**
[0.0234] [0.0396] [0.0245]
Dum: Year=2007 −0.0226 −0.1188** 0.0584**
[0.0235] [0.0405] [0.0247]
Dum: Year=2008 −0.0315 −0.1409*** 0.0607**
[0.0256] [0.0440] [0.0225]
Dum: Year=2009 −0.0687** −0.2297*** 0.0670**
[0.0303] [0.0345] [0.0311]
Dum: Year=2010 −0.0645** −0.2103*** 0.0583*
[0.0294] [0.0373] [0.0373]
Dum: Year=2011 −0.0579* −0.1938*** 0.0567*
[0.0292] [0.0403] [0.0403]
Input Industry by Y Y Y Y Y Y
Purchasing Country FE?
Observations 24,392 24,392 11,152 11,152 13,240 13,240
R2 0.9833 0.9834 0.9713 0.9715 0.9872 0.9872
Notes: The sample comprises all countries (41), industries (35), and years (17) in the WIOD. Standard errors are multi-way clustered by country, industry, and year; ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is the log expenditure share in country j on final-use purchases from
industry s. All columns control for country-industry (i.e., j-s) pair fixed effects; columns (2), (4), and (6) further include year fixed effects, with the omitted category being
the year dummy for 1995. Columns (1)–(2) run the regression on all observations; columns (3)–(4) restrict to expenditure shares for purchases from goods industries;
while columns (5)–(6) restrict to expenditure shares for purchases from services industries.
Table 5.7 Input-use shares over time
Dependent variable: log input-use shares, γ rsj
Industries: (1) All (2) All (3) Goods (4) Goods (5) Services (6) Services
Year 0.0000 −0.0113** 0.0097***
[0.0031] [0.0043] [0.0031]
Dum: Year=1996 0.0098 −0.0050 0.0227
[0.0160] [0.0186] [0.0142]
Dum: Year=1997 0.0093 −0.0209 0.0351**
[0.0134] [0.0167] [0.0167]
Dum: Year=1998 −0.0031 −0.0580*** 0.0437***
[0.0110] [0.0186] [0.0130]
Dum: Year=1999 0.0013 −0.0728*** 0.0643***
[0.0043] [0.0087] [0.0087]
Dum: Year=2000 0.0204*** −0.0544*** 0.0840***
[0.0032] [0.0091] [0.0062]
Dum: Year=2001 0.0450*** −0.0660*** 0.1391***
[0.0119] [0.0103] [0.0157]
Dum: Year=2002 0.0335** −0.0894*** 0.1377***
[0.0154] [0.0116] [0.0193]
Dum: Year=2003 0.0234 −0.1068*** 0.1337***
[0.0183] [0.0166] [0.0209]
Dum: Year=2004 0.0353 −0.1028*** 0.1524***
[0.0230] [0.0276] [0.0242]
Dum: Year=2005 0.0353 −0.1032** 0.1526***
[0.0260] [0.0372] [0.0250]
Dum: Year=2006 0.0300 −0.1072** 0.1462***
[0.0269] [0.0415] [0.0235]
Dum: Year=2007 0.0309 −0.1154** 0.1549***
[0.0292] [0.0437] [0.0254]
Dum: Year=2008 0.0226 −0.1298** 0.1518***
[0.0318] [0.0494] [0.0264]
Dum: Year=2009 −0.0112 −0.2111*** 0.1581***
[0.0363] [0.0440] [0.0298]
Dum: Year=2010 −0.0044 −0.1891*** 0.1520***
[0.0352] [0.0460] [0.0297]
Dum: Year=2011 −0.0021 −0.1773*** 0.1463***
[0.0350] [0.0486] [0.0300]
Input industry by Y Y Y Y Y Y
Purchasing Country-Industry FE?
Observations 826,130 826,130 378,258 378,258 447,872 447,872
R2 0.9622 0.9623 0.9543 0.9543 0.9662 0.9662
Notes: The sample comprises all input industries (35), purchasing country-industry pairs (41x35), and years (17) in the WIOD. Standard errors are multi-way clustered
by input industry, purchasing country-industry, and year; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variable is the
log share of purchases on inputs from industry r by industry s in country j. All columns control for country by industry-pair fixed effects; columns (2), (4), and (6) further
include year fixed effects, with the omitted category being the year dummy for 1995. Columns (1)–(2) run the regression on all observations; columns (3)–(4) restrict to
input shares for purchases from goods industries; while columns (5)–(6) restrict to input shares for purchases from services industries.
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and 2). When separately examining goods and services purchases though, we
immediately detect a downward time trend in the purchases of inputs from
goods industries (Columns 3 and 4), and a corresponding rise over time in that
associated with services (Columns 5 and 6). Comparing the point estimates in
Column 5 across Tables 5.6 and 5.7, each successive year is associated with an
increase in the services input-use share of about 0.97 per cent per annum,
versus an increase in the final-use share of about 0.37 per cent per annum; the
rise in purchases of services has thus been larger in proportional terms for inter-
mediate input-use than for final-use.
This observed increase in the use of services as an intermediate input warrants
some discussion. One interpretation is that production technologies have indeed
shifted toward substituting the use of more service for goods inputs. This view
would be in line with the “servification” hypothesis, as articulated for example
by Baldwin and Ito (2014). An alternative interpretation is that the use of services
is now recorded more comprehensively as a result of a rise in outsourcing. Ser-
vices that previously were performed in-house – ranging from basic janitorial ser-
vices to more complex accounting work – are now increasingly performed by
sub-contractors that are independent entities located outside of firm headquarters.
Such activity might in the past have been recorded as payments to labor within
the firm, but are now picked up instead as payments across establishments and
firms with the rise of such outsourcing practices. The observed increase in ser-
vices purchases may thus be a reflection of such organizational rather than tech-
nological change per se.28
Distinguishing between these two hypotheses is an interesting research ques-
tion, but one that lies beyond the scope of this chapter. What should be clear
is that the shifting composition of goods versus services industries – with the
latter rising in importance in both final expenditures and input purchases – has
potential to explain why F/GO and VA/GO (respectively, U and D) have remained
positively correlated at both the country and country-industry levels.
5. A structural interpretation of the data
We turn next to develop a theoretical framework that provides a structural inter-
pretation of all the cells in a WIOT, and that hence allows for a basic quantitative
assessment of the extent to which trade cost declines and the rising importance of
services can help to account for the correlations seen over time between the
various GVC measures.
5.1. A useful starting point
The Caliendo and Parro (2015) model provides a useful starting point. Consider a
world with J > 1 countries and S > 1 sectors or industries. This gives rise to a
J × S by J × S matrix of bilateral country-industry trade shares for trade in
167 Upstreamness and downstreamness 167
intermediate inputs, and a J × S by J matrix of trade shares for trade designated
for final-use.
For the purposes of clarity, let us establish upfront the notation to index the
economic variables in the exposition, which deviates from Caliendo and Parro
(2015). As in our empirical sections, we use the subscripts i and j to refer
throughout to countries; whenever a pair of subscripts is used (e.g., to describe
a trade flow variable), the left subscript will denote the source country, while
the right subscript will denote the destination country (so ij corresponds to a
flow from i to j). On the other hand, we use the superscripts r and s to refer to
industries; once again, whenever a pair of superscripts is used on a variable,
the left superscript will be the identity of the source (i.e., selling) industry,
while the right superscript will be the identity of the destination (i.e., buying)
industry (so rs is a purchase from industry r by industry s).
5.1.1. Model set-up and equilibrium
Preferences are country-specific and take the form:YS ( ) sa
uðCj Cs
jÞ ¼ j ; ð19Þ
s¼1
where Csj denotes consumption of a sector-s aggregate, Cj denotes the vector of
the Csj ’s consumed in country j, a
s
j is the share of industry s in the expenditure ofP
the country-j representative consumer, and Ss¼1 a
s
j ¼ 1.
Within each industry s, there is a continuum of varieties indexed by ωs 2 [0, 1].
Production of each variety is a Cobb-Douglas function of equipped labor, as well
as intermediate inputs. More specifically, in country j, the production function for





- g ( )
ys os zs r¼1j ð Þ ¼ j ð Þ j ð Þ Mrs s
j
j ðo Þ : ð20Þ
r¼1
Note that Mrsj ðosÞ is the amount of composite intermediates from industry r used
in the production of variety ωs in country j. The exponent grsj is the (constant)
share of production costs spent on intermediate inputs from sector r by each
industry-s producer in country j. We assume that 0 < grsP j < 1, and moreover
that 0 S< rsr 1 gj < 1, so that the equipped labor share (or simply, value-added¼
share) of production costs is strictly positive in all sectors and countries. The pro-
ductivity shifter zsj ðosÞ is an i.i.d. draw from a Fréchet distribution with cumula-
tive density function: expf-Tsj z-y
sg. The scale parameter Tsj governs the state of
technology of country j in industry s, while θs > 1 governs (inversely) the disper-
sion of productivity in industry s across producers worldwide, thereby shaping
comparative advantage.
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The country-j composite in industry s, which is used both for final consump-
tion (Csj ), as well as to provide inputs to other sectors r (M
sr
j ), is a CES aggregate
over the set of varieties on the unit interval:( )Z ss ss=ð -1Þ
Qs qs os 1-1
s=s
j ¼ j ð Þ dos ; ð21Þ
where qs s sj ðo Þ denotes the quantity of variety ω that is ultimately purchased, nat-
urally from the lowest-cost source country. Note that the same CES aggregator
over varieties applies to the industry-s composite, whether it is being consumed
in final demand or being used as an intermediate input; this is a key feature of the
model that will be relaxed below.
Consider the decision problem of either the representative consumer or a firm
in country j, regarding which country to purchase variety ωs from. As in Eaton
and Kortum (2002), this corresponds to choosing the lowest-cost source
country across i 2 {1, …, J}, after factoring in the unit production costs csi
and iceberg trade costs τs across all potential source i.29ij countries The solution
to this discrete choice problem and the law of large numbers yields an expression
for the expenditure share of country j spent on industry-s varieties that come from
country i:
s
T si ðcsi τs -yps ijÞij ¼PJ ðcskτs -ys : 22Ts ð Þk 1 k kjÞ¼
In turn, the unit production cost csj is obtained as the solution to the cost-
minimization problem faced by each industry-s firm in country j, based on the
production function (20). This is given by:PS S
1
( )grs
s - grsYc js 1 jj U w r Prj j ¼¼ j ; ð23Þ
r¼1
where Us depends only on the parameters rsj is a constant that gj , and P
r
j is the ideal
price index of the industry-r composite being used as an intermediate input in
country j. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), the expression for Prj is given
explicitly by:" #XJ ( ) yr -1=yr
Pr Ar T r crτr
-
j ¼ i i ij ; ð24Þ
i¼1
where Ar is a constant that depends only on σr and θr.30
Let X sij denote the expenditure of country j on industry-s varieties from country
i. This is the sum of country-j expenditures on the industry-s composite from
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country i, over both its use as an intermediate input and for final consumption. In
define: (i) X s
P
turn, J sj ¼ i 1 Xij as the total expenditure of country j on industry-s¼
varieties; and (ii) Y sj as the value of gross output in industry s produced in country
j. Having defined these objects, we can close the model by clearing the market for
each industry in each country:XS XJ
X s sr r¼ X rj i p s
( )
j g ji þ aj wjLj þ Dj :
r 1 i¼1 ð25Þ¼ |fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflffl}
Yrj
Note that the first term on the right-hand side of (25) is equal to the total pur-
chases of intermediate inputs from industry s, where the sum is taken over all
industries r that purchase intermediate inputs from s.31 Dj is the national deficit
of country j, computed as the sum of all sectoral and final-use imports of a
country minus the sectoral and final-use outputs. Then, the second term on the
right-hand side is the total purchases by country j on industry s for final
consumption.
We finally impose trade balance, equating a country j’s imports to its exports
plus its observed deficit Dj:XS XS XJ XS XJ
X sj ¼ X sj psij ¼ X spsi ji þ Dj ð26Þ
s¼1 s¼1 i¼1 s¼1 i¼1
One can show that this last equilibrium condition can alternatively be derived
from the equality of (equipped) labor income and total value-added.32
The equilibrium of the model is then pinned down by the system of equations:
(22), (23), (24), (25), and (26).33
5.1.2. Mapping the model to empirical counterparts
How does the model map to the available data from Global Input-Output Tables?
Remember that a WIOT contains information on intermediate purchases by
industry s in country j from sector r in country i, which we denote by Zrsij . It
also contains information on the final-use expenditure in each country j on
goods/services originating from sector r in country i, which we denote by Frij.
Finally, the values of country-industry gross output Y sj and value-added V
s
j , as
well as country-specific trade deficits Dj, can all be computed from the WIOT.
For clarity, we denote the observed values for these variables that come from
the WIOT data with tildes (e.g., Z~rsij ).
The main limitation of this framework as it stands is that it imposes the same
market share of a given country i in the sales of output of a given sector r to a
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destination country j regardless of whether that output is designated for final-use
or for use as an intermediate by other industries. In particular, note that the model
imposes:
F~r ~
p P ij Zrsr ijij ¼ J ¼PJ for j ¼ 1; . . . ; J :F~r Z~rs ð27Þk¼1 kj k¼1 kj
Prior to the WIOD, the standard proportionality assumptions used to infer these
import shares from available data would have generated identical shares across
both final-use and input purchases. One of the contributions of the WIOD was
to bring additional information to bear to distinguish imports across different
end-use categories (see Dietzenbacher et al., 2013, for details). In the WIOD
data, the J input shares on the right-end of equation (27) and the final-use
shares in the middle term would thus differ from each other, except by
extreme coincidence. Hence, the Caliendo and Parro (2015) model cannot
exactly match all the entries of a generic WIOT. For certain applications, this mis-
match may of course not be too important. But in using the WIOT to make sense
of the positioning of a country in GVCs, it stands to reason that it would be
important for the model to be able to fully account for all final-use and interme-
diate-use trade shares.
5.2. A more flexible model
We now present a more flexible version of the Caliendo and Parro (2015) model.
In particular, we relax their assumption that iceberg trade costs τsij are only
country-pair and (selling) industry specific.
5.2.1. New assumptions and equilibrium
Instead of the previous formulation of trade costs, consider the case in which
trade costs are denoted by τrsij when goods/services in sector r from country i
are shipped to industry s in country j. Similarly, denoted by τrFij , the trade costs
incurred when goods/services in sector r from country i are shipped to final con-
sumers in country j. This variation could reflect, for instance, underlying hetero-
geneity in the characteristics (weight, value, etc.) of the various inputs and final
goods that are lumped together into a sector in the WIOD. Naturally, it might
also be driven by heterogeneity in the man-made trade barriers applied to
these various industry subcategories. To the extent that different sectors buy dif-
ferent types of inputs in a given sector in different proportions, they will effec-
tively face different trade costs, with the same being true of purchasers of final
varieties.
As noted in the Introduction (see footnote 6 in particular), the proportionality
assumptions used to construct WIOTs would generate identical trade shares, prij,
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across all input-purchasing industries s.34 This suggests that an extension of the
Caliendo and Parro (2015) framework that simply allowed for distinct trade costs
for shipments of inputs and final-goods for a given country pair i-j and selling
sector r would be sufficient to match all the entries of a WIOT. In practice, the
WIOD used in our empirical analysis features minor deviations from these pro-
portionality assumptions, so we develop here a model with more flexible input
trade shares that vary depending on the identity of the purchasing industry.35
Although this added flexibility is likely to be of little quantitative importance
for our exercise centered on the WIOD, there are good reasons to believe (see
de Gortari, 2017) that trade shares do vary significantly in the real world depend-
ing on what the input is used for, and we expect future WIOTs to more effectively
exploit firm-level import and export data to document larger departures from the
commonly-used proportionality assumptions.
How does this more general formulation of trade costs affect the equilibrium
conditions of the model developed above? Following the same exact steps as
in our derivations in the Caliendo-Parro model, it is easy to verify that producers
in industry s in country j now spend on inputs from different sectors r and coun-




prs P i ij Þij ¼ J : 28Tr cr τrs -yr ð Þk 1 k ð k kjÞ¼
Meanwhile, consumers in j spend a share prFij of their sector-r final consumption
on varieties from country i, where prFij is given by:
r
T r crτrF -y
prF P i ð i ij Þij ¼ J 29r r rF Þ-yr : ð
k¼1 Tk ðckτkj Þ
These expressions are analogous to equation (22), but they now define (S + 1) × J
distinct trade shares, rather than only J.







j ¼ j j j ; ð30Þ
r¼1
where Usj is again a constant that depends only on the parameters g
rs but Prsj , j is
now the ideal price index of the sector-r composite good in country j when pur-
chased by industry-s producers. This price index is given by:" #X ( ) -1=yrJ yr
Prs r T rj ¼ A i cr rsi τ
-
31
ij ; ð Þ
i¼1
where Ar is again a constant that depends only on σr and θr. The main difference
relative to equation (24) is that this price index is now rs-specific, rather than just
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r-specific. For similar reasons, we now have to separately define the price index
for final consumption for each sector in each country j:" #X ( ) -1=yrJ
P Tr rτ
-yr
rF Ar rF¼ c : ð32j i i ij Þ
i¼1
Note that the price index for overall consumption is now given by:
YS ( ) sa
PF PsF=as
j
j ¼ j j : ð33Þ
s¼1
Consider next the goods-market clearing conditions. As in the previous less
flexible model, the equality of total expenditure of country j on industry-s varie-
ties can still be expressed as the sum of total expenditure on inputs and on final
consumption in that sector:
XS




j wjLj þ Dj : ð34Þ
r¼1
However, it is now not so straightforward to express Y rj as a function of X
r
i in
other sectors and countries, as we did in equation (25). Instead, we need to con-
sider final sales and intermediate input sales separately, which leads us to develop
a linear system of equations in the gross output levels:
XJ XS XJ
Y s psFas w L D psrgsr rj ¼ jk kð Þk k þ k þ jk k Yk :|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflk¼1 ffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl} |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflr ð35Þ¼1 k¼ffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflffl1 fflfflffl}
final‐use sales intermediate‐input sales
In words, the gross output of sector s in country j is either used for final consump-
tion in all countries around the world (the first term in (35)) or as an input by all
industries in all countries (the second term in (35)).
We finally impose trade balance, equating a country j’s imports to the sum of
its exports and its trade deficit Dj. After some simplifications, this can be written
as:
XJ XS XS XJ XS XS XS XJ
psrgsrj Y
r
ij j þ wjL psr rj¼ ji gsri Y psFji asi þ i ð ÞwiLi þ Di : ð36Þ
i¼1 r¼1 s¼1 i¼1 r¼1 s¼1 s¼1 i¼1
One can show that this last equilibrium condition can again be written as
(equipped) labor income being equal to value-added.36
The equilibrium is now defined by equations (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (35),
and (36). Note that (28) comprises J × (J −1) × S × S independent equations, since
the shares prsij need to sum to 1 for each j-rs pair; for a similar reason, (29) com-
prises J × (J − 1) × S independent equations. In turn, (30) and (32) comprise J × S
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equations each, while (31) comprises J × S × S equations. Finally, the market-
clearing conditions in (35) comprise J × S−1 independent equations, since one
of these is redundant by Walras’ Law, and we also have J trade balance conditions
from (36). On the other hand, the equilibrium seeks to solve for the following
objects: the prsij ’s (of which there are J × (J − 1) × S × S independent shares);
the prFij ’s (of which there are J × (J − 1) × S independent shares); the unit produc-




j (of which there are J × S, J × S × S, and
J × S terms respectively); the J − 1 wage levels wj’s (with one country’s wage
picked as the numéraire); as well as the J × S gross output levels Y sj ’s. Thus,
we have as many equilibrium conditions as variables to be solved for. With
wages and the gross output levels, we can also easily solve for the expenditure
levels X sj using equation (34).
We shall not concern ourselves with proving the sufficient conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. Such a proof could be carried out
following the approach in Alvarez and Lucas (2007). In discussing how our
extended Caliendo-Parro model maps to a WIOT, we will however discuss
issues that relate to the existence of an equilibrium.
5.2.2. Mapping to empirical counterparts
We now turn to evaluate the ability of our model to match the type of data avail-
able in World Input-Output Tables. Our main result will be that, via a suitable
choice of parameter values for trade costs, our extended model will be able to
match all entries of a WIOT that relate to intermediate-use and final-use expen-
ditures. This will in turn allow us to provide a structural interpretation of a WIOT
and of the measures of GVC positioning computed from its entries. We will also
show in the next section, that one can perform interesting counterfactuals with
information on only a small subset of the primitive parameters of the model, a
subset that crucially does not include the complex matrix of trade costs that
ensure a perfect fit of our model.
Before discussing the mapping between model and data, remember that a
WIOT contains information on country-industry pair input flows (Zrsij ), country-
pair final-use trade flows by sector (Frij), country-sector-specific gross output Y
s
j
and value-added Vsj , and country-specific trade deficits Dj. As before, we
denote the observed values of these variables in the WIOT with tildes.
It is useful to begin by considering the mapping between the data and both the
input share parameters grsj and final expenditure share parameters a
s
j . As in the
benchmark Caliendo-Parro framework developed above, the Cobb-Douglas
structure of the model allows us to easily recover all these parameters from
observed trade flows. In particular, we have:PJ ~rs
i¼1Zgrs ijj ¼ ;Y~s ð37Þj




j ¼P :S ð38r ~ Þ
r VAf þD¼1 j j P
Furthermore, the value-added share in sector s can be recovered as 1 S- r j .¼1 grs
Let us now turn to the ability of the model to replicate observed inter-industry
and final-use flows, this being a limitation of the benchmark Caliendo-Parro
model. With our more flexible trade cost formulation, we now have:
Zrs prs rsj Y
s




r¼ j j þ Dj : ð40Þ
r¼1
The key novelty is that the trade shares prsij now vary both across buying and
selling industries, and are also distinct from the trade shares for final consumption
(prFij ). This feature in turn implies that, conditional on the observed values of gross
output Y~s, value-added in all sectors VAf rj , and the trade deficits D~j j, together with
the recovered values of grs sj and aj in (37) and (38), there exist values for the trade
cost parameters τrs and τrFij ij that lead the model to exactly match all the empirically
observed values of Z~rs ~ij and F
r
ij.
To illustrate this result, focus first on the prsij trade shares. Let us define: b
r( ) i( ) ¼yryr
T ri c
r - rs
i and r ¼ τrs
-
ij ij . Combining equation (39) with the definition of the




ij ¼P kJ Z~ br rrskj : ð41rs Þl¼1 lj k¼1 i
For each destination country j and each sector pair rs, equation (41) defines a
system of J linear equations in the power transformation of trade costs( )
rrs; . . . ; rrs1j ij ; . . . ; r
rs
Jj . Clearly, the system is linearly dependent: given a solution,
if all the rrsij are multiplied by a common constant k
rs
j , these alternative trade costs
also solve the system. One can thus normalize one of the J trade cost parameters
to 1, and it is natural to set the domestic trade cost to rrs 1 (i.e., τrsjj ¼ jj ¼ 1). Under
weak invertibility conditions, the system in (41) with rrsjj ¼ 1 delivers a unique
solution for the matrix of rrsij ’s, given a vector of observed input flows Z~
rs
ij as
well as values for the terms bri .
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which also delivers, under weak invertibility conditions, a unique solution for the
matrix of τrFij ’s conditional on values for observed final-use flows F~
r
ij and the
values of the terms bri , after setting r
rF
jj ¼ 1 (i.e., τrFjj ¼ 1).
It is worth stressing that our results above are not sufficient to provide a method
to recover a unique set of values of the trade cost parameters, τrsij and τ
rF
ij , that
ensure a perfect match between the trade shares in the model and in the data.
More specifically, the trade cost parameters implicitly defined by (41) and (42)
are a function of the terms bri , which are in turn shaped by the unobserved technol-
ogy parameters Tri and by the (endogenous) unit cost variables c
r
i . Furthermore,
transitioning from rrsij to τ
rs
ij requires knowledge of the trade elasticity parameters θ
r.
For these reasons, backing out the values of τrsij and τ
rF
ij that ensure that the
model perfectly matches the data is not straightforward. Fortunately, we will dem-
onstrate in the next section that this does not preclude a structural interpretation of
the data and the implementation of interesting counterfactuals. For our purposes,
it will suffice to show that there exists at least one set of values for the trade cost
parameters τrs rFij and τ ij such that the model exactly replicates the data. Our deri-
vations above indicate that this is certainly the case (under weak invertibility con-
ditions) conditional on the values of bri . In the appendix, we demonstrate that
when allowing the values of bri to be determined by the technology parameters
Tri and by the general equilibrium of the model, this existence result persists.
As long as the general equilibrium of the model exists (regardless of whether
that equilibrium is unique or not), the equilibrium will deliver a well-defined
vector of values for bri , which also ensures that the model can exactly match
the input and final-use trade shares, prsij and p
rF
ij ; it follows immediately that the
model will also match the country-sector-specific gross output Y sj and value-
added Vsj , and country-specific trade deficits Dj.
There is one additional issue with regard to mapping the model exactly to the
data. The underlying Eaton-Kortum structure of the model implies that all of the
trade shares, prsij and p
rF
ij , are strictly positive. In particular, this means that the pro-
duction of each good s in country j would source a positive amount of inputs from
all sectors r in all countries i. In the WIOD data, however, zero entries are rela-
tively common. To address this, we have taken the pragmatic approach of replac-
ing each zero input-purchase or final-use entry in the WIOD with a positive
constant (1e−18) that is less than the smallest positive entry seen in the WIOD.
This naturally precludes us from evaluating interesting counterfactuals that
pertain to how the extensive margin of sourcing would adjust. In what follows,
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we have therefore focused on counterfactual outcomes that pertain to the aggre-
gate economy (rather than on the effects on specific entries in the WIOT).
6. Counterfactuals
We conclude the chapter by illustrating how the theoretical results derived in the
last section can be used to deliver quantitative insights related to where countries
are positioned in GVCs. First, we will extend the “hat algebra” results in Dekle
et al. (2008) and Caliendo and Parro (2015), to show that in order to perform
various counterfactuals with the model, all that is required are: (i) the initial
trade shares, prs rFij and pij , available from a WIOT; (ii) the demand and technolog-
ical Cobb-Douglas parameters grsj and a
s
j , which we have also shown are easily
recoverable from the same WIOT; and (iii) a vector of sectoral parameters θr
shaping the elasticity of trade flows (across source countries) to trade barriers.
In particular, although the existence of flexible trade costs τrsij and τ
rF
ij is crucial
to ensure that the model is able to fit the WIOT data exactly, knowledge of the
precise values of these trade cost parameters is not necessary to conduct counter-
factuals. Similarly, although the technological parameters Tri certainly shape the
values of the trade costs, τrsij and τ
rF
ij , that would enable the model to fit the
data, the specific values of Tri are not essential for these counterfactuals.
Having derived these sufficient statistics results, we then perform a series of
counterfactual exercises, in order to shed light on the possible determinants of
the evolution of our various GVC positioning measures over time.
6.1. The hat algebra approach
We are interested in obtaining the values of the counterfactual entries of a WIOT
following a shock to some of the parameters of the model. In practice, we will
focus in our applications on changes in trade costs, τrs rFij and τ ij , and in the final
demand Cobb-Douglas parameters arj ; our exposition below will therefore con-
sider the case where only these parameters change in the model.37 For simplicity,
we will also assume that deficits Dj are held constant in the counterfactuals we
will study. We denote the counterfactual value of a parameter or variable X
with a prime (e.g., X 0) and use hats to denote the relative change in these vari-
ables, i.e., X̂ ¼ X 0=X .
With this notation, and invoking equations (39) and (40), we can express the
counterfactual input and final-use flows as:( )0 ( )0 ( )
Zrs grs sj Y
0
ij p
rs¼ ij j ; ð43Þ
and:  !( ) ( )
Fr





ij ¼ j VAr
0
ij j þ Dj : ð44Þ
r¼1
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Clearly, to obtain the specific counterfactual values of these entries, one needs to
figure out how the trade shares prsij and p
rF
ij , as well as gross output Y
s
j and value-
added levels VArj ; are affected by changes in trade costs or final-consumption
shares.
Consider first trade shares. Using the hat algebra notation, it is easy to verify











îj ¼ : 46P̂rF
ð Þ
j
In words, the percentage response of trade shares is purely shaped by the trade
elasticity parameters θr and by the percentage shifts of the various trade cost
parameters, as well as the percentage responses of the unit costs cri , and the
price indices Prs rFj and Pj . It is worth stressing that (45) and (46) are not approx-
imations: They hold exactly for any shock to trade costs (or to final consumption
shares), regardless of the size of the shock. Notice also, that the level of trade
costs or the unobserved technological parameters Tri do not appear directly in
these equations.
The responses of the unit costs cr rsi and the price indices Pj and P
rF
j to changes
in the environment can be obtained from simple manipulations of equations (30),
(31), and (32). More specifically, plugging in the expressions for the trade shares







j ¼ ^ r¼1j Pj ; ð47Þ
r¼1




rτ̂rs 48i ij ; ð Þ
i¼1
and: " #X ( ) 1 yr- =J yr




There are two key features of these three sets of equations. First, the only var-
iables in levels that appear in these equations are the trade shares prior to the
shocks (which are obviously observable), the Cobb-Douglas technological
parameters grsj (which are retrievable from the data in a WIOT), and the trade
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elasticity parameters θr. Second, it is clear from inspection that combining (47)
and (48), one should be able to solve – albeit computationally – for ĉsj and P̂
rs
j
as a function of these initial trade shares, as well as the percentage changes in
wages (ŵ input trade costs (τ̂rsj) and ij ). Similarly, combining (47) and (49), we
can obtain P̂rFj as a function of these same initial trade shares, as well as the per-
centage changes in wages (ŵj) and final-use trade costs (τ̂
rF
ij ).
Plugging these resulting values of ĉsj , P̂
rs
j , and P̂
rF
j into (45) and (46), this then
allows us to express the changes in trade shares as a function of observables (prsij ,
prF , and grs), the trade elasticity parameters θrij j , and the percentage changes in
wages and trade costs.
We finally discuss how to trace the response of wages, as well as gross output
and value-added, to the shocks. For that, we invoke the goods-market clearing
conditions (35) and the trade balance conditions (36). In the counterfactual equi-
librium, these can be re-written as:
( )
s
0 XJ ( ) S J
Y psF





ŵkwkLk þ D psr gsrk Y r
0
j ¼ jk k ð Þk þ jk k ; ð50Þ
k¼1 r¼1 k¼1
and:













i¼1 r¼1 s¼1 i¼1 r¼1 s¼1










j ¼ Ŷ ij . Yij and ŵj as a function of the changes in trade costs and Cobb-
Douglas demand parameters (τ̂rsij , τ̂
rF , and âs). Plugging these values into (39)( ) ij j
and (40), and noting that VAr
0
VAc r VArj j ¼ ^rj . VAr¼ j . Y j (due to the Cobb-
Douglas assumption in technology), this then allows us to obtain the counterfac-
tual values of all the entries in a WIOT.
In sum, we have demonstrated that in order to perform counterfactual exercises
that shock trade costs or the demand parameters asj while holding all other param-
eters constant, all that is required is the initial values of a set of variables that are
easily retrieved from a WIOT, as well as values for the trade elasticities θr.38 We
next turn to an application of this result to various counterfactual scenarios of
interest.
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6.2. Applications
We will perform two types of counterfactuals, using the system of equations in
“hat algebra” form just laid out in (43)–(51). First, we will study how much
changes in trade costs and changes in the asj preference parameters can help
explain the evolution of the GVC positioning of industries and countries
over the period 1995–2011. More specifically, we will hold all other parameters
of the model (including trade deficits) to their 1995 levels, and allow first trade
costs and then the parameters asj to jump to their 2011 levels. This will shed
light on the extent to which these factors might help in resolving the empirical
puzzles identified in Section 3. We will later consider further counterfactual
trade cost reductions and changes in demand parameters starting from their
2011 levels, to offer projections for the future positioning of countries in
GVCs.
We should stress that the exercise here is not meant to be an exhaustive
exploration of the forces that could account for the persistent correlations in
the country-level GVC measures. The counterfactuals that we run here speak
to the two candidate explanations posited earlier in Section 4, namely move-
ments in trade costs and shifts in sectoral composition. Even so, we are
unable to explore the effect of changes in the input purchase share parameters
(the grsj ’s), though these have likely contributed too to the realignments in sec-
toral composition, as such shifts cannot be analyzed using the “hat algebra”
techniques within the current model with Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions.39 Likewise, we do not explore the possible role of changes in the funda-
mental technology levels (the Tri ’s), since these are harder to discipline
empirically with available data. (Note that in the exercises below, we adopt
θr = 5 throughout for simplicity.)
In Table 5.8 below, we explore the model’s implications for shifts in country
GVC positioning over the 1995–2011 period. Panel A reports several key
moments and correlations related to the country-level GVC measures, includ-
ing the values computed directly from the 1995 and 2011 WIOTs. Consider
first the effect of a change in trade costs from 1995 to 2011 levels. Since we
encounter a non-trivial number of zero entries in the WIOT in each year
(which would inconveniently imply that the Head-Ries trade cost index is infi-
nite for these entries), we opt to aggregate the industries in the WIOT into two
broad sectors, namely goods versus services. We thus compute Head-Ries
indices associated with trade in intermediates between any country-sector
pair (based on the goods and services sectoral aggregates), as well as the
Head-Ries indices associated with final-use trade between any country pair
in goods and in services.40
What are the quantitative implications of the empirically observed reductions
in trade costs? We argued in Section 4.1 that falling trade costs would tend to
weaken the correlation between the final-use and value-added shares in gross
output across countries, as production along GVCs becomes more fragmented
across borders. Yet, in Section 4.2 we also put forth the view that the increased
Table 5.8 Evaluating the role of changes in trade costs and expenditure shares
A: Country-level GVC measures Mean F/GO Mean VA/GO Correlation Mean U Mean D Correlation Real wage change
F/GO, VA/GO U, D (Min, Mean, Max)
1995 baseline (from data) 0.507 0.503 0.825 1.976 1.987 0.868 —
2011 baseline (from data) 0.484 0.487 0.925 2.085 2.070 0.912 —
1995 to 2011 shifts
Change trade costs 0.518 0.502 0.612 1.940 1.984 0.666 (1.003, 1.104, 1.512)
Change expenditure shares 0.516 0.513 0.857 1.945 1.953 0.889 (0.993, 1.001, 1.017)
Both changes 0.525 0.511 0.660 1.917 1.952 0.705 (1.002, 1.093, 1.434)







(Coef on (VA/GO) sficient j,t ) (Coefficient on (D)
s
j,t )
1995 baseline (from data) 0.5434*** 0.5184** 0.0851 0.5337*** 0.4839** 0.2564*** —
2011 baseline (from data) 0.6543*** 0.6373*** 0.2647*** 0.6286*** 0.5785*** 0.4156*** —
1995 to 2011 shifts
Change trade costs 0.5534*** 0.5321*** 0.1101* 0.5270*** 0.4844** 0.2474*** —
Change expenditure shares 0.5942*** 0.5760*** 0.1029* 0.5930*** 0.5540*** 0.2753*** —
Both changes 0.6009*** 0.5854*** 0.1193** 0.5856*** 0.5512*** 0.2609*** —
Country FE? N Y Y N Y Y —
Industry FE? N N Y N N Y —
Notes: Quantitative evaluations based on the multi-country, multi-industry general equilibrium model described in Section 5. Panel A reports moments and correlations
for the country-level GVC measures, as well as real wage changes. Panel B reports the partial correlation between the country-industry level GVC measures based on the
regression specifications in Table 5.3; standard errors are multi-way clustered by country and industry; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively. For the “1995 baseline” and “2011 baseline” rows, the moments and correlations are calculated directly from the WIOT data. Under “Change trade costs”,
this simulates the effect of the observed change between 1995 and 2011 in the Head-Ries trade costs indices computed at the country-sector level after aggregating the
industries up to broad sectoral aggregates (i.e., Goods versus Services). The trade costs indices are computed separately for intermediate-use and final-use shipments; for
each of these categories, changes in trade costs that fall below the 1st percentile (respectively, above the 99th percentile) are bottom-coded (respectively, top-coded).
Under “Change expenditure shares”, this simulates the effect of the observed change between 1995 and 2011 in the final-use expenditure shares. The “Both changes”
row simulates the combined effect of both the above changes in trade costs and final-use expenditure shares.
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specialization in services and in goods production illustrated in Figure 5.8 –
which tended to increase the correlation between F/GO and VA/GO – could
also well be driven by trade cost reductions. Which of these forces dominated
over the period 1995–2011? Our results in Table 5.8 indicate that, in isolation,
trade costs would have led to a reduction in the correlation between F/GO and
VA/GO from a value of 0.825 in the initial year to 0.612 by the end of the
period. This contrasts against the fact that this correlation actually moved in
the opposite direction in the data, and stood at 0.925 in 2011. Along a similar
vein, the changes in trade costs alone would have generated a drop in the corre-
lation between the country-level production staging measures (U vs D), from
0.868 to 0.666, whereas the WIOT data point to an increase in this correlation
to 0.912.
We next consider the effects of holding trade costs constant while feeding into
the model the observed change in the asj preference parameters seen between
1995 and 2011. As reported under “Change expenditure shares” in Panel A,
this generates a moderate increase in the correlation between F/GO and VA/GO
to 0.857, as well as in the correlation between U and D to 0.889. As services
have become more important in consumption relative to goods, the model
implies that service industries would have expanded across most countries,
which in turn would reinforce the aforementioned positive correlations among
these country-level measures of GVC positioning. Note that, quantitatively, the
change in the asj ’s on their own brings us about a third to a half of the way
towards bridging the gap between the correlations recorded in 1995 and in 2011.
However, when the changes in trade costs and the final-use expenditure shares
are considered simultaneously, the effect of the trade cost declines dominates:
The correlations of interest all weaken relative to 1995, although the extent of
this decline is not as large compared to the first counterfactual where only trade
cost movements were considered. This leaves us to conclude that other forces
which we are not able to accommodate with the current framework – such as
shifts in the use of inputs (the grsj ’s) towards services – would have had to be at
play, in order to rationalize the rising correlation between the country-level
GVC measures from 1995 to 2011.
A similar conclusion is reached if we look at Panel B of Table 5.8. There, we
have re-run the same series of regressions as in Table 5.3, to estimate the partial
correlation between the counterfactual GVC measures at the country-industry
level (i.e., between ðF GO s and =GO s= Þj ðVA Þj , as well as between ðU sÞj and
ðD sÞj ). These regressions have been run in the pure cross-section with no fixed
effects, with country fixed effects, and further including industry fixed effects.
The simulations point to an increase in the slope coefficients across all
columns, which is consistent with what we see in the actual evolution of the
country-industry GVC measures between 1995 and 2011. That said, the com-
bined effect of the trade costs and expenditure share shifts (“Both changes”) is
only able to partially account for the increase seen in the slope coefficients; in
particular, these forces alone do not do particularly well in explaining the
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magnitude of the increase in the slope coefficient when both country and industry
dummies are controlled for.
We turn to some forward projections in Table 5.9. For this exercise, we now
calibrate the model to the 2011 WIOT as a starting point, and then ask what
would happen to the country-level GVC measures if shifts in trade costs (and/
or the final-use expenditure shares) were to persist for a further 16 years. We
take guidance from the average rates of decline in trade costs estimated earlier
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 for intermediate and final-use trade, for goods and services
separately. For example, we assume in these simulations that trade costs for goods
shipped for intermediate use continue to decline at the rate of 1.81 per cent per
annum (based on the coefficient estimate in Column 3, Table 5.4); the assumed
rates of decline for trade in final-goods, as well as for trade in services are
drawn from these tables in an analogous manner.41 For the projected changes
in the expenditure shares, we likewise simulate the effects of a decrease in the
asj ’s associated with goods industries of 1.27 per cent per year (taking guidance
from Column 3, Table 5.6), coupled with a rise in the asj ’s associated with
services of 0.37 per cent per year (Column 5, Table 5.6); the counterfactual asj
shares are re-scaled proportionally to ensure that they sum to 1 for each country.
We once again find in Table 5.9 that a decline in trade costs alone would tend
to reduce the country-level correlations between the final-use and value-added
shares in gross output (from 0.925 to 0.840), as well as that between U and D
(from 0.912 to 0.815). A more nuanced view emerges when we consider
changes in the trade costs associated with shipping goods and shipping ser-
vices separately. A hypothetical decline in trade costs for goods (“Goods
only”) would tend to reduce the cross-country correlations, as expected.
However, a decline in trade costs for services (“Services only”) instead sees
the correlation between U and D rise to 0.908, and that between F/GO and
VA/GO rise to 0.914. It thus appears that if trade costs for services were to
fall relatively more than trade costs for goods, this would reinforce compara-
tive advantage in services for those countries that were already initially spe-
cializing in those industries; this in turn would be sufficient to raise the
cross-country correlation between the GVC measures. Thus, depending on
whether trade costs declines are larger for goods versus services, there
appears to be scope for trade cost movements to generate a between-industry
shift in specialization patterns.
As in our counterfactuals in Table 5.8, the effects of an isolated shift in the final
expenditure shares (continuing their 1995–2011 trajectory) would tend to
increase the country-level correlations between the final-use and value-added
shares in gross output. Even though the initial correlations are already very
high, they increase even further to 0.934 (between F/GO and VA/GO) and to
0.923 (between U and D), respectively. When considered in conjunction with
the trade cost movements, the shifts in the asj ’s act to moderate the decline in
these key correlations induced when trade cost decreases are applied to both
goods and services; the shift in consumption towards services is however not
Table 5.9 Counterfactual projections
Country-level measures Mean F/GO Mean VA/GO Correlation Mean Mean Correlation Real wage change
F/GO, VA/GO U D U, D (Min, Mean, Max)
2011 baseline (from data) 0.484 0.487 0.925 2.085 2.070 0.912 —
1995 to 2011 shifts
Change trade costs 0.482 0.476 0.840 2.095 2.101 0.815 (1.070, 1.207, 1.485)
Change trade costs (goods only) 0.483 0.480 0.836 2.089 2.091 0.811 (1.058, 1.151, 1.269)
Change trade costs (services only) 0.486 0.485 0.914 2.081 2.073 0.908 (1.010, 1.048, 1.286)
Change expenditure shares 0.492 0.494 0.934 2.054 2.042 0.923 (0.997, 1.000, 1.006)
Change trade costs (goods & services) 0.489 0.483 0.867 2.066 2.072 0.849 (1.064, 1.189, 1.456)
and expenditure shares
Notes: Quantitative evaluations based on the multi-country, multi-industry general equilibrium model described in Section 5. Moments and correlations for the country-
level GVC measures, as well as real wage changes, are reported. The “2011 baseline” row reports summary statistics calculated directly from the 2011 WIOT data.
Under “Change trade costs”, this simulates the effects of a decrease commencing in 2011 for 16 more years, in which trade costs for intermediate goods decline at
a rate of 1.81% per year, trade costs for intermediate service inputs decline at a rate of 1.50% per year, trade costs for final goods decline at a rate of 2.31% per
year, and trade costs for final-use services decline at a rate of 1.96% per year, these being the rates of change estimated from Tables 5.4 and 5.5. The subsequent
two rows simulate the effects of this trade cost decrease, but applying the decrease to Goods (respectively, Services) industries only. Under “Change expenditure
shares”, this simulates the effects of a decrease commencing in 2011 for 16 more years, in which the expenditure share for goods industries falls at a rate of 1.27%
per year, and that for services industries rises at a rate of 0.37% per year; the expenditure shares are re-scaled proportionally to ensure that they sum to 1 for each
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Figure 5.11 Further declines in trade costs and country GVC position
sufficiently large to fully undo or reverse the overall weakening in these correla-
tions between the country GVC measures.
We round off this discussion of counterfactuals by taking a more detailed look at
the projected shift in countries’ GVC positioning should trade costs continue to
decline. Figure 5.11 plots the changes in country-level upstreamness (U) and
downstreamness (D) based on the “Change trade costs” simulation from
Table 5.9. The figure points to interesting variation across countries in response
to a continued fall in trade costs applied to both goods and services. China
stands out as a country that records a large decrease in its production staging dis-
tance according to both U and D. A closer look at the underlying sectoral shifts
reveals that this is driven by a further decline in output in Mining and Quarrying
(an industry with a particularly high value of U), as the fall in trade costs reinforces
China’s production patterns towards other goods and service industries in which it
has stronger comparative advantage. On the other hand, economies like Taiwan,
Finland, and Japan exhibit an increase in both U and D, and thus appear to
become more embedded in longer value chains that place them at a greater produc-
tion staging distance from both end-consumers and primary factors.
7. Conclusion
This chapter aims to contribute to our understanding of the positioning of coun-
tries and industries in GVCs. We have relied on data from the World Input-Output
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Database (WIOD) to document the evolution of the upstreamness and down-
streamness of various countries and industries in GVCs during the period
1995–2011. We have emphasized, in particular, the presence of a puzzling posi-
tive correlation between several pairs of GVC measures at both the country and
country-industry levels. More specifically, countries and country-industries far
removed from final demand also tend to be far removed from the use of
primary factors in production. We have explored potential explanations for this
phenomenon and have assessed the quantitative role of two factors: a reduction
in trade costs and an increase in the share of world spending on services. This
quantitative evaluation is based on a theoretical model of GVCs that we have
built, by extending the framework of Caliendo and Parro (2015) in a way that
allows the model to match all the entries of a World Input-Output Table. We
have finally used the model to conjecture on the future evolution of the position-
ing of industries and countries in GVCs. By introducing considerations related to
the positioning of countries and industries in GVCs into a general equilibrium
model of trade with cross-sectoral linkages, we hope to contribute a useful
bridge between two literatures: On the one hand, the body of empirical work
on GVCs employing Input-Output analysis techniques, and on the other hand,
the theoretical literature on quantitative trade models that facilitate a structural
interpretation of input flows across countries (c.f., Costinot and Rodríguez-
Clare 2014). We also hope that the modeling framework will in turn provide
scope for future research, to arrive at a more complete decomposition of the
forces that account for the evolution of GVC activity. In this regard, a potentially
fruitful line of work would be to generalize the production setup to a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) specification, in order to assess the role of
shifts in input-use shares (the γ’s) in accounting for the observed trends in the
measures of GVC positioning.
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1 These contributions relate to a parallel body of work, starting with the seminal piece of
Johnson and Noguera (2012), that has been concerned with tracing the value-added
content of trade flows and the participation of various countries in GVCs (see
Koopman et al., 2014, Johnson, 2014, Timmer et al., 2014, de Gortari, 2017).
2 See, among others, Harms et al. (2012), Baldwin and Venables (2013), Costinot et al.
(2013), Antràs and Chor (2013), Tyazhelnikov (2017), Fally and Hillberry (2018), and
Kikuchi et al. (2018). This literature is in turn inspired by earlier contributions to mod-
eling multi-stage production, such as Dixit and Grossman (1982), Sanyal and Jones
(1982), Kremer (1993), Yi (2003, 2010), and Kohler (2004).
3 Two recent exceptions are the work of Antràs and de Gortari (2017) and de Gortari
(2017), who develop multi-country models that emphasize the sequential nature of
trade flows in GVCs. Their frameworks provide a structural interpretation of Global
Input-Output Tables, but the calibration of those models requires a much more
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cumbersome estimation procedure than is required for the model developed in this
chapter.
4 Baldwin and Venables (2013) famously introduced the term “snakes” to refer to purely
sequential value chains, in which each production stage obtains its inputs from a
unique upstream stage. They distinguished “snakes” from “spiders”, which are
flatter GVCs in which each production stage sources from several upstream suppliers
simultaneously. The measures of GVC positioning that we review in Section 2 are
defined in a general way, so that they can be computed for production processes
that have both “snake”-like as well as “spider”-like features.
5 In a revision of his 2012 working paper, Fally studies the role of the growth of the
service sector in explaining the downward trend in D observed in U.S. Input-
Output Tables in the period 1947 to 2002.
6 A recent paper by Alexander (2017) extends the Caliendo and Parro (2015) frame-
work by allowing trade shares to vary depending on whether goods are sold to final
consumers or to other industries, but imposes a common trade share for all interme-
diate input purchasing industries. Readers familiar with the construction of WIOTs
will be aware that proportionality assumptions are commonly adopted that would
imply identical trade shares for all input purchasing industries. In practice though,
the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) used in this chapter introduces minor
adjustments that generate some variation in input trade shares in the data. Following
the lead of de Gortari (2017), we hypothesize that future WIOTs will make better use
of firm-level import and export data to generate even larger departures from such pro-
portionality assumptions.
7 See Johnson (2017) for a recent complementary overview of these and other measures
of GVC activity.
8 It may be tempting heuristically to view the exercise here as one of projecting the infor-
mation on production linkages within the WIOT into a stylized linear production chain.
We should however caution against this interpretation, since the intention of the GVC
measures is not to literally arrange the country-industries in a WIOT into a unique pro-
duction sequence. To give an example, if the Mining and Quarrying industry in Aus-
tralia has the next largest U value compared to the Rubber and Plastics industry in
China, it does not mean that the former is necessarily being purchased as an input
by the latter industry; instead, what this means is that the former industry tends on
average to enter production chains at a larger number of stages relative to final demand.
9 We should stress that although they were developed independently, Fally’s (2012)
measure chronologically preceded that in Antràs and Chor (2013).
10 Miller and Temurshoev (2017) refer to Usj as the “output upstreamness” of sector s in
country j, and Dsj as the “input downstreamness” of the same sector.
11 Our numerical results also suggest that the gross-output weighted-average of the
country-industry U’s (respectively, D’s) is slightly larger than the country-level U’s
(respectively, D’s) computed from a collapsed WIOT. This would be consistent
with the matrix inverse used in the computation of these indices being a convex
transformation.
12 The proof relies on the fact that: (i) U can be computed from the Leontief inverse
matrix, L = [I − A]−1; (ii) D can be computed from the Ghosh inverse matrix, G =
[I − B]−1; and (iii) the Leontief and Ghosh inverse matrices are closely related to
each other. Facts (i) and (ii) were discussed earlier in Section 2, while (iii) is made
explicit in Miller and Temurshoev (2017). In particular, define Y to be a square
matrix whose diagonal entries are equal to gross output in each country-industry,
and whose non-diagonal entries are all equal to zero. Then, we have: YG = LY.
13 We have separately verified that similar patterns hold in the recent 2016 release of the
WIOD. Relative to the 2013 edition, the 2016 WIOD includes 44 countries and 56
industries from 2000–2014. The increase in the number of industries covered arises
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mainly from a more detailed breakdown of service industries. We have nevertheless
based the analysis in this chapter on the 2013 WIOD, in order to trace the evolution
of GVCs starting from an earlier year.
14 The full output identity should thus be:
XS XJ XJ
Y r Zrsij þ Frij þ Nri ¼ i :
s¼1 j¼1 j¼1
15 See Antràs et al. (2012) for a derivation of this correction term and how it arises from
proportionality assumptions.
16 As mentioned in Section 2.3, an alternative approach would be to work directly with
the country-industry measures of GVC positioning in a given year, and take weighted-
averages of these to obtain their analogues at the country level. As explained in
Section 2, the two approaches clearly yield exactly the same country-level values
for F/GO and VA/GO if weights equal to gross output in each country-industry are
used. While the two approaches are not equivalent for U and D, they nevertheless
result in highly correlated GVC measures at the country level (with a correlation
higher than 0.98, for both U and D). The trends that we document are thus not sen-
sitive to the approach taken to compute the country-level GVC measures. In practice,
the net inventory correction introduces small discrepancies between the country-level
GVC measures computed under either approach, but the correlation remains very
high.
17 We have found no major differences in the within country-industry time trends when
re-running the Table 5.2 regressions restricting to either goods-producing or service
industries. The time trends for each of the GVC measures retain the same sign as
in Table 5.2; statistical significance on the Yeart variable is lost in only one case,
for the regression involving F/GO for goods industries (results available on
request). The goods-producing industries are defined as industries 1–16 in the
WIOD, these being industries in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing activities;
the service industries are defined as industries 17–35.
18 In separate unreported results, we have found similar time trends when weighting each
observation by the gross output of the country-industry in question. Likewise, the
results are robust when adopting a less stringent set of fixed effects, namely when
the FEsj ’s are replaced with a set of country fixed effects instead.
19 Costinot et al. (2013) and Antràs and de Gortari (2017) develop models in which
countries specialize in equilibrium in particular segments of the global value chain:
some countries have comparative advantage in more upstream stages, while others
specialize in more downstream stages.
20 The correlation between the country-level measures of F/GO and U, as well as
between the country-level measures of VA/GO and D, is indeed negative and lower
than −0.96 in any given year.
21 We have verified that the patterns documented in this section are not unduly driven by
the small economies in the WIOD sample. In particular, similar time trends are
obtained when: (i) dropping Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, these
being the five smallest countries by GDP; (ii) using aggregate gross output as regres-
sion weights in the cross-country regressions underlying the lower panels in Figures
5.5 and 5.6; or (iii) weighting the Table 5.3 regressions by the gross output of the
country-industry in question.
22 Using the notation in Section 2.3, this is calculated for any country pair (i, j) as:
((ZijZji)/(Z Zjj))
−1/2θ




use trade. Note that the formulae for the Head-Ries indices imply that trade costs
are infinite when either the value of trade from i to j or that from j to i is zero. For
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practical purposes, we therefore add a small constant to all Zrs rij and Fij entries that are
equal to zero, before collapsing the WIOT to a country-by-country set of tables, in
order to bound the implied trade costs away from infinity. The constant added
(1e−18) is less than the smallest positive entry seen in the WIOT in any year.
23 When plotting Figure 5.7, we have dropped the largest 1 per cent of values for both
intermediate-use and final-use trade costs. In practice, this helps to smooth out the
time trend in the figure, ensuring that the patterns are not being driven by outliers
that correspond to very small trade flows that are most prone to being measured
with error.
24 There appears to be a small rise in trade costs around the onset of the Global Financial
Crisis, consistent with the collapse in trade flows experienced during that episode.
25 These industry-level elasticities are for goods-producing sectors, and so we continue
to set θ = 5 for trade flows involving services in this robustness exercise.
26 Similar results are obtained when dropping the industries related to transport services,
namely Inland Transport (23), Water Transport (24), Air Transport (25), and Other
Transport Activities and Travel Agencies (26).
27 The coefficient of variation of the service share in gross output rose slightly from
0.159 in 1995 to 0.167 in 2011.
28 See Berlingieri (2014) for a related discussion based on the U.S. Domestic Input-
Output Tables.
29 We ignore tariffs and their implied tariff revenue for simplicity.
30 We assume that σr < 1+ θr for each r, in order for the ideal price index over this
industry-r CES aggregate to be well-defined.
31 The manipulation uses the fact that gross output of industry r in country j is equal to
the world’s total purchases from this country-industry.
32 Aggregating (25) across sectors, and using (26), one obtains after some manipulations: !  !XS XS XJ XS XS
w L 1 gsr pr rj j j 1- gsr r¼ - jiXi ¼ j Yj :
r¼1 s¼1 i¼1 r¼1 s¼1
In words, the total wage payments to labor in country j are equal to total value-added
across all sectors of j.
33 Note that (22) comprises J × (J − 1) × S independent equations, since the shares psij
need to sum to 1 for each j-s pair. Also, (23) and (24) each comprise J × S equations.
The market-clearing condition (25) comprises J × S − 1 independent equations, since
one of these is redundant by Walras’ Law. Finally, there are J trade balance conditions
in (26). On the other hand, the equilibrium seeks to solve for the following objects:
The shares psij (of which there are J × (J − 1) × S independent shares), the unit pro-
duction costs cs and price indices Psj j (of which there are J × S each), as well as the
J − 1 wage levels wj’s (with one country’s wage chosen as the numéraire) and the
J × S expenditure levels X sj ’s. Thus, we have as many equilibrium conditions as var-
iables to be solved for. P
34 In other words, given the identities of i, j and r, Z~rs J ~k 1 Z
rs
ij = kj would be equal for all
purchasing industries s.
¼
35 These deviations arise from adjustments made by the WIOD to reconcile the informa-
tion contained on bilateral trade flows; see in particular Section 5 of Dietzenbacher
et al. (2013).
36 In particular, and just as in footnote 32, aggregating (25) across sectors, and using
(26), one obtains after some manipulations: !XS XS
w 1- gsrj Y rjLj ¼ j :
r¼1 s¼1
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37 One could also easily use this approach to explore changes in the technology param-
eters Tri . It would also be interesting to explore shocks to the Cobb-Douglas techno-
logical parameters grsj , but the sufficient statistics results derived below do not easily
generalize to this type of shocks.
38 As pointed out by a reviewer, for the approach to work, it is important that the sectoral
trade elasticities do not vary across importing countries.
39 To accommodate changes in the grsj ’s, one would require a more flexible production
specification, such as CES production functions in each industry.
40 In other words, we calculate (2J)2 instead of (J × S)2 trade costs for intermediate
inputs, and 2J2 instead of J2 × S trade costs for final-use trade. We adopt θ = 5
when computing these Head-Ries indices. Even after aggregating to the broad sectoral
level, there are still a number of zeros in the matrix. We therefore bottom-code τ̂rsij and
τ̂rFij at their respective first percentile values if these proportional changes fall below
this percentile threshold. Likewise, we top-code large values of τ̂rsij and τ̂
rF
ij at their
respective 99th percentile values.
41 Specifically, trade costs for goods shipped for final-use are assumed to decline at the
rate of 2.31 per cent per annum (Column 3, Table 5.5); trade costs for services shipped
for intermediate use decline at 1.50 per cent per annum (Column 5, Table 5.4); and
trade costs for services shipped for final-use decline at 1.96 per cent per year
(Column 5, Table 5.5).
42 Strictly speaking, one should also be concerned with the model satisfying the equilib-
rium condition (32), which solves for the matrix of final-use price indices PrFj . These
price indices are however not directly observable in a WIOT, so this condition is not
relevant for the purposes of the result we are proving.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we first outline the main steps involved in proving the existence
of equilibrium in our extension of the Caliendo and Parro (2015) model. We also
expand our discussion from the main text regarding the ability of the model to
match all the entries of a WIOT.
Let us first tackle the issue of existence of equilibrium. The key equations char-
acterizing such an equilibrium are (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (35), and (36). We
begin by noting that the system of equations in (31), after plugging in (30), can be
written as
 ( ) P -yr ( ) yr YSy X rJ S1 gtrr ( ) tr
Prs
-




t 1 i tr
j ¼ i ¼ P
gið Þ i ij i i :
i¼1 t¼1
Following the same approach as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) or Antràs and de
Gortari (2017), one can verify that as long as trade costs are bounded andPS
t 1 g
tr
i < 1 for all i and r, the system above delivers a unique mapping¼ { }
between the vector of wages w ¼ w Jj and the matrix of price indices Prsj .j¼1
From equation (30), this in turn implies that, under the same conditions, there
exists a unique matrix of unit costs cri given a vector of wages w.
The proof of the existence of a vector of wages is more involved, and we shall
not develop it in full detail here, but such a proof would proceed as follows. First,
notice that the system of equations defined in (35) can be inverted – under weak
invertibility conditions – to express the matrix of gross output levels as a function
of the equilibrium vector of wages w. In doing so, one would invoke that trade
shares are only a function of wages and parameters once plugging in the
values of cri as a function of the same vector of wages. With this result in
hand, the last step is to simply plug trade shares – in (28) and (29) – and gross
output levels – in (35) – into the trade balance condition (36) to obtain a
system of J equations in the J equilibrium wages w. Following Alvarez and
Lucas (2007) or Antràs and de Gortari (2017), one would then define an excess
demand function Z(w) and show that it satisfies the conditions in Propositions
17.C.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p.585), namely continuity, homogeneity of
!
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degree 0 in wages, Walras’ Law, the existence of a lower bound, and a limit
condition.
The existence of an equilibrium does not of course guarantee that it is unique.
In fact, even in the simpler one-sector Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, unique-
ness has only been demonstrated under certain (sufficient) conditions on the
matrix of trade costs (see Alvarez and Lucas, 2007). To derive the analogous suf-
ficient conditions, one would need to verify the restrictions on trade costs that
guarantee that the excess demand function Z(w) has the gross substitutes property
in w (see Proposition 17.F.3 in Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 613).
Let us now return to the issue of whether our more flexible formulation of trade
costs allows our model to match all the entries of a WIOT, no matter their values.
A first obvious observation is that, if an equilibrium of the model exists, then
given matrices of input and final-use trade costs, there exists equilibrium com-
modity flows Zrsij and F
r
ij across sectors and industries, as well as country-
sector-specific gross output Y sj and value-added VA
s
j levels. In other words, the
model produces values for all the entries of a WIOT.
Now suppose that we begin with the empirical entries of an actual WIOT.{ }
Suppose you fix the vector of equipped labor L
J¼ Lj to some arbitraryj¼1
values (e.g., the labor force in each country). Given L and the vector of aggregate
value-added in each country, we obtain a vector of empirical wages w~, where we
again use tildes to denote empirical values. It is clear that plugging the empiri-
cally observed trade shares p~rs rF ~rij and p~ji , and gross output and deficit levels Y j




i (see (37) and
(38)), the goods-market and trade balance conditions (35) and (36) will hold as
identities. ( ) rr ( ) y




i ¼ i i ij ¼ ij ,

















We now further note that the values of (transformed) trade costs rrsij and the term
bri need also satisfy the two remaining equilibrium conditions (30) and (31),
which further imposes: " #( ) grs r1 s=y P( ) =j yS- YS -
s¼ C w 1~ - g
XJrs
bs rj ¼1
j brrrs ; ðA:3j j i ij Þ
r¼1 i¼1
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rs
where the constant Csj is given by C
s s s g
j T U ð ÞAr j .42 Fixing the parameters Ts¼ j j j ,
as well as σr and θr (shaping Ar), the system provides a second set of equilibrium
conditions relating trade costs rrs term brij and the i (while involving other param-
eters and “observables”). Combining (A.1) and (A.3) one should, under the nec-
essary invertibility conditions solve for the matrix of values for bsj consistent with
the observables in the WIOT and the general equilibrium of the model. With
those in hand, it just suffices to plug them back into (A.1) and (A.2) to obtain
the matrices of trade costs rrs rrFij and ij that make the model replicate all the
entries of a WIOT exactly. Although it should be clear from our proof, obtaining
those parameters requires however fixing the other unobserved (and not easily
retrieved) parameters L , r and θrj T sj , σ .
Table 5.A1 Summary statistics: country-industry GVC measures
10th Median 90th Mean Std Dev N
F/GO
All industries 0.125 0.444 0.901 0.473 0.271 24,076
Goods industries only 0.076 0.373 0.700 0.379 0.240 11,105
Service industries only 0.216 0.496 0.956 0.553 0.270 12,971
VA/GO
All industries 0.279 0.456 0.738 0.489 0.186 24,395
Goods industries only 0.247 0.360 0.499 0.371 0.118 11,152
Service industries only 0.378 0.575 0.812 0.589 0.175 13,243
U
All industries 1.153 2.126 2.914 2.098 0.649 24,395
Goods industries only 1.523 2.298 3.048 2.291 0.605 11,152
Service industries only 1.055 1.982 2.771 1.936 0.640 13,243
D
All industries 1.502 2.141 2.624 2.092 0.450 24,395
Goods industries only 2.033 2.381 2.728 2.376 0.316 11,152
Service industries only 1.356 1.846 2.363 1.852 0.404 13,243
Notes: Based on the country-industry GVC measures calculated from the WIOD for 1995–2011; the
sample comprises all 41 countries, 35 industries, and 17 years. Goods industries are defined as primary
and manufacturing industries, namely industries 1–16 in the WIOD classification. The service
industries are industries 17–35 in the WIOD classification.
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6 Understanding regional export
growth in China
David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson
and Lei Li
1. Introduction
Over the last quarter century, China has emerged as the world’s most dynamic
manufacturing nation. Based on data from the World Development Indicators,
between 1991 and 2013 the country’s share of global manufacturing value
added grew more than six fold, rising from 4 per cent to 24 per cent. Having sur-
passed the United States in 2010, China is now the world’s largest producer of
manufactured goods. As China’s manufacturing sector has grown, so too has
its presence in global markets. Between 1991 and 2014, China’s share of
world manufacturing exports increased more than seven times, from 2 per cent
to 17 per cent, with most of this growth having occurred by 2010, when the
global financial crisis dented growth in world trade. Today, China is the
world’s factory.
Most discussions of China’s manufacturing boom center on economic
reforms that the country enacted in the 1980s and 1990s, which initiated a
process of export-led development similar to that of the Asian Tigers – Hong
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan – in earlier decades (Rodrik,
2006; Hsieh and Ossa, 2016). Initial reforms created special economic zones
in which foreign enterprises set up export processing plants to import parts
and components for the assembly of final exports (Wang, 2013; Alder, Shao,
and Zilibotti, 2016). By the late 1990s, export-processing plants accounted
for over half of China’s manufacturing exports (Yu and Tian, 2012 and
2017), with most of this production occurring in establishments owned by mul-
tinational corporations. A second phase of reforms closed and consolidated
state-owned enterprises, allowing higher productivity private manufacturers to
expand (Hsieh and Song, 2015). At the same time, the de facto relaxation of
barriers on internal migration permitted over 150 million workers to reallocate
from rural farms to urban factories (Li, Li, Wu, and Xiong, 2012; Fan, 2015;
Zi, 2016).
China’s outward-oriented economic-policy changes culminated with its acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization in 2001, which reduced tariff barriers on
imported intermediate inputs (Yu, 2015; Amiti, Dai, Feenstra, and Romalis,
2017; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang, and Zhang, 2017; Yu and Tian, 2017),
DOI: 10.4324/9781351061544-6
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phased out restrictions on which firms are allowed to export directly (Ding, Sun,
and Jiang, 2015; Bai, Krishna, and Ma, 2017), and attenuated uncertainty over
China’s access to foreign markets, the United States in particular (Pierce and
Schott, 2016; Handley and Limao, 2017; Erten and Leight, 2017). Together,
these modifications helped China’s manufacturing sector achieve annual rates
of productivity growth of nearly 8 per cent, on a value-added basis, and of
nearly 3 per cent, on a gross-output basis, in the 10 years preceding the onset
of the global financial crisis (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012).
In this chapter, we use disaggregated regional data on Chinese trade to assess
the channels through which the country’s exports have surged. We begin the anal-
ysis by describing how the composition of exports in China changed during the
period spanning the country’s accession to the WTO. Since 2000, the share of
export processing in China’s exports has declined, as China has shifted into
more vertically integrated forms of production for global markets. Due in large
part to the liberalization of foreign trading rights, the share of exports by state-
owned enterprises has plummeted. In their place, the share of exports by
foreign-owned enterprises has grown steadily, while the share by private domestic
enterprises has skyrocketed. Also over this time period, China’s exports shifted
from traditionally labor-intensive goods, such as apparel, footwear, furniture,
and toys, to more sophisticated electronics products, including cellphone handsets
and laptop computers (Xu and Lu, 2009). Two decades ago, China had few
brands that were recognized globally. Today, Huawei (telecommunications equip-
ment) and Lenovo (personal computers) are the largest global producers in their
respective industries, while three of the top five producers of smartphones are
Chinese companies (Huawei, Oppo and Vivo).
As a starting point for our analysis, we use a Bartik (1991) shift-share approach
to evaluate the common component of industry-level export growth across
regions in China. Applied in our context, this approach, which takes the
method in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) for modeling the growth in U.S.
imports from China down to the level of Chinese regions, involves predicting
a region’s manufacturing export growth over the 2000s by combining the
initial regional share of economic activity in each industry with national export
growth in that industry and then summing across industries. Regions are
“exposed” to better export-growth opportunities if they begin specialized in
industries that subsequently experience rapid growth at the national level.
We thus imagine that a region’s pattern of industrial specialization as of the late
1990s is predictive of its later export growth. Predictability may arise from stabi-
lity in regional comparative advantage over time (or at least over the 10-year
period that we examine) or from the geographic clustering of related industries,
such that growth in one industry (textiles) tends to be related to growth in
upstream industries (chemicals) or downstream industries (apparel). Our
reduced-form empirical approach allows us to be agnostic about the origins
of regional export growth. Variation in regional export growth may reflect
regional stability in relative factor supplies (which would determine comparative
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advantage in a Heckscher-Ohlin setting), in relative industry technological capa-
bilities (which would determine comparative advantage in a Ricardian setting), or
in localization patterns arising from agglomeration economies. Our use of a
Bartik measure to explain China’s export growth is similar in spirit to Bombardini
and Li (2016), who examine the consequences of China’s export boom for
pollution-related mortality in the country, and Cheng and Potlogea (2015), who
study how trade-related economic linkages affect local economic development
in China.
Of course, regional comparative advantage or industry agglomeration are not
the only factors that indicate a region’s export-growth potential. The substantial
changes in China’s economic policy over the time period that we study are
also potentially important determinants of regional export growth, at least to
the extent that regions differ in their exposure to these policy changes. Our anal-
ysis also considers the impact on exports of explicit measures of policy change
that the literature has identified as important drivers of China’s trade expansion,
in particular, and post-trade liberalization episodes, in general. These include the
reduction of barriers on imported intermediate inputs, the Pierce and Schott
(2016) measure of policy uncertainty confronting China in the U.S. market
(Feng, Li and Swenson, 2017), and reductions in quotas on apparel and textile
products mandated by the end of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (Khandelwal,
Schott and Wei, 2013). To avoid the confounding effects of the surge in state
lending that China undertook to combat the global financial crisis (Bai, Hsieh
and Song, 2016), we focus our analysis on the years 2000 to 2010, which cap-
tures a period of accelerated export and productivity growth in China (Brandt,
Wang and Zhang, 2017) and coincides with the most intense phase of China’s
export boom.
We find that a simple Bartik measure has substantial predictive power for
China’s regional export growth. Even though China’s regional development
has been highly uneven, the spatial pattern of regional export growth is to a
large extent explained by industry trends at the national level. Our results indicate
that a region at the 75th percentile of exposure to China’s national export boom
would have had growth in export intensity 0.1 standard deviations higher than a
region at the 25th percentile of exposure. Once we add the Bartik measure to the
regression, the estimated impact of reduced input tariffs on China’s export growth
falls substantially and loses statistical significance. A similar outcome is observed
for the Pierce and Schott and Handley and Limao uncertainty measures, whose
impacts on export growth falls to zero with the inclusion of the Bartik
measure. The ability of these tariff-based measures to predict export growth
also declines considerably when province dummies or controls for the initial spe-
cialization of cities in the textile/apparel and electronics/machinery sectors are
added to the regression analysis. Whereas exposure to different tariff regimes
appears to vary to a large extent across rather than within provinces and
sectors, the Bartik measure provides a consistently strong prediction of export
growth even when province-level and sector-level trends are absorbed into
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control variables. We see little evidence that regions more exposed to the elimi-
nation of MFA quotas enjoyed faster export growth.
Next, we examine the importance of export regimes (processing versus ordi-
nary exports) and firm ownership type (state-owned, foreign-owned, domestic
privately owned establishments) in China’s export growth. If some regions –
say, because of their proximity to ports – are better suited to export processing,
they may have enjoyed relatively rapid growth (Brandt and Morrow, 2017;
Dai, Maitra and Yu, 2016). Similarly, regions that were initially more dominated
by state-owned enterprises may have seen slower growth as foreign and private
domestic firms outpaced SOEs in their ability to attract resources and penetrate
foreign markets (Hsieh and Song, 2015). We find that ordinary exports and pro-
cessing exports operate as independent drivers of regional export growth, while
among firm types it is national growth in industry exports by foreign-owned
enterprises – rather than by state-owned or private domestic enterprises – that
is the strongest predictor of regional expansion in exports. The initial attractive-
ness of regions to foreign-owned companies, driven in part perhaps by Deng
Xiaoping’s early experiments in opening locations to foreign investment and
trade, appears to have laid the foundation for China’s 2000s export boom.
The result of our analysis is a reduced-form model of regional export growth in
China, which can be used to support analysis of the local-labor-market impacts of
deeper global economic integration. The rapidly growing literature on how
import competition from lower-income countries has affected labor markets in
developed economics (e.g., Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013 and 2016; Autor,
Dorn, Hanson and Song, 2014; Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price,
2016) has not been matched by an equivalent volume of work on how China’s
export growth has affected its own local labor markets. A newly emerging liter-
ature examines how export growth in China affects local pollution (Bombardini
and Li, 2016), enhances incentives for skill and capital accumulation (Cheng and
Potlogea, 2015; Li, 2015), and induces reallocation of labor out of agriculture and
into manufacturing (Fan, 2015; Zi, 2016; Leight, 2016; Erten and Leight, 2017).
If regional comparative advantage or industry agglomeration patterns are roughly
stable over decadal time periods, then export growth across regions will vary
according to their initial patterns of industrial specialization and which industries
enjoyed rapid export growth at the national level. We also consider the impact of
explicit measures of policy change that the literature has identified as drivers of
China’s trade expansion, including reductions of tariffs on final goods, tariffs on
imported intermediate inputs, trade-policy uncertainty for China in the U.S.
market, and MFA quotas on apparel and textile products.
We find that a simple Bartik measure has substantial predictive power for
China’s regional export growth. Once we add the Bartik measure to the analysis,
the impacts of reduced input and output tariffs or trade-policy uncertainty on
China’s export growth fall substantially and become statistically insignificant.
These tariff-based predictors of export growth are also very sensitive to the inclu-
sion of time trends across provinces and broad sectors, whereas the Bartik
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measure has considerably more success in predicting variation in export growth
within provinces and sectors. There is little evidence that regions more exposed to
the elimination of MFA quotas enjoyed faster export growth. Our results provide
a foundation for the analysis of how China’s export boom affected China’s
regional economies.
2. Background on China’s export growth
China’s quarter century of export growth began in the early 1990s. Although
Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reform in the late 1970s, the early emphasis
was on improving incentives for agricultural production and relaxing centralized
control over industry. In 1989, after more than a decade of reform, China still
remained a small player in global manufacturing, accounting for only 1.8
per cent of global manufacturing exports. When hardliners re-established
control over economic policy following the events at Tiananmen Square in
1989, reform stalled and there was doubt about the sustainability of China’s tran-
sition toward a market economy (Naughton, 2007). It was not until the reformist
camp reaffirmed its authority over economic policy in the early 1990s that China
fully embraced export-led development. Deng’s famous “southern tour” in 1992
focused national attention on the successes of earlier policy experiments in a
handful of locations on China’s east coast (Vogel, 2011). These efforts had
included the creation of special economic zones (SEZs), which allowed foreign
companies to set up export processing plants that imported inputs and exported
final outputs, relatively free from government interference (Yu and Tian, 2017;
Alder, Shao and Zilibotti, 2016). As the number of SEZs grew from 20 in
1991 to 150 in 2010, foreign-owned export plants proliferated. According to
the World Development Indicators, inflows of foreign direct investment, which
averaged only 0.7 per cent of GDP during the 1980s, rose to 4.2 per cent of
GDP during the 1990s and 2000s.
China’s economic isolation under Mao created abundant opportunities for later
catch up (Zhu, 2012; Brandt, Ma and Rawski, 2016). Because the distortions of
the Maoist era kept China far inside its production frontier, market opening
ignited a phase of transitional growth that was governed in large part by the coun-
try’s accumulated productivity gap with the developed world (Song, Storesletten
and Zilibotti, 2011). A key feature of this transitional growth was China realizing
its long dormant comparative advantage in manufacturing. Whereas many large
emerging economies specialize in primary commodities – including Brazil in
iron ore, Indonesia in rubber, Russia in oil and gas, and South Africa in
minerals – China’s advantage is overwhelmingly in industrial goods. Over the
period 1990 to 2013, manufacturing averaged 88 per cent of China’s total
exports of goods and services. This fraction of manufacturing exports was
higher than any other country with consistent data over this time period, and
simply stunning for such a large economy. Relative to other major emerging
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economies, China’s manufacturing export share over this time period compares to
77 per cent in South Korea, 69 per cent in Mexico, 60 per cent in Thailand,
59 per cent in the Philippines, 49 per cent in India, 48 per cent in Vietnam,
42 per cent in Indonesia, 41 per cent in Brazil, 40 per cent in South Africa,
and 18 per cent in Russia. To the extent that China’s regions varied either in
their comparative advantage within manufacturing (e.g., coal supplies in
China’s northeast may account for the region’s strength in steel production) or
their access to foreign markets (e.g., the proximity of Guangdong province to
Hong Kong may have helped its local firms make connections with multinational
enterprises), the country’s transitional growth may have favored particular indus-
tries in particular locations. It is the combination of China’s dramatic market
opening and its latent relative strength in manufacturing production that we
exploit in specifying a Bartik-style, reduced-form model for export growth in
China.
The culmination of China’s entry onto the world economic stage was its acces-
sion to the WTO in 2001. The country’s entry occurred over the course of nearly
a decade. In 1996, China began to meet preconditions for its WTO accession by
removing its most restrictive non-tariff barriers. Trade licenses, special import
arrangements, and discriminatory policies against foreign goods were reduced
or eliminated, thereby making import tariffs the primary instruments of protec-
tion. In 2001, China began to reduce tariffs themselves. The simple average
tariff (across six-digit HS products) fell from 17 per cent in 2000 (with a standard
deviation of 12 per cent) to 6 per cent by the end of 2005 (with a standard devia-
tion that was nearly 50 per cent smaller). Since 2005, average tariffs have
remained stable (Amiti, Dai, Feenstra and Romalis, 2017).
Changes in tariffs have meant increased competition from imports in China’s
domestic market and improved access to imported intermediate inputs. A now
substantial literature documents the positive impact of lower barriers on
imported inputs on the productivity of manufacturing plants, including work
by Amiti and Konings (2007) on Indonesia; Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)
and Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova (2010) on India; and Yu
(2015) and Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang and Zhang (2017) on China
itself. Thus, one indirect way in which the WTO accession may have enhanced
China’s export performance was by raising productivity through lower-cost
access to foreign inputs and capital goods and the advanced technology that
they embody.
The WTO accession also inspired other reforms. One was privatization (Ber-
kowitz, Ma and Nishioka, 2017). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, China
idled many state-owned manufacturing enterprises, helping the country move
towards compliance with WTO provisions that restrict state subsidies to domestic
industries. Capital and labor were consequently reallocated from smaller, less
productive state-owned companies to privately owned manufacturing plants,
helping raise productivity and output in the sector (Hsieh and Song, 2015).
Joining the WTO also obligated China to phase out requirements that had man-
dated most private establishments to export through state-run intermediaries.
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Such restrictions constitute barriers to exporting, which the WTO expressly
forbids. Bai, Krishna and Ma (2017) estimate that had private firms not been
granted direct foreign trading rights, China’s manufacturing exports in the
2000s would have been one third smaller than they were. A further consequence
of China’s WTO entry regards the insecurity of its access to the U.S. market on a
most-favored nation (MFN) basis. Prior to 2001, China’s MFN status in the
United States was subject to annual reauthorization by Congress. Although Con-
gress never failed to reauthorize China’s MFN status, the annual ritual possibly
created risk in the minds of investors regarding the stability of China’s economic
relations with the United States. Pierce and Schott (2016) and Handley and Limao
(2017) argue that the lurking prospect of a return to non-MFN tariffs, which aver-
aged 37.0 per cent in 1999 and compared to average MFN tariffs of only 3.4
per cent in that year, dissuaded Chinese firms from investing in operations ded-
icated expressly to exporting to the United States. WTO accession removed this
uncertainty, potentially encouraging increased trade between China and the
United States through this channel.
Finally, China’s entry into the WTO allowed the country to benefit from
reduced quotas on its exports of apparel and textile products, which WTO
members had long retained alongside tariff reductions in other manufacturing
industries under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (Khandelwal, Schott and Wei,
2013). The MFA quotas, after a staged phase out beginning in 1995, were
fully eliminated in 2005. China would have begun to enjoy the impacts of
relaxed MFA quotas in 2001, by which point two MFA quota reductions had
occurred, in 1995 and 1998, and a third, in 2002, was about to occur. As MFA
quotas in China prior to 2001 appeared to be allocated disproportionately to
state-owned enterprises, their termination may have especially benefited foreign
and domestic private enterprises in apparel and textile sectors.
Motivated by this context, we utilize four measures of the determinants of
regional export growth in China: (i) the reduction in tariffs on output and on
imported intermediate inputs, (ii) the reduction in uncertainty regarding China’s
access to the U.S. market, (iii) the elimination of MFA quotas, and (iv) underlying
comparative advantage. Given the importance of multinational enterprises for
China’s exports, in a second stage of our analysis we evaluate export growth
by firm ownership, in which we separate foreign-owned firms from domestically
owned private firms and state-owned enterprises. The ownership distinction
allows us to examine the differential performance of state-owned firms in reach-
ing foreign markets, after the loss of their privileged control over foreign trading
rights, MFA quotas, explicit government subsidies, and other benefits.
3. Patterns of export production in China
In this section, we summarize the data we use in our analysis and describe pat-
terns of export production in China by regime, firm ownership type, sector,
and region.
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3.1. Data sources
Trade data are from China’s Customs Bureau, which gives details on export activ-
ity by HS 8-digit product (of which there are roughly 7,000), customs-district
(which are roughly at the prefectural level and of which there were 742 in
2010), trade regime (discussed below and of which there were 15 in 2010),
and ownership type of firm (discussed below and of which there were 7 in
2010). The separation of exports by trade regime and ownership type, as well
as by detailed product code and regional identifier, provides an enormous
amount of detail on trade in China. We elect to use these data, rather than com-
monly used firm-level data on trade in China, as the matching of firms to the
customs data results in a substantial loss in total trade activity. We have data
for the years 1997, 2000 and 2010 and we focus the analysis on the key 2000
to 2010 period. The year 1997 is the first for which prefectural level trade data
are available, and, as mentioned, 2000 to 2010 spans the most intense phase of
China’s post-trade liberalization export growth.
To analyze regional export growth, we need to define geographic markets in
China. Administrative units in the county are defined at four levels: provinces,
prefectures, counties, and townships. We select the prefecture to be the target
of our analysis, which leads us to aggregate more than 700 customs districts
into 337 quasi-prefectural-level entities, which are roughly the equivalent of
large metropolitan zones. We refer to these entities as cities. There are three jus-
tifications for this choice. First, people in China usually live and work within
the same prefecture. (An exception to this regularity is the four large
municipalities – Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin – which are provinces
in themselves but are generally regarded as unified local labor markets.) The pre-
fecture thus approximates a local labor market, which would be of interest in
many applications of our results. Combining customs districts within a prefecture
into a single entity implicitly allows shocks to one zone of a city (e.g., special
economic zones in Xiamen) to affect exports in other zones of a city (e.g., loca-
tions outside SEZs in Xiamen). Second, many government policies – e.g., those
related to migration restrictions, social policy, land-use policy, or infrastructure
investments – are implemented at the provincial or prefecture level. Third,
most data released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics data are at the provin-
cial or prefecture level, whereas county, township, or customs area level data are
limited in availability. Analysis of local labor markets in the country would thus
likely occur at the prefectural level.
3.2. Export regimes and ownership types
We next describe export patterns by trading regime and firm ownership type. By
far and away the two dominant regimes are ordinary exports – which are exports
by firms that enjoy no special benefits regarding imported inputs – and processing
exports – which encompass exports under in-bond arrangements in which firms
post a bond equal to the value of duties on imported inputs and have the bond
Table 6.1 Export share by trading regime
Year Export share




Note: Processing trade is defined as processing with imported materials and processing and
assembling. Ordinary trade includes all other trade regimes, such as ordinary trade, warehousing
trade, entrepot trade by bonded area and border trade.
returned once they export their output, giving them tariff-free access to foreign
intermediate goods under the constraint that all output is shipped abroad.
It is common for a country in the early stages of export-led growth to have pro-
cessing exports dominate its shipments to foreign markets. This was the case in
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan (Naughton, 1996), where firms entered
export-oriented production by serving as assembly shops for foreign contractors.
China has followed a similar pattern. Under export processing, a foreign firm typ-
ically provides the specifications for a product, orders or selects the inputs to be
used in production, and handles distribution, while the firm in China simply pro-
vides the labor and other factors used to assemble or otherwise process the inputs
into a final good (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005). Often, but not always, the foreign
contractor owns the Chinese export-processing plant outright. In China’s case,
Hong Kong and Taiwan are the two primary economies involved in establishing
and (or) contracting with export processing plants.
Table 6.1 shows that processing exports as a share of total exports stood at 55
per cent in both 1997 and 2000, and then declined over the 2000s, dropping to 47
per cent by 2010. Brandt and Morrow (2017) argue that the reduction in barriers
on imported inputs induced many firms to reorient themselves from being export
processors to becoming ordinary exporters, so as to relax the constraint of having
to export the entirety of their output. The WTO accession thus may have encour-
aged China’s move toward more vertically integrated production within manufac-
turing and in production by plants that ship to foreign markets in particular.
Given the importance of multinational enterprises in export processing, it is no
surprise that foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) account for the majority of
exports under this regime. Table 6.2 shows that, in 1997, foreign-owned firms
represented 64 per cent (0.350/(0.350+0.196) of China’s processing exports,
compared to their accounting for just 13 per cent (0.061/(0.061+0.392)) of the
country’s ordinary exports. The foreign-firm share of processing exports rises
over time, to 71 per cent in 2000 and to 84 per cent in 2010. The foreign-firm
share of ordinary exports also rises over time, reaching 29 per cent by 2010.
In the 1990s, the foreign-owned firms that obtained permission to operate in
China were freed from having to export their output through state-owned interme-
diaries. Privately owned domestic enterprises (POEs) could not avoid this
requirement. Table 6.2 shows that in 1997 all processing and ordinary exports
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Table 6.2 Export share by firm ownership and trading regime
Year Export share
Firm type Processing trade Ordinary trade Total
1997 SOE 0.196 0.392 0.588
1997 POE 0.000 0.000 0.000
1997 FOE 0.350 0.061 0.411
2000 SOE 0.162 0.349 0.511
2000 POE 0.001 0.009 0.010
2000 FOE 0.391 0.089 0.480
2010 SOE 0.047 0.133 0.180
2010 POE 0.029 0.244 0.273
2010 FOE 0.394 0.153 0.547
Note: See Table 6.1 for definitions of processing trade and ordinary trade. SOEs (state-owned
enterprises) include collective enterprises and state-owned enterprises. POE is short for private-
owned firms. FOEs (foreign firms) include Sino-foreign contractual joint ventures, Sino-foreign
equity joint ventures and foreign-owned enterprises.
by non-foreign firms were by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which reflects the
mandate still in effect at this time. As the government relaxed and then eliminated
the control of foreign trading rights by state-owned firms, private domestic firms
began to play a larger role in exports. The domestic private enterprise (POE)
share of ordinary exports reached 46 per cent in 2010 (from 0 per cent in
1997) and of processing exports reached 6 per cent in 2010 (also from
0 per cent in 1997). By 2010, foreign-owned enterprises accounted for
55 per cent of China’s overall exports, followed by private domestic firms at
27 per cent of overall exports and state-owned firms at 18 per cent of the total.
The relative decline of the state-owned sector in exporting is even more rapid
than its decline in industrial production, which falls from one half in 1998 to
just over one quarter in 2010 (Hsieh and Song, 2015).
3.3. Measuring export growth and shocks to export growth
In specifying regional export growth, we need to account for the fact that some
prefectures begin the sample period with relatively low levels of exports. These
low export levels reflect the weak direct integration of many Chinese regions into
the global economy, prior to China’s accession to the World Trade Organization
in 2001. Simply using the change in log exports to measure the expansion of
exports would possibly create a distorted sense of growth in these locations.
The obvious solution is to scale export growth by the size of the local
economy. Because exports are a gross sales value, the value of gross output by
prefecture would be a suitable scaling variable. In China, however, local- and
industry-level output data are likely to be of low quality over our sample
period. Because city boundaries changed dramatically in the 2000s, we would
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where Xit is exports by city i in final year t (2010 in our analysis) and Pit−1 is the
residence-based population in city i in the initial period, t − 1 (2000 in our anal-
ysis). Table 6.3 presents summary statistics. The average growth in exports per
capita across Chinese regions is 1.036 (measured in units of 1,000 U.S.
dollars, and thus corresponding to $1,036 per person), with an interquartile
range of 0.034 to 0.463, implying substantial skewness in this measure. We
address skewness by presenting results with and without four outlier cities that
have exceptionally high levels of exposure to export growth, Dongguan,
Shenzen, Suzhou, and Zhuhai. The first two are cities in Guangdong Province,
which lie immediately to the north of Hong Kong; the third is a city that
borders Shanghai; and the fourth is a city that borders Macao. Hence, the outliers
in terms of export growth are cities that have access to major international ports
and that were among the earliest locations in which special economic zones were
established (Yu and Tian, 2012).
Table 6.3 Summary statistics
Variable mean sd min p25 p75 max N
Export Growth per Capita 1.036 2.855 −0.043 0.034 0.463 23.097 337
Predicted Export Growth (PEG) 0.999 3.727 0.000 0.018 0.432 41.282 337
4log(Output Tariff+1) −0.066 0.027 −0.186 −0.083 −0.053 0.094 337
4log(Input Tariff+1) −0.032 0.016 −0.072 −0.044 −0.022 0.005 337
NTR Gap 0.321 0.131 0.000 0.275 0.393 0.596 337
Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU) 0.481 0.177 0.000 0.460 0.583 0.734 337
MFA Share 0.018 0.017 0.000 0.005 0.027 0.116 337
Export Share of Textile/Apparel 0.245 0.204 0.000 0.090 0.369 1.000 337
in 2000
Export Share of Electronics/ 0.151 0.164 0.000 0.019 0.237 0.847 337
Machinery in 2000
Note: Export growth per capita and predicted export growth are both measured in thousand U.S.
dollars. The statistics are weighted by residence-based population in 2000.
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need to aggregate county-level data to construct city-level data. County-level data
are likely subject to particularly severe measurement error, and have a large
number of missing values which are unlikely to be random. Absent reliable
local output data, we instead scale export growth by prefectural population at
the beginning of the sample period. China’s population census provides complete
county-level data for the population based on the place of residence (rather than
based on the location of one’s official registration, or hukou status) in 1990, 2000,
and 2010. Our resulting measure of regional export growth Δxit is:
" # !X X i
Db ijt-1
X -ijt - Xjt--1 Xi0
it ¼ ; 2X X
j it-1 jt-1 P
ð Þ-i
i0
where Xijt−1/Xit−1 is the share of industry j in city i’s exports in the initial period,
which captures regional comparative advantage in the industry, and X -ijt is
national exports in industry j and year t excluding the province in which city i
is located.
The logic behind the expression in equation (2) as a determinant of export
growth is that the initial pattern of export specialization in a city exposes the
city to national-level shocks more in some industries than in others. There is a
clear theoretical logic behind using initial city industry export shares to character-
ize the exposure of a city to national export growth opportunities. Taking a trade
model with a gravity structure, one can easily show that regional or national
exposure to global industry shocks (due, e.g., to trade reform or technological
change at home or abroad) is summarized by the initial pattern of regional or
national specialization by industry (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013 and 2016).
Indeed, in the exact hat algebra of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008) for
general-equilibrium trade models, these initial industry shares of activity in an
economy fully summarize initial patterns of comparative advantage. As men-
tioned in Section 1, our approach to measuring regional exposure to export
growth opportunities does not require us to take a stand as to whether specializa-
tion patterns reflect comparative advantage, agglomeration economies, or their
interaction. All that is required is that initial patterns of regional specialization
are useful for predicting regional export growth, which we show empirically to
be the case.
To avoid introducing a common source of measurement error on both sides of
the regression equation, we measure the scaling variable in (2), Xi0/Pi0, using
values from a pre-sample year (1997 in our analysis, which is the first year for
which we have regional trade data). We define the population level for the pre-
sample period in a region as the geometric mean of population levels in 1990
and 2000, given that population measures are only available in census years
(e.g., 1990, 2000, 2010). In (2), we define industries at the HS 2-digit product
level, in order to limit the distorting effects of zero values on measuring initial
regional comparative advantage. Whereas in 2000 zero values populate
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3.3.1. Bartik predicted export growth
Our first shock to export growth is a Bartik (1991) type measure, a variant of
shift-share growth decomposition which is commonly applied in labor economics
(e.g., Diamond, 2016) to capture how national-level shocks are transmitted to
local economies. We project national export growth onto Chinese regions by mul-
tiplying industry export growth in outside regions (i.e., excluding a given city i)
by the initial share of an industry in city i’s exports and then summing across
industries in the city. The resulting Bartik measure is:
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89 per cent of city-HS-6-digit-product combinations and 81 per cent of city-HS-
4-digit-product combinations, zero export values account for just 54 per cent of
the city-HS-2-digit-product combinations.
To give an initial view of the data, Figures 6.1a and 6.1b plot the Bartik var-
iable in equation (2) against export growth per capita in equation (1). In Fig-
ure 6.1a, we see both a strong positive correlation between the two variables
(correlation coefficient of 0.61) and the presence of the four outlier cities in
terms of export growth; in Figure 6.1b, we see that the correlation between
Bartik-predicted and observed export growth remains strongly positive (correla-
tion coefficient of 0.86) when the four outlier cities are dropped from the sample.
We will report regression results with and without controls for the four outlier
cities in the analysis.
3.3.2. Industry tariffs
We include in the analysis measures of regional exposure to changes in output
tariffs and to changes in input tariffs. To utilize the tariff data, we need to
account for the fact that tariff measures for a given year are defined in terms
of the HS product codes which apply to that year. The tariff data for 2000 are
based on the 1996 HS codes, whereas the tariff data for 2010 are based on
2007 HS codes. To create a common basis for measurement, we first take the
simple average of tariffs across HS 8-digit products within an HS 6-digit
product in each year and then use the WITS crosswalk to convert the 2000
tariffs to the 1996 HS codes. Using as weights the share of each HS 6-digit
product within China’s HS 2-digit exports in 2000, we calculate the average
HS 2-digit tariffs in 2000 and 2010, respectively. With these tariffs in hand,
we then calculate the average change in output tariffs that apply to city i as:X X [ ]( )
τO 1
( )
D ijt-it ¼ ln 1X þ τ jt - ln 1þ τ jt-1 ; ð3Þ
j it-1
where Xijt−1/Xit−1 is the share of HS 2-digit product j in city i’s exports in the
initial period and τjt is the tariff that applies to HS 2-digit product j in year t.
To calculate changes in tariffs that apply to intermediate inputs, we use the
2002 Input/Output Table for China, which is defined for I/O 5-digit sectors (of
which there are 122) at the national level.1 The construction of the input tariff
proceeds in three steps. First, we convert HS 6-digit-product tariffs to 5-digit
I/O sectors. Second, we calculate the change in input tariffs for I/O sector j in
city i as: X [ ]( ) ( )




where γjj is the share of inputs from sector j
0
0 I/O in total input purchases by I/O
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Figure 6.2a Changes in output tariffs, 2000–2010, relative to initial levels
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combining industry changes in input tariffs Dτ Iijt with initial city importing pat-
terns. The resulting value is,
X M




where Mijt−1/Mit−1 is the share of I/O industry j in total imports by city i in the
initial period. Because we cannot separate a city’s imports in an industry into
those used for intermediate inputs versus those used in final consumption, we
impose the assumption that input and consumption shares for imports are the
same within each industry and within each city.
In Figures 6.2a and 6.2b, we plot regional exposure to changes in output and
input tariffs in equations (3) and (5) against regional weighted average initial
tariffs. The strong, linear, and negative relationships between initial tariffs and
tariff changes indicate that the magnitude of tariff reductions were driven
largely by the level of China’s pre-WTO tariff protection. As part of China’s
WTO accession, the country reduced both the mean and variance of tariffs,
such that initially more-protected industries saw larger increases in foreign com-
petition and in access to foreign inputs. After 2001, the regions in which these
industries were concentrated thus also saw larger increases in import competition
and imported-input access. This pattern of tariff change derives largely from the
fact that the WTO mandates maximum levels for tariffs at the industry level.
Initially high-tariff industries were thus mechanically subject to larger reductions
in tariffs, as China brought its trade barriers in line with WTO guidelines.
In Figures 6.3a and 6.3b, we plot regional export growth against regional expo-
sure to changes in input tariffs, first including all observations (in Figure 6.3a)
and then dropping the four outliers cities. There is an apparent negative correla-
tion between regional export growth and exposure to input tariff changes, indicat-
ing that cities enjoying fast increases in exports per capita were those specialized
in industries that saw larger reductions in tariffs on imported inputs. The slope of
the regression line falls sharply in absolute value when outlier cities for export
growth are dropped.
3.3.3. NTR gap (Pierce and Schott tariff uncertainty measure)
Pierce and Schott (2016) measure uncertainty in trade policy confronting China
before its accession to the WTO using the difference in U.S. non-MFN and
MFN tariffs, which they refer to as the normal trade relations (NTR) tariff gap.
This gap represents the increase in tariffs that would have occurred had U.S. Con-
gress not reauthorized China’s MFN status in the U.S. market. While China was
granted MFN status in the United States in 1980, Congress instituted a require-
ment for annual reauthorization after the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Once China became a WTO member in 2001, it was no longer subject to this
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Figure 6.2b Changes in input tariffs, 2000–2010, relative to initial levels
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Figure 6.3a Changes in input tariffs and export growth per capita (2000–2010)
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since the 1930s. We take the simple average of HS 8-digit NTR and non-NTR
tariffs within HS 6-digit products for the year 1999. We then calculate the
average NTR gap among the HS-6-digit products that are contained in a HS 2-
digit code, using as weights the share of an HS 6-digit product in China’s HS
2-digit exports to the United States. Finally, we calculate the regional NTR gap
by combining NTR gaps at the HS 2-digit level with the initial composition of
a region’s exports across HS 2-digit products, yielding the following measure:" #X X X ( )
NTR ijt-1 g τnon-NTR NTRi ¼ k;1999 - τX jkt k;1999 ; ð6Þ-1
j it-1 k2j
where Xijt−1/Xit−1 is the share of HS 2-digit product j in city i’s exports in the
initial period, γjk is the share of HS 6-digit product k in China’s exports of HS
2-digit product j to the United States in the initial period, and τnon-NTRk;1999 (τ
NTR
k;1999)
is the U.S. non-NTR (NTR) tariff for HS 6-digit product k in 1999. The
average NTR gap has a mean value of 32 per cent (standard deviation of 13
per cent) across Chinese regions (see Table 6.3).
3.3.4. MFA quotas
To capture the exposure of regions to the removal of MFA quotas, we calculate
the export share of products subject to MFA quotas within each HS 2-digit
product in the year 2000, where we account for the fact that some HS 8-digit
products may be subject to a quota in one market (e.g., the United States) but
not in other markets (e.g., Canada). The resulting measure of exposure to the
elimination of MFA quotas for city i is, in 2000:X X
MFA ijt-1i ¼ MFAj2000; 7X ð Þ
j it-1
where MFAj2000 is the share of exports in HS 2-digit product j subject to MFA
quotas in the year 2000. The average value for this share is 2 per cent, with a
maximum value of 12 per cent (Table 6.3).
4. Empirical results
The specification for regional export growth that we estimate is the following:
Dxit ¼ a þ b O Is 1Dbit þ b2Dτ it þ b3Dτ it þ b4NTRi þ b5MFAi þ eit; ð8Þ
where Δxit is growth in exports per capita for city i from (1), αs is a dummy var-
iable for the province in which city i is located, Δbit is the Bartik predictor of
regional export growth in (1), DτOit is the exposure of city i to changes in
output tariffs in (3), Dτ Iit is the exposure of city i to changes in input tariffs in
(5), NTRi is the average NTR gap confronting city i as of 1999 in (6), MFAi is
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the average share of exports by city i subject to MFA quotas as of 2000 in (7), and
e is an error term. DτOit (Dτ
I
it it) is replaced as zero for cities with no export (import)
in 2000. Accordingly, a dummy variable for the 18 cities with no import or export
in 2000 is included. The time period for the analysis is 2000 to 2010, meaning
that we estimate a single long difference for 337 cities, which are approximately
at the prefectural level. The province-managing counties (accounting for
1 per cent of China’s population in 2000) which the provincial government
could by-pass the prefecture government to control directly are merged into pre-
fectures which used to govern the counties. Standard errors are clustered at the
province level (of which there are 31 and which include 5 autonomous regions
and 4 municipalities).
4.1. Results for the Bartik predictor and industry tariffs
Table 6.4 presents our main estimation results. Panel (A) shows baseline regres-
sions that do not include any covariates other than an indicator variable for the
small number of cities that lack foreign trade in the base year. The column (1)
estimate indicates that the shift-share instrument is a strong and precise predictor
of local export growth (t-statistic of 7.3). The large R-squared value of 0.63 indi-
cates that patterns of local export growth largely reflect national industry trends in
exporting, rather than city-specific shocks.
In column (2), we replace the shift-share variable with regional exposure to the
change in output tariffs. The negative coefficient indicates that regions whose
industries have been subject to larger reductions in output tariffs had more
rapid export growth, a finding that we will see is not robust. A negative coeffi-
cient also appears on regional exposure to changes in input tariffs, in column
(3). When we include both input and output tariff exposure together in the regres-
sion, in column (4), a similar result obtains. Exposure to output-tariff changes
enters negatively, indicating that cities exposed to larger increases in foreign com-
petition have greater export growth. Exposure to input-tariff changes also enters
negatively, indicating that cities enjoying greater improvements in access to
imported inputs experience faster export growth. The coefficients are precisely
estimated and quantitatively sizable.
The finding on input tariffs is consistent with substantial evidence that reduc-
tions in barriers to foreign inputs raise industry productivity and output (Yu,
2015; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, Wang and Zhang, 2017). Comparing cities at
the 25th and 75th percentiles of exposure to output-tariff reductions, the latter
has greater export growth by 483 U.S. dollars per person ((.08 – .05) × 16.1
units of 1,000 dollars per capita), or 0.2 standard deviations; comparing cities
at the 25th and 75th percentiles of exposure to input-tariff reductions, the latter
has export growth that is greater by 904 dollars per person ((.04 – .02) ×
45.2 × 1000), or 0.3 standard deviations. These impacts fall substantially,
however, when further controls are added to the regression.
Table 6.4 Impact of predicted export growth and changes in tariffs
Dependent variable: 4 export/residence-based population (in 1,000 US$)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Baseline
Predicted Export Growth 0.606*** 0.595*** 0.587*** 0.582***
(0.083) (0.078) (0.075) (0.073)
4log(Output Tariff+1) −24.342** −16.135** −10.090** −6.920*
(9.289) (6.420) (4.900) (3.832)
4log(Input Tariff+1) −53.242*** −45.216*** −22.346** **−19.143
(17.586) (14.874) (8.517) (7.302)
R-squared 0.628 0.048 0.081 0.099 0.635 0.641 0.644
Panel B: Controlling for Province Dummies
Predicted Export Growth 0.600*** 0.599*** 0.597*** 0.597***
(0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
4log(Output Tariff+1) −6.219 −3.911 −3.519 −3.021
(3.827) (3.349) (2.809) (2.679)
4log(Input Tariff+1) −25.929* −24.746* −6.380** −5.473*
(13.198) (13.104) (3.080) (2.708)
R-squared 0.764 0.347 0.356 0.357 0.765 0.765 0.765
Panel C: Controlling for Province Dummies and Dummies for Four Outlier Cities
Predicted Export Growth 0.726*** 0.725*** 0.720*** 0.719***
(0.100) (0.099) (0.101) (0.100)
4log(Output Tariff+1) −3.331* −1.994 −1.455 −1.258
(1.741) (1.441) (1.057) (1.022)
4log(Input Tariff+1) −15.099** −14.500** −2.646 −2.279
(5.695) (5.600) (2.368) (2.343)
R-squared 0.955 0.888 0.892 0.892 0.955 0.955 0.956
Panel D: Controlling for Each City’s Initial Export Share of Textile/Apparel and Electronics/Machinery Sectors
Predicted Export Growth 0.548*** 0.548*** 0.547*** 0.547***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
4log(Output Tariff+1) −4.816 −4.554 −0.459 −0.340
(3.177) (3.247) (2.688) (2.702)
4log(Input Tariff+1) −14.231* −14.029* −6.912 −6.898
(7.594) (7.587) (4.327) (4.288)
R-squared 0.663 0.233 0.236 0.237 0.663 0.664 0.664
Panel E: Controlling for Province Dummies, Outlier Cities and Export Shares of Two Sectors
Predicted Export Growth 0.701*** 0.701*** 0.700*** 0.700***
(0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101)
4log(Output Tariff+1) 0.138 0.124 −1.013 −1.013
(1.652) (1.737) (1.284) (1.295)
4log(Input Tariff+1) −7.409 −7.408 −0.914 −0.914
(5.175) (5.186) (3.272) (3.291)
R-squared 0.956 0.899 0.900 0.900 0.956 0.956 0.956
Note: N = 337. Panel C and E include dummy variables for the four outlier cities, namely Dongguan, Shenzhen, Suzhou, and Zhuhai. A dummy variable for cities with no
export or import in 2000 is included in all regressions. Textile/apparel and electronics/machinery include 2-digit I/O industries 17 to 19 and 35 to 41, respectively. All
observations are weighted by city-level residence-based population in 2000. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on province.
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
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In columns (5) to (7) of Table 6.4 (panel A), we add the Bartik predictor of city
export growth to the specifications with tariff variables. The result is a substantial
increase in the explanatory power of the regression, with the adjusted R-squared
rising from 0.10 in column (4) – with just output and input tariffs as regressors –
to 0.64 in column (7) – with the Bartik measure added to the specification. Using
the column (7) results, moving a city from the 25th to the 75th percentile of expo-
sure to national-industry export growth leads to higher export growth of 238
dollars per person ((.43 – .02) × 0.58 × 1000), or 0.08 standard deviations.
Further, the inclusion of the Bartik predictor leads to a substantial reduction in
the estimated impacts of output-tariff or input-tariff changes on regional export
growth. Adding the Bartik variable causes the coefficients on both tariff variables
to fall by nearly three fifths (when comparing column 7 to column 4), though both
variables remain at least marginally statistically significant.
Panel (B) of Table 6.4 repeats the regressions in panel (A), now with province
dummies added to the specification. Comparing column (1) in panels (A) and (B),
we find no impact of these geographic controls on the coefficient estimate for pre-
dicted export growth, while the precision of the estimate improves. Columns
(2)–(4) in panels (A) and (B) however show that the inclusion of province
dummies leads the absolute magnitude of the coefficients on output-tariff
changes to fall by about three-quarters and input-tariff changes to fall by half.
The sensitivity of exposure to tariff changes to the inclusion of provincial
dummies suggests that these measures could be correlated with unobserved
regional shocks – e.g., regarding the establishment of SEZs, openness to internal
migration, or the phaseout of state-owned enterprises. When we further add the
Bartik predictor of regional export growth, the tariff coefficients fall further. In
column (7), the panel (B) coefficient on output tariffs is only two-fifths as
large and the coefficient on input tariffs is only one-quarter as large, when com-
pared to the coefficients in panel (A); with province dummies included, the first
variable is insignificant while the second is marginally significant. By contrast,
the coefficient on the Bartik predictor remains strongly positive and precisely esti-
mated, increasing slightly in absolute value when provincial controls are added to
the regression. The stability of the coefficient on Bartik-predicted exports to the
inclusion of provincial dummy variables indicates that this variable captures
robust explanatory factors behind regional export growth, including the exposure
of regions to comparative-advantage or industry-agglomeration driven export
expansions associated with China’s phase of post-reform transitional growth.
In panel (C) of Table 6.4 we further add dummies for the four outlier cities seen
in Figure 6.1a. The absolute coefficient magnitudes on output tariffs and input
tariffs decline further, while for the Bartik variable they increase modestly. Con-
sidering the results in column (7), output and input tariff coefficients fail to
achieve statistical significance. Comparing cities at the 25th versus 75th percen-
tiles of exposure to output-tariff reductions, the latter would have export growth
that is 0.01 standard deviations higher, while comparing cities at the 25th versus
75th percentiles of exposure to input-tarriff reductions, the latter would also have
export growth that is 0.02 standard deviations higher. The Bartik variable
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continues to be strongly positive and precisely estimated. Comparing cities at the
25th versus 75th percentiles of exposure to national-industry export growth, the
latter would have export growth that is 0.10 standard deviations higher.
The shift-share variable and the tariff variables are all functions of a city’s
export composition across industries in the base year 2000. It is therefore possible
that any of these variables could be correlated with unobserved sectoral shock
such as different technology trends. Panel (D) of Table 6.4 augments the baseline
model of panel (A) with two control variables for the share of textile and apparel,
and the share of electronics and machinery in a city’s exports in 2000. In 1997,
both of these sectors accounted for over a quarter of all Chinese exports
(29 per cent textile and apparel, 27 per cent electronics and machinery). By
2010, the fraction of textile and apparel had declined to 15 per cent, while
exports of electronics and machinery had expanded to 50 per cent of all
exports. The results in column (1) of panel (D) indicate that the inclusion of
these controls modestly reduces the coefficient estimate for predicted export
growth compared to the baseline model in panel (A) while precision improves.
All coefficient estimates for the tariff variables in the subsequent columns of
panel (D) are much smaller than the initial estimates in panel (A), and none
reaches a high level of signficance.
The final panel (E) of Table (4) includes both the geographic controls from
panel (C) and the two controls for sectorial composition from panel (D). The esti-
mate for the Bartik variable retains a similar magnitude as in the previous spec-
ifications, and it remains highly significant. By contrast, estimates for the tariff
variables are modest in magnitude and never significantly different from zero,
irrespective of the exclusion or inclusion of the Bartik variable in the regression
model (columns 2–4 vs columns 5–7).
There are three primary lessons from these results. First is that for explaining
regional export growth in China, the variation in regional exposure to output- and
input-tariff changes that is independent from regional exposure to national-
industry export growth is modest. The Bartik predictor functionally operates as
an omnibus measure of the sources of export growth in China, implicitly captur-
ing a substantial portion of the trade-policy shocks associated with explicit
output- and input-tariff changes. Second, and related, is that because the magni-
tude of tariff reductions in China was largely determined by the level of initial
tariffs (Figures 6.2a, 6.2b), it appears to be the strong comparative-advantage
industries – i.e., industries that following the phaseout of Maoist-era distortions
were most primed for export growth – that were initially the most protected.
Thus, when we add the Bartik predictor to the regression, the impact of
output- and input-tariff changes is diminished, while the explanatory power of
the regressions improves sharply. The increase in explanatory power suggests
that there are non-tariff policy distortions that kept China’s comparative-advan-
tage industries artificially small in the pre-reform period, such that their
removal helped unleash a surge in growth in the regions in which these industries
were concentrated. Evidently, regional exposure to the removal of these other dis-
tortions is far from fully encapsulated by regional exposure to industry tariff
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changes. Third, the Bartik predictor yields stable results across regression models
that do or do not control for province dummies, outlier cities and initial sectorial
composition. This pattern indicates that the shift-share variable is able to predict
variation in export growth across cities within the same province, and across
cities that had a similar pattern of specialization across broad industrial sectors.
The variation in export growth that is related to the tariff variables instead gets
largely absorbed by a parsimonious set of geography and sector controls,
which implies that it is difficult to separate the impact of tariffs from other
shocks that operate at the level of provinces or broad sectors.
4.2. Results on the NTR gap and MFA quotas
In Table 6.5, we expand the analysis to include the NTR gap, which is the Pierce
and Schott (2016) measure of pre-WTO tariff uncertainty confronting China in
the U.S. market. Accordingly, we use regional growth in exports to the United
States instead of regional export growth to construct the dependent variable in
equation (1) for Table 6.5. The Bartik predicted export growth is constructed
in a similar way by using predicted export growth to the United States. The
NTR gap enters positively and is precisely estimated in column (1) of panel
(A), a specification with no other controls in the regression. This finding indicates
that regions more specialized in industries subject to greater uncertainty over U.S.
trade policy in the 1990s enjoyed faster export growth in the 2000s, once China
had joined the WTO. However, the coefficient on the NTR gap falls substantially
and loses significance in column (3), with the Bartik predictor and output and
input tariffs added to the specification.
For completeness, we also examine results using an alternative measure of
trade policy uncertainty. Columns (4) to (6) of panel (A) of Table 6.5 use the
Handley and Limao (2017) measure of pre-WTO U.S. trade policy uncertainty
for China. We see a similar pattern for coefficient estimates on this variable as
for the NTR gap, with a large, positive and precisely estimated effect with no
other controls in the regression (column 4), which falls to near zero when addi-
tional controls are included (column 6). With either measure of trade-policy
uncertainty included in the regression, coefficient estimates on tariff variables
have similar values and patterns of statistical significance as in Table 6.4.
We obtain considerably smaller coefficient estimates on the NTR gap and the
Handley and Limao (2017) trade-policy uncertainty measure in panel (B) of Table
6.5, which reports specifications that incorporate dummy variables for provinces
and four outlier cities. It is now the case that both trade-policy uncertainty mea-
sures are highly insignificant in all specifications, no matter whether or not the
Bartik and tariff variables appear in the regression. In columns (3) and (6), the
NTR gap and the Handley-Limao measure have t-statistics of 0.38 and 0.30,
respectively. It thus appears that regional exposure to uncertainty over U.S.
trade policy can only predict spatial variation in export growth to the United
States across Chinese provinces, but not across cities within provinces.
Table 6.5 Impact of predicted export growth and trade policy uncertainty
Dependent variable: 4 export to the U.S./residence-based population (in 1,000 US$)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NTR Gap
Trade Policy Uncertainty
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C: Controlling for Each City’s Initial Export Share of Textile/Apparel and Electronics/Machinery Sectors
NTR Gap 0.204 0.141 0.105
(0.151) (0.120) (0.113)
Trade Policy Uncertainty 0.181 0.137 0.101
(0.124) (0.098) (0.094)
Predicted Export Growth (U.S.) 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.174***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
4log(Output Tariff+1) 0.062 0.050
(0.452) (0.455)
4log(Input Tariff+1) −2.317* −2.233*
(1.230) (1.242)
R-squared 0.186 0.268 0.271 0.187 0.268 0.271
Note: N = 337. The NTR gap is the difference between non-NTR tariffs (column 2 tariffs) and NTR tariffs (column 1 tariffs) in 1999. Trade policy uncertainty (TPU) is a
non-linear measure of the difference between non-NTR tariffs and NTR tariffs based on Handley and Limao (2017). Panel B includes the dummy variables for the four
outlier cities, namely Dongguan, Shenzhen, Suzhou, and Zhuhai. A dummy variable for cities with no export or import in 2000 is included in all regressions. Textile/
apparel and electronics/machinery include 2-digit I/O industries 17 to 19 and 35 to 41, respectively. All observations are weighted by city-level residence-based
population in 2000. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on province.
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
Table 6.6 Impact of predicted export growth and MFA quota share
Dependent variable: 4 export/residence-based population (in 1,000 US$)































































Note: N = 337. The four outlier cities are Dongguan, Shenzhen, Suzhou, and Zhuhai. A dummy
variable for cities with no export or import in 2000 is included in all regressions. Models in Column
(3)–(6) control for the initial export shares of the textile/apparel and electronics/machinery sectors
which include 2-digit I/O industries 17 to 19 and 35 to 41, respectively. All observations are
weighted by city-level residence-based population in 2000. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered on province.
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
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The regression models in panel (C) of Table 6.5 omit the province and outlier
city dummies, but control for initial export shares of the textile/apparel and elec-
tronics/machinery sectors. These controls for broad sectorial composition of
export activity reduce the panel (A) estimates for NTR gap and trade policy
uncertainty by more than half in most models, suggest that tariff uncertainly
varies primarily across rather than within broad sectors. Taken together, the
panel (B) and (C) results imply that it is difficult to separate effects of tariff uncer-
tainty from province-level and sector-level shocks.
Table 6.6 expands the analysis to include regional exposure to the elimination
of MFA quotas. We report results with and without provincial dummy variables,
control for the four outlier cities (which accounted for a large fraction of China’s
apparel and tariff production in its pre-WTO era), and control for the initial export
shares of the textile/apparel and electronics/machinery sectors. In no specification
is the coefficient on MFA quotas precisely estimated. There is little change in the
results when the Bartik predictor, tariff variables and the NTR gap are added to
the specification (columns 4–6). We conclude that there is little evidence regional
exposure to the elimination of MFA quotas affected regional export growth in
China during the 2000s.
Table 6.7 Predicted export growth and export growth per capita by trading regime
Dependent variable: 4 export/residence-based population by trading regime (in
1,000 US$)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total
export
Export growth per capita


















































Note: N = 337. Province dummies, dummies for outlier cities, namely Dongguan, Shenzhen, Suzhou,
and Zhuhai, and a dummy variable for cities with no export or import in 2000 are controlled. Please
refer to Table 6.1 for definitions of the trading regimes. All observations are weighted by city-level
residence-based population in 2000. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on province.
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
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4.3. Results on exports by trade regime and firm ownership type
In Table 6.7, we expand the analysis by disaggregating exports by customs trade
regime. Column (1) replicates results from column (7) and panel C of Table 6.4.
Column (2) uses processing exports alone (rather than total exports) to construct
the dependent variable in equation (1), while column (3) uses ordinary exports in
the equivalent variable construction. Bartik predicted export growth is based on
all trade. We see qualitatively similar results to those in Table 6.4. Overall Bartik-
predicted export growth is strongly positive correlated with regime-specific
export growth, both under the ordinary trade regime and the export-processing
regime. Columns (4) and (5) repeat the analysis, now using regime-specific
trade to construct Bartik-predicted export growth, with broadly similarly
results. Finally, in column (6) we return to total export growth as the dependent
variable and include regime-specific Bartik-predicted exports. With both Bartik
variables in the regression, we see that predicted growth in processing exports
is the stronger variable of the two, with a coefficient of 1.11 for Bartik-predicted
processing exports compared to 0.33 for Bartik-predicted ordinary exports, where
the former is very precisely estimated while the latter fails to achieve statistical
significance.
Finally, we turn to exports by firm ownership type in Table 6.8. We perform
an analysis similar to that in Table 6.7, in which we analyze export growth sepa-
rately for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in columns (1) and (4), private domes-
tic enterprises (POEs) in columns (2) and (5), and foreign-owned enterprises
(FOEs) in columns (3) and (6). In columns (1)–(3), we see that overall
Bartik-predicted export growth is strongly positively correlated with export
growth of each ownership type; in columns (4)–(6) we see that Bartik-predicted
export growth for each ownership type is strongly positively correlated with
export growth of that type (i.e., predicted SOE export growth has a strong pos-
itive impact on actual SOE export growth, etc.). In column (7), we combine the
three Bartik-predicted export growth measures together to explain total city
export growth. Strikingly, while Bartik-predicted export growth for foreign-
owned enterprises has a positive and precisely estimated impact on overall
export growth, predicted export growth for SOEs and POEs enter insignifi-
cantly, and the latter with a negative sign. Of the components of predicted
Table 6.8 Predicted export growth and export growth per capita by firm ownership
Dependent variable:4 export/residence-based population by firm ownership (in
1,000 US$)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SOE
Export growth per capita
Total
export






































































Note: Province dummies, dummies for outliers and a dummy variable for cities with no export or
import in 2000 are included. The four outliers are Dongguan, Shenzhen, Suzhou, and Zhuhai.
Please refer to Table 6.2 for definitions of firm ownership types. All observations are weighted by
city-level residence-based population. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on province.
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.1
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city export growth that matter for overall export expansion, it is growth related
to foreign-owned firms that appears to be the most important, both economi-
cally and statistically.
Why might the shift-share analysis show that the local presence of foreign-
owned enterprises – and their associated national growth – is the strongest predic-
tor of regional export booms among the three ownership types? One possibility is
that foreign-owned firms may be a channel through which local firms learn about
foreign market opportunities. That is, export production by foreign firms may
generate positive spillovers to nearby firms by showing them the types of
goods to produce (helping spread product innovations), how to manufacture
them (helping spread process innovations), and where to sell them (helping
spread marketing knowledge). Another possibility is that local governments suc-
cessful in attracting foreign firms may offer a policy environment that is condu-
cive to trade growth for all firm types. Such policies could include the more
efficient operation of customs, relatively low regulatory burdens, and greater
ease of resolving commercial disputes. A third possibility is that Deng’s experi-
ments in creating SEZs had long-lasting effects. Initially, foreign-owned firms
were confined to operate in SEZs, which were concentrated in a few select loca-
tions in the country. Over time, SEZs proliferated and private firms, both foreign
and domestic, were permitted to produce for export in many locations. The early
establishment of SEZs may have shaped later local industrial development, and
perhaps policy-makers attitudes toward foreign trade, in a manner that had persis-
tent effects on regional export activity.
5. Discussion
Over the last quarter century, China has experienced one of the greatest manufac-
turing booms that the world has ever seen. The country’s dramatic expansion in
the supply of exports and in the demand for imported inputs have upended
markets globally. The China export-supply shock has contributed to reductions
in manufacturing employment in regions specialized in labor-intensive manufac-
turing in Germany, Mexico, Norway, Spain, and the United States, among other
countries (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2016). In turn, the China import-demand
shock contributed to spikes in global commodity prices in the mid- to late
2000s, with concomitant sharp increases in export earnings in commodity export-
ing economies. Although the China shock appears to have peaked in the late
2000s, the two-decade-long period of growth in the country’s manufacturing
sector has enduringly transformed the global economy.
Driving China’s export growth is the country’s greater openness to foreign
trade and investment. Although there is a long list of potential factors that are
responsible for China’s export surge, most literature to date has focused on one
or another factor, without considering them in concert. Our goal in this chapter
is to evaluate the contributions of exposure to changes in output tariffs, input
tariffs, uncertainty over trade policy, and MFA apparel and textile quotas to
regional export growth in China. We compare the role of these specific measures
of policy change to a Bartik predictor, which captures differential regional
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exposure to export growth tied to China’s underlying comparative advantage.
That is, while industry-specific changes in trade policy surely matter for explain-
ing China’s recent trade expansion, what has also driven manufacturing export
growth is the country’s once-in-an-epoch transition from near economic isolation
to a high degree of openness. During this process of transitional growth, regions
more specialized in strong comparative-advantage industries (or strong agglom-
eration-economy industries) would have experienced larger increases in produc-
tion, as China reoriented from production for its domestic market to production
for the global economy and moved from a distorted equilibrium far inside its
technology frontier to an equilibrium more closely aligned with world relative
prices for goods and services.
Our findings indicate that a simple Bartik measure is the strongest and most
robust predictor of China’s regional export growth among those examined. It con-
sistently explains a larger share of the spatial variation in export growth than any
of the tariff-based variables, and remains a significant predictor of export growth
also in regressions that allow for different time trends across provinces and broad
sectors. With other controls in the regression, changes in output tariffs and input
tariffs, trade-policy uncertainty, and MFA quota elimination instead appear to be
only weakly related to China’s regional export growth. These results imply that
regional variation in Chinese export growth, and particular spatial variation
within provinces, has important determinants beyond tariff policy which are cap-
tured by the Bartik measure.
Looking forward, one would expect that the contribution of China’s initial
comparative advantage for its regional export growth may attenuate. As
China’s period of post-transition growth comes to an end, the country appears
to be engaging in more concerted industrial policy, as indicated by intensifying
government efforts to move the country into the production of high-end elec-
tronics, renewable energy technologies, and sophisticated transportation equip-
ment. Similarly, the effects of changes in specific trade policies may also recede
in importance for China’s regional export growth. Reductions in import barriers
were most intense in the half-decade immediately after China’s WTO accession.
These impacts will likely lessen in importance as the country moves further
away from its entry date. If, indeed, industrial policy increasingly supplants
the role of China’s market transition in guiding the expansion of its export activ-
ity, other factors may rise in importance in explaining the regional distribution
of export production. These factors may include the ability of regional govern-
ment officials to steer industrial policies in favor of their local industries and
firms.
Note
Acknowledgement: We thank Lili Yan Ing, Miaojie Yu and an anonymous reviewer for
helpful comments.
1 At the provincial level, I/O tables are calculated at the I/O 2-digit level (42 industries).
Because these data use more aggregate industry categories (and may be subject to mea-
surement error in smaller provinces), we elect to use national I/O tables.
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Scott Orr, Daniel Trefler and Miaojie Yu
1. Introduction
The rise of China as the world’s manufacturer has generated considerable interest
in the evolution of Chinese productivity, e.g., Yu (2015) and Brandt et al. (2017).
Yet how productivity is and should be estimated remains an area of active
research. In this chapter we review some state-of-the-art methods for estimating
productivity, always adopting a practitioner’s perspective. We then apply these
methods to Chinese manufacturing data over the 2000–2006 period. We estimate
dozens of different specifications for 28 industries for a total of 672 production
function estimates. We then compare results across specifications and draw con-
clusions about the strengths and pitfalls of each.
To obtain an estimate of firm-level productivity, the researcher typically esti-
mates some variant of the following model:
yit ¼ f ðxitÞ þ oit ð1Þ
where yit is log output of firm i, xit is a vector of inputs used by firm i, f (.) is the
production function, and ωit is log total factor productivity (TFP).
Generally, the researcher observes yit and xit, while the production function and
TFP are unknown. However, if the production function can be estimated, firm-
level TFP can be obtained as the estimated residual from (1). For example, in
the simplest case of Cobb-Douglas production, the researcher estimates the fol-
lowing linear model:
yit ¼ bLlit þ bKkit þ oit ð2Þ
where lit and kit are the logs of the labour and capital inputs, and the parameters βL
and βK govern the marginal products of labour and capital. TFP is then the
portion of firm-level output that is unexplained by input use. To obtain this
object, we need estimates of the production function parameters.
Since (2) is a simple linear model, one might be tempted to estimate the pro-
duction function parameters using OLS. This would likely lead to biased coeffi-
cients of the production function parameters and, as a result, misleading estimates
of productivity. Since each firm likely knows its own productivity, labour, and
capital inputs are likely correlated with ωit. For example, since high-productivity
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firms have lower costs of production, they have lower prices and sell more output,
requiring that they buy more labour and capital than low-productivity firms.
This leads to an upward bias in estimated production function coefficients and
hence to an upward bias in the estimated returns to scale βL + βK. It may even
lead to estimates of increasing returns to scale (βL + βK > 1) when in fact there
are decreasing returns (βL + βK < 1). This would be a very misleading picture
of the nature of production. Similarly, since by construction OLS chooses produc-
tion function parameters to minimize the variance of the residual, this approach
will tend to underestimate productivity dispersion within an industry. This is prob-
lematic because accurate measurements of productivity dispersion are central to
the literature on macroeconomic misallocation (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow 2009)
and the literature on international trade (e.g., Eaton and Kortum 2002 and
Melitz 2003).
The problems with using OLS to estimate production functions have been rec-
ognized at least since Marschak and Andrews (1944). Fortunately, there has been
enormous progress since then in developing alternative methods to estimate pro-
duction functions that alleviate these concerns. See Griliches and Mairesse (1995)
and Ackerberg et al. (2007) for a review of some of this literature.
Our chapter focuses on one popular approach that has been extensively used in
the applied literature over the last 20 years, the so-called “proxy-variable”
approach of Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg
et al. (2015). In this approach one uses first-order conditions for inputs (such as
capital and labour) to proxy for the direct effect of TFP in (1).1
In this chapter, we estimate the production function using five different ver-
sions of the proxy-variable estimation procedure described in Ackerberg et al.
(2015) as well as De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). We then compare the pro-
duction function parameters and productivity estimates obtained across the differ-
ent methods.
Our main conclusions are as follows. First, gross-output production functions
tend to display returns to scale that are centred between 0.9 and 1.1. In contrast,
value-added production functions display much greater variation in scale returns
(between 0.5 and 1.5). Second, translog gross-output production functions are
very stable across proxy-variable methods. The same is not true of the other
three production functions (Cobb-Douglas gross-output, Cobb-Douglas value-
added, and translog value-added). Third, we examine log TFP dispersion, a
topic of great interest for thinking about the macro misallocation literature
(Hsieh and Klenow 2009) and the literature on international trade (Eaton
and Kortum 2002 and Melitz 2003). We find that the choice of proxy-
variable method makes little difference to the estimated dispersion in TFP.
However, dispersion is much lower for gross-output production functions than
for value-added production functions. Fourth, when examining the TFP premia
associated with either capital intensity or size, the premia are present for value-
added production functions, but much less so for gross-output production func-
tions. We conclude from these four observations that gross-output production
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functions tend to produce more sensible estimates than value-added production
functions.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic
model underlying the estimation routine, while in Section 3 we describe the esti-
mation of productivity in more detail than is typically done. This makes this
section more technical than the rest of the chapter. Our expectation is that the
casual reader will race through it, ignoring the details. However, for those
wishing to estimate state-of-the-art productivity, Section 3 provides a line-by-
line guide to all of the details that practitioners need, including some common
extensions such as correcting for attrition bias (Olley and Pakes 1996) and the
impact of exporting on productivity (De Loecker 2013). Section 4 describes
the data and implementation. Sections 5 and 6 present the estimated parameters.
Section 7 describes the results for TFP dispersion. Section 8 describes results for
the TFP premia associated with capital intensity, size, and exporting. Section 9
concludes.
2. Model
Before we outline the actual estimation procedure, it is useful to describe a simple
model of firm-level production. This discussion will highlight the basic assump-
tions we need to obtain consistent estimates of the production function
parameters.
Suppose each firm i produces output using the following technology:
yit ¼ f ðlit; kit;mit; bÞ þ oit þ eit ð3Þ
where t indexes years, yit, lit, kit, and mit are the natural logarithms of output,
labour input, capital input, and materials input, respectively; β is a vector of pro-
duction function parameters, ωit is firm-level productivity, and eit is an ex-post
productivity shock that is not realized until after a firm has made its production
decisions.2 While yit, lit, k are observable, ωit and eit are not.
3
it, and mit
To obtain an estimate of ωit, our primary object of interest, we estimate (3)
using the two-step proxy-variable estimation procedure described in Ackerberg
et al. (2015). For this approach to identify the production function, we need to
make some further assumptions. First, we assume that ωit evolves over time
according to a fixed Markov process, i.e.,
oit ¼ gðoi;t ;X-1 i;t 1Þ þ xit ð4Þ-
where Xi,t−1 is a vector of firm-level characteristics that potentially affect the law
of motion for productivity and g(ωi,t–1, Xi,t–1) = E[ωit|ωi,t–1, Xi,t–1] is expected
productivity conditional on past productivity and Xi,t−1. Note that by construction,
E[ξit] = 0, Cov(ωi,t−1; ξit) = 0 and Cov(Xi,t−1; ξit) = 0. As in Ackerberg et al.
(2015) we assume that (4) is known by each firm.
232 Scott Orr, Daniel Trefler and Miaojie Yu 232
Next we assume that capital requires time to build, with the firm-level capital
stock at time t being determined by investment at time t − 1. Formally, we assume
that capital follows a deterministic law of motion given by:( )
kit ¼ k ki;t 1; i ;t-1 ð5- i Þ
where ii,t−1 is investment in capital at time t − 1.
While (5) implies that capital is predetermined at the beginning of each period t,
we assume that labour, materials, and investment, are determined by the firm after
observing ωit. The particular timing assumptions we make are graphically
described in Figure 7.1. At the beginning of period t, we assume that each firm
i inherits a predetermined capital stock kit, and then observes ωit. The firm then
chooses {lit, mit, iit} to maximize the present discounted value of profits. After
making these input decisions, eit is realized. Finally, investment is realized, gener-
ating ki,t+1, which takes us to the start of period t + 1. Following Ackerberg et al.
(2015), we assume that labour may have dynamic implications (e.g., adjustment
costs), while materials inputs are “static,” in the sense that they have no
dynamic implications. This means materials demand will only depend on current
state variables of the firm (e.g., current productivity, capital, and labour), while
labour demand may depend on past realizations of labour input.
Finally, we assume that the conditional demand function for mit only depends
on a single unobservable, ωit, and the conditional demand function is strictly
increasing in ωit. Let Wit denote a vector of firm-level observable characteristics
(aside from labour and capital) that may affect materials demand. The final set of
assumptions can then be written compactly as:
@h
m tit ¼ htð Þlit; kit;Wit;oit ; > 0 :@o ð6Þit
3. Estimation
The estimation procedure is primarily based on the two-step “proxy-variable”
approach described in Ackerberg et al. (2015), while also incorporating some
insights from De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). In this section, we describe
the details of our empirical implementation of this procedure. Afterwards, we
describe some extensions to the general estimation approach that we implement,
including estimation with over-identification restrictions, and correcting for attri-
tion bias using a selection-correction approach as in Olley and Pakes (1996).
3.1. First stage
To generate the first-stage estimating equation, note that equation (6) is invertible
since we assume conditional materials demand is strictly increasing in ωit. As a
result, we can write:
oit ¼ h-1t ð Þlit; kit;mit;Wit : ð7Þ
Figure 7.1 Timeline
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Note that all the variables on the right-hand side of (7) are observable. As a result,
we should be able to non-parametrically account for the effect of ωit in the pro-
duction function. In particular, substitute (7) into (3), yielding:
yit ¼ ϕtð Þlit; kit;mit;Wit þ eit ð8Þ
where
ϕtð Þlit; kit;mit;Wit = f ðlit; k it; b h 1it;m -Þ þ t ð Þlit; kit;mit;Wit :
Equation (8) is the first-stage estimating equation. Although the production
function parameters β cannot be identified from this equation,4 estimating (8)
allows us to obtain estimates of eit, the productivity shocks that the firm observes
after it has made its input decisions. In practice, we treat ωit as fundamental firm
productivity and treat eit as noise that we net out when examining productivity
empirically.
There are a variety of ways one could non-parametrically estimate (8). The
standard approach in the literature, which we also follow, is to approximate ϕt
by a cubic polynomial in lit, kit, mit, and Wit. Since in our particular application,
we take Wit to only consist of an indicator for whether a firm exports or not, we
can write the first stage estimating equation as follows:5
yit ¼ a0 þ Vita1 þ EitVita2 þ at þ eit ð9Þ
where(





it ¼ lit; l2 it; kit it ;mit;m2it;m3it; litkit; l2itkit; litk2 2it ; litmit; l2 2 2itmit; litmit;mitkit;mitkit;mitkit ; litkitmit
is a vector of input interaction terms, Eit is equal to 1 if a firm exports (and is
equal to zero otherwise), αt is a vector of year fixed effects (to control for the var-
iation in ϕt over time), and α0, α1, α2 are parameters to be estimated. We then esti-
mate (9) using OLS.
3.2. Second stage
To obtain the second-stage estimating equation we need to take a stance on the
particular functional form f (.) takes in (3). We consider four different functional
forms for the production function: Cobb-Douglas value added (CD VA), translog
value added (TL VA), Cobb-Douglas gross output (CD GO), and translog gross
output (TL GO). Letting yVAit be the log of value added (sales minus material
costs), the two different value-added functional forms are described by:
yVAit ¼ bLlit þ bKkit þ oit þ eit ðCD VAÞ
and
yVAit ¼ bLlit þ b 2 2Kkit þ bLLð Þlit þ bKKð Þkit þ bLKlitkit þ oit þ eit : ðTL VAÞ
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The gross-output functional forms are described by:
yit ¼ bLlit þ bKkit þ bMmit þ oit þ eit ðCD GOÞ
and
y þ bKkit þ bMm þ bLLð Þl 2 2 2it ¼ bLlit it it þ bKKð Þkit þ bMMð Þmit ðTL GOÞ
þbLKlitkit þ bLM litmit þ bKMkitmit þ oit þ eit :
We begin by discussing the estimator for the simplest case of Cobb-Douglas
value added, and then conclude by discussing modifications needed for the
more complicated functional forms described by (TL VA), (CD GO), and (TL
GO). When the production function is given by (CD VA), the second-stage esti-










We discuss these in turn. The second moment condition, E[ξitkit] = 0, follows
from the fact that capital is predetermined (through equation (5)), and as such
should not be correlated with the innovation to productivity, ξit.
Next consider the first moment condition E[ξitli,t−1] = 0. Since ωit (and therefore
ξit) is observed before the firm chooses labour input, E[ξitlit] 6¼ 0. Following Ack-
erberg et al. (2015), we instrument for labour using its lagged value, since this
choice is made before ξit is revealed, and hence we should have E[ξitli,t−1] = 0.
Relevancy of the instrument is justified by labour adjustment costs (as we
assumed in Section 2) or serial correlation in firm-level wages.
To estimate the model by GMM using the moment conditions (10), one must
first obtain ξit as a function of βL, βK, and observable parameters. This can be
done as follows. First, note that since ϕt(lit, kit, mit, Wit) = f(l k
1
it, it, mit; β) + h
−
t (lit,
kit, mit, Wit), we can write ωit = ϕt(lit, kit, mit, Wit) − βLlit − βKkit using (7) and (CD
VA). Since ϕt has been estimated in the first stage, we can obtain an estimate of
ωit as a function of βL, βK and observable parameters, as follows:
ô ð Þ ^it bl; bk ¼ ϕit - bLlit - bKkit ð11Þ
where ϕ̂it is the predicted value of each observation from the first-stage regression,
i.e., ϕ̂it = â0 þ Vitâ1 þ EitVitâ2 þ ât.
Next, note that by (4), ξit = ωit − g(ωi,t−1, Xi,t−1). Hence, if g(ωi,t−1, Xi,t−1) were
known, we could recover ξit using (11). In practice, we do this by estimating g(.)
non-parametrically for every potential value of (β , β 6L K). In particular, suppose, as
in our application, that Xi,t−1 only consists of an indicator variable for whether a
firm exports or not (denoted, as before, by Ei,t−1). Approximating g(.) using a
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cubic polynomial in ω̂i,t−1 and Ei,t−1, we then estimate the following model by
OLS for every candidate value of (βL, βK):( )
ô b þ ~itð ÞL; bK ¼ g0 V itð ÞbL; bK g1 þ Ei;t V~1 itð ÞbL; bK g2 þ xit ð12Þ-
where V~itð ÞbL; bK ¼ ðôi;t-1ð Þb ; 2L b ;o 3K ^i;t-1ð ÞbL; bK ; ôi;t-1ð ÞbL; bK Þ .
Having estimated (12) for a given value of (βL, βK), we can now obtain an esti-
mate for ξit for any trial value of (βL, βK), which we denote by:
x̂itð ÞbL; b ~K ¼ ôit bL; b ĝ0ð ÞbL; bK -V itð ÞbL; b( )ð ÞK - K ĝ1ð ÞbL; bK ð13Þ- E ~i;t-1V itð ÞbL; bK ĝ2ð ÞbL; bK
where γ̂i(βL, βK) denotes the OLS estimate of γi in (12), given (βL, βK).
We then use (13) to estimate the remaining parameters using standard GMM
techniques. In particular, a Nelder-Mead optimization routine is used to choose
the value of β that minimizes a quadratic form of the sample equivalent of
the moments conditions described by (10). Formally, we choose (βL, βK) to
solve:7 ( )0( )
min Q b ^ 0
b
ð Þ ¼ Z 0x b ^ð Þ Z x bð Þ ð14Þ
where, for example, if we observe a balanced panel of n firms for T periods, ê(β)
is an n(T − 1) × 1 vector with typical element given by (13) and Z is an n(T − 1) ×
3 matrix of instruments, with each column corresponding to li,t−1, kit, and a cons-
tant, respectively. Note that (Z0ê (β))0(Z0ê (β)) is just the standard (unweighted)
GMM criterion function for the moment conditions described by (10).
This completes the estimation algorithm for the Cobb-Douglas value-added
case. As discussed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), estimation using
more complicated functional forms follows the same general procedure. The
only modification that needs to be made is the inclusion of extra moment condi-
tions in the GMM criterion function to identify any extra parameters. For
example, in the translog value-added case, where the production function is
given by (TL VA) above, we define the following moments to estimate the pro-
duction function:2 0 13 0 1li;t6 B -1 0C7 B C6 B k C7 B6 B it 0C
2
C7 B C
E6 B 7 B6xit l Ci;t 1 C7 ¼ B 0CB C ; ð156 B - C Þ4 @ k2 C7 Bit A5 @ 0A
li;t 1k- it 0
i.e., we obtain more moments by interacting the instruments in the same manner
these variables are being interacted within the production function. In this case,
the system is still exactly identified so the form of the criterion function does
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not change. Note, however, that the matrix of instruments Z will now include the
“extra” instruments, l2 , k2i;t-1 it and li,t−1kit.
Estimation of gross-output production functions, as in (CD GO) and (TL GO),
proceed analogously, with the extra moment condition for identifying the mate-
rials coefficient(s) being given by:( )
E xitmi;t ¼ 0; ð16Þ-1
i.e., we use lagged materials to identify the materials input elasticity, because we
would expect current materials to be correlated with the innovation to firm i’s
current productivity, as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and Brooks et al.
(2016).8
Having discussed the basic estimation procedure, we now consider some of the
extensions to the main approach that we will be using.
3.3. Extensions: over-identification and attrition
3.3.1. Over-identification
Note that we can also use ki,t−1 as an “extra” instrument for kit. In this case, we
have more identifying moments than we have parameters to identify and, as a
result, we minimize the standard weighted GMM criterion function to identify
β. In particular, we solve:( )
Q b 0x̂ b
0 ( )
min Z Z 0Z -1 Z 0
b
ð Þ ¼ ð Þ ð Þ x̂ðbÞ ð17Þ
where, in the Cobb-Douglas case, Z is now an n(T − 1) × 4 matrix with columns
corresponding to a constant, l i,t−1, respective
9
i,t−1, kit and k ly.
3.3.2. Attrition
The methods described so far have implicitly been for balanced panels. However,
our data involves an unbalanced panel of firms due to firms exiting the market. As
a result, our estimates will suffer from attrition bias since firms with high values
of ω will tend to stay in our dataset, i.e., high-productivity firms are less likely to
exit while low-productivity firms (low ω) are more likely to exit as they are not
productive enough to survive in the current market place.
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we can include an extra selection term in
the procedure to correct for attrition bias. In particular, suppose that firm exit
is endogenous in the sense that a firm (rationally) decides to exit if it draws a
value of ωit that is sufficiently low. Olley and Pakes (1996) point out that if
we model entry and exit using the tools developed in Ericson and Pakes
(1995), then firm i will exit the market whenever oit < oit ¼ otðkitÞ, where
otðkitÞ is the cutoff value of ωit, which will depend on kit as well as any other
state variables of the firm’s dynamic programming problem.
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Having put some structure on the firm’s exit decision, we can now characterize
the probability that a firm in period t − 1 continues into period t. Let Pit denote the
probability that we observe firm i at time t, conditional on the firm’s information
set at the end of period t − 1. Given the optimal cutoff rule, this probability is
given by: ( ) ( )
Pit ¼ Pr oit > oitjoit;oi;t 1 ¼ }- t oit;oi;t 1 ð18Þ-
where }t is some unknown function. Note that since we are conditioning on the
firm’s information set at the end of period t − 1, oit ¼ otðkitÞ is known, because
capital is predetermined.
Notice that we can estimate (18) via a probit regression using the information
that we have. In particular, note that while a firm’s capital stock at time t will not
be observed if a firm has exited by time t, we can still infer the level of the capital
stock from investment behaviour using (5). As a result, kit is going to be some
deterministic function of past investment and capital, κ(ki,t−1, ii,t−1). Substituting
(5) and (7) into (18) then yields:( )( ) ( )
P } o k k ; i ; h-1it ¼ t it ð i;t 1 i;t 1 Þ li;t 1; k ;mi;t W-1;- - - i;t-1 i;t-1( ) ð19Þ¼ }t ki;t 1; i li;t 1;m- i;t 1;- - i;t-1;Wi;t-1 :
Hence, we can obtain an estimate of the probability of remaining in the dataset
at time t by running a non-parametric selection probit on a cubic polynomial in
ki,t−1, ii,t−1, li,t−1, mi,t−1, and Wi,t−1. Call the predicted values from this regres-
sion Pbit .
The final step, following Olley and Pakes (1996), is to note that the bias term
that shows up due to non-random exit in the second-stage regression is given by
E½oitjoi;t 1;oit > o ] ¼ g-ð ;- it oi;t Þ. Hence, to correct for this bias we need to-1 oit
include a non-parametric function of oit and ωi,t−1 in the second-stage regression.
While we have already discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 how to recover estimates
of lagged productivity, oit still needs to be estimated.
To estimate oit, note that since (18) is a conditional survival probability, it must
be monotonically decreasing in oit. As a result, we can invert (18), yielding:( )
oit ¼ }-1t Pit;oi;t-1 : ð20Þ
Since we already have estimates for the probability of staying in the market, P̂it,
and we also have estimates of past productivity, ôi;t need-1, we actually do not
to estimate oit. Rather, the( )( ) “bias” term g-(.) can simply be written as
g- oi;t-1; }
1-
t Pit;oi;t-1 , i.e., we can control for endogenous exit by including
a cubic in the estimated survival probability P̂it and lagged productivity ôi;t-1
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in the regression model (12) (i.e., the regression for the law of motion for produc-
tivity, where we now include the bias correction terms in this regression). In par-
ticular, define the following vector of cubic terms for P̂it and ôi;t :-1
V-itðbÞ ¼ ðôi;t 1ðbÞ; ô2 b 3 2 3 2i;t 1ð Þ; ô ^i ð Þ; P̂- 1 b ^ ^ ^- ;t- it;Pit;Pit;Pit x ôi;t-1ðbÞ;Pit
x ô ; o2i ; P̂t it x ^i;t-1ðbÞÞ :-1ðbÞ
Continuing to take lagged export status Ei,t−1 as the only other firm-level variable
that affects the law of motion for productivity, we can then estimate the following
model by OLS for each candidate value of β:( )
ô ð Þb ¼ y V-it 0 þ itðbÞy1 þ Ei V-;t y2 þ xit : ð21Þ-1 it
As before, we then construct an estimate of êit, for each potential value of β, as
follows: ( )bxit b ocit b ŷ b V~it b ŷ1 b Ei;t V~it b ŷ0 1 2 b ð Þð Þ ¼ ð Þ - ð Þ - ð Þ ð Þ - ð Þ ð Þ 22-
which we then use to construct the criterion function (14).
4. Data and empirical implementation
We use firm-level data from the 2000–2006 Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises
(CME) dataset. The dataset includes information on all state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) as well as non-SOEs with annual sales of more than RMD 5 million.
We first clean these data according to the method described in Feenstra et al.
(2014) by eliminating observations with (i) incomplete or internally inconsistent
financial variables, (ii) fewer than 8 employees, (iii) missing firm identification,
or (iv) invalid entries for year. We then drop firms based on four extra criteria
that are relevant for productivity analysis. First, the firms must have complete
data on sales, employment, material costs, and capital. Second, they cannot
have “holes” over time, i.e., if they appear in years t0 and t1 then they must
appear in all years between t0 and t1. Third, they cannot switch industries or
cities over time (city switching is very rare). Industries are defined at the 2-
digit Census Industry Classification level (CIC-2). Fourth, we drop Tobacco
(CIC-2 = 16) because it has too few firms. This leaves us with 772,788 firm-
years and 298,259 firms in 28 industries. See Table 7.1.
To prepare the data for estimation, we deflate each firm’s sales using an
industry-level price deflator. We deflate materials input expenditures at the indus-
try level using input price deflators that have been filtered through the Chinese
Input-Output Tables.10 We estimate the production function by CIC-2 industry
using six different methods: OLS and five different variants of the proxy-variable
approach outlined in Section 3. The five proxy-variable estimators are:
1 Case 1 (Vanilla): This specification is exactly as described in Sections 3.1 and
3.2, except that we do not allow the law of motion for ωit to depend on
observables.11
2 Case 2 (Exporting): Same as vanilla except we allow the law of motion for
firm level productivity to depend on lagged export status. This controls for
learning-by-exporting effects as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De
Loecker (2013).
3 Case 3 (Attrition): Same as vanilla, except we include the selection correction
terms to correct for attrition bias. See Section 3.3.2.
Table 7.1 Number of firm-years
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4 Case 4 (Over-identification): Same as vanilla, except we include ki,t−1 as an
extra instrument. We also include k2i;t 1 as an extra instrument in the translog-
case. See Section 3.3.1.
5 Case 5 (Full Model): The case 2–4 modifications of case 1 are all introduced
simultaneously.
We apply each of these estimation strategies to each of the four functional
forms for the production function described in Section 3.2.
1 Cobb-Douglas, Value Added
2 Cobb-Douglas, Gross Output
3 Translog, Value Added
4 Translog, Gross Output
This yields 6 × 4 = 24 methods for calculating productivity for each of the 28
industries we observe. Since this results in 672 different production function esti-
mates, to convey a representative picture of the production functions of firms in
China we will often present histograms of coefficients weighted by the number
of observations in Table 7.1. In particular, this approach is ideal for Cobb-
Douglas specifications, since many important features of the production function
are characterized by production function parameters that only vary across indus-
tries, not firms, e.g., the derivative of the log production function with respect to
log labour is βL. On the other hand, this is no longer the case for translog produc-
tion functions, as even simple features of the production function, such as deriva-
tives, depend on where the firm is located on the production function. Restated,
simple features of the production function vary across firm-year observations,
even within an industry. In this case, we will summarize our production function
results by showing histograms of various firm-level characteristics, e.g., the deriv-
ative of log production function with respect to log labour inputs, at the firm level.
5. Results using Cobb-Douglas
There are a number of possible Cobb-Douglas specifications. We start with value-
added production functions and consider three cases: OLS, Case 1 (vanilla) and
Case 5 (full model). The top panel of Figure 7.2 reports the labour coefficients βL.
Each curve is a histogram (or, more accurately, smoothed kernel) of the 28
industry-level βL, but weighted by the number of observations in Table 7.1.
12
The dotted line is OLS histogram, the dashed line is the case 1 (vanilla) histo-
gram, and the solid line is the case 5 (full model) histogram.
Consider the top panel for labour (βL). The OLS line is left-shifted compared to
cases 1 and 5, indicating that the OLS coefficients tend to be smaller. This may be
surprising, as we expect OLS to be upward biased. The middle panel is for capital
(βK) and, as expected, OLS tends to generate relatively larger values of βK than
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Figure 7.2 Cobb-Douglas, value-added production functions
Notes: The top panel reports the labour coefficients βL. Each curve is a weighted histogram (or more
accurately, a smoothed kernel) of the 28 industry-level βL. The weights are the number of firm-year
observations reported in Table 7.1 so that the histograms are representative of the underlying popula-
tion of firms. We trim outliers when estimating the kernels; see the appendix for point estimates for all
industries. The three lines correspond to three different specifications: OLS (dotted line), case 1 or
vanilla (dashed line), and case 5 or full model (solid line). The middle panel repeats the exercise
for the capital coefficient βK. The bottom panel repeats the exercise for scale returns βL + βK.
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solving the OLS bias, this may simply indicate that high productivity firms tend
to accumulate more capital than labour.
The bottom panel reports the estimated returns to scale, βL+ βK. OLS estimates
almost always display decreasing returns to scale. In contrast, the proxy-variable
approaches display much more heterogeneity: There are large masses of firms
both above and below unity. While this is surprising, this could also be due to
the fact that using a value-added production function does not directly account
for the role of materials in production, and therefore we are simply missing the
contribution of a very important factor of production.
We can account for this by instead turning to the gross-output production func-
tions in Figure 7.3. Here we see much less variation in the degree of returns to
scale. The proxy-variable methods provide estimates of returns to scale in the nar-
rower range of 0.9 to 1.15. These seem much more reasonable than the value-
added estimates.13
6. Results using translog
Since translog coefficients are hard to interpret on their own, we instead plot the
distribution of the output elasticities for each input, @f/@l where f is log output
and l is log labour. In the Cobb-Douglas case this is just βL. In the translog
case this is:
bL þ 2bLLlit þ bLKkit þ bLMmit
that is, it depends on where the firm is on the production function.
The distribution of labour output elasticities for the translog value-added spec-
ifications appear in the top left panel of Figure 7.4. There are five histograms, one
for each of our 5 cases. We find that the particular method used to estimate the
production function can matter a great deal. While a particular pattern is hard
to see in the labour elasticities, which vary widely across firms over the a
priori unlikely range (0,2), note that the capital elasticities systematically decrease
once we over-identify the capital coefficient using cases 4 and 5. This is a bit puz-
zling, as these values on the capital coefficient are smaller than we would expect.
This may be worth examining more carefully in future research.
It is tedious but straightforward to prove that summing the labour and capital
input elasticities gives us a local measure of returns to scale at the firm level. This
measure of local returns to scale is plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 7.4. We
find very wide variation in the degree of returns to scale across firms, with many
operating in regions far from unity (constant returns to scale). Case 5 is of par-
ticular note, as it appears to generate a bimodal distribution, with a large set of
firms operating subject to decreasing returns, and another set operating subject
to constant or slightly increasing returns. However, once we allow for materials
in the production function, we end up with less exotic histograms.
In Figure 7.5 we turn to the gross-output production functions and plot the dis-
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Figure 7.3 Cobb-Douglas, gross-output production functions
Notes: This figure is identical to that in Figure 7.2, but with three minor differences. First, it is for
Cobb-Douglas gross-output production functions (rather than value added). Second, because it is
for gross output, there is an additional panel for the materials coefficient βM. Third, scale returns in
































Figure 7.4 Translog value added: output elasticities and returns to scale
Notes: Each panel displays 5 histograms and each histogram corresponds to one of the 5 cases described at the start of Section 4. The panels report labour output elas-
ticities (βL + 2βLLlit + βLKkit), capital output elasticities (βK + 2βKKkit + βLKlit), and returns to scale (the sum of the labour and capital elasticities). Since output elasticities









































Figure 7.5 Translog gross output: output elasticities and returns to scale
Notes: This figure is identical to that in Figure 7.4, but with three minor differences. First, it is for translog gross-output production functions (rather than value added).
Second, because it is for gross output, there is an additional panel for the materials output elasticity (βM + 2βMMmit + βLMmit + βKMkit). Third, returns to scale in the bottom
panel is now defined as the sum of the labour, capital, and materials output elasticities. See Figure 7.4 for additional details.
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the returns to scale elasticities are fairly evenly centred around one for all estima-
tion approaches. Moreover, as with the Cobb-Douglas case, allowing for a gross-
output production function appears to generate much less dispersion in the returns
to scale, with most firms operating in regions with local returns to scale between
0.75 and 1.3.
One of the most striking features of Figure 7.5 is how each method appears to
provide essentially the same picture of the production technology.
It is often the case that estimates of the labour and capital output elasticities (βL
and βK) are small and even negative for Cobb-Douglas gross-output production
functions. Because there is no parameter counterpart to these output elasticities
under translog, it is unclear whether this problem persists under translog. Figure
7.5 illustrates that it does. There is a sizeable number of firms operating in
regions where increasing labour or capital decreases output. In particular, slightly
more than 10 per cent of firms have negative labour and capital output elasticities.
This calls for an explanation. One possibility is that there is a problem with the
underlying data. According to the Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises dataset,
Chinese manufacturers have low labour shares. For the median firm it is 26 per
cent in 2000–2006. This is low relative to the aggregate Chinese economy,
whose labour share averaged above 40 per cent during 2000–2006 Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2014).14 To investigate the impact of reported labour shares, we
re-estimated all of our specifications using the wage bill in place of the number
of workers. This did not systematically raise the estimated coefficients associated
with labour. Given that small labour and capital coefficients appear in many pro-
ductivity studies, the explanation is deeper than an appeal to China-specific factors.
It would be useful for future research to determine why these methods generate
such small output elasticities for labour and capital and how we are to understand
why some firms produce in a region where the increased use of an input decreases
output.
7. Measures of within-industry productivity dispersion
In this section, we ask whether the sizeable difference in the production function
parameters that we found across many estimation methods in Sections 5 and 6
provide different estimates of productivity dispersion. The magnitude of productiv-
ity dispersion within an industry is a question of substantive economic interest
since industries with greater productivity dispersion have a greater scope for
across-firm allocative productivity gains. For example, the international trade liter-
ature has found that trade liberalization leads to aggregate productivity improve-
ments by reallocating resources away from low productivity firms towards
higher productivity firms. See Melitz and Trefler (2012) for a review of this liter-
ature. Similarly, a growing literature in macroeconomics and development has
argued that various firm-level wedges or distortions such as taxes and subsidies
can generate significant resource misallocation, which can explain a sizeable
portion of the large differences in aggregate productivity observed across countries.
See Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) for a review of this literature. To quantify the
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extent to which these mechanisms matter for aggregate productivity and welfare,
estimates of industry dispersion in productivity are needed.15 As a result, it is
important to know whether different approaches to estimating productivity will sig-
nificantly change the degree of dispersion we find in the data.
In Figure 7.6, we plot the estimated density of log TFP obtained using the five
different proxy-variable approaches, for each of the four functional forms of the
production function.16 The most important takeaway from these pictures is how
little the particular estimation method appears to matter for obtaining an estimate
of productivity dispersion, as most of the densities closely align with one another.
To see this, note from Figure 7.6 that in any single panel all 5 curves largely
overlap. For the translog value-added production function, which has the
largest dispersion, the standard deviations of the 5 estimates range tightly
between 0.84 to 0.97. For the Cobb-Douglas gross-output production function,
which has the smallest dispersion, the standard deviations of the 5 estimates
range tightly between 0.24 to 0.29.
While we obtain similar pictures of TFP dispersion across estimation methods,
the assumed functional form of the production function has much larger implica-
tions for measuring productivity dispersion. In Figure 7.7, we plot the dispersion
of productivity for our 4 different functional forms using estimation method 5.
From the figure, there is much less dispersion in productivity when we use a
gross-output specification, compared to a value-added specification, with the
ratio of standard deviations varying by more than a factor of 3. These are
massive differences, likely due to the fact that value-added specifications load
the effect of materials on production into the productivity residual. Since accu-
rately estimating the degree of productivity dispersion matters a great deal for
questions related to input reallocations and aggregate efficiency, Figure 7.7
tells us that thinking carefully about which model more accurately reflects pro-
duction within the industry is likely of first order importance, as has also been
recently argued by Gandhi et al. (2016).
8. Assessing differences in estimated productivity – economic
metrics
We have seen that very different conclusions emerge about productivity disper-
sion when we compare different methods of estimating TFP. However, with
over 700,000 firm-years and 24 different methods of estimating TFP, it is chal-
lenging to decide whether these differences carry over to other economic ques-
tions of interest. In this section we examine three questions: (1) Are more
capital-intensive firms more productive? (2) Are larger firms more productive?
(3) Are exporters more productive?
8.1. Capital intensity and productivity
Figure 7.8 reports four TFP histogram/kernels for translog specifications. In
















































Figure 7.6 TFP dispersion across estimation methods
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Figure 7.7 TFP dispersion across functional forms for full model
Notes: The figure plots 4 TFP histograms (kernels), one for each of our 4 functional forms. CD VA =
Cobb-Douglas value added; TLVA = translog value added; CD GO = Cobb-Douglas gross output; TL
GO = translog gross output. Only case 5 (Full Model) is used. TFP has been demeaned at the 2-digit
industry level so that the histograms capture within-industry TFP dispersion.
capital-labour intensities and the dashed line is for firms with below-average
capital-labour intensities. On the top left is the kernel associated with a vanilla
(case 1) value-added translog production function. It shows that labour-intensive
firms are slightly more prominent in the middle of the TFP distribution and
capital-intensive firms are slightly more prominent at the top of the TFP distribu-
tion. When we move to case 5 (bottom left panel), there is a much clearer separa-
tion of the two lines, meaning that there is a much more pronounced ‘capital-
intensity premium’, i.e., capital-intensive firms are more productive.
This is something of a puzzling result given our assumption that, once control-
ling for capital and labour, we can pool across firms within an industry. The
puzzle is resolved by the right-hand panels of Figure 7.8 which report gross-
output translog production functions. In these two pictures, there is very little evi-
dence of a capital-intensity premium. This points to a satisfying feature of gross-
output production functions relative to value-added production functions.
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Figure 7.8 The capital-intensity premium in the translog model
Notes: This figure plots histograms (kernels) of TFP. TFP has been demeaned at the 2-digit industry level so that the histograms capture within-industry TFP dispersion.
There are two histograms per panel. The solid histogram is for capital-intensive firms and the dashed histogram is for labour-intensive firms. A firm is capital-intensive
(labour-intensive) if its capital-labour ratio is above (below) the industry’s average capital-labour ratio.
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8.2. Sales and productivity
It is natural to expect that more productive firms will capture a larger share of the
market. Without suggesting that we are estimating a causal relationship running
from productivity to sales, we can examine the correlation between sales and pro-
ductivity. To this end, within each industry we divide firms into two groups based
on whether the firm has above-average or below-average log sales. We emphasize
that this split is done within industry.
Each of the four panels in Figure 7.9 reports two TFP kernels: The solid line is
for big firms and the dashed line is for small firms. Consider first the two left
panels, which are for value-added production functions. We see that there is a
very clear “size premium”, by which we mean that big firms have higher TFP.
The two right panels are for gross-output production functions. They also
display a size premium, but it is less pronounced. This is of interest because trans-
log production functions display non-homotheticities in inputs, i.e., the ratio of
inputs to output are allowed to vary with output. Stated more graphically,
output expansion paths need not be linear. The difference in size premia
between value-added and gross output production functions suggests that much
of the non-homotheticities load on capital and labour rather than on materials.
This is sensible: A car needs four wheels so the ratio of material inputs (four
wheels) to output (cars) is four, independently of the number of cars produced.
8.3. Exporting and productivity
It has long been asserted that exporters are more productive than non-exporters
(e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1995) and this relationship appears to be at least par-
tially causal (e.g., Lileeva and Trefler 2010). To examine the export premium
we divide firms into two groups based on whether they export. In each of the
four panels in Figure 7.10, the solid line is the TFP kernel for exporters and
the dashed line is the TFP kernel for non-exporters. We only report results for
the translog production function and we demean TFP by subtracting off the
mean TFP of the firm’s 2-digit industry.
For the vanilla (case 1) value-added translog production function in the top left
panel of Figure 7.10, the exporter premium is very clear. The solid line is shifted
towards higher TFP levels, indicating that there is indeed an exporter TFP
premium.
Recall that in the full model (case 5) we have included a lagged exporter
dummy in the equation determining the evolution of productivity (equation (4)).17
As pointed out by De Loecker (2013), if one theorizes that exporting affects
productivity then this is the right thing to do. One then assesses the impact of
exporting on productivity by examining the export dummy coefficient in the evo-
lution-of-productivity equation. It is thus of interest that when looking at the
value-added translog production function (left panels of Figure 7.10) and compar-
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Figure 7.9 The size premium in the translog model
Notes: This figure plots histograms (kernels) of TFP. TFP has been demeaned at the 2-digit industry level so that the histograms capture within-industry TFP dispersion.
There are two histograms per panel. The solid histogram is for big firms and the dashed histogram is for small firms. A firm is big (small) if its log sales are above (below)
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Figure 7.10 The exporter premium in the translog model
6
Gross Output, Vanilla (Case 1)Value Added, Vanilla (Case 1)
Notes: This figure plots histograms (kernels) of TFP. TFP has been demeaned at the 2-digit industry level so that the histograms capture within-industry TFP dispersion.
There are two histograms per panel. The solid histogram is for firm-years where the firm exports and the dashed histogram is for firm-years where the firm does not
export.
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where exporting has already been controlled for, there is only a very small
exporter premium.
A different conclusion emerges when looking at gross output. See the two right
panels of Figure 7.10. First, the exporter premium in case 1 is confined to firms
with productivity below approximately 0.03, which is about 40 per cent of all
firms. Second, cases 1 and 5 do not appear to be all that different in terms of infer-
ences about the exporter premium. This may point to the difficulty of including
the exporter dummy directly into the evolution-of-productivity equation. Includ-
ing it solves the problems identified by De Loecker (2013), but the resulting
exporter premium may not capture a causal effect because at least some and
maybe most of the sample variation in the exporter premium is across firms
rather than within firms.18 In contrast, studies such as Lileeva and Trefler
(2010) do not allow for exporting directly in the evolution-of-productivity equa-
tion (a drawback), but are able to purely exploit within-firm switching into and
out of exporting (an advantage). Tying the two approaches together would be
an interesting area for future research.
9. Conclusions
We estimated production functions for:
1 28 industries,
2 OLS plus five proxy-variable methods,
3 gross output and value added, and
4 Cobb-Douglas and translog.
That is, we estimated 672 production functions. While generalizations are
somewhat difficult, we find the following empirically.
1 When comparing value-added to gross-output production functions, the
former yield very large variations in returns to scale. Looking across speci-
fications, returns to scale ranging to the extremes of 0.5 and 1.5 are not
uncommon. In contrast, gross-output production functions display much less
variation in returns to scale, which tend to be strongly centred between 0.9
and 1.1. In short, gross-output production functions display more sensible
returns to scale.
2 Using the translog gross-output function, estimates of output elasticities and
returns to scale are extremely stable across proxy-variable estimation
methods. This is not true of Cobb-Douglas or value-added production
functions.
3 We examine log TFP dispersion, a topic of great interest for thinking about
the macro misallocation literature and the international trade reallocation
literature. Conditional on functional form (e.g., Cobb-Douglas value added),
the choice of proxy-variable method makes little difference to the estimated
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dispersion in TFP. However, dispersion is much lower for gross-output
production functions than for value-added production functions.
4 When looking at the TFP-premium associated with both capital intensity and
size, the premium was present for value-added production functions, but
much less so for gross-output production functions.
In collecting these many results, it appears that greater efforts must be made in
the literature to demonstrate robustness of results to alternative production func-
tion specifications and proxy-variable methods. One theme that appears repeat-
edly is that we often obtain empirically more sensible results using gross-
output production functions rather than value-added production functions.
Notes
Acknowledgement: We are indebted to David Rivers and Frederic Warzynski for helpful
discussions. Trefler thanks the Canadian Institute for Advance Studies (CIFAR) Program
in Institutions, Organizations and Growth, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRC) and the Bank of Canada for generous intellectual and finan-
cial support.
1 See also Gandhi et al. (2016) whose first-order-condition approach we do not consider,
but only in the interest of space.
2 eit may also be interpreted as measurement error in output.
3 Ideally, all inputs should be measured in productivity adjusted units; otherwise, differ-
ences in input quality show up in ωit or eit.
4 This is because we cannot separately identify f(l ; from 1it, kit, mit β) ht
- ð Þlit; kit;mit;Wit .
5 Note that yit in the first stage estimating equation should either be in gross-output or
value-added units, depending on the exact specification of the production function one
wishes to estimate.
6 This is equivalent to “concentrating out” the parameters governing g(.) in the overall
GMM estimation procedure.
7 Note that β in the GMM criterion function always includes a constant term as well as
(βL, βK).
8 Note that Gandhi et al. (2016) have recently pointed out that this sort of identification
strategy, which has previously been used in the literature, may run into some identi-
fication problems. In particular, they show that proxy-variable approaches that use
lagged materials as an instrument for a gross-output production function are non-para-
metrically non-identified. Put differently, functional form restrictions are not innocu-
ous when one uses this type of estimation strategy, because the production function
parameters will only be identified off of these restrictions. This may lead to misleading
inference if the functional form restrictions do not hold in practice.
9 If we are considering the translog case, Z also contains l2t 1, k
2
i; it , li,t−1, kit, k −1, k
2




10 We measure labour input using employment and thus do not need a labour deflator.
However, capital is simply measured in RMB.
11 Put differently, Xit in (4) is empty. Note, however, thatWit is not empty. (Recall thatWit
is the vector of firm-level variables that affect demand for inputs.) Following De
Loecker and Warzynski (2012), Wit always includes an export dummy. For the
reader interested in the exporting-and-productivity literature, this means that we are
not allowing exporting to affect the law of motion for productivity in the vanilla
case. This is allowed only in cases 2 and 5.
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12 Point estimates by industry can be found in the appendix.
13 Note that for labour and intermediates, all three cases have the same central tendency,
but the proxy-variable methods have greater dispersion. In contrast, for capital, the
proxy-variable methods yield smaller estimates of βK.
14 The difference between 26 per cent and 40 per cent might be explained by the fact that
services are more labour-intensive than manufacturing. We are skeptical that this is the
only reason for the difference.
15 See Melitz and Redding (2015) for a recent discussion on when detailed estimates of
micro-level productivity dispersion matter for quantifying the aggregate gains from
trade. Similarly, see Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for a detailed discussion on how dis-
persion in revenue TFP can be used to measure the degree of resource misallocation
within an industry.
16 We demean log TFP within an industry in these diagrams, so that we only capture
within-industry dispersion in productivity.
17 This dummy is interacted with lagged productivity.
18 This is what we expect from work on the sunk costs of exporting by Roberts and
Tybout (1997).
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Cobb-Douglasa point estimates
CIC-2 Industry name Case 1: Case 5: Case 1: Case 5:
value- value- gross gross
added added output output
βL βK βL βK βL βK βM βL βK βM
13 Food processing 0.62 0.20 0.42 0.17 0.33 0.02 0.67 0.11 0.04 0.76
14 Food 1.42 0.00 0.90 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.87 0.03 0.02 0.94
manufacturing
15 Beverages 1.21 0.08 1.07 0.12 0.22 0.04 0.78 0.25 0.04 0.72
17 Textiles 0.30 0.26 0.35 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.73 0.09 0.03 0.79
18 Apparel 1.20 0.00 0.79 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.94 0.08 0.00 0.99
19 Leather 0.57 0.21 1.02 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.99 0.24 0.02 0.77
20 Timber 0.19 0.21 0.63 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.91 0.05 0.02 0.92
21 Furniture 1.29 −0.07 0.76 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.90 0.07 0.02 0.86
22 Paper 0.78 0.10 1.12 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.82 0.07 0.01 0.89
23 Printing 0.08 0.43 0.32 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.85 0.06 0.05 0.83
24 Toys 0.70 0.11 0.69 0.10 0.23 0.02 0.70 0.15 0.03 0.76
25 Petroleum 0.79 0.23 1.66 0.06 0.34 −0.05 0.85 0.01 0.02 0.86
26 Raw chemicals 0.45 0.29 0.34 0.18 0.36 0.01 0.73 0.06 0.02 0.86
27 Medicines 0.17 0.38 1.35 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.79 0.09 0.04 0.85
28 Chemical fibers 0.07 0.39 −0.07 0.27 −0.01 0.01 0.97 −0.08 0.03 0.96
29 Rubber 0.93 0.10 0.87 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.89 0.15 0.03 0.79
30 Plastics 0.84 0.13 1.11 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.07 0.02 0.86




0.71 0.25 0.50 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.97 0.06 0.03 0.84
33 Smelting, non-
ferrous metals
0.66 0.19 0.46 0.15 −0.14 −0.11 1.44 0.02 0.02 0.91
34 Metal 0.88 0.20 0.49 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.97 0.19 0.03 0.76
35 General machinery 1.03 0.12 1.02 0.12 0.24 0.01 0.84 0.20 0.02 0.83
36 Special machinery 1.11 0.07 0.93 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.85 0.07 −0.01 1.06
37 Transport
equipment




CIC-2 Industry name Case 1: Case 5: Case 1: Case 5:
value- value- gross gross
added added output output
βL βK βL βK βL βK βM βL βK βM
39 Electrical 0.79 0.25 1.56 0.08 0.46 0.05 0.59 0.59 0.02 0.61
machinery




0.79 0.16 0.34 0.17 0.37 0.09 0.50 −0.01 0.03 0.88
42 Art 0.56 0.18 0.91 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.93 0.06 0.01 0.94
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1. Introduction
The competitiveness of a country’s exported products relies heavily on their
quality. Better-quality products are preferred by consumers but are generally
more expensive and more difficult to invent, innovate, and produce. Better-
quality products are associated with more advanced technology, higher input
quality, skill intensity, greater innovation, and more efficient management
(Schott, 2004; Verhoogen, 2008; Khandelwal, 2010; Kugler and Verhoogen,
2012; Fan et al., 2015). Quality upgrading is widely interpreted as an indicator
of the success of a firm at the disaggregate level and of an economy at the aggre-
gate level. Quality is not only determined by a country or firm’s capability and
technology but is also affected by other factors. As argued by Alchian and
Allen (1977) and supported by a great deal of empirical evidence, the per-unit
trade cost (or specific trade cost) also significantly alters the product quality of
trade. Specifically, proxies for higher per-unit trade cost (longer distance) tend
to be positively associated with better-quality or higher unit values or prices
(Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Manova and Zhang,
2012; Martin, 2012).
A classic argument to account for this finding is that higher per-unit trade costs
lower the relative price of high-quality goods, so higher per-unit trade costs skew
the composition of exports towards higher-quality goods (firms) and therefore,
increase the average export quality (price). Feenstra and Romalis (2014)
suggest that in addition to the effects across firms, a firm will also endogenously
produce products at a higher quality when the unit trade cost is high, a within-
firm effect that has been overlooked by previous research but is supported in
empirical studies (for within-firm evidence using Chinese micro-level data, see
Manova and Zhang, 2012; for within-firm evidence using French micro-level
data, see Martin, 2012).
Empirical studies also document evidence that countries with higher per capita
income tend to import and consume higher-quality goods (Hallak, 2006; Hallak
and Schott, 2011; Fajgelbaum et al., 2011). Such evidence suggests that higher-
income countries have higher tastes for quality, and these differences in taste can
shape the composition and quality of the goods they demand.
DOI: 10.4324/9781351061544-8
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Measuring product quality is useful in understanding the consequences of these
quality variations on trade and the economy. We can learn how trade and indus-
trial policies affect individual firm quality choice via the channels of innovation
or reductions in costs. Meanwhile, quality choice can be associated with the des-
tination country’s characteristics, such as per capita income and shipping costs.
These associations suggest that quality does not only reflect a firm’s capability
but also an economy’s constraints for business, such as transport and logistics
costs. The quality upgrading process can have significant consequences that
affect many parties in an economy. Increases in the quality of imported goods
can trigger tougher competition and have an impact on domestic firms and
workers. At the aggregate level, quality and price are crucial for measuring the
welfare of a country. Measuring quality is, therefore, an important empirical
issue.
Quality is an attribute of a product that increases a consumer’s satisfaction but
at the same time requires extra costs. Our framework relies on the endogenous
choice of quality for individual firms and includes the impact of production effi-
ciency, consumers’ tastes for quality, input costs, and per-unit shipping costs on
quality choice. The cost minimization motive stemming from the trade-off
between the production cost and the unit shipping cost, together with consumers’
taste for quality, will determine the choices for optimal quality. The optimal
quality will increase if the unit shipping cost is relatively higher than the unit pro-
duction cost and if consumers’ preferences for quality are higher. A firm com-
bines production inputs and shipping inputs to serve each market, and the
relative amount of production inputs with respect to shipping inputs (quantity
used to ship goods) suggests the relative cost of shipping adjusted by the taste
for quality.
We estimate the firm-product-destination-year-level export quality for Indone-
sia from 2008 to 2012 and for China from 2000 to 2013. Figure 8.1 shows that
both countries experienced rapid export growth after 2000. Understanding the
variations in export quality offers some insights into explaining the variations
in export value. We also document and explore the rich variations in export
quality along several dimensions. We present the evolution of export quality dis-
tribution in aggregate, by firm type, and by industry, for which we document sub-
stantial heterogeneity in both Indonesia and China. We also document the cross-
sectional quality variations associated with the destination’s per capita income
and decompose the evolution of export quality into different sources. Our
results show that export quality in Indonesia and China is driven by different
sources of variation.
Since quality is difficult to observe, we need to develop indicators to measure
quality using observable data. Convenient and straightforward measures of
product quality are the prices or unit values obtained from trade data.1
However, variations in prices and unit values reflect not only variations in
quality but also variations in other determinants of prices, such as production
efficiencies, markups, and input costs. Hence, price is often considered to be a
rough measure of quality.
The hedonic method, which links product quality directly to the specific attri-
butes of a product, is also used in some cases. Examples include Goldberg and
Verboven (2001), and Auer et al. (2014), who use horsepower, fuel consumption,
and other attributes to measure the quality of an automobile; and Crozet et al.
(2012) and Chen and Juvenal (2016), who, respectively, measure the quality of
champagne using ratings from the Champagne Guide and ratings by wine
experts. The hedonic method requires detailed information on a product’s attri-
butes, such as horsepower for a car or the number of processors for a laptop,
and such information is generally not available in standard trade datasets.
In the last decade, substantial progress has been made in inferring quality via
estimating the demand function. Quality is modelled as a demand shifter that
measures the valuation consumers attach to a good. Therefore, if the demand
function can be consistently estimated with observed quantity and price data,
one can infer product quality as the residuals of the fitted demand function. Intu-
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Figure 8.1 Export value index (2000 = 100), China and Indonesia
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Source: Authors.
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shares or sales conditional on price. This intuition is derived and applied by
Khandelwal (2010) under a nested-logit preference and by Khandelwal et al.
(2013) under a constant elasticity of substitution preference to estimate, respec-
tively, the qualities of import varieties to the United States and the export qualities
of Chinese textile exporters. Hallak and Schott (2011) also show that conditional
on the export price, countries running trade surpluses are inferred to offer higher
quality than countries running trade deficits. In these methods, since the determi-
nation of quality is not characterized, quality is expressed as a function of quan-
tity and price together with some aggregate price index and expenditure
measures. These aggregate variables are, in general, not observed. As a result,
in empirical practice, these aggregate variables are often captured by destination-
and time-specific fixed effects. Since the residuals of the estimated demand func-
tion are taken as measured qualities, the introduction of fixed effects makes the
measured qualities difficult to compare across destinations or over time in abso-
lute terms. This constrains the application of such demand-side methods when
one wants to study the cross-destination variations or over-time evolution of
quality.
Researchers then turn to the supply side to try to understand how quality is
determined and pursue other methods of measuring quality. Schott (2004) finds
that high-income countries tend to export better-quality goods. Kugler and Ver-
hoogen (2012) introduce complementarity between input and firm capability in
the production of quality and generate the implication that firms with higher capa-
bility produce better-quality goods. However, their focus is on the domestic
market, and they do not consider the possibility that a firm may offer goods
with different quality levels to different destinations. Feenstra and Romalis
(2014) combine the per-unit trade cost with endogenous quality. The resulting
optimal qualities, given a firm, vary across destinations. Using a zero-cut-off
profit condition, they estimate the export and import qualities of different coun-
tries for different products. While Feenstra and Romalis (2014) provide measured
qualities for each exporter and importer for each Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC) product, there has so far been no attempt to measure the
qualities at the micro level based on endogenous quality.
The method used in this study is built on the theoretical framework of Feenstra
and Romalis (2014) but further exploits a firm’s trade-off through which optimal
quality choice is shaped by the per-unit shipping (trade) cost. A firm embeds
more quality units into one physical unit to avoid incurring shipping costs
when the per-unit shipping cost is high. The shipping cost therefore introduces
economies of scale in quality production and shipping. This framework provides
an explicit solution to optimal quality. Furthermore, it generates the endogenous
reactions of quality to variations in the per-unit trade costs within a firm, which is
consistent with previous empirical findings. For empirical analysis, Feenstra and
Romalis (2014) rely on United Nations Comtrade data to estimate a country’s
import/export quality-adjusted price index and quality index for each SITC
product. Our method is based on the same theoretical framework, but we use
micro-level production and trade data to develop a procedure to measure the
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firm-product-destination-year-level product quality. As such, we are interested in
estimating product quality at the micro level, compared with Feenstra and
Romalis (2014) who focus on differences in quality at the macro level. In partic-
ular, we exploit the implication of the model that a firm combines production
inputs and shipping inputs to serve its customers and we estimate the production
function of the quality-adjusted outputs. Our method also ensures that the mea-
sured qualities are comparable both across destinations and over time.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework
of endogenous quality choice and the implementation procedure for estimating the
export quality. Section 3 discusses the data and estimation results. Section 4 shows
the analyses of the export quality of Indonesia and China on quality evolution.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Estimating micro-level export quality: approach and
implementation
In this section, we describe how we measure export quality at the micro level. In
our model, quality is the attribute of a product that increases consumer satisfac-
tion but, meanwhile, is costly to produce, as in Hallak (2006), Verhoogen (2008),
Khandelwal (2010), Hallak and Schott (2011), Johnson (2012), Khandelwal et al.
(2013) and Feenstra and Romalis (2014). We first lay out the theoretical frame-
work under which a firm’s optimal quality choice is determined in a cost min-
imization problem. A firm incurs two types of costs in serving its customers:
production costs and per-unit shipping costs. The cost of shipping relative to pro-
duction determines the optimal quality level that minimizes the total cost. If the
shipping cost is relatively high, then a firm tends to produce better-quality goods
to avoid incurring the high shipping cost. Furthermore, because rich consumers
value quality differently to poor consumers, a firm also sets different qualities
according to the destination income levels.
We show that the total quality units being served to customers require both pro-
duction inputs and shipping inputs, and the total physical units reveal information
on the shipping inputs being used. Therefore, the ratio between the total physical
units and production inputs implies the cost of shipping relative to production.
We exploit these relationships to estimate export quality.
Our method differs from most of the existing literature, which mainly relies on
the demand-side relationship between market share and price to identify quality.
In particular, existing methods usually infer product qualities as the residuals
of the market shares conditional on prices and the destination-year fixed
effects. This implementation makes the estimated qualities incomparable across
destinations and years. Our method, on the other hand, is able to identify
quality variations across firms, across destinations and across years as we
avoid using any destination-year fixed effects in the estimation procedure.
Such variations are important in describing the over-time evolution of export
quality both at the disaggregate level and the aggregate level.
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2.1. Optimal quality and cost minimization
We assume that the effective output of a firm is in terms of quality units. To be
specific, the total quality unit Q is determined by the total physical unit q and
quality level per physical unit z, namely
Q ¼ q . z
Quality z determines the satisfaction level a consumer obtains when consuming
one unit of a particular variety and is related to the attractiveness of that variety.
We assume that Q enters the consumer’s utility U and U is increasing in Q. There-
fore, quality increases a consumer’s valuation of a particular variety and increases
a consumer’s utility.
We assume that in each destination market k there are multiple firms under
monopolistic competition. Firms j differ in their exogenous production efficiency
φj. Similar to Feenstra and Romalis (2014), the technology to produce quality zjk
is assumed as in equation (2.1):
zjk ¼ ðφj . ljk þ a ykÞ ð2:1Þ
ljk is the quantity of effective composite inputs that a firm needs in order to
produce quality z 2jk for each unit of physical output. ak > 0 is the consumer’s
‘baseline’ valuation when ljk = 0 and varies by k. This parameter characterizes
how consumers in different markets evaluate a firm’s efforts in producing
quality. To illustrate, suppose ak > al for two markets served by firm j. In
order to ensure that consumers in the two markets obtain the same satisfaction
level zjk = zjl, firm j should invest more in market l so that ljl > ljk. The inverse
of ak can therefore be interpreted as the taste for quality, and higher efforts in
l are required to conquer consumers with higher tastes for quality.3jk “ ” We there-
fore assume that ak is decreasing in per capita income in market k to capture the
association between per capita income and the taste for quality.
θ measures the diminishing returns to production inputs in producing quality
zjk and is assumed to lie between 0 and 1. Equation (2.1) implies the following
unit cost function to produce one unit of physical output associated with




jk ¼ wljk ¼ zjk - ak ð2:2φ Þj
Equation (2.2) states that given a firm’s quality choice zjk, the unit cost to
produce one unit of physical output, is increasing in input price w, increasing in
product quality zjk, decreasing in ak, and decreasing in production efficiency φj.
0 < θ < 1 implies that quality upgrading is subject to diminishing marginal
returns. When θ is higher, the marginal cost of upgrading quality is lower. A
higher ak suggests consumers’ higher valuation when ljk = 0, the lower taste
for quality given the same level of production inputs used, and therefore, the
lower unit cost of production to be incurred given zjk.
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When selling goods to a particular destination, k, firms are also subject to trade
costs. There are two types of trade costs: the per-unit shipping cost Tjk (capturing
additive trade costs, such as shipping, transportation and distribution costs) and
the iceberg trade cost τjk (capturing multiplicative trade costs, such as tariffs).
Tjk reflects the transportation and distribution costs associated with destination
k, and we allow the costs to vary across firms. As a result, the total cost to
produce and ship one unit of physical output becomes !( )w
UC τ c T τ z
1
y
jk ¼ jkð jk þ jkÞ ¼ jk jk - aφ k þ Tjkj
Given the total quality unit firm j wants to produce to serve market k, Qjk, the
optimal quality that minimizes the total cost of production and shipping is
min UCjk . qjk ; s:t: Qjk ¼ qjk . zjk
qjk ;zjk
( )( )





- ak þ Tjkjk
jk ¼ Qz z jkzjk jk jk
This motivation can be justified in a world where a consumer relies on the total
quality units he/she consumes to derive utility. The optimal quality, zjk, therefore






- ak þ Tjk
zjk zjk
The optimal quality is thus:{ [( )
y T φ y
z
jk j
jk ¼ a1 k ð2:3Þ- y w -
Equation (2.3) suggests that quality is increasing in the term
Tjkφj
w
- ak . When the
per-unit shipping cost, Tjk, increases or when the firm-specific production cost, w,φj
decreases, the optimal quality choice of the firm increases.
When such a relative cost is high, firms tend to produce higher quality. The
intuition is that when the cost of shipping is high compared with the cost of pro-
duction, it is optimal to serve customers with fewer physical units and a higher
quality per physical unit to avoid incurring too high shipping costs. A decrease
in production input cost w or an increase in firm production efficiency φj
causes a similar effect because the effective production cost decreases. Further-
more, when consumers have a higher taste for quality (lower ak), firms also
endogenously supply higher quality. A higher taste for quality lowers the baseline
per-unit valuation of a particular product, equivalent to a higher per-unit cost for a
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firm to maintain its consumers at a given satisfaction level. Therefore, a higher
taste for quality acts as a per-unit cost wedge and also introduces economies of
scale in quality upgrading.
The trade-off between the average production cost and average shipping cost
(and the wedge due to taste for quality) therefore determines the optimal
quality. A higher shipping cost associated with a destination induces firms to
ship better-quality goods to that destination. This is the within-firm “Washington
apple effect”. A lower input cost induces firms to upgrade quality, and more pro-
ductive firms tend to produce higher-quality goods. Moreover, firms tend to serve
high-income markets with higher quality. This property captures the idea that
high-income countries demand high-quality goods.
The optimal quality in log form is, therefore: !
y T
z y ln jk
a
ln y ln kjk ¼ 1 þ - φj ð :4Þ- y w φ þ y ln 2j




z y y T
l jk jk
ak
jk ¼ φ ¼ 1 y w -j - φj
Therefore, we can define the total amount of production inputs used to produce
qjk units of physical output with quality level zjk as Xjk, taking into account the




X kjk ¼ jk jk ljk ¼ 1 y w - τ- φ jkqjkj
Defining free on board (FOB) physical unit as qjk
* ¼ τ jkqjk and rearranging, we
get  !




* 1- y w φj
This expression suggests that the ratio between a firm’s spending on production( )





tant. The per-unit shipping cost is adjusted by the taste for quality in market k
as we highlight that a higher taste for quality (lower ak) acts as a per-unit cost
wedge that increases a firm’s actual per-unit cost in serving consumers. Such a
relationship stems from the firm’s cost minimization behaviour.
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The total FOB quality unit, Qjk









¼ ðφj Þ qjk ð2:6Þ-
Therefore, the total quality units produced and shipped, Qjk
*, is created by
combining production inputs Xjk and shipping inputs qjk
*. Productivity φj acts
as a production input-augmented technology advancement. Using the ratio
between the production inputs and shipping inputs and the total FOB quality





* ¼ ln Xjk - ln - lnφ ð2:7w - Þj 1- y
ln Qjk
* ¼ ð1- y *Þ ln qjk þ y ln Xjk þ y ln φj ð2:8Þ
2.2. Implementation
With the subscripts indicating the different products, g (defined as the HS 6-digit
product), and year, t, the expressions for the physical units, qjk
*, and quality units,
Qjk
*, become ( )
ln q * ln X ln Tjkgt akgt y- - ln gjkgt ¼ jkgt - :1 y ð2 9w φ Þgt jgt - g
ln Qjkgt
* ¼ ð1 *- ygÞ ln qjkgt þ yg ln Xjkgt þ yg ln φjgt þ εjkgt ð2:10Þ
where εjkgt is a mean-zero error term due to either measurement error in the
dependent variable or the idiosyncratic random output shocks that are realized
after all the input decisions are made.
We now turn to additional parametric assumptions regarding the structure of
composite input Xjkgt. Following Ackerberg et al. (2015), we assume Xjkgt to
be Leontief in materials as in equation (2.11):
X minfK agjkgt . L 1jkgt -agjkgt ¼ ; bgMjkgtg ð2:11Þ
Kjkgt, Ljkgt, and Mjkgt are, respectively, the capital, labour, and materials used by
firm j to produce product g shipped to k in year t. Capital and labour are assumed
to be substitutable with each other with constant returns to scale, while materials
are not substitutable for capital or labour. This production specification is defined
as “structural value-added” and is motivated by Ackerberg et al. (2015) and
Gandhi et al. (2017).4
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gt are the prices of one unit of effective material, capital, and
labour, respectively. Equation (2.11) simply states that
ln Xjkgt ¼ ag ln Kjkgt þ ð1- agÞ ln Ljkgt ð2:12Þ
The cost share of capital, αg, is assumed to be dependent on g to reflect differ-
ent production technologies across different products. Each αg lies between 0
and 1. We combine equations (2.12), (2.9), and (2.10) to yield( )
ln qjkgt
* ¼ ag ln K a ln L Tjkgt akgtjkgt þ ð1- gÞ jkgt - ln - - ln ygwgt φjgt 1- y ð2:13Þg
ln Qjkgt
* - ð1- yg ln qjkgt*Þ
¼ ygag ln Kjkgt þ ygð1- agÞ ln Ljkgt þ yg ln φjgt þ εjkgt ð2:14Þ
We use an iteration procedure to estimate ln zjkgt. The iteration procedure con-
sists of three equations, namely equations (2.4), (2.13), and (2.14). With Kjkgt,
Ljkgt, and qjkgt








together with ln φjgt and θg, forms an estimate for ln zjkgt according to equation
(2.4). Combining ln zjkgt and ln qjkgt
*, we again can estimate equation (2.14) to
obtain estimates of θg, αg, and ln φjgt.
We develop a five-step iteration procedure to implement the estimation as
follows.
Given the values of by n ng and cag (superscript denotes the n-th iteration), first( )




- to equation (2.13):





- ¼ acn ng ln K 1 gjkgt Þ ln Ljkgt - ln qjkgt*φ þ ð - acg - lngt jgt 1 b- y ng
Then, we construct the estimate of product quality ln zc n according to equa-( ) jkgtd n
tion (2.4), given the value of ln φc n and ln Tjkgt akgtjgt wgt - φjgt
ln zc n b n bln y n ( )g db njkgt ¼ y Tjkgt akgt b n ng b n y nþ g ln w - φc1 y gt φ þ yg ln jgt- jgtg
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Generate the estimate of ln Qd njkgt* , namely
ln Qd n ln zc njkgt jkgt þ ln qjkgt** ¼
Estimate equation (2.14) to generate updated estimates of ln φc njgt þ1, by nþ1g and
acng þ1:
ln Qd njkgt* - ð1 b- y ng Þ ln qjkgt*by nþ1 n 1 b nþ1 n 1 b nþ1 n 1¼ g cag þ ln Kjkgt y g þþ g ð1- ac Þ ln Ljkgt þ yg ln φc þjgt þ εjkgt
Using ordinary least squares to estimate equation (2.14) incurs a potential
simultaneity bias since inputs ln Kjkgt and ln Ljkgt are likely to be correlated
with production efficiency ln φjgt. To mitigate the potential simultaneity bias,
we use the control function approach proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and
Frazer (2015) (henceforth, ACF). We use intermediate input (materials) as a
proxy variable to express production efficiency ln φjgt as a function of the mate-
rials, capital and labour being used, and identify θg αg and θg (1 − αg). Except for
productivity, any other factors that move the quality unit output will operate
through the input channel by increasing the input requirements. In the appendix,
we describe in detail the algorithm for implementing the control function
approach with the intermediate inputs (or materials) as the proxy variable. The
estimation delivers the updated estimates of ln φc njgt þ1, by nþ1g , and ca nþ1g .
If the following convergence condition is not met, we repeat Step 1 to Step 4.
max b nacng þ1 bfj - yg a n b n 1 by nþ1 c nþ1 n ng g jy þj; g ð1- acg Þ - yg ð1-cag Þjg < tol
tol is set to be 0.0001. Once convergence is achieved, we repeat Step 1 and
Step 2 to generate the final estimate of product quality lnzjkgt.
We implement the iteration procedure for each HS 4-digit product and obtain
estimates of ln zjkgt for each Chinese export j selling product g in each destination
k in year t.5 Distinct from the quality estimated using the demand-side approach,
ln zjkgt is comparable across destinations and years. This property allows us to
construct a quality index that captures the quality shocks over time.
To ensure the qualities across different products are comparable, we normalize
the estimated quality by subtracting ln zjkgt from the “reference quality level”
in its own product category, which we define as the 5 per cent quantile of the
quality distribution of product g in the year when product g first appears in the
sample:6
qualjkgt ¼ ln zjkgt - ln z 5%g0 ð2:15Þ
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3. Data and estimation
In this section, we first describe the micro-level data used to estimate export
quality for Indonesia and China. We then present the estimation results, including
the parameter estimates and several systematic variations in export quality across
firms and destinations.
3.1. Data
Our micro-level data involve both firm-level production data and product-level
trade data. From the firm-level production data, we obtain information, among
others, firm identity, total output, labour, capital stock and intermediate inputs.
From the product-level trade data, we obtain information, among others, firm iden-
tity, product classification, destination country, export value and quantity.
3.1.1. Indonesian data
The Indonesian firm-level production data are from the Manufacturing Survey of
Large and Medium-sized Firms (Survey Industry, or SI), which we name the
Indonesian Firm Dataset (IFD), issued by Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Sta-
tistik, or BPS). The survey is conducted every year and covers all manufacturers
in Indonesia with over 20 employees. The data period that we have access to is
from 2008 to 2012. The IFD dataset contains necessary firm-level information on,
among others, output, expenses on domestic materials and imported materials,
capital, the number of employees, domestic sales, export and import status, the
shares of exports and imports and other firm characteristics. All firms are classi-
fied according to ISIC revision 4, at the 4-digit industry level.
Indonesian product-level trade data are also available from 2008 to 2012. This
dataset is also provided by Statistics Indonesia. The product-level trade data
records information on domestic sales, export dollar value, export quantity, des-
tination and product category up to HS 10-digits for each firm in each year. We
aggregate each firm’s export value (converted to Indonesian Rupiah) and quantity
to each destination in each year to the HS 2007 6-digit level since the HS 6-digit
level is the most disaggregated product level compatible across countries.
One important note is that the firm’s identity numbers in the Indonesian
product-level trade data are of the same coding system as those in the IFD
dataset. Therefore, we can readily match the product-level information with the
SI dataset using the firm identity number (Kode Identitas Pendirian Usaha,
PSID), which is also cross-checked by a unique tax number, address and
phone number.
3.1.2. Chinese data
The Chinese firm-level production data are collected and maintained by China’s
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). We refer to the dataset as the Chinese Firm
Dataset (CFD). The dataset covers all state-owned industrial firms and all
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non-state-owned industrial firms with annual sales exceeding a certain threshold
(RMB 5 million from 1998 to 2010 and RMB 20 million from 2011 to 2013).
Therefore, the CFD dataset consists of large and medium-sized enterprises.7
The dataset records comprehensive production information (gross output,
material inputs, employment, export sales and other firm characteristics) and
financial information (assets, fixed assets and other variables). The dataset
spans from 1998 to 2013. All firms are classified according to the China Indus-
trial Classification (CIC) at the 4-digit level, which is comparable to the ISIC
4-digit industries.
We acknowledge the shortcomings of the CFD according to Brandt et al.
(2012) and Feenstra et al. (2014). A part of the sample in the CFD suffers
from missing or misleading information. Hence, we conduct a data-filtering pro-
cedure before using the data. Following Yu (2015), we delete observations that
have missing values for assets, the net value of fixed assets, sales, gross output
or the firm’s identity number; have greater values of current assets than total
assets; have greater values of fixed assets than total assets; have greater values
of the net value of fixed assets than total assets; or have an establishment
month less than 1 or greater than 12.
The Chinese product-level trade dataset comes from the General Administra-
tion of Customs of China (Chinese Customs dataset, CC). The CC dataset
records information on the export dollar value, export quantity, destination,
product category up to the HS 8-digit level and export mode for each exporter.
The time span we have access to is from 2000 to 2013. As noted by Yu
(2015) and Dai et al. (2016), in China, processing exports possess entirely differ-
ent production features than ordinary exports. To avoid unnecessary complica-
tions induced by the mixture of export modes, we keep only ordinary exports
in our sample. We then combine each firm’s export value and volume to the
HS 2007 6-digit level for each destination in each year before constructing
China’s firm-product-year-level export quality.
One point worth noting is that the CC dataset and the CFD dataset have differ-
ent coding systems for the firm identity numbers. We therefore follow Yu (2015)
and Dai et al. (2016) to match the two datasets using each firm’s Chinese name as
well as the zip code and the last seven digits of the phone number.
3.2. Estimation results
The matched dataset for Indonesia and China contains all the variables needed for
the calculation of export quality. The firm-level number of employees, Ljt, and
materials inputs, Mjt, are available. The firm-level capital stock Kjt for Indonesia
is directly available from the Indonesian dataset, and the firm-level capital stock
for China can be constructed from the Chinese dataset via the perpetual inventory
method proposed by Brandt et al. (2012).8 Firm j’s FOB export sales and quantity
of product g to destination k in year t, Rjkgt* and qjkgt*, respectively, are also
available.
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We need an initial guess of ln φc 0 0jgt , by 0g andcag to initialise the estimation. The
initial guess of the production efficiency, ln
0
φcjgt , is obtained by estimating equa-
tion (3.1) for each CIC 2-digit industry separately using the ACF algorithm:
ln Rjt
* ¼ ln φ Initialjt þ rK ln Kjt þ rL ln Ljt ð3:1Þ
where we take ln φc 0 ln φ Initial. We can then obtain the estimated ln φc 0jgt ¼ jt jgt , r̂K ,
and r̂L. The initial estimated ca 0g is computed as
ac0 r̂Kg ¼ r̂K þ r̂L
For by 0g , Feenstra and Romalis (2014) have estimates for each SITC 4-digit
level product. We map their estimated values into the HS 6-digit level to generate
y FRg as initial values for θg.
With the initialization, the estimation is carried out for each HS 2007 4-digit
level for Indonesia and China. Table 8.1a presents the distribution of the esti-
mated θ for Indonesia and China separately. There are 307 HS 4-digit products
for Indonesia and 750 HS 4-digit products for China in the sample. The mean
and median values of the distribution concentrate around 0.55, while the first
and third quartiles are around 0.48 and 0.62, respectively. The standard deviation
reveals heterogeneity of θ, reflecting technology differences across products.
Although the estimation is conducted for the two countries separately, we still
document considerable similarity in technology given a particular product across
the two countries. Figure 8.2 presents the scatter plot of θIDN and θCHN. The
cross-sectional correlation is 0.49. The high correlation between θIDN and θCHN
suggests that the technology to produce quality for a particular product is
highly correlated across the two countries.
Table 8.1a Summary of theta
Variable Observations Mean Median 75% quantile 25% quantile Std dev.
θIDN 307 0.566 0.558 0.640 0.480 0.127
θCHN 750 0.553 0.542 0.609 0.489 0.104
Note: θIDN stands for the estimated values obtained using the Indonesian data, while θCHN stands for
the estimated values obtained using the Chinese data, both at the HS 4-digit level.
Source: Authors.
As unit value has been used to measure quality in a large number of previous
studies, we first investigate how our measured quality varies with unit value. Spe-
cifically, we estimate the following specification:
ln uvjkgt ¼ b1 . ln zjkgt þ b2 . ln zjkgt x Diffg þ mkgt þ εjkgt ð3:2Þ
We introduce an interaction term of our measured quality and a dummy indi-
cating whether product g is differentiated. The definition of Diffg follows Rauch
(1999).10 β1 is expected to be positive, while β2 is also expected to be positive.
The intuition is that among differentiated products, the variation in price
should be more informative for the variation in quality.
Table 8.1b reports the results that examine the correlation between unit value
and the measured quality using Indonesian data. Both β1 and β2 are estimated to
be positive at the 1 per cent significance level. This suggests that our measured
quality is positively associated with unit value, and such a positive correlation
is stronger for differentiated goods than for homogeneous goods. Table 8.1c
reports similar results using Chinese data.
We next proceed to investigate the cross-sectional variations of ln zjkgt
along different dimensions. We first focus on the quality variations within a
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Figure 8.2 Theta comparison: Indonesia versus China
Source: Authors.
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ln zjkgt ¼ b0 . Dkt þ mjgt þ εjkgt ð3:3Þ
We pay particular attention to the vector of destination attributes, Dkt, where we
include the log per capita income, ln GDPpckt, and log population, ln popkt, of
that destination in a year. We also include the geographic association between
the destination and the source country, such as the log bilateral distance
Table 8.1b Quality and unit value, Indonesia 2008–2012
Dependent variable: ln uvjkgt (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln zjkgt
Diffg














































Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors.
Table 8.1c Quality and unit value, China 2000–2013
Dependent variable: ln uvjkgt (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln zjkgt 1.066
*** 1.068*** 1.203*** 1.200***




ln zjkgt × Diffg 0.199*** 0.192*** 0.030*** 0.033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year FEs No Yes Yes Yes
Product FEs No No Yes Yes
Product-destination-year FEs No No No Yes
Number of observations 7,639,763 7,639,763 7,639,763 7,639,763
R-squared 0.880 0.882 0.965 0.972
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors.
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Firm-product-year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 107,412 109,025 107,034 107,034
R-squared 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors.
ln distk, a dummy indicating whether the destination is a landlocked country, and
a dummy indicating the contiguity between the destination and the source
country. The inclusion of firm-product-year fixed effects, μjgt, ensures that our
comparison is made across markets by holding firms, products, and years fixed.
Table 8.2a presents the estimation results of equation (3.3) for Indonesia, with
the complete specification in the final column. ln GDPpckt is positively associated
with quality, consistent with our model prediction and the general hypothesis that
higher-income countries demand high-quality goods because they have higher
tastes for quality. Similar facts are also documented by Hallak (2006), Feenstra
and Romalis (2014), and Manova and Zhang (2012). The population size,
ln popkt, on the other hand, is negatively associated with quality. This is in con-
trast to any of the theories predicting the scale effect of market size on quality
upgrading and might suggest that the fixed cost for quality upgrading, if any,
is not paid for each market. An alternative interpretation could be that larger
markets are associated with lower per-unit trade costs due to the possibility
that the transportation and distribution margins are decreasing in market size.
Turning to the geographic variables, we find evidence supporting the existence
of “Washington apple effects”. Namely, better-quality goods are normally
shipped to farther destinations associated with higher per-unit trade costs. A
1 per cent increase in bilateral distance increases quality by 0.018 per cent,
which is aligned with the finding of Hummels and Skiba (2004), Baldwin and
Harrigan (2011) and Manova and Zhang (2012), and also consistent with the
prediction of the model presented in Section 2. Under a higher unit trade cost
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Table 8.2a Quality across destinations, Indonesia 2008–2012














Firm-product-year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 7,627,008 7,696,988 7,608,761 7,608,761
R-squared 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Authors.
(longer distance), a firm optimally chooses higher quality for each physical unit to
avoid incurring shipping costs out of the cost-reduction motive. The landlocked
and contiguity dummies have the right signs but are not significant.
Table 8.2b reports the estimation results of equation (3.3) for the Chinese
sample. Again, Chinese firms tend to ship better-quality goods to destinations
with higher per capita income. Meanwhile, population size is again negatively
correlated with quality. It is also worth noting that the magnitudes of the quality
elasticities with respect to income and population size in the Indonesian sample
are close to those obtained in the Chinese sample. The geographical barriers to
trade exhibit a different although broadly consistent picture. Despite that the
log bilateral distance is not systematically associated with the quality level
shipped (and the elasticity with respect to distance is virtually 0), a landlocked
destination is significantly associated with higher quality, which is in general
consistent with the rationale that quality should be increasing in per-unit
trade cost.
We next turn to the quality variations across firms. We examine whether firm
size and quality are positively correlated. We estimate the following specification:
ln zjkgt ¼ b1 . ln Rjkgt þ b2 . FIEjt þ b3 . SOEjt þ mkgt þ εjkgt ð3:4Þ
We introduce destination-product-year fixed effects to restrict the comparison
across firms. ln Rjkgt is the sales of product g in k by firm j in year t. FIEjt and
SOEjt are dummies suggesting whether a firm is foreign owned or government
owned.
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Table 8.2b Quality across destinations, China 2000–2013
Dependent variable: ln zjkgt (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln Rjkgt 0.044
*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.036***







Year FEs Yes No Yes No
Product FEs Yes No Yes No
Product-destination-year FEs No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 109,795 109,795 109,795 109,795
R-square 0.629 0.629 0.842 0.842
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
FIEjt equals 1 if the foreign share is larger than 50% and 0 otherwise. SOEjt equals 1 if the central and
local government share is larger than 50% and 0 otherwise.
Source: Authors.
Table 8.3a reports the estimation results of equation (3.4) for the Indonesian
sample. Within a destination-product-year cell, higher quality is associated with
larger sales, consistent with the conjecture that more productive firms are more
likely to produce high-quality goods. Meanwhile, foreign-invested enterprises
(FIEs) are associated with high-quality goods, while state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) are associated with low-quality goods.
Table 8.3b reports the estimation results of equation (3.4) for the Chinese
sample. Again, larger firms are systematically associated with high-quality
goods, while foreign-owned firms and SOEs are both more likely to produce
high-quality goods.
To summarize, the estimated qualities show cross-sectional variations that are
consistent with previous theories and empirical findings. Within a firm, high-
quality goods are more likely to be shipped to high-income and farther destina-
tions, while within a destination, firms with larger sales are more likely to
produce high-quality goods.
4. Evolution of export quality: Indonesia and China
In this section, we describe the evolution of export quality for Indonesia and
China. Due to data limitations, the Indonesian sample spans from 2008 to
2012, while the Chinese sample spans from 2000 to 2013. We then continue to
document the quality evolution by different ownership, industries and destina-
tions. We finally conduct a dynamic decomposition to attribute the aggregate
quality fluctuations into various margins.
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Table 8.3a Quality and ownership, Indonesia 2008–2012
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Table 8.3b Quality and ownership, China 2000–2013
Dependent variable: ln zjkgt (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln R *** ***jkgt 0.056
*** 0.057 0.059 0.060***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




Year FEs Yes No Yes No
Product FEs Yes No Yes No
Product-destination-rear FEs No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 7,904,893 7,904,893 7,904,893 7,904,893
R-squared 0.583 0.585 0.689 0.690
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
FIEjt equals 1 if a firm registered as a ‘foreign-invested firm’ or a ‘Hong Kong/Macau/Taiwan-invested
firm’ and 0 otherwise. SOEjt equals 1 if a firm registers as a ‘state-owned firm’ and 0 otherwise.
Source: Authors.
Prior to proceeding with our descriptive analysis, we conduct the following
normalization for each HS 2007 6-digit product to ensure the comparability
between different products. Specifically,
qualjkgt ln zjkgt - ln z5%¼ g0 ð4:1Þ
According to equation (4.1), we subtract the log quality by its “reference
quality”, which is the 5 per cent quantile of the quality distribution of HS 6-
digit product g in the initial year when g first appears in the sample. The normal-
ized log quality, qualjkgt, is thus the percentage premium/discount with respect to
the ‘reference quality’. We use qualjkgt in the following analysis.
4.1. The evolution of the overall distribution
We first present the evolution of the quality distribution over time for Indonesia
and China. Table 8.4a reports the distribution of qualjkgt for the Indonesian
sample by year. The whole distribution of the Indonesian export quality experi-
ences an abrupt drop from 2008 to 2009. The mean and median values continue
to drop from 2009 to 2010 and start to pick up from 2010 to 2012. The drop in the
quality distribution is likely to have been induced by the global financial crisis in
2008, and its effect seems persistent. During the whole sample period, the mean
and median quality drop by 21 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively.
The evolution of the standard deviation also reveals substantial heterogeneity
in the quality evolution. It is worth noting that the standard deviation increases
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Table 8.4a Quality distribution, Indonesia 2008–2012
Year Obs. Mean Median 75% quantile 25% quantile Std dev.
2008 15,623 1.029 0.754 1.382 0.272 1.130
2009 21,279 0.853 0.615 1.280 0.120 1.298
2010 22,331 0.803 0.548 1.333 0.046 1.359
2011 24,255 0.805 0.578 1.353 0.031 1.396
2012 26,260 0.810 0.602 1.360 0.052 1.390
Source: Authors.
Table 8.4b Quality distribution, China 2000–2013
Year Obs. Mean Median 75% quantile 25% quantile Std dev.
2000 131,098 1.217 1.072 1.677 0.550 1.018
2001 160,494 1.242 1.111 1.714 0.579 1.055
2002 232,899 1.242 1.105 1.704 0.588 1.057
2003 303,798 1.247 1.111 1.724 0.587 1.073
2004 478,296 1.293 1.151 1.772 0.621 1.092
2005 567,975 1.335 1.191 1.817 0.664 1.109
2006 672,284 1.383 1.232 1.882 0.684 1.156
2007 618,598 1.371 1.210 1.881 0.650 1.189
2008 716,510 1.444 1.267 1.968 0.689 1.249
2009 761,432 1.449 1.275 2.007 0.666 1.295
2010 739,582 1.470 1.297 2.038 0.689 1.302
2011 885,174 1.493 1.303 2.063 0.684 1.374
2012 823,269 1.558 1.351 2.184 0.687 1.448
2013 813,484 1.588 1.360 2.218 0.702 1.480
Source: Authors.
from 1.13 in 2008 to 1.39 in 2012. The evolutions of the 75 per cent and 25
per cent quantiles suggest that the upper tail of the quality distribution starts its
recovery soon from 2009 to 2010, while the lower tail of the quality distribution
keeps declining during 2008–2011. The distinct and divergent evolutions of the
upper tail and lower tail give rise to the growing dispersion of Indonesian
exports. Table 8.4b presents the quality distribution of China’s exports from
2000 to 2013. Before 2007, the whole distribution keeps on improving, with
the mean and median growing by around 16 per cent. The whole distribution
decreases by 1.2 per cent to 2.2 per cent in 2007 and starts to grow again until
2013. From 2000 to 2013, the mean and median quality grow by 37 per cent
and 29 per cent, respectively.
The dispersion within each year also increases as time goes by, from 1.02 in
2000 to 1.48 in 2013. Again, this is due to the fact that the upper tail of the dis-
tribution is growing faster than the lower tail. From 2000 to 2007, the 75 per cent
quantile increases by 21 per cent, while the 25 per cent quantile only increases by
Table 8.5a Quality distribution by ownership, Indonesia 2008–2012
Year Private SOE FIE
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
2008 8,953 0.938 0.752 62 0.571 0.532 6,608 1.157 0.759
2009 12,269 0.761 0.595 36 0.741 0.343 8,974 0.978 0.655
2010 13,085 0.709 0.532 48 0.482 0.200 9,198 0.937 0.589
2011 14,171 0.699 0.521 58 0.460 0.049 10,026 0.956 0.731
2012 15,874 0.740 0.586 98 0.342 0.256 10,288 0.922 0.657
Source: Authors.
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10 per cent. If we focus on the whole sample period, then the 75 per cent quantile
grows by 54 per cent, while the 25 per cent quantile grows by 15 per cent. While
these exercises simply display the evolution of the distribution of the normalized
qualities, qualjkgt, across years, we have not explored the driving forces behind
these evolutions. In Section 4.5, we decompose these aggregate variations
across years into the intensive and extensive margins and discuss which
margin plays the main role.
4.2. Evolution of different ownerships
In this subsection, we divide the sample for each country into different owner-
ships and examine whether there are different trends for different types of
firms. We divide the sample into three groups: private firms, SOE firms and
FIE firms.
Table 8.5a shows the over-time variations for Indonesia. In 2008, the start of
the period, the quality ranking is FIEs > private firms > SOEs. Since the
number of observations for SOEs is fewer than 100 in the sample period, we
focus on the comparison between private firms and FIE firms.
Both private firms and FIE firms exhibit a U-shaped trajectory during the
sample period. However, although the gap between the median qualities
widens during the period as FIE increases its relative quality premium to
private firms, the quality gap between mean qualities decreases. This suggests
that the upper tail for the private firms grows faster than that for FIE firms,
while the rest of the quality distribution for private firms grows more slowly.
Table 8.5b reports the results for China. All of the three types keep growing
during the sample period but experience a drop during the global financial
crisis (2008–2010). From 2000 to 2013, the median export qualities for private
firms, SOE firms and FIE firms grow by 25 per cent, 33 per cent, and 39
per cent, respectively. FIE remains the highest quality, and the quality premium
of FIE relative to the other two types of firms widens during the sample
period. SOE firms start with the lowest quality but end up with both higher
mean and median qualities than private firms. The role of the extensive margin
might account for the differences in the trends for private firms and SOE firms.
Year Private SOE FIE
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
2000 27,068 1.134 0.997 23,684 1.134 0.916 80,346 1.269 1.140
2001 45,314 1.113 0.991 20,114 1.143 0.949 95,066 1.323 1.196
2002 75,550 1.120 0.982 20,286 1.180 0.993 137,063 1.318 1.186
2003 108,411 1.120 0.977 18,681 1.162 0.989 176,706 1.333 1.205
2004 182,129 1.181 1.035 14,084 1.204 0.992 282,083 1.369 1.230
2005 225,292 1.239 1.084 12,356 1.196 1.016 330,327 1.406 1.266
2006 272,280 1.290 1.128 10,539 1.282 1.055 389,465 1.451 1.304
2007 275,726 1.298 1.115 5,940 1.303 1.035 336,932 1.431 1.288
2008 331,362 1.362 1.158 4,937 1.520 1.216 380,211 1.515 1.357
2009 359,081 1.343 1.154 5,614 1.542 1.320 396,737 1.544 1.379
2010 330,323 1.350 1.168 6,976 1.478 1.189 402,283 1.569 1.405
2011 468,642 1.404 1.196 5,610 1.516 1.206 410,922 1.595 1.425
2012 458,509 1.453 1.232 5,531 1.618 1.231 359,229 1.691 1.500
2013 474,434 1.478 1.243 3,494 1.569 1.247 335,556 1.742 1.530
Source: Authors.
Notice that during the sample period, the observations of private firms keep
increasing, while those of SOE firms keep shrinking. This is consistent with
the Chinese government’s “grasp the large and let go of the small” strategy to
keep SOEs with exceptional performance in control while privatizing SOEs
that underperform. Because higher quality can reflect higher production effi-
ciency, the selection channel might be responsible for the rapid growth in the
mean and median export qualities of the SOE group.
4.3. Evolution of different industries
In this subsection, we restrict our attention to the quality evolution of different
types of industries. We first divide the sample for each country into labour-intensive
and capital-intensive industries. Specifically, we calculate the median capital-labour
ratio in each two-digit industry and use the median capital-labour ratio to determine
whether an industry is labour intensive or capital intensive.
Table 8.6a reports the comparison for the Indonesian sample. Notice that for
Indonesia, most of the exports are concentrated in labour-intensive sectors. As
for the over-time evolution, during 2008–2012, the mean and median export qual-
ities of labour-intensive industries drop by 24 per cent and 17 per cent, respec-
tively. The mean export quality of capital-intensive industries remains almost
constant, while the median export quality of capital-intensive industries increases
by 7 per cent.
Table 8.6b reports the same statistics for Chinese firms during 2000–
2013. Clearly, most of China’s exports shift from labour-intensive sectors to
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Table 8.5b Quality distribution by ownership, China 2000–2013
Year Labour intensive Capital intensive
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
2008 11,318 0.912 0.706 4,305 1.337 0.947
2009 16,033 0.684 0.537 5,246 1.369 0.910
2010 17,928 0.648 0.480 4,403 1.432 1.244
2011 19,484 0.671 0.512 4,771 1.351 1.141
2012 20,678 0.670 0.531 5,582 1.330 1.016
Source: Authors.
Table 8.6b Quality distribution by factor intensity, China 2000–2013
Year Labour intensive Capital intensive
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median
2000 83,635 1.203 1.086 47,463 1.241 1.045
2001 92,307 1.264 1.132 68,187 1.212 1.081
2002 96,361 1.362 1.208 136,538 1.156 1.040
2003 127,804 1.266 1.147 175,994 1.233 1.083
2004 224,188 1.407 1.243 254,108 1.191 1.065
2005 393,824 1.246 1.147 174,151 1.538 1.323
2006 321,339 1.335 1.171 350,945 1.427 1.284
2007 340,268 1.275 1.121 278,330 1.488 1.325
2008 335,304 1.400 1.235 381,206 1.483 1.294
2009 351,622 1.246 1.125 409,810 1.623 1.401
2010 403,964 1.330 1.209 335,618 1.639 1.435
2011 435,167 1.451 1.240 450,007 1.534 1.361
2012 439,920 1.466 1.298 383,349 1.663 1.413
2013 359,283 1.279 1.136 454,201 1.832 1.552
Source: Authors.
capital-intensive sectors. During the sample period, the mean and median export
qualities of labour-intensive industries grow by 7 per cent and 5 per cent, while
those of capital-intensive industries grow by 59 per cent and 51 per cent, respec-
tively. The contrast suggests that China has experienced massive transformation,
both in the composition of its export industries and in quality growth within
labour-intensive and capital-intensive industries.
Table 8.7a presents the number of observations and the median Indonesian
export quality for each ISIC rev. 4 two-digit industry in each year. In the final
column, we also calculate the gap between the 2012 median and the 2008
median. It reveals substantial heterogeneity across different industries. Consistent
with the aggregate pattern, most of the industries exhibit decreasing trends in
export quality during 2008–2012. The machinery (28), computer (26), and elec-
trical (27) industries experience the largest declines in median export quality at
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Table 8.6a Quality distribution by factor intensity, Indonesia 2008–2012
Table 8.7a Quality by ISIC 2-digit industry, Indonesia 2008–2012
ISIC 2-digit industry 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012–2008
Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Median
Food 10 1,582 0.441 2,071 0.430 2,091 0.401 2,532 0.249 3,089 0.287 −0.154
Tobacco 12 13 1.350 25 2.062 26 1.182 109 0.932 116 1.196 −0.154
Textile 13 1,981 0.501 2,608 0.434 2,343 0.248 2,146 0.255 2,466 0.283 −0.218
Apparel 14 2,284 0.662 4,291 0.344 4,740 0.253 5,568 0.410 6,373 0.505 −0.157
Leather 15 323 0.772 528 0.707 507 0.644 545 0.691 633 0.567 −0.205
Wood 16 1,228 0.694 1,284 0.519 2,104 0.440 1,603 0.375 1,280 0.450 −0.244
Paper 17 142 0.692 232 0.343 239 0.438 238 0.577 227 1.354 0.662
Printing 18 52 1.792 71 1.031 103 2.004 114 1.421 120 2.114 0.322
Chemical 20 901 0.466 1,269 0.953 1,357 1.063 1,419 1.063 1,351 1.072 0.606
Medicine 21 27 2.775 50 2.544 88 2.340 100 2.328 118 2.377 −0.398
Rubber and plastic 22 1,279 0.908 1,405 0.808 1,439 0.708 1,436 0.743 1,419 0.771 −0.137
Non-metallic 23 197 0.669 290 0.828 313 0.875 352 0.771 396 0.968 0.299
Metals 24 136 0.550 248 0.479 232 0.210 214 0.269 234 0.212 −0.338
Metal products 25 352 1.071 553 1.059 684 0.907 696 0.645 722 0.929 −0.142
Computer 26 371 1.075 587 0.476 796 0.664 796 0.123 860 0.446 −0.629
Electrical 27 413 1.577 502 2.279 473 1.753 535 1.885 457 1.150 −0.426
Machinery 28 219 1.061 271 0.638 292 0.514 253 0.682 329 0.287 −0.774
Motor 29 803 1.159 697 1.065 711 2.213 844 1.299 800 1.219 0.059
Other transportation 30 87 1.738 102 2.311 67 2.124 194 2.650 219 2.243 0.505
Furniture 31 2,622 1.052 3,340 0.786 2,972 0.906 3,663 0.940 4,180 0.876 −0.176
Other 32 594 1.157 811 1.307 709 1.071 834 0.988 828 1.114 −0.042
Note: Industries with fewer than 100 observations in each year during the sample period are not reported.
Source: Authors.
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77.4 per cent, 62.9 per cent and 42.6 per cent, respectively. The industries that
experience the largest increases in median export quality are the paper (17),
chemical (20) and other transportation (30) industries by 66.2 per cent,
60.6 per cent and 50.5 per cent, respectively.
Table 8.7b presents a similar exercise for the Chinese export quality at the CIC
two-digit industry level in each year. The final three columns present the gap
between medians: between 2007 and 2000, between 2013 and 2007, and
between 2013 and 2000. The divisions allow us to separate the quality growth
of each industry into the pre-and post-financial crisis periods. In the 2000–
2007 subsample, the printing (23), furniture (21) and special machinery (36)
industries have the largest increases in median quality, by 91.1 per cent,
79.7 per cent and 46.8 per cent, respectively. Meanwhile, the petroleum (25),
chemical fibre (28) and beverage (15) industries have the largest declines in
median quality, by 37.2 per cent, 27.1 per cent and 24.9 per cent, respectively. In
the 2007–2013 subsample, the measuring and office (42), special machinery (36)
and leather (19) industries have the largest increases in median quality by
57.4 per cent, 31.7 per cent and 30.4 per cent, respectively. Meanwhile, the petro-
leum (25), non-ferrous metals (33) and medicine (27) industries experience the
largest declines in median quality by 59.8 per cent, 26.6 per cent and 24.0
per cent, respectively.
Summarizing the whole sample period from 2000 to 2013, the evolutions of
export quality are still heterogeneous across industries. The printing (23), furni-
ture (21) and measuring and office (42) industries improve their median qualities
by 110.5 per cent, 83.6 per cent and 79.2 per cent, respectively, showing the
largest increases in median quality. Meanwhile, the petroleum (25), beverage
(15) and chemical fibre (28) industries experience the largest declines in
median quality by 97.0 per cent, 21.7 per cent and 18.0 per cent, respectively.
4.4. Quality leaders to each destination
We now turn to the cross-destination variation of export quality. Similar to Amiti
and Khandelwal (2013), we first define the weighted-average quality, qualkgt, asX
qualkgt ¼ ðvaluejkgt . qualjkgtÞ= valueskgt
s
We next define a product-destination-year dummy, leaderkgt, which defines
whether Indonesia (or China) is offering its best quality product g to destination
k in year t, namely:8< 1; if qualkgt ¼ max qualsgt
s
leaderkgt ¼ : 0; if qualkgt ¼ max qualsgt
s
Table 8.7b Quality by CIC 2-digit industry, China 2000–2013
CIC 2-digit industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median
Processing of food 13
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CIC 2-digit industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Table 8.7b (Continued) Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median
CIC 2-digit industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median
Processing of food 13 6,585 0.687 7,439 0.721 12,966 0.593 6,641 0.544 14,262 0.573
Manufacturing of food 14 6,513 0.608 7,499 0.621 6,870 0.625 7,202 0.600 8,251 0.515
Beverage 15 1,154 0.740 1,290 0.729 1,027 0.671 973 0.681 1,462 0.603
Textile 17 86,360 0.913 88,566 0.918 82,059 0.888 88,155 0.904 85,327 0.877
Apparel 18 76,319 1.248 85,979 1.283 81,399 1.290 95,233 1.289 88,843 1.278
Leather 19 20,197 1.332 22,840 1.358 20,965 1.358 22,261 1.426 22,187 1.663
Wood 20 5,686 1.270 6,008 1.239 8,659 0.935 9,727 0.935 9,869 0.957
Furniture 21 11,694 1.631 14,044 1.660 13,384 1.971 19,343 1.970 19,574 2.012
Paper 22 3,307 1.264 4,662 1.243 4,643 1.251 5,275 1.224 5,697 1.308
Printing 23 2,625 1.681 4,158 1.784 4,365 1.829 5,245 1.900 5,703 1.971
Cultural and sports 24 27,794 1.228 32,639 1.239 27,887 1.277 33,325 1.313 32,209 1.329
Petroleum 25 404 0.255 418 0.125 261 0.078 277 0.182 585 0.131
Chemical 26 23,021 0.815 28,008 0.798 20,972 0.786 23,350 0.840 29,560 0.835
Medicine 27 4,842 1.417 5,727 1.393 3,858 1.509 4,002 1.439 5,009 1.541
Chemical fibre 28 1,372 0.751 1,492 0.669 1,691 0.709 1,488 0.675 1,584 0.650
Rubber 29 6,809 1.134 8,306 1.180 7,669 1.081 8,950 1.191 10,043 1.102
Plastic 30 24,232 1.297 31,605 1.298 27,929 1.269 33,912 1.271 37,833 1.313
Non-metallic 31 25,873 0.981 31,931 1.019 27,057 0.958 30,544 0.971 33,637 0.931
Ferrous metals 32 3,130 0.549 4,992 0.472 5,100 0.445 5,484 0.504 4,562 0.405
Non-ferrous metals 33 4,275 1.054 5,485 1.032 4,595 1.028 22 1.873
Metal products 34 39,265 1.189 50,359 1.218 48,609 1.202 59,546 1.213 60,788 1.213
General machinery 35 38,448 1.390 47,206 1.498 41,922 1.494 55,000 1.574 64,656 1.575
Special machinery 36 15,444 1.821 21,157 1.876 19,168 1.870 25,654 2.008 29,398 2.017
Transportation vehicle 37 19,015 1.335 24,341 1.439 23,085 1.398 30,401 1.466 32,569 1.472
Electrical 40 42,647 1.181 52,476 1.212 46,514 1.171 61,576 1.255 71,188 1.279
Communications and computer 41 26,963 1.815 32,675 1.908 28,414 1.967 32,858 2.008 37,762 2.053
Measuring and office 42 9,848 1.402 12,291 1.566 8,912 1.633 10,647 1.707 10,959 1.841
Artwork and other 43 34,153 1.326 38,691 1.328 38,618 1.304 39,433 1.324 37,891 1.280
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CIC 2-digit industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Table 8.7b (Continued) Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median
CIC 2-digit industry 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007– 2013– 2013–
2000 2007 2000
Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Obs. Median Median Median Median
General machinery 35 67,333 1.619 77,141 1.610 75,357 1.706 79,993 1.777 0.154 0.283 0.437
Special machinery 36 32,043 2.005 38,750 1.995 41,628 2.129 46,068 2.187 0.468 0.317 0.784
Transportation vehicle 37 38,362 1.478 48,041 1.457 52,540 1.521 11,097 1.438 0.073 0.040 0.113
Electrical 40 64,628 1.236 86,232 1.264 84,580 1.305 88,437 1.381 −0.008 0.211 0.202
Communications and computer 41 40,240 2.068 51,938 2.118 51,361 2.231 55,593 2.260 0.417 0.293 0.710
Measuring and office 42 12,550 1.734 15,295 2.005 13,614 2.108 13,049 2.206 0.263 0.574 0.836
Artwork and other 43 40,457 1.313 42,184 1.334 34,803 1.318 7,933 1.481 0.080 0.178 0.257
Note: Industries with observations fewer than 100 in each year during the sample period are not reported.
Source: Authors.
Table 8.8a Destinations with the most quality leaders: Indonesia
Rank 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1 Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan
2 Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore
3 United States United States Thailand Malaysia Thailand
4 Malaysia Thailand Australia Australia Malaysia
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Figure 8.3a Quality leader versus income: Indonesia
Source: Authors.
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Finally, we calculate the log of the number of quality leaders to each destina-
tion in each year:
ln # qual leaderkt ¼ ln ð1þ SgleaderkgtÞ ð4:2Þ
We plot ln #_qual_leaderkt against ln GDPpckt for each year. Figure 8.3a pre-
sents the scatter plots and the fitted lines for Indonesia in 2008 and 2012. The
positive association between the two variables is obvious and straightforward,
and the correlation is above 0.6. The positive correlation is a confirmation of
the “preference for quality” hypothesis and is aligned with the empirical evidence
of Hallak (2006) and Feenstra and Romalis (2014).
We also show that the cross-sectional correlation between quality and destina-
tion income is rather persistent. Table 8.8a reports the top five destinations with
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Figure 8.3b Quality leader versus income: China
Source: Authors.
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2012. Japan and Singapore rank first and second, respectively, across all years,
while the United States, Malaysia, Thailand and Australia rank third, fourth
and fifth in all years. With the relative ranking of per capita income being persis-
tent during the sample period, the top destinations with the highest quality from
Indonesia also remain stable.
It may appear that the top destinations with the largest number of quality
leaders are inconsistent with our model prediction. While our model predicts
that a firm tends to offer higher quality for richer and more distant markets,
many of the top destinations listed in Table 8.8a are actually countries near Indo-
nesia. This is because the number of quality leaders reflects not only the average
quality Indonesia offers to a market but also the probability of Indonesia’s firms
selling their products in that market. If a market is rich and far away from Indo-
nesia, considering the relative cost of shipping costs to production, Indonesia will
offer higher quality products in that market relative to the other markets, condi-
tional on serving that market. As that market is distant and costly to enter, Indo-
nesia may be able to sell only a few products there, decreasing the number of
quality leaders. The number of quality leaders in a market reflects both Indone-
sia’s capability of reaching that market and Indonesia’s quality decision in that
market, conditional on reaching that market.
Now, we turn to the case of China. Figure 8.3b presents the scatter plots and
fitted line for ln #_qual_leaderkt against ln GDPpckt for 2000, 2004, 2008 and
2012. There is a strong positive correlation between these variables shown by a
correlation that is higher than 0.6 in each year.
Analogously, we present the top five destinations with the largest number of
quality leaders in Table 8.8b. Japan ranks first across the whole sample period,
while Hong Kong and the United States rank second and third. The Republic
of Korea (henceforth, South Korea) constantly ranks fourth in the whole sample,
while Singapore, Taiwan and Germany rank fifth. The ranking is also mostly per-
sistent over time.
4.5. Margins of quality evolution: a dynamic decomposition
In this subsection, we focus on decomposing the aggregate weighted average
export quality into various margins that contribute to its evolution. This calls
for a dynamic decomposition framework that appropriately measures the contri-
butions of survivors, entry, exit and the between-effect occurring among
survivors.
After surveying the literature, we adopt the dynamic Olley-Pakes decomposi-
tion (henceforth, DOPD) proposed by Melitz and Polanec (2015). With the begin-
ning period (defined by t = 1) and the ending period (defined by t = 2), we
streamline the subscript by letting s be a firm-product-destination (jkg) combina-
tion, which we call “variety”. Therefore, the aggregate weighted-average export
quality in each period, Qt, is !  !X X
Qt ¼ valuest . qualst = valuest
s s
We define the sample as three subgroups. If s is present in both t = 1 and t = 2,
then s is defined as “survivor” and s 2 S. If s is present in t = 1 and absent in
t = 2, then s is defined as “exit” and s 2 X. If s is absent in t = 1 and present
in t = 2, then s is defined as “entry” and s 2 E. Finally, G = {S, X, E}.
Table 8.8b Destinations with the most quality leaders: China
Rank 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
1 Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan
2 Hong Kong Hong Kong United States United States Hong Kong
3 United States United States Hong Kong Hong Kong United States
4 South Korea South Korea South Korea South Korea South Korea
5 Singapore Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan Germany
Source: Authors.
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Therefore, for different subgroups, G, we can define the group-specific market
share, MGt, and the weighted-average export quality, QGt: !  !X X
MGt ¼ valuest = valuest
s2G s
 !  !X X
QGt ¼ valuest . qualst = valuest
s2G s2G
Therefore, according to Melitz and Polanec (2015), Q1 and Q2 can be decom-
posed as the following:
Q1 ¼ MS1QS1 þMX 1QX 1 ¼ QS1 þMX1ðQX1 - QS1Þ
Q2 ¼ MS2QS2 þME2QE2 ¼ QS2 þME2ðQE2 - QS2Þ
The change of aggregate export quality is, therefore,
Q2 - Q1 ¼ Q Q M Q Q M Q Q 4:3|fflfflfflfflfflS2ffl{zfflfflfflfflffl- Sffl}1 þ |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflE2ð {zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflE2 - S2}Þ þ |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflX 1ð ffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflS1 - X1ffl}Þ ð Þ
Survivor Entry Exit
Equation (4.3) clearly shows that the aggregate quality upgrading comes from
three margins. The survivor margin is positive if and only if the weighted-average
quality of survivors increases. The entry margin is positive if and only if the
weighted-average quality of entry is higher than the weighted-average quality
of survivors in t = 2. Similarly, the exit margin is positive if and only if the
weighted-average quality of exit is lower than the weighted-average quality of
survivors in t = 1. The survivor margin is the intensive margin, while the sum
of the entry and exit margins is the extensive margin.
We can further decompose the intensive margin into within-variety and
between-variety margins:
QS2 - QS1 ¼ QS2 - QS1 þ Dcov ð4:4Þ
QS2 - QS1 is the gap between the means of survivors in the two periods, and
Δcov measures the contribution of market share reallocation among survivors.
Δcov is positive if and only if the market share of high-quality variety increases
across two periods.
According to equations (4.3) and (4.4), we conduct the DOPD approach for
Indonesia and China separately. We first conduct the decomposition on a year-
to-year basis, then we conduct the decomposition for the first and last years of
the sample period. We also provide a sub-period decomposition for China’s case.
Table 8.9a reports the decomposition results for Indonesia. Except for 2009–
2010, other yearly intervals in the sample all feature a decrease in the overall
weighted-average export quality. In most of the yearly intervals, the survivor
margin plays the key role, while the entry and exit margins are less important.
Turning to the whole period, the aggregate weighted-average export quality
decreases by 12.14 per cent, with the survivor margin contributing to a decrease
by 15.24 per cent. Entry contributes positively with a 5.42 per cent margin, sug-
gesting that entering varieties are on average of higher quality than continuing
varieties. The exit margin also contributes a −2.32 per cent margin, suggesting
that exiting varieties are of higher quality compared with continuing varieties.
Finally, within the survivor margin, both within-variety and between-variety con-
tribute negatively, with the within-margin accounting for nearly two-thirds of the
declining export quality in the survivor margin.
Table 8.9b reports the decomposition for China. In most of the yearly intervals,
the weighted-average export quality increases, except for 2009–2010 where a
massive drop in export quality happens due to the negative exit margin. Com-
pared with Indonesia, the roles of entry and exit are more important in the case
of China. The 2000–2007 and 2007–2013 sub-periods both feature aggregate
quality upgrading of more than 20 per cent. In both periods, the extensive
margin plays a major role in determining the aggregate quality upgrading
pattern. In 2000–2007, both entry and exit margins contribute positively, totalling
a 27.19 per cent margin. In 2007–2013, the exit margin contributes a 37.41
per cent margin, while the entry margin contributes a −13.25 per cent margin,
totalling a 24.16 per cent margin. In these two sub-periods, the survivor
margin provides slightly negative contributions, mainly due to the between-
variety effects. Summing up the whole sample period, we find that the aggregate
quality upgrading is 46.84 per cent, with entry and exit margins contributing 9.60
per cent and 24.71 per cent. Therefore, the extensive margin accounts for almost
three-quarters of the total quality upgrading. Among the 12.53 per cent contribu-
tion of the survivor margin, within-variety contributes 31.37 per cent, while the
market share reallocation mechanism deteriorates aggregate quality by 18.84
per cent.
Table 8.9a Margins of quality evolution, Indonesia 2008–2012
Begin End (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









































Note: (1) = (2) + (5) + (6), (2)
Source: Authors.
= (3) + (4).
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Table 8.9b Margins of quality evolution, China 2000–2013
Begin End (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

































































































































Note: (1) = (2) + (5) + (6), (2) = (3) + (4).
Source: Authors.
5. Concluding remarks
In this study, we first employ an approach that allows for the estimation of firm-
product-destination-year-level export quality for Indonesia and China. This
approach is based on a theory where firms determine the optimal quality for
each destination via a trade-off between the production cost and per-unit shipping
cost, by taking into account different consumers’ preferences for quality. An
increase in the shipping cost relative to the production cost thus raises the
optimal quality. Optimal quality is also higher when the consumer’s preference
for quality is stronger.
The estimated export quality is positively associated with sales across firms
within a destination and positively associated with income and geographic barri-
ers across destinations within a firm. We document the export quality evolutions
of Indonesia and China in detail. Specifically, we present the aggregate export
quality distribution over time for the two countries as well as the export
quality distribution over time by firm type and industry. We observe substantial
variation across types and industries.
We also show that better-quality goods are more likely to be sold to high-
income destinations, and the ranking in terms of quality received remains
rather stable over time. We finally decompose the aggregate weighted-average
export quality into the intensive margin and extensive margin. We find that the
intensive margin plays a major role for Indonesia, while extensive margin
plays a major role for China.
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Our estimations and descriptions generate variations in export quality along
several dimensions, and we plan to explore these facts and evidence in further
studies to identify and analyse the underlying economic mechanisms that deter-
mine the variation in export quality.
Notes
Acknowledgement: We thank Gene Grossman and Martin Richardson for their constructive
comments on earlier drafts. Disclaimer: The study was conducted when Lili Yan Ing was
with Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). The views expressed
here do not represent views of the Ministry of Trade of Indonesia.
1 Hallak (2006), Bastos and Silva (2010), Auer and Chaney (2009) and Alessandria and
Kaboski (2011).
2 We assume that ljk is a combination of various inputs, for example, capital, labour and
intermediate inputs. w is then defined as the composite input price associated with the
combination of these inputs. In a later section, we describe how to construct the empir-
ical counterpart of ljk and the associated w, while presently, we simply regard ljk as a
composite input.
3 A lower ak suggests that market k’s consumers are more sensitive to variations in a
firm’s quality effort ljk and forces a firm to put more effort into increasing quality.
For example, compared with a poor country, a rich country may have stronger pref-
erences for apparel products made from delicate materials with fashionable styles
over basic-style apparel made of cotton.
4 The reason for specifying a “structural value-added” specification rather than a gross
output specification (where the materials enter a Cobb-Douglas production function
together with capital and labour) is that under the assumption of “scalar unobservable”
(namely, a firm’s investment or material use is a function of unobserved productivity),
without further restrictions, the gross production function cannot be identified. This
argument is shown by Bond and Soderbom (2005) for the case of a Cobb-Douglas
production function and by Gandhi et al. (2017) for more general cases.
5 In principle, we can perform the estimation for each HS 6-digit product. However,
since the average sample size for each product gets smaller when one moves from
aggregate classification to disaggregate classification, we fail to generate sensible esti-
mates for some HS 6-digit products due to insufficient observations. We therefore
choose to perform our estimation at the HS 4-digit level in order to incorporate as
much trade volume as possible while at the same time preserving the substantial tech-
nology variations across products.
6 For example, before normalization, we cannot compare a pencil’s quality with a car’s
quality. After such a normalization, we can at least say a pencil’s quality ranking in its
own category is higher than a car’s quality ranking in its own category.
7 We admit the limitation that some small manufacturers that also export may not be
included in the CFD sample. However, since most of the trade volume comes from
large manufacturers, we assume that neglecting those small exporters does not give
rise to systematic measurement errors on aggregate export quality.
8 For the sample period where firm-level depreciation is available, we use the actual
reported depreciation in the perpetual inventory method. For the sample period
where firm-level depreciation is missing (2008–2010), we calculate the depreciation
rate at the CIC 2-digit industry level (increase in accumulated depreciation of
the whole industry in that year divided by the fixed asset at the original price of the
whole industry in that year) and use this depreciation rate to calculate the firm-level
depreciation in order to conduct the perpetual inventory method.
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9 We admit that such an approximation can be subject to measurement errors because
the input share of a product (to a market) is not necessarily proportional to the
revenue share of that product (to that market). Therefore, when estimating the produc-
tion function of quality units, we are exploiting the variations in input uses across
firms to identify parameters.
10 If a product is defined as “differentiated” by Rauch (1999), we let Diffg = 1. If a
product is defined as “reference-priced” or “open exchange”, we let Diffg = 0. We
use “conservative” classification in this practice.
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Appendix
Step 4 in estimating export quality
We propose a five-step iteration procedure to estimate quality. Among the five steps,
step four includes an estimation of equation (2.14) using a two-stage control func-
tion approach proposed by ACF (2015) to mitigate the simultaneity problem.
ln Qjkt
* *- ð1- yÞ ln qjkt ¼ ya ln Kjkt þ yð1- aÞ ln Ljkt þ y ln φjt þ εjkt
We describe this approach in detail in this appendix. Throughout this appendix,
the two-stage estimation is done for each HS 4-digit product separately, so we
abstract the subscript g for concision.
We first rewrite equation (2.14) as (A1):
yjkt ¼ bkkjkt þ blljkt þ ojt þ εjkt ðA1Þ
yjkt is ln Qjkgt* − (1 − θg) ln qjkgt*. kjkt and ljkt are simply the log forms of Kjkt
and Ljkt. ωjt is (βk + βl) ln φjt, and εjkt is the mean-zero error term due to measure-
ment errors or idiosyncratic output shocks that are realized after a firm has made
all its input decisions. Both ωjt and εjkt are unobserved.
ωjt is likely to be correlated with kjkt and ljkt and, therefore, induces endogene-
ity. We follow ACF (2015) to introduce an observable input demand proxy var-
iable mjkt which satisfies equation (A2):
mjkt ¼ gðojt; kjkt; ljktÞ ðA2Þ
Equation (A2) states that conditional on kjkt and ljkt, intermediate input mjkt is
the function of ωjt. We impose the following assumption:
Assumption A1. Conditional on kjkt and ljkt, mjkt = g(ωjt, kjkt, ljkt) is invertible
in ωjt.
Under the assumption that g(ωjt, kjkt, ljkt) is conditionally invertible, we can
transform ωjt into (A3):
ojt
-1¼ go ðmjkt; kjkt; ljktÞ ðA3Þ
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jkgt ¼ ln MR jtjt*
Mjk is the absolute value of real intermediate inputs, which is obtained from the
Indonesian and Chinese firm-level data. Rjkgt* is the total value of sales of firm jP
of product g to destination k in year t, while Rjt
* *¼ k;g Rjkgt .
We plug (A2) into (A1) to obtain
yjkt ¼ bkk b l þ g-1jkt þ l jkt o ðmjkt; kjkt; ljktÞ þ εjkt
ðmjkt; kjkt; l Þ þ ε
ðA4Þ¼ F jkt jkt
We use third-order polynomials of (mjkt, kjkt, ljkt) to non-parametrically approx-
imate Φ(mjkt, kjkt, ljkt). Therefore, estimating equation (A4) generates an estimatedcF ^jkt ¼ Fðmjkt; kjkt; ljktÞ of Φjkt. This completes the first-stage estimation.
Before we proceed to the second-stage estimation, we specify that the produc-
tion efficiency ln φjt follows an AR (1) process, which is equivalent to the claim
that ωjt follows an AR (1) process:
ojt ¼ rojt þ-1 djt
δjt is the innovation on production efficiency orthogonal to ωjt−1. Therefore, the
following moment condition holds:
E½djt þþεjkt j Ijkt-1] ¼ 0
E½yjkt - bkkjkt - bl ljkt - rðFjkt 1 - bkkjkt 1 - bl ljkt 1Þ j Ijkt 1] ¼ 0 ðA5Þ- - - -
We define yjt, Φjt−1, kjt(t−1) and ljt(t−1):X X
yjt ¼ yjkt; Fjt ¼-1 Fjkt-1
k2Ojt k2OjtX X
kjt t 1 ¼ k l ¼ lð - Þ jktðt-1Þ; jtðt-1Þ jktðt-1Þ
k2Ojt k2Ojt
Ωjt is the set of destinations to which firm j is selling (product g) to in year t.
Summing equation (A5) within each firm-year combination across destination k
generates the following moment condition:
E½yjt - bkkjt - blljt - rðFjt-1 - bkkjt 1 - Þ j- bl ljt-1 Ijt ] ¼ 0 ðA6Þ-1
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Following ACF (2015), we specify Ijt−1 = {1, kjt,ljt,Φjt−1,kjt−1,ljt−1}. Therefore,
we use non-linear least squares to estimate equation (A7) to complete the second-
stage estimation.
yjt ¼ bkkjt þ bl ljt þ rðFjt 1 - bkk -1 - b jt-1Þ þ- jt ll xjt ðA7ÞP P
xjt ¼ djt k 1ðk 2 OjtÞ þ k εjkt. 1(k 2 Ωjt) is a dummy variable indicating2Ojt
whether destination k is among one of the destinations where firm j sells product
g in year t. This procedure jointly estimates βk and βl. So θ = βk + βl and α = βk/θ.
We can proceed to calculate the estimated value for ln φjt, as in equation (A8):
y b̂ k b̂ l
ln φ jtP- k jt - l jtjt ¼ 1ðk 2 O ðA8y Þk jtÞ
We implement this control function approach for each HS 4-digit product to
obtain θg, αg, and ln φjgt.
Lorenzo Caliendo, Ferdinando Monte and
Esteban Rossi-Hansberg
1. Introduction
Exporting affects the organization of production. In order to produce at the scale
needed to access export markets, firms need to hire teams of workers with a dif-
ferent set of skills, pay them different wages and give them different roles within
the organization. In this chapter we explore how a firm’s organization reacts to
new or improved export opportunities. Guided by the theory of knowledge-
based hierarchies,1 we understand organization as the characteristics and roles
played by the workers within a firm. Hence, we explore how the number of man-
agement layers, as well as the number of workers and wages in each of these
layers, change when the firm starts exporting or expands its presence in
foreign markets. Our goal is to document these relationships and attempt to ratio-
nalize them using available theories. Given that these reorganizations have impor-
tant implications for the size, hiring practices and productivity of exporting firms,
the findings are relevant to understand the overall effects of trade liberalizations,
as demonstrated by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012, from now on CRH).
We follow the work in Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015, from now
on CMRH) that uses matched employer-employee data to document empirically
how firms change their organization when they grow. The paper identifies four hier-
archical layers of the firm using a French classification of occupations (PCS) based
on an occupation’s hierarchical position in the firm. That paper shows that firms
actively manage their organizational structure. When they grow substantially,
they reorganize by adding a layer of management,2 lowering average wages in
all preexisting layers of the firm (including the layer of workers), and hiring
more employees in all of these layers. In contrast, when they grow little, they
tend not to reorganize, and so they grow by adding workers in preexisting layers
and increasing average wages. This behavior can be rationalized using the
theory of knowledge-based hierarchies. Firms that grow substantially want to econ-
omize on costly knowledge by concentrating it into a few managers and lowering
the knowledge of workers that do more routine tasks. Hence they add a manage-
ment layer and lower skill, and consequently average wages, in preexisting
layers. Firms that grow little do not find this change profitable since it requires a
more costly management structure, so they prefer to grow by hiring more and
DOI: 10.4324/9781351061544-9
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better workers and managers in preexisting layers that require less managerial help.
In follow up work, using Portuguese data, Caliendo, Mion, Opromolla and Rossi-
Hansberg (2015) confirm these findings for an additional country, but more impor-
tantly, show that they are associated with changes in quantity-based measures of
productivity of the firm. So, reorganizations that add layers also increase the
ability of the firm to transform inputs into physical units of output.
None of our work so far, however, has studied empirically the relationship
between organization and exporting. This is our aim in this chapter using the
same French dataset that we used in CMRH. This data set covers the vast major-
ity of French manufacturing firms during the period 2002–2007.3 We start by
exploring the organization of exporters relative to non-exporters. Exporters are
larger, employ more hours of labor, pay higher wages, and have more layers.
Firms with more layers are much more likely to be exporters. For example,
among firms with three layers of management (the highest number of layers
given that they also have a layer of workers), 90.2 per cent of the value added
is generated by firms that also export. All of these facts are consistent with the
standard finding in the literature that exporters are larger and are also consistent
with CRH where larger firms have weakly more layers. Hence, it is perhaps more
interesting to turn our attention to new exporters.
We find that new exporters are more likely to add layers than non-exporters
(and symmetrically firms that exit exporting are more likely to drop layers). In
addition, new exporters that add layers decrease average wages in existing
layers while exporters that do not add layers increase them. The well-known
finding (Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1997, and Verhoogen 2008) that firms that
become exporters pay higher wages is the result of a composition effect. In
fact, the firms that expand significantly as a result of exporting, namely, the
ones that add layers, reduce average wages. Furthermore, they do so at all pre-
existing layers. In contrast, new exporters that do not change layers barely
expand but do increase wages. Since there are more new exporters that do not
change layers than there are exporters that do change layers, the average effect
on wages is positive but small. The result is relevant for the conceptualization
of new exporters. The notion that new exporters expand and increase the
wages of their employees either because they upgrade their technology (and so
the marginal product of labor is higher) or because profits are higher and they
share them with workers (via a wage sharing or bargaining mechanism) is at
odds with our data.4 The data are consistent with a view in which new exporters
that expand significantly change their organizational design and economize on
knowledge by employing less knowledgeable employees who are paid less.
The findings above do not document the causal effect of exporting on organi-
zation, but rather the fact that exporting and organizational change are related in
the data. To try to measure the causal effect of exporting on organization, we
exploit pre-sample variation in the destination composition of a firm’s exports,
in conjunction with real exchange rate variation across countries, to build an
instrument for exports. Similar instruments were used by Bertrand (2004), Bram-
billa, Lederman, and Porto (2012), Revenga (1992) and Verhoogen, (2008). We
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then use this instrument to evaluate if the probability of adding layers is causally
related to increases in exports. We find that the first stage is somewhat noisy and
weak across the subsamples of firms with different numbers of layers, but the
second stage shows that for firms with one, two or three layers exporting does
increase the probability of adding layers significantly. The result is not significant
for firms with four layers, perhaps due to the fact that our identification of layers
in the data allows for a maximum of only four layers so those firms can only
reduce the number of layers. Perhaps more interesting is that, using this instru-
ment, the causal effect of increases in the number of layers due to better
access to foreign markets is to reduce wages in preexisting layers and to increase
the number of employees in all of them. This holds for all layers in firms with any
number of layers. More work is needed to establish this causality definitively, and
we discuss several other papers that have tried to do so with other samples of
firms and countries in Section 5, but this evidence is, we believe, encouraging.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reproduces some of the
theory in CRH to clarify the logic behind the relationships that we look for in the
data. Section 3 presents the empirical description of the relationship between orga-
nization and exporting. Section 4 presents our causal results and Section 5 reviews
the related literature using occupations to understand the organization of the firm
and its relationship to foreign markets in a variety of countries. Section 6 concludes.
2. Exports and reorganization: theoretical implications
In this section we discuss briefly the framework in CRH. Given that the purpose
of the current chapter is to describe and understand the data, we present the theory
in its simplest form and do not discuss all the details fully. The interested reader is
directed to CRH for the more technical discussions and all proofs of the results.
We consider an economy with N identical agents. Agents acquire knowledge in
order to solve the problems they encounter during production. Agents that acquire
more knowledge command higher wages according to a function w(z) with
@w(z)/ 5@z > 0.
Firms are started and organized by a CEO. She pays a fixed entry cost f E in
units of labor to design her product. After doing so, she obtains a demand
draw α from a known distribution G(α). The draw α determines the level of
demand of the firm. If the entrepreneur decides to produce, she pays a fixed
cost f in units of labor. Production requires labor and knowledge. Agents
employed in a firm act as production workers (layer ℓ = 0) or managers (layers
ℓ ‘> 1). We denote by n , z‘L, and w‘L L; the number, knowledge, and total wage
of employees at layer ℓ = 0, 1, 2… of an organization with L layers of manage-
ment (or L + 1 layers of employees, given that we call the layer of workers layer
zero). Workers use their unit of time to generate a production possibility that can
yield one unit of output. For output to be realized, the worker needs to solve a
problem drawn from a distribution F(z) with F@(z) < 0. Workers learn how to[ ]
solve the most frequent problems, the ones in the interval 0; z0L : If the
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problem they face falls in 0; z0L ; production is realized; otherwise, they can ask a
manager one layer above how to solve the problem. Managers spend h units of
their time on each problem that gets to them. A manager at layer ℓ = 1 tries to
solve the problems workers could not solve. Hence, they learn how to solve prob-[ ]
lems in z0; z0 1L L þ zL . In general, the firm needs n‘ hn0L ¼ Lð1- FðZ‘-1L ÞÞ managersP
of layer ‘ 6ℓ, where Z‘ l 0 z
l
L ¼ L:
Let C (q; w) denote the
¼
minimum variable cost of producing q units, and CL
(q; w) the same cost if we restrict the organization to producing with L layers
of management, in an economy with an equilibrium wage function w(.). Then,
the organizational problem of the firm is given by,XL




q < F ZLð LÞn0L; ð2Þ
w‘ wðz‘L ¼ LÞ for all ‘ < L; ð3Þ
n‘ hn0 1 FðZ‘-1L ¼ L½ - L Þ] for L > ‘ > 0; ð4Þ
nLL ¼ 1: ð5Þ
So one entrepreneur, nLL ¼ 1; chooses the number of layers, L, employees at each
layer, n‘L; and the interval of knowledge that they acquire, z
‘
L, subject to the output
constraint (2), the prevailing wage function (3) and the time constraints of
employees at each layer (4).
The problem above has several implications for the internal organization of
firms as they grow. Consider first the choices z‘L and n
‘
L as functions of q, but con-
ditional on L. That is, consider a firm that decides to produce more without
changing the number of layers, that is, without reorganizing. To expand produc-
tion, the firm needs to increase either total knowledge, ZLL ; or the number of
workers, n0L: Since knowledge and the number of workers are linked through
the time constraint (4), the firm does a bit of both. The only way to have more
workers is to make them more knowledgeable so they ask less often and the
CEO can have a larger span of control. Since the knowledge of agents at different
layers is complementary, the firm does so at all layers. Hence, the number of
workers in all layers increases, as does the knowledge and, consequently,
wages of all workers. Note also that since every worker has to learn more in
order to expand the firm, the marginal cost of production is increasing in quantity
conditional on the number of layers ( 2@ CL(q;w)/ q
2@ = @MCL(q;w)/@q > 0). It is
increasingly costly to expand production in an organization with a fixed organi-
zational structure as reflected by the number of layers.
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In contrast, as proven in CRH, as firms increase the number of layers by one in
order to produce more, the number of agents in each layer increases and the
knowledge in all pre-existing layers, and therefore the wage, decreases. The
logic is straightforward. Firms add layers to economize on the knowledge of
their workers. So when they add a new top layer, they make the new manager
deal with the rare problems and make lower level employees know less, and con-
sequently they pay them less. The lower knowledge in all pre-existing layers
reduces, by equation (4), the span of control of each manager in the organization.
However, the number of employees in all layers still goes up since the span of
control of the new top manager is larger than one. The marginal cost also declines
discontinuously at the quantity produced where the firm adds a layer. The orga-
nization is building capacity by adding an extra layer, and that reduces the mar-
ginal cost discontinuously.
So far we have not said anything about how the quantity produced is deter-
mined. To do so we need to turn to the profit maximization and entry decision
of the firm. CRH embed the cost function discussed above into a standard
Melitz (2003) type framework with heterogeneity in demand. The model in
CRH also allows us to study the effect of a new opportunity to export on the orga-
nization of firms. We sketch some of those arguments here.
We now embed our economy, that we denote by i, in a world with J foreign
countries, with typical index j. Let xij(α) be the quantity demanded of an agent
in country j for good α produced in country i, and let pij(α) denote its price.
The name of the good α is also a demand shifter that implies that agents like vari-
eties with higher α better. So that with constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
preferences with elasticity of substitution σ > 1, ! s
p
-
ij a R =Nx j jijð Þa






where Pj, Rj and Nj denote the price index, total revenue and population in
country j.
CEOs in the domestic country pay a fixed cost fii to produce. If they want to
supply the foreign market, they also need to pay a fixed cost fij. Trading goods
is costly. Let τij > 1 be the “iceberg” trade cost incurred by firms exporting to
market j. Consider the problem of a firm with demand draw α in country i. It
solves, ( )X X
pið Þa = max piið Þa Nixiið Þa þ pijð Þa Njxijð Þa - C qð Þið Þa ;wi - fii - fij
xii;fxijg >0ð ÞJ J J
subject to (6), where X
qið Þa ¼ Nixiið Þa þ τ ijNjxijð Þa :
J
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The cost function C(.;wi) solves the cost minimization problem described above.
The first-order conditions of this problem implicitly define the quantities sold in
each market, ( )
s-1 s sNix
-
iið Þa ¼ aRiPi MC qs- 1 ð Þið Þa ;wi ;
and ( )s s




In contrast with the standard model, xii(α) and xij(α) enter the marginal cost func-
tion through qi(α) as well. That is, a firm’s level of total production affects its
marginal cost and therefore how much it sells in each market. Importantly, the
decision to export affects the cost of production of the goods sold in the local
market.7 Hence, as usual, the price in each market is given by a constant
markup over marginal cost, namely,
s
pijð Þa ¼ τ ijMCð Þqið Þa ;wi ¼ piið Þa τs- 1 ij:
Note that, as we argued above, since @MCL(q;w)/@q > 0 the price of firms that
expands increases conditional on the number of layers and declines discontinu-
ously with a reorganization. Furthermore, a firm that starts to export to a new
market, as a result of a marginal increase in α or an idiosyncratic reduction in
τij or fij, increases qi(α), which results in higher marginal cost, higher wages
and more employees in all layers, if the firm does not reorganize. However, if
exporting to the new market makes the firm add a layer, it will reduce its marginal
cost discontinuously which will decrease its price and expand its quantity more
than in the previous case. The reorganization is accompanied by reductions in
knowledge and wages in all preexisting layers, and increases in the number of
workers in all layers, as discussed above.
When looking at the data, one must acknowledge that the way in which firms
reach the new optimal organization depends on the particular institutional features
and frictions of the labor market in which they operate. As we document in
CMRH, French firms adjust mostly on the extensive margin: for example, to
reduce the average knowledge in the layer, they hire new hours of work that are
paid less than the average of the pre-existing hours. The development of a fully
dynamic theory with adjustment costs is needed to account for these features.
To sum up, the model has the following implications.
1 Exporters are larger and have more layers than non-exporters.
2 A firm that becomes an exporter, or enters a new export market, as a result of
a marginally higher α or marginally lower τij or fij for some j,
(a) increases L weakly;
(b) if L does not change, it increases w‘L and n
‘
L at all ℓ;
(c) if L increases it decreases w‘ and increases n‘L L at all ℓ.
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Armed with these implications, we now turn to our empirical analysis.
3. Exporting and firm organization: evidence from France
We use confidential data collected by the French National Statistical Institute
(INSEE) for the period 2002 to 2007. It combines the BRN dataset with manu-
facturing firm balance-sheet information with the DADS which includes
worker characteristics. The details of the data construction can all be found in
CMRH. Our sample includes 553,125 firm-year observations in the manufactur-
ing sector and all monetary values are expressed in 2005 euros.
We use the PCS-ESE classification codes for workers in the manufacturing
sector to identify the hierarchical layer in the firm. For manufacturing, it includes
five occupational categories given by:
2 Firm owners receiving a wage (which includes the CEO or firm directors).
3 Senior staff or top management positions (which includes chief financial
officers, heads of human resources, and logistics and purchasing
managers).
4 Employees at the supervisor level (which includes quality control tech-
nicians, technical, accounting and sales supervisors).
5 Qualified and non-qualified clerical employees (secretaries, human
resources or accounting employees, telephone operators and sales
employees).
6 Blue collar qualified and non-qualified workers (welders, assemblers,
machine operators and maintenance workers).
As in CMRH we merge classes 5 and 6, since the distribution of wages of
workers in these two classes is extremely similar. Hence a firm can have a
maximum of four layers, three of management and one of workers. We refer to
the number of layers in the firm by the number of management layers. So a
firm that has a layer of workers and one layer of managers is referred to as a
firm with one layer.
3.1. Cross-sectional comparisons between exporters and non-exporters
It is well known by now that exporters are larger in terms of value added and
employment (see Bernard and Jensen, 1999, and Bernard, Jensen, Redding and
Schott 2007, among others). This is clearly the case in our data as well.8 They
also pay slightly higher wages. As Table 9.1 shows, they have more layers of
management as well. The average number of layers of management among
non-exporters is 1.25, meaning that the average exporter has a layer of
workers, a layer of management and a fraction of a second layer of management.
If we look at exporters, they have 2.11 layers of management on average.
Hence, as we would expect from the fact that they are larger, exporters have
more layers.
In Figure 9.1 we present the distribution of value added by layer and by export
status. For firms with a given number of layers, each of the panels compares the
distribution of exporters and non-exporters. As can be seen from comparing the
dark lines across panels, firms with more layers have a distribution of value added
with a higher mean. We document this carefully in CMRH. Our emphasis in this
chapter is the comparison between exporters and non-exporters. Clearly, for all
layers exporters tend to be larger in terms of value added. The size advantage
of exporters is present even conditional on the number of layers. Nevertheless,
the size advantage of exporters is clearly larger across firms with more manage-
ment layers. These figures look very similar after we control for time and industry
fixed effects. The distributions of hours employed also exhibits similar shifts
to the right for exporters with the difference growing larger for firms with
more layers.
The comparison is not as clear when we compare the distribution of wages
across exporters and non-exporters with a given number of layers in Figure
9.2. Exporters do tend to have a distribution of average hourly wage slightly
shifted to the right, but the differences are small, and if anything, more pro-
nounced for firms with less layers. Clearly, the fact that the average hourly
wage combines employees with different skills and different roles in the organi-
zation that earn very different hourly wages, makes this comparison not particu-
larly informative. As it is, the analysis combines the average wage of the CEO
and the janitor. The theory of the organization of the firm outlined above can
help us unpack these average effects. In fact, this theory tells us that exporters
should pay more to the top layers, but less to the bottom ones. These two impli-
cations cancel each other out, at least partially, when we look at average wages.
About 44 per cent of the firms in our data export, and they account for slightly
more than 83 per cent of value added, with some variation across years. More
relevant for our purposes is that the firms that export tend to have more layers.
As Table 9.2 shows, of the firms with three layers of management, 66.7
per cent of them export, while for firms with only workers, only 9.5 per cent
of them export.
Table 9.3 presents the composition of firms by number of layers. Out of all
exporters, only 15.5 per cent have only a layer of management, while
44.3 per cent have two layers of management, and 35.5 per cent have three.
So there is substantial heterogeneity in the number of layers of exporters and
Table 9.1 Description of exporters
VA
Average Firm-year obs.
Hours Wage # of layers
Non-exporters 667.97 24,112.07 23.06 1.25 288,680
Exporters 6,754.35 164,534.30 23.71 2.11 162,795
Note: The difference in wages is significant at 1%.
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Figure 9.2 Firm average hourly wage distribution by number of layers and export status
non-exporters. Furthermore, most exporters have many layers, while most non-
exporters have only one or two.
Taken together, the results in this section corroborate Implication 1 of the
theory. We now turn to the behavior of firms over time.
3.2. New exporters
We now focus on firms that become exporters during the period in our sample:
new exporters. New exporters are more likely to add layers than non-exporters.
Table 9.4 shows that the probability of adding one or more layers for new export-
ers is significantly higher than for non-exporters, regardless of the initial count of
layers. The probability of keeping the same number of layers goes down if the
firm has zero or one layer of management, while the probability of keeping the
same number of layers increases for firms with two or three layers. Given that
firms with three layers cannot add layers, this is natural. We conclude from
this evidence that new exporters tend to add layers, consistent with the fact
that they grow as a result. Of course, there are some that also drop layers, but
there are fewer of those firms than those that do not start to export. Table 9.5
Table 9.2 Share of exporters by number of layers





Table 9.3 Composition of firms by number of layers






Table 9.4 Layer transitions for new exporters relative to non-exporters
# of layers at t + 1
0 1 2 3
# of layers at t 0 −10.84 7.84 2.50 0.50
1 −4.15 −2.91 6.40 0.67
2 −0.91 −5.75 4.34 2.32
3 −0.20 −2.85 −4.81 7.87
Note: All significant at 1%.
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Table 9.5 Layer transitions for exporters exiting relative to exporters staying
# of layers at t +1
0 1 2 3
# of layers at t 0 4.51*** −1.84 −2.19*** −0.47***
1 3.29*** 0.30 −3.14*** −0.45**
2 0.83*** 6.50*** −3.73*** −3.60***
3 0.14*** 1.69*** 5.46*** −7.30***
** significant at 5%
*** significant at 1%
Table 9.6 Behavior of firms that enter the export market
All Increase L No change in L
d In total hours 0.031*** 0.161*** 0.019***
− detrended 0.046*** 0.176*** 0.034***XL 0.012 1.233*** 0.014**d ln n‘L‘¼0
− detrended 0.024** 1.244*** 0.025***
d In V A 0.036*** 0.117*** 0.031***
− detrended 0.044*** 0.125*** 0.038***
d In avg wage 0.004* −0.025*** 0.010***
− detrended −0.015*** −0.045*** −0.009***
− common layers 0.004 −0.143*** 0.010***
− detrended −0.016*** −0.163*** −0.010***
% firms 100 14.17 71.81
% V A change 100 46.59 49.49
* significant at 10%
** significant at 5%
*** significant at 1%
shows that firms that exit the export market are also more likely to drop layers
than exporters that do not exit. So the effect is symmetric: firms that enter the
export market are more likely to add layers and firms that exit are more likely
to drop layers. These two tables corroborate our Implication 2a.
In fact, the new exporters that add layers expand on average much more than
the ones that do not reorganize. Table 9.6 shows the changes in hours, normalized
hours, value added and average wages for all new exporters, the ones that add
layers, and the ones that do not change L. We present results when we detrend
using trends for all firms in the economy (not only new exporters, of course).
Firms that start exporting increase value added on average by 3.6 per cent. The
ones that add layers increase value added by much more, 11.7 per cent, while
the ones that do not change layers increase value added by only 3.1 per cent.
We find similar numbers for hours and normalized hours. Namely, new exporters
that add layers expand much more than firms that do not add layers.
gTable 9.7 Elasticity of hours with VAit for firms that change export status and do not
change layers
# of layers Layer b‘L s.e. p-value Obs
1 0 0.027 0.04 0.45 5,178
2 0 0.026 0.03 0.33 9,434
2 1 −0.010 0.03 0.73 9,434
3 0 0.117 0.04 0.01 4,789
3 1 0.103 0.05 0.03 4,789
3 2 0.066 0.05 0.17 4,789
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Now let’s look at wages. After detrending, new exporters pay wages similar to
those paid before; so do firms that do not change layers. In contrast, firms that
increase layers decrease wages by a significant 4.5 per cent. Perhaps more rele-
vant is that this average change masks a composition effect between the new top
manager and pre-existing layers. When we focus on wages of employees in pre-
existing layers, we find that wages fall by 14.3 per cent in firms that add layers
(16.3 per cent if we detrend), while they increase 1 per cent in firms that do not
change layers (although the change is insignificant when we detrend).
The results paint a picture consistent with the one presented in the previous
section. New exporters that reorganize reduce wages in pre-existing layers. Fur-
thermore, these are the new exporters that actually expand significantly. The firms
that add layers account for 14.17 per cent of new exporters and 46.59 per cent of
the total increase in value added by new exporters. In sum, many firms expand
little when they become exporters; these firms increase the salaries of all their
employees. Some firms expand a lot when they start to export. They reorganize,
add layers, and pay lower wages to employees in the pre-existing layers and
higher than average wages to the new top manager.
We now proceed to verify that these results hold layer by layer. We look first at
firms that do not add layers. We estimate the regression
d ln n~‘Lit ¼ b‘Ld ln VAf it þ εit ð8Þ
where i denotes a firm, L denotes the total number of layers, t denotes time and d
denotes a yearly time difference. n~‘Lit represents normalized hours, and VAf it is the
value added of a firm that stays at L layers for two consecutive years; we have
removed from both variables the economy-wide trend. The only difference is
that now we use only firms that either start to export or stop exporting in the
year in which we measure the change in normalized hours. The results for b‘L
are presented in Table 9.7. Many of these estimates are not significant. The
ones that are, are positive as predicted by the theory. As we showed using
Table 9.5, the firms that do not add layers expand very little, so it is hard to esti-
mate b‘L precisely enough to have significant results.
We estimate a parallel equation for wages, for the sample of firms that change
export status:
d ln w~‘Lit ¼ g‘ f 9Ld ln VAit þ εit ð Þ
where w~‘Lit is the detrended change in layer-level wages. Results are presented in
Table 9.8. Now the estimates are much more significant and robust. All the values
of g‘L are positive and significant and they tend to increase with ℓ given L. The
ranking of the elasticities is not always significant, but it is in most cases, and
when it is, it corresponds to the one predicted by the theory. Namely, the wage
of the higher-level managers expands proportionally more than that of the
lower-level ones. Hence, Implication 2b is also corroborated by the evidence.
The final prediction of the theory to contrast with our data is Implication 2c,
which states that new exporters that add layers decrease w‘L and increase n
‘
L at
all ℓ. We have already argued in the previous section that firms that add layers
decrease wages and increase hours at all layers, and Table 9.4 shows that new
exporters tend to add layers. So it is natural to expect that in fact the predictions
of the theory will be corroborated by the data.
Table 9.9 presents the average log change in the number of hours for all tran-
sitions and all layers. The table uses the sample of firms that enter the export
market and add layers and firms that exit the export market and drop layers.
The results establish that, for all transitions and layers, firms that add layers
increase the number of hours, while firms that drop layers decrease them.
The next step is to look at wages. Again, we study the change in average log
wages for all transitions and layers for the sample of new exporters that add layers
and firms that exit the export market and drop layers. The results are displayed in
Table 9.10. The prediction in Implication 2c is broadly corroborated by the data
(although the change in log wages for the case in which we do not have many
observations is not significant). New exporters that add layers decrease wages
and the firms that exit the export market and drop layers increase wages.9 As
# of layers Layer g‘L s.e. p-value Obs
0 0 0.065 0.02 0.00 2,064
1 0 0.072 0.02 0.00 5,178
1 1 0.087 0.02 0.00 5,178
2 0 0.122 0.02 0.00 9,434
2 1 0.143 0.02 0.00 9,434
2 2 0.152 0.02 0.00 9,434
3 0 0.194 0.03 0.00 4,789
3 1 0.202 0.03 0.00 4,789
3 2 0.204 0.03 0.00 4,789
3 3 0.260 0.04 0.00 4,789
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Table 9.8 Elasticity of wages with gVAit for firms that change export status and do not
change layers
Table 9.9 Change in normalized hours for firms that transition and change export status
# of layers Layer Change s.e. p-value Obs
Before After
0 1 0 1.476 0.10 0.00 347
0 2 0 1.786 0.24 0.00 62
0 3 0 2.815 0.31 0.00 9
1 0 0 −1.614 0.08 0.00 434
1 2 0 0.748 0.05 0.00 843
1 2 1 0.612 0.05 0.00 843
1 3 0 1.045 0.18 0.00 62
1 3 1 0.965 0.18 0.00 62
2 0 0 −1.952 0.22 0.00 85
2 1 0 −0.734 0.05 0.00 949
2 1 1 −0.558 0.05 0.00 949
2 3 0 1.073 0.06 0.00 676
2 3 1 1.008 0.06 0.00 676
2 3 2 0.822 0.07 0.00 676
3 0 0 −2.713 0.46 0.00 8
3 1 0 −1.125 0.15 0.00 94
3 1 1 −0.911 0.16 0.00 94
3 2 0 −1.248 0.05 0.00 860
3 2 1 −1.170 0.06 0.00 860
3 2 2 −1.042 0.06 0.00 860
Table 9.10 Change in wages for firms that transition and change export status
# of layers Layer Change s.e. p-value Obs
Before After
0 1 0 −0.156 0.02 0.00 347
0 2 0 −0.697 0.14 0.00 62
0 3 0 −0.906 0.48 0.10 9
1 0 0 0.221 0.03 0.00 434
1 2 0 −0.082 0.01 0.00 843
1 2 1 −0.307 0.02 0.00 843
1 3 0 −0.215 0.09 0.01 62
1 3 1 −0.434 0.09 0.00 62
2 0 0 0.439 0.09 0.00 85
2 1 0 0.053 0.01 0.00 949
2 1 1 0.237 0.02 0.00 949
2 3 0 −0.039 0.01 0.67 676
2 3 1 −0.082 0.02 0.00 676
2 3 2 −0.217 0.02 0.00 676
3 0 0 1.053 0.60 0.12 8
3 1 0 0.175 0.07 0.01 94
3 1 1 0.430 0.07 0.00 94
3 2 0 0.043 0.01 0.00 860
3 2 1 0.061 0.01 0.00 860
we show in Table 9.4, new exporters tend to add more layers than non-exporters.
Similarly, firms that exit the export market tend to drop more layers than
exporters.
So, exporters tend to reduce wages as a result of adding layers. To consider an
example, a new exporter that had one layer of management and added another as
a result of its decision to start exporting reduces the wages of its workers in layer
zero by 8.2 per cent, and the wage of managers in layer one declines by 30
per cent. In contrast, as Table 9.11 (discussed below) shows, the newly hired
second layer manager earns 90.2 per cent more than the average wage in the
firm before the change.
The result should change our view on the distribution of the gains from export-
ing. The view that new exporters pay higher wages is misleading. Most new
exporters expand little and do not change their organization. They hire more
hours and pay higher wages. The new exporters that expand substantially add
layers of management. They hire substantially more workers but pay these
workers less (since according to the theory they also know less). The new export-
ers that expand and add layers exhibit more dispersion in wages within the firm.
Table 9.11 separates the change in wages in the firm in the contribution to the
average of the new top manager and the change in the wage of the pre-existing
layers. The top left panel shows that the average wage of all existing layers
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Table 9.11 Decomposition of total log change in average wages
o-‘<LL0 it =o- o
L0
Lit L0 it=o-Lit
From/to 1 2 3 From/to 1 2 3
0 0.935** 0.734** 0.706** 0 1.454** 1.331** 1.666*
(346) (61) (9) (346) (62) (9)
1 0.912** 0.838** 1 1.902** 2.015**
(842) (60) (841) (62)
2 0.975** 2 7.336*
(675) (675)
s d ln o-Lit
From/to 1 2 3 From/to 1 2 3
0 0.732** 0.618** 0.581** 0 −0.014 −0.454** −0.184
(346) (62) (9) (346) (61) (8)
1 0.856** 0.775** 1 −0.036** −0.070
(843) (62) (843) (61)
2 0.946** 2 −0.023
(676) (675)
All results from trimmed sample at 0.05%.
* significant at 5%
** significant at 1%
Number of obs. in parenthesis.
Figure 9.3 Representative transitions from and to L = 0
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decreases as firms add layers (and we know from Table 9.10 that it decreased for
each layer individually). The top right panel shows the wage of the new top
manager relative to the mean wage of the firm before the change. Clearly,
wage dispersion in the firm increases substantially when it starts to export and
adds layers.
We end this section with a graphical representation of the change in firms as
they become exporters. Figures 9.3 to 9.5 show how the typical organization
of firms change when they enter or exit the export market: in each figure, the
first row in each graph represents the old and new organization when the firm
adds layers and starts to export, while the second row represents a current
exporter which leaves the export market.10 Perhaps the most striking observation
coming out of Figures 9.3 to 9.5 is how large the changes are as firms actively
manage their organization. This is in stark contrast to the very small changes
for those firms not reorganizing, as reported in Tables 9.7 and 9.8. Hopefully,
these figures are convincing in showing that new exporters expand by adding
layers, adding employment and reducing wages. The reduction in wages chal-
lenges, as far as we know, all theories of trade that do not add explicit organiza-
tional choices.
Figure 9.4 Representative transitions from and to L = 1
Figure 9.5 Representative transitions from and to L = 2
4. How do firms change the average wage in a layer?
Table 9.12 shows that for firms that change their export status (either entering or
leaving the export market without adding layers), the only significant adjustments
occur via changes in formal education, and especially at lower layers.
Table 9.13 shows that when a change in the export status is accompanied by a
reorganization, firms tend to mostly act upon experience, while formal education
Table 9.12 Elasticity of knowledge with value added for firms that start or stop exporting
and do not change L
# of layers Layer Experience p-value Education p-value Obs
0 0 0.003 0.745 0.006 0.023 2,062
1 0 −0.029 0.013 0.006 0.007 5,172
1 1 −0.006 0.628 0.007 0.002 5,172
2 0 −0.008 0.356 0.004 0.007 9,422
2 1 0.008 0.537 0.004 0.015 9,422
2 2 0.017 0.073 0.000 0.892 9,422
3 0 −0.008 0.437 0.003 0.170 4,783
3 1 0.008 0.602 0.000 0.884 4,783
3 2 0.002 0.871 −0.001 0.773 4,783
3 3 0.008 0.556 −0.002 0.678 4,783
Table 9.13 Elasticity of knowledge with value added for firms that start exporting and
increase L, or stop exporting and decrease L
# of layers Layer Experience p-value Education p-value Obs
Before After
0 1 0 −0.161 0.000 0.004 0.413 346
0 2 0 −0.148 0.055 −0.014 0.174 62
0 3 0 −0.324 0.081 0.054 0.132 9
1 0 0 0.061 0.004 0.006 0.132 433
1 2 0 −0.030 0.017 0.000 0.817 841
1 2 1 −0.190 0.000 0.001 0.861 841
1 3 0 −0.049 0.250 0.006 0.652 62
1 3 1 −0.208 0.010 0.000 0.990 62
2 0 0 0.044 0.513 0.004 0.667 85
2 1 0 0.036 0.002 0.003 0.103 945
2 1 1 0.170 0.000 −0.007 0.039 945
2 3 0 −0.007 0.510 0.002 0.166 675
2 3 1 −0.036 0.020 0.001 0.739 675
2 3 2 −0.206 0.000 0.026 0.000 675
3 0 0 0.158 0.244 0.032 0.227 8
3 1 0 0.091 0.052 −0.004 0.591 94
3 1 1 0.189 0.007 −0.016 0.163 94
3 2 0 0.028 0.002 −0.001 0.391 860
3 2 1 0.013 0.284 0.002 0.356 860
3 2 2 0.111 0.000 −0.018 0.000 860
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is almost never significant. These patterns are consistent (although somewhat
more noisy) with our findings for the general population of firms.
5. Exogenous export demand shocks and reorganization
In this section, we explore a more causal relation between reorganization and
layer-level outcomes. In particular, we exploit variation in firm-level exports
induced exogenously by country variations in real exchange rate as a “foreign
demand shock”. In the theory, firms close to the reorganization threshold
should add a layer following a demand shock large enough; such reorganization
will trigger changes in layer-level outcomes.
To compute plausibly exogenous firm-level demand shocks, we exploit pre-
sample variation in the destination composition of exports, in conjunction with
real exchange rate variation across countries. For each firm, we observe the
shares of exports to all its destinations in 2002, sid; we then build the following
measures of exposure for firm i at time t:X
W ð Þk s wð Þkit ¼ id dt ð10Þ
d
where wð Þkit is either the bilateral real exchange rate
11 between France and destina-
tion d in year t (denoted with k = 1), or the yearly change in the same bilateral real
exchange rate between t and t + 1 (denoted with k = 2).
We start by estimating12 the following model that relates export shocks to the
probability of changing layers:8> d logX c0 o0 W n0 V ε0< Lit ¼ Lit þ L Lit þ Lit ð11:1L þ L Þ
Pr 1> fdLayersLit ¼ Ng ¼ faL;N-1 < cL þ xL . d logXLitþ 11:> ð Þ0 1þZLVLit þ εLit < aL;Ng ð11:2Þ
In this notation, i denotes a firm, t denotes time, and L denotes the number of
layers firm i has at the beginning of time t.13 c j and ε jLit for j = 0, 1 are constants
and stochastic i.i.d. error terms, respectively.
The first equation is a linear regression; it describes the change over time in log
exports as a function of exposure to real exchange rate variationsn o
W ð Þ1 ð Þ2Lit ¼ WLit ;WLit , and a vector VLit of controls: year dummies and log value
added of firm i with L layers at the beginning of the year (to proxy for how
close the firm is to the threshold).
The second equation is an ordered probit: it models the probability of any
change in the number of layers as a function of the firm change in exports and
the same set of controls (the parameters αL,N are the standard thresholds for the
latent variable).
We focus on the set of firms who export throughout the sample period. We esti-
mate this model separately for all firms with initial number of layers L.
Table 9.14 reports estimates for the coefficient ξL in equation (11.1).
14
Increases in exports induced by variations in the real exchange rate significantly
affect the probability of reorganizing the firm. The last column in the table shows
the probability of adding one layer for firms at the 90th percentile of value added
implied by these coefficients, following a 10 per cent increase in export demand:
for example, exporters with 1 layer at the 90th percentile of size within the group
have a 33.7 per cent chance of reorganizing if they are hit by an exogenous
10 per cent increase in export demand.
To study how these demand shocks affect firm-level outcomes, we extend (11)
and estimate the four-equations model:8> d logX c‘;0 o‘ W n‘ V ‘;0> Lit L L0¼ L 0þ Lit þ Lit> þ εLit ð12:1Þ>> Pr dLayers ‘f g¼ N ¼ Prfa ‘;L; L þ x‘Lit N 1 < c 1 L . d logX> Lit< þ-
‘0 ε‘;1 ‘þZLV> Lit þ Lit < aL;Ng ð12:2Þ ð12Þ>>> d ln n‘Lit ¼ c‘;2L þ b‘ ‘;2L . dLayersLit þ εLit ð12:3>> Þ:
d ln w‘ c‘;3 ‘;3Lit ¼ L þ g‘L . dLayersLit þ εLit ð12:4Þ
As above, i denotes a firm, t denotes time, and L denotes the number of layers
firm i has at the beginning of time t; in addition, ℓ denotes the layer-ℓ outcome. cℓ, j
and ε‘; jLit for j = 0, …, 3 are constants and stochastic i.i.d. error terms, respectively.
Equations (12.1) and (12.2) are similar to (11.1) and (11.2) respectively, except
that the coefficients are layer ℓ-specific. We estimate this model separately for
each initial number of layers L and layer-level outcome ℓ: the estimation
sample includes all firms that start with L layers and have at least ℓ layers the fol-
lowing period. For example, one model would only look at all firms with L = 2
layers initially, and study change in hours and wages at layer ℓ = 1, using all the
firms that have at least 1 layer the next period.
The third and fourth equations in model (12) are linear regressions that relate
the change in normalized hours and wages, respectively, at a given layer ℓ for a
firm with L layers initially, as a function of the change in layers.
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Table 9.14 Impact of change in export on dLayersLit




L; VALit ¼ p90 ðLÞ
)
0 1.138 0.04 0.00 1,557 0.057
1 0.649 0.27 0.02 7,337 0.337
2 1.063 0.20 0.00 29,965 0.414
3 −0.193 0.36 0.59 28,816 −




can be read as the impact of adding 1 layer to the firm on the correspondent
layer-ℓ outcome: for example, adding one layer in firms with L = 1 layers
implies a decrease in average wages of 100(1 − exp{0.132})% = −14.1% in
wages, but an increase of 100exp{1.037}% = 282% in the normalized number
of hours in layer 0.
Overall, these results emphasize that firms react to shocks to their ability to trade
by reorganizing in exactly the way we would expect from the logic in the theory.
These reactions change their performance and in equilibrium have further reper-
cussions both on trade and on other economic outcomes as emphasized by
CRH. Other papers have also explored some of these responses empirically in
other countries and context. In the next section we describe these contributions.
6. Organizational change and trade in other economic contexts
The starting point of this empirical agenda on organizations is that using changes
in occupational categories to identify organizational structure and reorganizations
is economically meaningful in that it is related to a variety of other firm charac-
teristics like size, wages, employment, productivity, among others. CMRH pre-
sented the evidence for the case of France, and since then several studies
document that mapping layers of management to occupations is meaningful
across countries with very different labor market regulations and/or at very differ-
ent stages of development. Moreover, some of these empirical studies find that
reorganization not only has effects on firm level outcomes, but also aggregate
implications for the economy.
A few studies have verified and reproduced the results in CMRH for different
time periods and countries. For example, recent work by Bernini, Guillou and
Treibich (2016) use French match-employer employee data as in CMRH. They
validate all of CMRH’s results for a more recent period, the years 2009 to
2013. Also for France, Spanos (2016b) also shows that higher ability workers
# of layers Layer b‘L p-value g
‘
L p-value Obs
0 0 1.257 0.00 −0.362 0.00 1,557
1 0 1.037 0.00 −0.132 0.00 7,337
1 1 0.744 0.00 −0.312 0.00 6,854
2 0 1.851 0.00 −0.091 0.00 29,965
2 1 1.970 0.00 −0.179 0.00 29,965
2 2 1.929 0.00 −0.208 0.00 27,886
3 0 1.262 0.00 −0.066 0.00 28,816
3 1 1.299 0.00 −0.092 0.00 28,816
3 2 1.478 0.00 −0.144 0.00 28,816
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are employed in the higher layers of firms, and presents evidence of positive
assortative matching between workers in the different layers. Tåg (2013) uses
the Swedish Standard Classification of Occupations 1996 (SSYK) which is a
national version of the International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO-88 (COM)). He finds that the empirical patterns in Sweden match the the-
oretical predictions of CRH (2012). In particular, he finds that firms in Sweden
are hierarchal, i.e. higher layers have less workers and a higher mean wage
than lower layers. Reorganizing by adding layers is accompanied with an increase
in firm size and decrease in firm wages at pre-existing layers, while the reverse
holds for firms that reduce their layers.
In developing countries, Cruz, Bussolo and Iacovone (2016) study the Brazil-
ian economy using the Classificao Brasileira de Ocupacao (CBO). Using this
classification, they first document that firms are hierarchical in terms of hours
and wages. Then, they find that in re-organized firms inequality of wages
increases, as firms pay higher wages in added higher layers than in pre-existing
ones. Also, and importantly for the main implications of the evidence in this
chapter, they document how the change in firms’ organization is positively cor-
related with export performance. So the results we find in France are very
much consistent with their results for Brazil.
In order to try to be more detailed on the identification of the effect of export-
ing on organizational change, Friedrich (2016) uses confidential data collected by
Statistics Denmark to study the internal organization of Danish firms. He finds
evidence for how trade affects wage inequality, focusing on changes in firm hier-
archies. Its main contribution is that the paper identifies a causal effect of trade
shocks on firm hierarchies and wage inequality. Namely, Friedrich (2016)
shows that trade shocks do generate changes in the way firms organize production
and as a result the way in which wage inequality changes inside the firm. To do
so, the paper uses two different identification strategies, one based on foreign
demand and transportation costs, and the other using the Muslim boycott of
Danish exports after the cartoon crisis. Both of these identification strategies
result in robust effects of trade shocks on within-firm inequality through
changes in the number of management layers. The evidence from the paper is
consistent with models of knowledge-based hierarchies. He finds that adding
a hierarchy layer significantly increases inequality within firms, ranging from
2 per cent for the 50–10 wage gap to 4.7 per cent for the 90–50 wage gap.
These results reinforce our finding that reorganization can be an important
channel by which trade affects wage inequality.
In this chapter our focus has been mostly in the reorganization associated with
entry/exit behavior in foreign markets and the effects on layer-level changes in
wages, span of control and knowledge composition. We have not explored the
reverse channel by which organization affects trade, which is of course present in
the general equilibrium theory of CRH. Spanos (2016c) complements our findings
for France by looking at the effect of organization on export performance. He uses a
similar dataset as our study and shows evidence that firms with more layers sell a
larger number of products, and to more destinations, compared to the ones with
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fewer layers. He identifies these export margins as the ones more correlated to pro-
ductivity and number of layers. In fact, these results complement nicely with the
study on Portugal by Mion, Opromolla and Sforza (2016), who find that export
experience acquired by managers in past organizations can result in more exports
in their current firm. Put together, these results underscore that the channel from
organization to export performance is also important and active in the data on
top of the effect of exporting on organization that we have documented. Also
using Portuguese data, Bastos, Monteiro and Straume (2018) find that foreign acqui-
sitions lead to firm reorganization and an increase in within-firm wage inequality.
6.1. Other outcomes
The studies above look at the two-way link between organization and some firm
level outcomes, including their participation in export markets. We have argued
that this is important because the way firms organize determines their productivity
and costs. Several papers have studied the link between organizational change and
productivity. For example, Caliendo, Mion, Opromolla and Rossi-Hansberg (2015)
show that the reorganization of firms is an important source of the aggregate pro-
ductivity gains in the Portuguese economy. They first document that the empirical
patterns in the Portuguese economy match the theoretical predictions of CRH.
They then study empirically the prediction of the CRH model, that reorganization
reduces the marginal cost of the firm, and therefore prices, while increasing the
physical productivity of the firm by reducing average variable cost. As a result,
revenue based productivity should fall, while quantity based productivity should
increase, as firms add layers. The results are stark. The study does not find any
case in which the evidence can falsify this prediction on how a reorganization
affects both types of firm productivity. Moreover, the paper presents some evidence
of a causal effect of changes in layers on productivity, using firm specific exchange
rates based on a firm’s import and export patterns. In sum, changes in organization
affect significantly the physical productivity of the firm. For France, Spanos
(2016a) finds that firms in larger markets have more layers and are more produc-
tive. Furthermore, Spanos (2016a) finds that between 8 per cent and 40 per cent of
the productivity differences across locations within France can be explained by
firms having a greater number of layers and more complex organizations. This pro-
vides a relevant rationale for why we care about the results on export opportunities
and organization that we have documented in this chapter.
Finally, more recent research has also shown that using organizations can help to
shed light on business creation. In particular, using a sample of 16 million obser-
vations of Swedish workers and occupational categories, Tåg, Åstebro and Thomp-
son (2016) provide evidence that the hierarchical structure of a firm matters for the
likelihood of business creation among its former employees. The results are strik-
ing; employees at the highest layers, namely CEOs, directors, and senior staff, are
three to four times more likely than production workers to found a limited liability
company. Unfortunately, given data limitations, the results cannot be interpreted as
causal.
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7. Conclusion
A firm’s sales in foreign markets are correlated with a variety of firm level out-
comes. Some of them are well known. For example, we know that trade makes
firms more productive and larger in terms of total sales and employment. In this
chapter we show that exporting is also associated with firm reorganizations.
Firms that start to trade are more likely to add management layers. In fact,
among all the firms that start to trade, the ones that grow significantly are the
ones that reorganize. These firms also exhibit particular patterns for wages and
employment in preexisting layers. In particular, the firms that reorganize when
they start exporting pay workers in preexisting layers less, and workers in the top
new layer much more. So, wage inequality within those firms increases. In contrast,
firms that start to export but do not reorganize increase wages modestly at all layers.
Our first set of results only describes an equilibrium relationship between
exporting and organization, not a causal effect. As such, these results are
helpful to discriminate between theories, but not to understand the impact of,
say, a trade liberalization on organization. So, we attempt to go further and esti-
mate causal effects using a Bartik-style shock. The results are encouraging in that
the causal effects are in general, significant and large. Still, more work needs to be
done in identifying instruments that produce a more systematic first stage. Other
studies have tried a variety of other instruments in other countries and yield
results that are surprisingly consistent with ours.
All together, the evidence that we have presented, as well as the evidence in the
existing literature, is starting to paint a consistent picture in which part of the
effect of access to foreign markets is realized through the reorganization of pro-
duction. Furthermore, as we argued in the last section, a variety of studies have
linked these reorganizations to changes in productivity.
Firms are complex organizations that react to changes in their environment.
Only if we understand how globalization affects the internal structure of firms
are we ever going to understand its full and true impact. We hope this research
is starting to illuminate some of the contents of one of the more resilient black
boxes in economics.
Notes
Acknowledgement: We thank Francis Kramarz for helpful comments and suggestions. The
computations in this chapter were done at a secure data center located at CREST, Paris.
1 As initially proposed by Rosen (1982) and Garicano (2000) and used in the context of
heterogeneous firms in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
2 Adding a layer is identified empirically as hiring an agent in an occupation classified
in a layer where the firm did not hire before.
3 We refer the reader to CMRH for a detailed description of this data.
4 Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), Helpman, Its-
khoki and Redding (2010) and Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz and Sampognaro (2011a)
propose models where the exporter-wage premium is the outcome of a bargaining
mechanism.
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5 In CRH the wage is interpreted as the compensation for the time endoment of the
workers, w-; plus the compensating differential for the cost of acquiring knowledge.
Learning how to solve problems in an interval of knowledge of length z costs wcz-
(c teachers per unit of knowledge at cost w- per teacher). Hence, the total wage of
an employee with knowledge z is given by w zð Þ ¼ w-½cz
6
þ 1]:
To derive some of the implications of the theory, CRH specify the distribution of prob-
lems as an exponential, so F(z) = 1 − e−λz.
7 This implies that even when fij > fii all firms in the economy could enter the exporting
market. Of course, if fij is large enough, then only the most productive firms will
export. This is a key distinction with Melitz (2003) where, for the case of two sym-
metric countries, all firms will export if and only if fij < fii.
8 Part of our data is used in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011b) to study the exporting
behavior of firms. As a result, some of these facts for France are known from their
paper. However, they have no results on layers or firm reorganization conditional
on changing or keeping constant the number of layers.
9 In CMRH, we show that the adjustment occurs mostly at the extensive margin: in
an expanding firm, new hours hired in a layer receive a lower average wage than
pre-existing hours active in the same layer; this action lowers the average wage in
the layer.
10 To estimate the representative hierarchies before a transition, we compute the average
number of normalized hours and wage only in the subset of firms with L layers that
will enter the export market and have L + 1 layers the following period. To estimate
the representative hierarchy after the transition, we use the estimated log changes for
firms entering the export market from Tables 9.9 and 9.10. For transitions one layer
up, the change in the hourly wage for the top layer after the transition is estimated
as the average log change in the wage of the top layer (ln wLþ1 LL 1;t 1 - ln wL;t).




eur for is the CPI in the
foreign country, Pfrance is the CPI in France, and Eeur is the price of a unit of
foreign currency in terms of Euros. Hence, an increase in the real exchange rate cor-
responds to a depreciation, and should hence induce an increase in exports.
12 We use routines developed by Roodman (2011).
13 In the notation, the number of layers L is superfluous since it is uniquely identified by
a firm and a time, i.e., L = L(i, t). We keep L explicit however since we will be per-
forming separate estimates according to L.
14 Table 9.A1 in the appendix reports the main coefficients in the second equation. While
the contribution of individual regressors is noisily estimated, the joint model (11) is
highly significant.
15 Note in this table that when estimating outcomes in the top layers, observations drop
somewhat. This happens because outcomes in the top layer are not observed
when the firm drops it. This is also why layer-3 outcomes in firms with 3 layers
cannot be estimated: the sample only includes firms with which do not change layers
(dLayersLit = 0), so that there is no variation on the RHS; morevoer, the left-hand
side d ln n~33it also has no variation since normalized hours at the top are always 1.
Table 9.A2 in the appendix reports the main coefficients in the first two equations. As
above, the contribution of individual regressors is noisily estimated, but the joint model
(12) is highly significant.
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Table 9.A1 shows the relevant coeffcients for equation (11.1) in model (11). Each
row corresponds to a separate model estimate. W ð Þ1L and W
ð Þ2
L are measures of
exogenous demand shocks as reported in the main text, and “p.v.” are the asso-
ciated p-values. Controls include year dummies and firm log value added at the
beginning of the period. “model sig. p-value” reports the p-value for a test of the
joint significance of model (11).
Table 9.A2 shows the relevant coefficients for equations (12.1), marked “Dep.
var.:dlogXLit”, and (12.2), marked “Dep. var.: dLayersLit”, in model (12). As
above, each row corresponds to a separate model estimate. W ð Þ1L and W
ð Þ2
L are
Table 9.A1 Export regression in model 11
# of layers W ð1Þ p.v. ðL W
2Þ p.v. Controls Model Sig. p-value Obs
L
0 0.006 0.65 0.113 0.61 Yes 0.00 1,557
1 −0.099 0.01 −0.035 0.80 Yes 0.00 7,337
2 −0.033 0.20 0.021 0.68 Yes 0.00 29,965
3 −0.080 0.00 0.098 0.02 Yes 0.00 28,816
Table 9.A2 Export regression and ordered probit for model 12
# of Layer Dep. var.:d log XLit Dep. var.: dLayersLit Model Obs
layers
W ð1Þ p.v. W ð2
sig.Þ p.v. Controls x‘ p.v. ControlsL L L p-value
0 0 0.007 0.71 0.104 0.74 Yes 1.138 0.00 Yes 0.00 1,557
1 0 −0.099 0.01 −0.040 0.78 Yes 0.638 0.02 Yes 0.00 7,337
1 1 −0.100 0.01 −0.034 0.85 Yes 0.477 0.28 Yes 0.00 6,854
2 0 −0.032 0.21 −0.017 0.68 Yes 1.091 0.00 Yes 0.00 29,965
2 1 −0.033 0.21 0.014 0.73 Yes 1.082 0.00 Yes 0.00 29,965
2 2 −0.024 0.46 −0.011 0.63 Yes 1.144 0.00 Yes 0.00 27,886
3 0 −0.081 0.00 0.098 0.02 Yes −0.058 0.87 Yes 0.00 28,816
3 1 −0.079 0.00 0.098 0.02 Yes −0.034 0.93 Yes 0.00 28,816
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measures of exogenous demand shocks as reported in the main text, and “p.v.”
are the associated p-values, in equation (12.1). x‘L is the coefficient multiplying
the log change in export, and “p.v” the associated p-value, in equation (12.2)
Controls include year dummies and firm log value added at the beginning of
the period. “model sig. p-value” reports the p-value for a test of the joint signifi-
cance of model (12).
Andrew Bernard, Esther Bøler and
Swati Dhingra
1. Introduction
Aggregate trade flows are composed of transactions between individual buying
(importers) and selling (exporters) firms. The rise of the large literature on hetero-
geneous firms has recognized the importance of variation across exporters, and to
a lesser extent across importers, in determining aggregate trade flows. However,
even in that firm-focused research, the detailed trade transaction data are usually
aggregated to the level of individual firms, summed across all buyers for export-
ers, or conversely, summed across all sellers for importers, before being used by
researchers. Naturally, both empirical and theoretical work on international trade
has also focused on firms on either side of the market, exporters in Melitz (2003)
or importers in Antràs et al. (2017). In this chapter, we explore the individual
matches between exporters and importers and examine the evolution of these
microeconomic relationships.
During the decades since the end of WWII, the world has seen both immense
progress on the reductions of tariffs and other barriers to international trade in
goods as well as dramatic reductions in transport and communication costs.
The rise of containerization, the successful multilateral rounds of the GATT
and the WTO and the exponential increase in telecommunications capabilities
have combined to allow the fragmentation of production across borders and
have driven increases in the volume of global trade far faster than those for
GDP (see Baldwin (2017)). However, in spite of these advances, estimates of
trade costs between distant locations remained largely unchanged (Head and
Mayer (2014)), suggesting that other forms of trade costs continue to be substan-
tial impediments to global integration. This chapter explores the role of firm-to-
firm connections in international trade both in the cross-section and over time as a
first step towards a greater understanding of the firm-level costs of trade.
We have access to a rich data set for Colombian firms where the identities of
both the exporter and the importer are known, and where each import transaction
can be linked to a specific seller in a source country, and each Colombian firm’s
annual export transactions can be linked to specific buyers in every destination
country. This allows us to develop a set of basic facts about sellers and buyers
across markets at a point in time as well as the evolution of those buyer–seller
relationships over time. We contribute to this nascent literature by confirming
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and extending previous findings on the importance of the extensive and intensive
margins of trade.
The emergence of research examining firms on both sides of trade transactions
has potentially important implications for policy and academic work on the
origins of international trade. While substantial progress has been made on reduc-
ing tariffs on manufactured goods, especially for flows between higher income
nations, empirical evidence suggests that substantial costs remain. Estimates of
fixed and variable costs of trade are large, even as technology and policy have
reduced costs of transport, communication and tariffs. To engender another
round of global integration with its attendant increases in income, consumption
and welfare, research must refocus attention on the nature of the trade costs
between the firms that engage in trade.
This chapter contributes to that agenda by documenting the relationships
between Colombian firms and their foreign suppliers. We find evidence that
the extensive margin of importer–exporter connections is strongly correlated
with aggregate country-level trade flows. In addition, there is substantial hetero-
geneity across both importers and exporters in terms of the numbers of partners
and the levels of trade flows. Again, the extensive margin is crucial in explaining
the variation in import levels across firms. Large importers do not import more
from each partner but rather have many more partners than smaller importers.
International trade involves firms trading with each other, rather than directly with
final consumers. Even domestic economies are comprised of a large network of
buyers and sellers. The continuing revolution in international trade transaction
data is opening up the black box of firm-to-firm connections across borders. One
temptation is to think of this as just another extensive margin of trade. However,
firm behavior is important on both sides of any international trade relationship
and existing frameworks largely ignore the interaction between buyers and sellers
each of whom may have market power (Bernard and Dhingra (2015)). Evidence
in this chapter and elsewhere shows that the extensive margins of trade, including
that of foreign partners, are important both in the aggregate and within firms. In
addition variation in the extensive margins is one of the forces underlying the
power of the gravity model in explaining aggregate trade volumes.
At a basic level we are still learning how firms structure their global supply and
customer networks and know little about a range of important questions: do firms
have multiple suppliers of the same product, how frequently do importers change
their suppliers, do importers switch partners to replace one supplier of a product
with another, what determines successful trade partnerships and what differences
are there between the big, dominant global firms and the large number of smaller
firms engaged in trade? This chapter will provide evidence on these questions for
Colombian importers.
2. Literature
Before turning to the Colombian trade data, we briefly review the literature
on firms and trade. The role of heterogeneous firms in exporting has been
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the subject of a large literature, see surveys by Tybout (2003), Bernard et al.
(2007), Redding (2011), Melitz and Redding (2014) and Bernard et al. (2012).
However, it is important to note that in that large theoretical and empirical liter-
ature the role of partner importing firms is largely left unmentioned. The export-
ing firm is heterogeneous and “interesting” while the destination market is
typically modeled as populated by a representative consumer. Similarly in the
smaller and more recent literature on importing and global sourcing, the export-
ing firms are also largely “uninteresting”. Our focus is on the role of firms on both
ends of the trade transaction; we will first briefly review the emerging research on
importing and then survey the smaller body of work looking at importer–exporter
pairings.
2.1. Firms and importing
There has been substantial recent work examining the characteristics and choices
of importing firms. Work on the characteristics of importers for the United States
(Bernard et al. (2007) and Bernard et al. (2009)), Belgium (Muuls and Pisu
(2009)) and Italy (Castellani et al. (2010)) shows that importers share many of
the characteristics of exporting firms in terms of their larger size and higher pro-
ductivity. In addition these papers find similar heterogeneity across importing
firms with the largest importers sourcing many products from many countries.
In fact, large importers and large exporters tend to be the same firms, (Bernard
et al. (2007)), as well as the most likely to have foreign affiliates and be embed-
ded in global production networks (Bernard et al. (2018b)). Our work extends this
research by examining the connections between importers and exporters and
exploring the link to firm size.
The causal nature of the relationship between importing and productivity has
been examined by a number of authors. Amiti and Konings (2007) find large pro-
ductivity gains from reductions in input tariffs on imported intermediate goods
for Indonesian firms. Goldberg et al. (2010) also examine trade liberalization
and imported inputs. They find substantial gains from trade through access to
new imported inputs driven by increased firm access to new input varieties.
Halpern et al. (2015) attribute one-quarter of Hungarian productivity growth
during 1993–2002 to increases in imported inputs. Bøler et al. (2015) find that
cheaper R&D stimulates imports of intermediates and that improved access to
imported inputs promotes technological change. Our work contributes to this
stream of research by examining the firm linkages underlying the import of inter-
mediate inputs.
A different approach to importing firms examines the decision to source from
abroad. Feenstra and Hanson (2005), Nunn and Trefler (2008), Bernard et al.
(2010) consider contracting and contractability in the decision to offshore
inside or outside the firm. Antràs et al. (2017) study the extensive and intensive
margins of firms’ global sourcing decisions, while Fort (2017) examines the inter-
action of technology and industry characteristics and shows substantial differ-
ences in the effects on domestic versus foreign outsourcing.
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2.2. Firm-to-firm connections
One of the earliest authors to consider the role of networks and firm-to-firm con-
nections in trade is Rauch (1999) who introduces the idea that information fric-
tions might dampen trade and that the customer or supplier network might help
reduce those frictions. Arkolakis (2010) provides an early model of the costly
acquisition of consumers and while he does not model firm-to-firm connections,
his framework is strongly linked to the emerging work on production and sales
networks. Rauch and Watson (2004), Antràs and Costinot (2011), Petropoulou
(2011) and Chaney (2014) model intermediaries as agents that facilitate matching
between sellers/exporters and foreign buyers.
Work on firm-to firm connections is not limited to international trade. Additional
theoretical and empirical contributions, often examining the role of production net-
works in the propagation of shocks, include Oberfeld (2013), Acemoglu et al.
(2012), Carvalho et al. (2014), Magerman et al. (2016) and Bernard et al. (2017).
Recent work has started exploring the cross-section of trading relationships
between exporters and importers. Blum et al. (2010; 2012) examine characteris-
tics of trade transactions for the exporter–importer pairs of Chile-Colombia and
Argentina-Chile while Eaton et al. (2014) consider exports of Colombian firms
to specific importing firms in the United States. Using Norwegian data,
Bernard et al. (2018a) find support for a model where exporters vary in their effi-
ciency in producing differentiated intermediate goods and pay a relation-specific
fixed cost to match with each buyer. Eaton et al. (2014) develop a model of search
and learning to explain the dynamic pattern of entry and survival by Colombian
exporters and to differentiate between the costs of finding new buyers and to
maintaining relationships with existing ones. Monarch (2013) estimates switching
costs using a panel of U.S. importers and Chinese exporters and Dragusanu
(2014) explores how the matching process varies across the supply chain using
U.S.-Indian data. Sugita et al. (2014) study matching patterns in U.S.-Mexico
trade while Benguria (2014) estimates a trade model with search costs using
matched French-Colombian data. Carballo et al. (forthcoming) focus on the
role of importer heterogeneity across destinations, using data on exporters from
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay.
Some stylized facts are emerging from this literature. The buyer margin
accounts for a large fraction of the variation in aggregate trade, and is, in fact,
as large or larger than the firm or product margins in accounting for cross-
country trade flows. Bernard et al. (2018a) show this using Norwegian data.
They also find that a firm’s number of customers is significantly higher in
larger markets and smaller in remote markets, i.e., importers per exporter vary
systematically with GDP and distance. This response of the buyer margin to
gravity variables is also shown by Carballo et al. (forthcoming).
The population of sellers and buyers are extremely concentrated. Bernard et al.
(2018a) find that the top 10 per cent of exporters to an OECD country typically
account for more than 90 per cent of aggregate exports to that destination. At the
same time, the top 10 per cent of buyers from an OECD country are as dominant
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and also account for more than 90 per cent of aggregate purchases. This concen-
tration of imports and exports in a small set of firms is similar to that found by
Bernard et al. (2009) and Bernard et al. (2018b) for the United States and
Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) for other European countries. Although a handful
of exporters and importers account for a large share of aggregate trade, these
large firms are matching with many partners; one-to-one matches are typically
not important in the aggregate. Many-to-many matches, i.e., where both exporter
and importer have multiple connections, make up almost two thirds of aggregate
trade. Using trade data for Chile and Colombia as well as Argentine and Chile,
Blum et al. (2012) similarly point to the dominance of large exporter–large
importer matches among the total number of trading pairs.
The distributions of buyers per exporter and exporters per buyer are character-
ized by many firms with few connections and a few firms with many connections.
Bernard et al. (2018a) plot the number of exporters per buyer in a particular
market against the fraction of buyers in this market who buy from at least that
many exporters. The distributions appear to be largely consistent with a Pareto
distribution as the cdfs are close to linear except in the tails, consistent with
the findings by Blum et al. (2010; 2012) and Carballo et al. (forthcoming).
Within a market, exporters with more customers have higher total sales, but
the distribution of exports across customers does not vary systematically with
the number of customers. Firms with more buyers typically export more: in the
Norwegian data, the average firm with 10 customers in a destination exports
more than 10 times as much as a firm with only one customer.
In looking at the nature of the connections between firms, there is negative
degree assortativity among sellers and buyers: the better connected a seller, the
less well-connected is its average buyer. In recent work by Bernard et al.
(2014), negative degree assortativity is found for buyer–seller links among Japa-
nese firms. Their Japanese dataset covers close to the universe of domestic buyer-
seller links and therefore contains information about the full set of buyer linkages
(not only the linkages going back to the source market). Negative degree assor-
tativity does not mean that well-connected exporters only sell to less-connected
buyers; instead it suggests that well-connected exporters typically sell to both
well-connected buyers and less-connected buyers, whereas less-connected
exporters typically only sell to well-connected buyers. Degree assortativity is
only a meaningful measure in economic environments with many-to-many
matching. Moreover, negative degree assortativity can coexist with positive
assortative matching on the intensive (export value) margin. Using the Colom-
bian import data, we corroborate these main stylized facts and examine the
nature of the evolution of trading partnerships over time.
3. Data
Our primary data source is the customs records of Colombia and includes a com-
plete history of Colombian import and export transactions from 1995 to 2014.
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This period includes dramatic changes in the Colombian economy, periods of
external liberalization and domestic reforms as well as several economic crises.
The data include all the available information on the customs forms. We focus
on a subset of the data. On the import side this includes the name of foreign firm i
in country s selling quantity q of product p to Colombian firm j for x USD on date
d. Products are defined at the HS 10-digit level using the Colombian classification
matching the tariff line for Colombian imports. Colombian importers are identi-
fied by their national identification number, NIT, while foreign firms have alpha-
numeric names in the data. The foreign firm name data are very noisy. Using the
information on the customs forms with no cleaning results in 1,847,822 foreign
firms. We clean the foreign firms’ names first by dropping or correcting typical
prefixes and suffixes (e.g. “inc”, “co.”, “spa”, etc), dropping non alpha numeric
characters and then employing machine learning algorithms to group likely
common spelling variants or misspellings. We vary the parameters on the
machine learning algorithms to create sets of firms’ names that are likely over-
matched and under-matched. Throughout this chapter we use the overmatched
set to avoid overemphasizing the extensive firm-to-firm margin.1 After cleaning
we are left with 432,156 unique foreign firms across the 20 years.
There are 3,023,055 million import transactions across 146,896 importer–
exporter pairs in 2014. 27,927 Colombian firms imported while there were
82,762 foreign suppliers (see column 1 of Table 10.2).2
3.1. Colombian trade over time
From 1995 to 2014, Colombia experienced a boom in international trade, both
exports and imports. As shown in Figure 10.1, total imports into Colombia
expressed in terms of US$ increased more than 450 per cent during the period.
The data show clearly the effects of several crises in the Colombian and world
economies. In 1999, following large devaluations and crises in Brazil and
Russia, Colombia experienced its first recession in 60 years and was also
forced to allow its exchange rate to float, resulting in a 30 per cent devaluation
against the dollar. The reduction in imports from both the economic crisis and
devaluation is apparent in the 27.5 per cent reduction in imports. The number
of Colombian importers and foreign exporters fell far less during the same
period, 10.7 and 8.6 per cent respectively. Import declines occurred again in
2001–2002 (0.9 per cent) and 2008–2009 (16.2 per cent) as a result of external
economic shocks in Colombia’s primary trading partners. Again the adjustments
of the extensive margins of the number of trading firms was much lower, sugges-
tive of the costs needed to create the relationships in the first place.
In Figure 10.2, we show the evolution of the mean number of exporters, prod-
ucts, and source countries per importer. The average number of foreign partners
and source countries have been stable over time while the number of imported
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Figure 10.2 Foreign exporters per Colombian importer, imported products and source countries
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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4. Cross section
In this section, we examine the nature of firm-to-firm connections at a point in
time. Whereas the emerging literature has documented facts from data on
exports as described above, we document the firm-firm connections from the
Colombian importing perspective.
4.1. Margins of trade
We start by decomposing aggregate country-level trade flows into their constitu-
ents parts, i.e the roles of exporting firms, importing firms, products and average
value per exporter–importer-product per year. This already represents an aggrega-
tion from the raw transaction level data which includes the additional dimensions
of the number of transactions per exporter–importer-product during the year.
With this decomposition, total imports from country j into Colombia in any
given year can be represented as
mj ¼ sjpjbjdjx-j
with sj , the number of sellers (exporters) in country j, pj, the total number of
products shipped by all sellers in country j, bj, the number of Colombian firms
that import from country j, x-j, average value per buyer-seller-product, and dj
(or density), the fraction of actual sbp triples out of all possible exporter–
importer-product combinations.
We regress each of the margins on total imports (in logs) using data from 2014
to assess the contribution of each of the three extensive margins (buyers, sellers,
products) and the intensive margin (average imports per buyer-seller-product) in
this decomposition. This set of regressions gives us a relatively simple way to
examine the role of different microeconomic components of trade to aggregate
trade flows. While previous research has examined the role of the number of export-
ers and the number of exported products, we are able to examine both the buyer and
seller contribution to the variation of Colombian imports across source countries.3
Given that OLS is a linear estimator and its residuals have an expected value of
zero, the coefficients for each set of regressions sum to unity, with each coeffi-
cient representing the share of overall variation in trade explained by the respec-
tive margin.4
The results in Table 10.1 confirm earlier work on extensive margin contribu-
tions to the cross-country variation in aggregate trade volumes. Both the
number of importers and the number of products increase rapidly as total trade
volumes rise. However, here we see that the role of the number of foreign part-
ners, in this case exporters, is equally large. Large trade volumes between pairs of
countries are associated with large numbers of firms on both sides of the border as
well as large numbers of products. The intensive margin also covaries positively
with total trade across countries but accounts for just under 40 per cent of the total
variance.5 Bigger trade volumes are associated with higher shipments per
importer–exporter-product and particularly with increases in the extensive
margins of more importers, more exporters and more products.
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Table 10.1 Country-level regressions (2014)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Buyers Sellers Products Intensive Density
Imports (log) 0.49a 0.48a 0.51a 0.39a −0.87a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Constant −4.20a −4.08a −3.75a 4.85a 7.18a
(0.31) (0.33) (0.33) (0.37) (0.55)
N 174 174 174 174 174
R2 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.60 0.77
a indicates significance at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 10.2 Summary stats 2014 – all and top 5 sources
Variables All U.S. China Mexico Germany Brazil
Total value in USD (millions) 55,199 19,229 3,728 3,254 1,820 1,691
# Colombian importers 27,927 13,680 9,278 2,851 2,831 2,829
# foreign exporters 82,762 24,557 16,076 2,431 3,501 2,641
Mean value per importer– 375.77 405.71 138.93 687.27 295.76 308.71
exporter ($’000s)
Median value per importer– 24.68 17.06 26.60 41.23 22.76 31.76
exporter ($’000s)
Mean exporters per importer 5.26 3.46 2.89 1.66 2.17 1.94
Median exporters per importer 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean importers per exporter 1.78 1.93 1.67 1.95 1.76 2.07
Median importers per exporter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Log max/median import value 11.39 8.29 8.55 8.64 7.84
Source: Authors’ calculations.
4.2. Connections
In 2014, there are 146,896 trading relationships involving 27,927 Colombian
importing firms and 82,762 foreign exporters. As shown in Table 10.2, the distri-
bution of the value in these partnerships is highly skewed with the mean more
than 15 times larger than the median. Similarly, the distributions of exporters
per importer and importers per exporter reflect the presence of large trading
firms. The mean importer has 5.26 foreign partners while the median has two.
These distributions confirm that the findings of prior research on the importance
of large firms in international trade flows also hold in Colombia, see Bernard
et al. (2009), Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) and Bernard et al. (2018b).
Looking at individual source countries, the United States is by far the largest
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Figure 10.3 Suppliers per importer and importers per supplier – all countries, 2014
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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partnerships and import value. Among Colombian importers, 49 per cent bought
from at least one U.S. partner. The relative lower cost of trading with the United
States is also reflected in the lower value imports for the median partnership, i.e.,
relatively smaller transactions with the U.S. are profitable. Across all the major
source countries, the median Colombian importer has just one partner.
Figure 10.3 plots the distributions of exporters per Colombian importer and
importers per foreign exporter across all relationships. The sub-figures are
double log distributions with discrete steps, for example the upper panel has
the number of suppliers per importer against the cumulative fraction of Colom-
bian firms with at least x foreign suppliers. In both cases, the distribution is
very close to a power law except in the extreme tails. There is a small number
of firms, either Colombian importers or foreign exporters, with many partners
and a large number of firms with a small number of partners.
The log linearity of the distributions appears at the country level as well for
importers per exporter. This captures the stylized fact that a few firms, either
exporters or importers, have large numbers of connections while large numbers
of firms have just one or two foreign partners. For all five of the top source coun-
tries the distribution is indistinguishable from log-linearity (see Figure 10.4).6
4.3. Matching
The preceding results suggest that most Colombian importing firms have few
partners while only a few are connected to many foreign exporters. However,
we can group trading relationships and trade value by types of firms according
to their number of partners. In Table 10.3 we place firms in two groups, one
where the firm has only a single foreign partner and the other where the firm
has multiple foreign partners.7
Table 10.3 confirms the important role for large, well-connected firms in inter-
national trade flows. Firms with more than one foreign partner appear in the vast
majority, 88 per cent of partnerships in 2014. Those partnerships in turn account
for the preponderance of Colombian import value, 91 per cent. In fact, more than
half of Colombian imports by value are conducted between exporting and import-
ing firms that each have multiple partners, i.e., there are large, well-connected
firms on both sides of the transaction. These results are perhaps unsurprising
given previous research that has emphasized the role of large, global firms in
international trade.
The link between the number of foreign partners and total firm imports can be
seen clearly in Figure 10.5. The vertical axis shows log imports, normalized such
that log imports are relative to the average imports for one-supplier firms. On the
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positively and linearly related to the number of foreign partners of the Colombian
importer. Big importers import from many firms.
However, while large importers import from many exporters, they do not
import more from each partner. Figure 10.6 shows the log value of imports for
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Figure 10.4 Importers per supplier – top source countries, 2014
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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importers with 5 or more suppliers.8 The vertical axis is log imports in the part-
nership, normalized by source to be 1 for importers with a single foreign partner.
The horizontal axis is the log number of foreign suppliers for the Colombian
importer.
Sales from the median foreign supplier to the Colombian importer (the middle
line) are invariant across firms, regardless of the number of foreign partners ship-
ping to the Colombian firm. In addition, the value of shipments from the median
exporter are the same as average purchases by Colombian firms with a single
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Figure 10.5 Log imports and the number of suppliers
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 10.3 Match types
Importer–exporter 1995 2004 2014
Count Value Count Value Count Value
1-1 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.09
1-many 0.17 0.1 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.16
many-1 0.29 0.18 0.29 0.24 0.28 0.21



















Figure 10.6 Log imports of 80th, 50th (median) and 20th percentile suppliers and the
number of suppliers
Note: Log imports (vertical axis) are normalized so average log imports for single-supplier importers
equal 1. The horizontal axis is the the number of suppliers for the firm.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
and smaller partners (20th percentile). Large importers have more foreign suppli-
ers but they do not purchase more from each of those suppliers.
This result is confirmed by work on Norwegian exports (Bernard et al. (2018a))
and on the domestic firm-to-firm production network in Belgium (Bernard et al.
(2017)) and is of substantial significance for future research on firm size and
aggregate export flows. Export volumes are large because of large numbers of
partnerships, especially with a large firm on one or both sides of the relationship,
and because large firms have many partners.
4.4. Assortativity
The literature on firm-to-firm connections in trade has many points of contact
with the larger existing literatures on social and economic networks. One striking
difference is in the assortativity of connections and the relationships between
well-connected and poorly connected firms. Social networks display a common
strong tendency for the best connected people (nodes) to be more likely to be con-
nected to other well-connected people (nodes). This feature means that the
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average connectedness of one’s connections increases in your own number of
connections, i.e., popular people are connected to other popular people.
Firm-to-firm connections systematically display negative assortativity.
Figure 10.7 shows the number of suppliers per Colombian firm from a given
source country j, aj, on the x axis and the average number of Colombian connec-
tions among those suppliers, sj(aj), on the y axis. The axes scales are in logs and
both variables are demeaned at the source country level.
While there is a large amount of dispersion, as in many other studies of inter-
national trade and domestic connections, we find a significant negative relation-
ship. Colombian firms that have large numbers of suppliers in a source country
(to the right along the x axis) on average are connected with suppliers that
have fewer Colombian partners. This finding suggests again that there is typically
a large firm on one side of most Colombian import relationships. It does not mean
that well-connected Colombian firms only connect with small (less well-
connected) foreign firms. Rather, well-connected Colombian firms connect with
large, medium and small foreign partners while small (less well-connected)
Colombian firms are more likely to only match with a well-connected partner.
Bernard et al. (2018a) document this finding in Norwegian export data and
propose a model with match-specific fixed costs. In that framework small firms
cannot profitably match with other small firms, while large firms can. In
Figure 10.7 Degree assortativity
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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general this finding means that models designed to explain importer–exporter
pairings cannot mirror the framework in the social network literature that often
features preferential matching yielding positive assortativity.
4.5. Gravity and connections
The importance of distance and market size (gravity) in explaining international
trade flows is the subject of a vast literature (see Head and Mayer (2014)).
However, only recently have these forces been linked to the extensive margins
of trade. In Table 10.4 we estimate a simple gravity regression for each of the
margins discussed earlier including log distance and log GDP of the source
country. As expected, distance and GDP are negatively and positively correlated
with the margins respectively. The distance coefficient has similar magnitude for
each of the extensive and intensive margins although it is not statistically signif-
icant in any single regression. The aggregate coefficient on distance is 0.74.9
GDP is positive and significant for each margin and the magnitude of the relation-
ship is stronger for the various extensive margins.
In Table 10.5 we look at the importance of distance and market size for import
volume variation within importing firms. The table reports regressions for the
number of foreign partners, the average value per partner and total firm
Table 10.4 Gravity and margins – Colombian imports (2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (35)
Importers Exporters Products Intensive Density
Distance −0.37 −0.31 −0.38 −0.30 0.62
GDP 0.96a 0.91a 0.99a 0.67a −1.7a
N 60,671 60,671 60,671 60,671 60,671
R2 0.28 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.28
a indicates significance at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 10.5 Within-firm gravity regression, 2014
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign sellers Average imports Imports
Distance (log) −0.16a −0.14a −0.29a
GDP (log) 0.19a 0.04a 0.23a
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes
N 65,866 65,746 65,746
R2 0.47 0.55 0.54
a indicates significance at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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imports on source country log distance and log GDP. Distance is negatively
related to the number of foreign partners in a source and the average value of pur-
chases from the country with the magnitudes of the effects roughly equal. GDP,
however, is much more strongly linked to the number of connections with the
effect on the extensive margin almost five times larger than the effect on the
average value of importer per partner. These results using the gravity framework
in the aggregate and within firms point to the importance of understanding the
barriers to making foreign connections.
5. Connections over time
The existing work on firm-to-firm connections has emphasized the differences
across trading firms in terms of the number and value of their partnerships. We
now explore the evolution of these importer–exporter connections over time.
5.1. Margins of trade over time
We start by examining the importance of the different margins, both extensive
and intensive, in the growth of country-level shipments to Colombia. Similar
to the decomposition for import levels done earlier, we regress the log differences
of the margin of imports on the log difference in aggregate imports from each
source country in Table 10.6. As before the coefficients sum to unity and the
regressions allow us to assess the contribution of each margin to the variance
in annual (and long-run) country growth rates. Panel A is an annual regression
with no fixed effects; panel B includes country fixed effects in the annual
growth rate regression, and Panel C runs a cross-section of long (19 year)
differences.
The results are quite similar across the three specifications and are quite differ-
ent from the cross-section decomposition of import levels reported above. The
three extensive margins each contribute between 9 and 16 per cent to aggregate
growth rate variation. Accordingly, the intensive margin is much more important
in the growth rate decomposition than in the levels specifications. The variation in
the growth of imports across source countries is strongly correlated with the var-
iation in the growth in average imports per exporter–importer-product.
5.2. Adding and dropping suppliers
While the recent round of research on firm-to-firm relationships in trade has doc-
umented a set of stylized facts that are robust across countries and years, there is
less research on the evolution of importer–exporter connections over time.
Table 10.7 divides importing firms into three mutually exclusively groups: those
that increase the number of their suppliers, those that reduce the number, those
that leave the number of their suppliers unchanged at annual and five-year hori-
zons.10 Less than a third of importers leave the number of suppliers unchanged
from one year to the next, while over five-year intervals more than 95 per cent
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Table 10.6 Import growth decompositions – country level regressions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ΔBuyers ΔSellers ΔProducts ΔIntensive ΔDensity
(A) annual Δlog imports (without country fixed effect)
ΔImports (log) 0.13a 0.12a 0.16a 0.82a −0.23a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.03a 0.03a 0.04a −0.05a −0.05a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812
R2 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.80 0.17
(B) annual Δlog imports (with country fixed effect)
ΔImports (log) 0.13a 0.12a 0.16a 0.83a −0.23a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.03a 0.03a 0.04a −0.05a −0.05a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812
R2 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.80 0.17
(C) long difference Δlog imports
ΔImports (log) 0.14a 0.15a 0.09a 0.88a −0.25a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant −867.24 416.03 −2271.04 2147.14 575.10
(2921.60) (2849.81) (4467.46) (4299.15) (5250.49)
N 93 93 93 93 93
R2 0.18 0.21 0.04 0.80 0.18
a indicates significance at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 10.7 Fraction of surviving firms that increase suppliers, reduce suppliers, unchanged
Year Increase Reduce Unchanged
Annual 0.36 0.35 0.29
5-year 0.47 0.50 0.03
Source: Authors’ calculations.
of firms adjust the count of suppliers up or down. Over short and longer intervals,
most Colombian importing firms are changing their supplier mix.
Table 10.8 provides a different perspective on the changing buyer–supplier
connections by reporting the fractions of Colombian importers that only add sup-
pliers, only drop, both add and drop or leave their supplier mix unchanged. From
year to year, only 13 per cent of importing firms maintain all their existing con-
nections without adding or dropping. More than three quarters of firms add at
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Table 10.8 Fraction that add at least one new supplier, drop at least one old supplier, do
both, do neither
Year Add Drop Both Neither
Annual 0.77 0.76 0.66 0.13
5-year 0.94 0.97 0.92 0.01
Note: The annual numbers are the averages calculated across all pairs of years from 1995 to 1996
through 2013–2014 inclusive. The five-year numbers are the averages calculated across 1995–
2000, 2002–2007 and 2009–2014.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 10.9 Supplier and import value shares at new, dropped and continuing suppliers
Year New Continuing
Value Connections Value Connections
Annual 0.20 0.52 0.80 0.48
5-year 0.57 0.86 0.43 0.14
Year Dropped Continuing
Value Connections Value Connections
Annual 0.17 0.52 0.83 0.49
5-year 0.46 0.75 0.54 0.25
Note: The annual numbers are the averages calculated across all pairs of years from 1995 to 1996
through 2013–2014 inclusive. The five-year numbers are the averages calculated across 1995–
2000, 2002–2007 and 2009–2014.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
least one supplier or drop at least one supplier while two-thirds of firms both add
and drop on an annual basis. Over five-year intervals almost every firm is chang-
ing their supplier mix with more than 90 per cent of firms both adding and
dropping.
Supplier churning is widespread among importing firms over short and espe-
cially longer horizons. Table 10.9 examines the importance of new and dropped
partners in the overall number of connections and the share of import value for
the firm. The four columns of the top panel report (i) the fraction of the value of
firm imports accounted for by new foreign partners, (ii) the fraction of connections
accounted by new foreign partners, (iii) the fraction of import value at continuing
partnerships, and (iv) the fraction of connections at continuing partnerships. The
rows give the fractions for one-year and five-year intervals.11 While the majority
of suppliers are new to the importer each year (52 per cent) those relationships
are smaller on average accounting for 20 per cent of import value. Relationships
begun before the previous year are, on average, more than four times larger than
partnerships begun in the past year. Looking at five-year intervals, we see a
similar pattern. The vast majority of connections are formed in a typical five-
year interval but the older relationships are much larger.
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The bottom panel considers a similar breakdown, reporting the fraction of this
year’s imports and connections that are accounted for by partnerships that will
stop and those that will continue. Again more than half of today’s suppliers
will no longer be matched to the importer next year. Over a five-year horizon,
three-quarters of the connections will disappear. The relationships that will con-
tinue one year into the future represent more than 80 per cent of today’s import
value, and those that will continue for five years represent half of today’s import
value.
These findings suggest that the typical importing firm is engaged in a substan-
tial amount of churning of their supplier mix. Firms frequently add and drop part-
ners which is at least suggestive of relatively low costs of matching. More
research is needed to examine how this churning varies across importer and
exporter industries.
Figure 10.8 shows the distribution of match length and match value for all
importer–exporter pairs across all 20 years in the data. As reported by Eaton
et al. (2008), more than half of all matches last only one year and are quite
small in value. Aside from the big drop between matches of length one and
two years, the distribution of match length suggests a relatively stable attrition
rate of about 20 per cent annually. Match numbers fall off much more quickly
than value, confirming that long-lived relationships are relatively more important
in total import value and providing some additional evidence on the role of the
intensive margin.
5.3. The 1997 cohort of new connections
In this and the next subsection, we focus on a single cohort of relationships start-
ing in 1997.12 First, we look at all new importer–exporter pairs in 1997 at new
and continuing importers and then we consider only firms that were new to
importing in the same year.
In 1997 across all importers, 64,432 importer–exporter connections were
begun. This includes connections at new importers as well as new connections
at firms that had previously imported from other partners. Of those new cross-
border relationships 6,360 (2,916) were still active 5 (10) years later.13 Consider-
ing all the importer–exporter connections that started in 1997, we find that they
account for almost 30 per cent of total import value and more than 60 per cent of
all importer–exporter connections in that first year (see Table 10.10). Over time
the share of this cohort of new connections in total importer–exporter relation-
ships falls both because specific matches end and because total Colombian
imports, and thus the total number of connections, are growing. As we found
earlier, the share of value falls less quickly than the share of connections and
by their second year the surviving connections from the 1997 cohort are larger
than average (value share is greater than the connection share).
Table 10.11 gives a similar path for that cohort of new partnerships in 1997
from the perspective of the importing firm. On average the new connections
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Figure 10.8 Importer–exporter match length
Source: Authors’ calculations.














































































importing firms that had at least one new connection. For those firms that con-
tinue to import a decade later, that set of initial connections still accounts for
more than a third of the firm imports although it represents just 13 per cent of
their foreign supply relationships.
Figure 10.9 reports the exit rate for these new matches for the subsequent 17
years. As we saw earlier, match disintegration rates are highest in the early years
of a match. For new importers the disintegration rate is higher, 61.3 per cent, than
for new connections at all importing firms, 51.3 per cent, i.e. the age of the
importer predicts the success of the match. Disintegration rates are high and
declining for the first several years of the match and then stabilize between 10
and 15 per cent per year.
5.4. The 1997 cohort of new importers
In 1997, 6,854 Colombian firms started importing, of which 929 (550) were still
active 5 (10) years later and 309 survived as importers to 2014.14 Importer failure
rates also start quite high, two thirds of this entering cohort imported only once
and an additional 17 per cent imported for only 2–3 years. After stabilizing the
annual exit rate for Colombian importers is 7 per cent (see Figure 10.10).
Except for the start year, three-quarters of continuing importers start a new con-
nection each year. Those new connections cover more than 1,400 products from
more than 65 countries. First-year connections for continuing importers in this
cohort average 1.22 suppliers per product. Total value of imports increases at
an average rate of 9 per cent per year, while value per importer increases at 34
















Figure 10.9 Importer–exporter (match) exit rates
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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their transactions. For 1997 starting importers that continue for at least 10 years,
20 per cent have relationships that lasted the full period.
5.5. Match failure
In this section we look at factors that are correlated with the probability of failure
of matches between importers and exporters. A match is defined between two
firms and can potentially include multiple products. We consider characteristics
of the importer and those of the exporter as well as match-specific variables.
As before we are limited in the extent of firm characteristics to those available
in the Colombian import data.
For Colombian importers we know the number of years the firm has been an
importer since 1995 and the number of foreign partners from the particular source
country. For the foreign exporter we know how long it has exported to Colombia,
and the number of Colombian import partners. For the match itself, we include
the current length of the match between the exporter and importer, the value in
the current year and whether or not it is a multi-product relationship. Finally
we consider the role of traditional gravity variables for the source country includ-
ing GDP per capita, population and distance.
Table 10.12 reports results of linear probability models for the failure of the
match in year t+1; the columns respectively include year fixed effects, importer
and year fixed effects, importer-year fixed effects and match and year fixed
effects. In column 1, including only year fixed effects, we find that the probability
of match failure is lower the longer the Colombian firm has been importing and
















Figure 10.10 Importer exit rates – 1997 cohort
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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failure is reduced if the foreign firm has been exporting for a longer time to
Colombia and if it is connected to more Colombian importers. Unconditionally,
and perhaps unsurprisingly, “better” firms, those that survive longer and have
more partners, have lower rates of match failure. The “quality” of the match is
also negatively correlated with match failure. The length of the match, the
value of the match and multi-product matches all are associated with lower
failure probabilities.
Gravity variables enter with perhaps unexpected coefficients. Unconditionally
one would expect matches to be harder to sustain at greater distances or in smaller
markets. However, we find that conditional on the value and characteristics of the
partners, distance is negatively associated with match failure. While the number
of connections and the value of connections is negatively related to distance, as
shown earlier, the survival of individual matches increases with distance. This is
suggestive of the possibility that the sunk costs of a match increase with distance
and thus firms are less willing to break a match at longer distances. Market size,
however, works in the opposite direction. Match failure rates are higher for
markets with larger populations and higher GDP per capita.
Including importer, or importer-year, fixed effects does not substantially alter
the findings of the match failure regressions. All the variables that potentially
proxy for match quality are again negatively related to match failure. Years of
importing for the Colombian firm are negatively correlated with match failure
although the number of exporters in the source country now is positive and
Table 10.12 Linear probability model of match failure
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Importer age
Log # of exporters per importer-source
country
Exporter age




Log GDP per cap source country
Log population source country


































































aand c indicates significance at the 1 and 10 per cent level respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 10.13 Product summary statistics, 2014
All U.S. China Mexico Brazil
Mean products per importer 14.73 11.31 8.18 5.85 6.32
Median products per importer 4.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00
Mean products per exporter 6.30 7.17 5.16 5.68 5.89
Median products per exporter 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Mean no. of products per importer–exporter 4.43 4.61 3.71 3.78 3.71
Median no. of products per importer–exporter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share of importer-products > 1 supplier 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.07
Share of importer-products > 1 source country 0.09
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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significant. Exporter age is positive but insignificant. The gravity-related source
country variables are again negative for distance and positive for GDP per
capita and population. Conditioning on match fixed effects, the results are
largely unchanged, although we now find match length is positively related to
failure.
6. Products
In this section we examine the relationship between importing firms and products.
Table 10.13 reports summary statistics on products for all source countries, and
for the top five sources of Colombian imports. As with other trade-related vari-
ables the number of products per importer is highly skewed. The mean number
of products is 14.7 while the median is 4. A few firms are importing large
numbers of products but most importers import multiple products. This contrasts
with the evidence on the numbers of foreign partners and sourcing countries in
Table 10.2, which showed that most importers sourced from a single partner in
a single country. This supports evidence from numerous studies that document
the prevalence of multi-product exporters in cross-border trade flows. On the
other side of the transactions, the mean number of products exported by a
foreign firm to Colombia is 6.3 and the median is 2 with relatively little variation
across source countries. Within an importer–exporter pair, the mean number of
products is 4.4 and the median is 1, again with modest variation across countries.
In their work modeling and documenting foreign sourcing by U.S. manufactur-
ing firms, Antràs et al. (2017) report that the vast majority of firms source prod-
ucts from a single country. Looking at Colombian imports, we see that 38 per cent
of importer-product combinations have more than one supplier. However, only 9
per cent of importer-product combinations source from multiple countries. When
firms have multiple suppliers, three quarters of the time those suppliers are in the
same source country. This provides some confirmatory evidence that there are
substantial country-specific sourcing costs along with the sunk costs within an
exporter–importer relationship suggested by the results in the previous section.




























































360 Andrew Bernard, Esther Bøler and Swati Dhingra 360
Looking at changes in sourcing partners over time, in Table 10.14, we calculate
the fraction of product drops for single supplier relationships in year t that are
replaced by a new supplier in year t+1. This excludes all importer-products
with multiple suppliers in year t. Surprisingly very few product drops appear
to be associated with churning of suppliers, on average fewer than 4 per cent
of dropped products are imported in the following year from a different
foreign firm. The second column shows that within the set of replaced suppliers,
most changes remain within the same source country. More than two thirds of the
new suppliers are from the same source country.
Over time, importers deepen their relationship with their suppliers. Within an
importer over time, the number of products per supplier rises 3 per cent per
year, see Table 10.15. We can see the growing importance of long-time suppliers
in Table 10.16 which follows the product characteristics of matches started in 1997.
As with other characteristics of the partnership such as import value, the distribu-
tion of the number of products supplied by foreign partners is highly skewed. In the
first year of the match the mean products per supplier is close to 11 while the
median is just 3. Over time the number of products traded within a match rises dra-
matically; the annual increase for the average surviving match is 20 per cent per
year (24 per cent excluding the recession years), while the increase at the
median surviving firm is 23 per cent per year (25 per cent excluding the recession
years). The average partnership from this cohort involves more than 40 products
after five years and more than 80 products after a decade.
While surviving importers increase the number of suppliers, the last two
columns of Table 10.16 show that the long-lived partnerships take on increasing
significance for importers over time. Products from importer–exporter connec-
tions that started in 1997 and survived for five years account for 35–41
per cent of all imported products. After 10 years, these relationships supply
41–48 per cent of the foreign products bought by the Colombian firm.
Table 10.16 Products per connection and share of total imported products
cohort
– 1997 match
Years # of products Share of total
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Table 10.15 Relative evolution of imported products and foreign partners
Variables (1) #products / #suppliers






a indicates significance at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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7. Conclusions
This chapter has explored a new comprehensive datasest of detailed firm-to-firm
Colombian import transactions covering the period 1995–2014. The results
shows that the extensive margin of foreign partner firms plays an important
role in both aggregate and especially firm-level trade flows. Large importers
are bigger precisely because they have many foreign partners and not because
they trade more with each partner. Gravity relationships that do well in explaining
aggregate trade flows are successful in part because they capture extensive
margins effects.
Looking at importers and import partnerships over time, the findings are strik-
ing that most firms see substantial changing in their supplier mix over both annual
and, especially, longer time horizons. Most importer–exporter pairs end within
the first year or two, but those that survive grow rapidly. Also firms do not
appear to be dropping foreign suppliers to replace them with new providers of
the same product. The vast majority of changes are towards partners supplying
different products than those dropped.
The results presented here suggest a path forward for future research. The
ability of firms to create profitable and productive matches across borders is a
key ingredient in aggregate trade flows and their growth. Large firms have
more matches and thus larger trade volumes. However, the underlying sources
of the frictions that prevent these matches, or cause them to be short-lived, are
still unknown. Continued work using detailed firm-level trade transaction data
with information on both the importer and exporter is needed to develop a
deeper understanding of the barriers to trade in order to reduce them.
Notes
Disclaimer: Any opinions or conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect those of the NBER, CEPR, CEP or any other institution to which the
authors are affiliated.
1 While there is also information on foreign addresses and telephone numbers, it is
missing in many cases and subject to even more variation so we to date have not
employed this in grouping transactions.
2 We retain all Colombian importers in our analysis including manufacturing and
service firms. The latter group includes retailers, wholesalers and other service firms.
3 It is possible to examine the margins one at a time using the results from this analysis.
For example, a decomposition into the number of importers and average imports per
importer would correspond to column (1), importers, and the sum of columns (2)–(5),
average importers per importer, in Table 10.1.
4 The coefficient on the density term is expected to be negative as the fraction of active
importer–exporter-product triples from a country is decreasing as the total possible
number of triples increases.
5 To see this consider the decomposition into the number of active importer–exporter-
products which corresponds to the sum of columns (1)–(4) and the average shipments
per importer–exporter-product, column (5).
6 Bernard et al. (2018a) develop a model with Pareto distributed productivity
for importers and exporters that results in the log-log linear relationships shown in
Figures 10.3 and 10.4.
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7 For the foreign firms we can only see their Colombian exports, so the two groups are
foreign exporting firms with one Colombian import partner and foreign firms with
multiple Colombian importers.
8 For a Colombian firm with 10 suppliers, this represents the imports from foreign
exporters with the 2nd, 5th and 8th largest sales to the Colombian importer.
9 Running the same regression on aggregate imports at the country level yields a signif-
icant coefficient.
10 In each case the actual suppliers may have changed.
11 The five-year intervals throughout the table represent averages for 1995–2000, 2002–
2007 and 2009–2014.
12 Choosing 1997 gives us the longest continuous set of new importing relationships.
13 New connections in 1997 are defined as an import transaction in an importer–exporter
pair in 1997 that did not transact in either 1995 or 1996.
14 New importers in 1997 are those who imported in 1997 but had not imported in either
1995 or 1996.
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11 Chinese import exposure and
U.S. occupational employment
Marco Del Angel, Sanjana Goswami
and Antonio Rodriguez-Lopez
1. Introduction
Occupations differ along several characteristics such as their pay, degree of routi-
neness, and required level of education. These differences should lead to heteroge-
neous responses of occupational employment levels to technology or international
trade shocks. For example, automation is more likely to replace highly routine
occupations, and an international offshoring relationship with an unskilled-labor
abundant country is more likely to replace low-skilled occupations in the source
country. For the United States, the greatest trade shock in the last few decades
comes from the rise of China as the world’s largest trader. In influential papers,
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price
(2016), and Pierce and Schott (2016) find a large negative impact of Chinese
import competition on U.S. employment.1 Contributing to this literature, the
goal of this chapter is to estimate the impact of the ‘China shock’ on U.S. occupa-
tional employment from 2002 to 2014 by distinguishing occupations according to
their wage, non-routineness, and education characteristics.
After sorting about 750 occupations from low to high wage, from routine to
non-routine, and from low to high education, we document the decline in the
share of lower-indexed occupations in total U.S. employment from 2002 to
2014, and an increase in the share of higher-indexed occupations during the
same period. At the industry level, we show that the composition of employment
in the vast majority of our industries changes in favor of higher-indexed occupa-
tions. Our empirical analysis confirms that Chinese import exposure is an impor-
tant driver of these results, mainly through its large negative employment impact
on lower-indexed occupations.
Following Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price (2016), henceforth
AADHP, we construct industry-level measures of direct, upstream, and down-
stream import exposure from China. An industry’s direct import exposure is
simply related to the change in the industry’s real imports from China, while
upstream and downstream import exposure take into account input-output link-
ages across industries. The upstream measure captures Chinese exposure
effects flowing from affected buying industries to domestic selling industries,
while the downstream measure captures Chinese exposure effects flowing from
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affected selling industries to their domestic buying industries. From those
industry-level variables, we construct occupation-specific measures of Chinese
import exposure using industry shares of occupational employment as weights.
Our first empirical specification, which ignores occupational sorting, obtains
large and negative employment effects of Chinese import exposure on U.S. occu-
pational employment. We estimate the employment effects of direct import expo-
sure, and of two combined measures of import exposure – the first combined
measure adds the direct and upstream exposures, while the second measure
adds the direct, upstream, and downstream exposures. From 2002 to 2014, the
predicted employment losses are 1.05 million jobs from direct exposure,
1.51 million when we consider upstream exposure, and 2.12 million when we con-
sider downstream exposure. These numbers are well in line with the employment
losses calculated by AADHP from 1999 to 2011 in their industry-level analysis.
Our second empirical specification considers occupational sorting under our
three criteria (real wage, non-routineness and education). Occupations are
arranged into tertiles (low, middle and high) under each criteria, and we estimate
the impact of Chinese import exposure on each occupational tertile – a regression
is individually estimated for each occupation-sorting criteria. Our estimation
obtains a large negative effect of all types of Chinese exposure on lower-
indexed (low wage, routine, low education) occupations, suggesting that a high
content of these occupations is embodied in U.S. imports from China.
Additionally, we obtain a mildly significant positive employment effect of
Chinese direct import exposure on high-education occupations. These gains are
either the result of (i) strong productivity effects – as described by Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) – by which firms importing cheaper inputs from
China increase their productivity and market shares, allowing an expansion in
occupations that remain inside the firm, or (ii) market share reallocation effects
as in Melitz (2003), by which contracting or dying firms are displaced by more
productive firms that hire high-education workers more intensively, or (iii) a com-
bination of both. The associated employment gains in high-education occupations
are sufficiently large to make up for the employment losses in low-education
occupations.
Our third and last empirical specification investigates the effects of Chinese
import exposure on occupational employment across different sectors. After clas-
sifying industries into three sectors (Chinese-trade exposed, non-exposed tradable
and non-exposed non-tradable), this chapter finds large and negative employment
effects of Chinese exposure on lower-indexed occupations across all sectors, with
the exposed sector accounting for 55 to 63 per cent of employment losses due to
direct exposure. Although the losses in the exposed sector’s lower-indexed occu-
pations are expected, the losses in lower-indexed occupations in the non-exposed
sector are a novel result. The most likely explanation of this result is the existence
of local-labor-market effects as in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) along with a
heavy regional concentration of lower-indexed occupations. Importantly, we find
no evidence of Chinese-induced job reallocation of lower-indexed occupations
from the exposed sector to the non-exposed sector.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the
relevant literature. In Section 3 we discuss our data sources, and present a brief
overview of the 2002–2014 changes in occupational employment and in our
occupation-specific measures of Chinese import exposure. Section 4 presents
our empirical analysis for the impact of Chinese import exposure on U.S. occu-
pational employment. Lastly, Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
As mentioned above, this chapter builds on the recent contributions of Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2013), AADHP and Pierce and Schott (2016), who study
the impact of the China shock on U.S. employment. The main difference with
those papers is that we use occupational employment data, which allows us to
exploit differences in occupational characteristics to estimate differential effects
of Chinese exposure.2
Related to our focus on occupations, there are papers that link trade exposure
to U.S. outcomes at the occupational level. Ebenstein, Harrison and McMillan
(2015) estimate the impact of trade exposure on occupational wages using
worker-level data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Similar to our
approach, they construct occupation-specific measures of import penetration.
Also focusing on U.S. wages, Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan and Phillips
(2014) find that the negative effects of globalization affect routine occupations
the most, and argue – while highlighting the importance of labor reallocation
across sectors and into different occupations – that globalization affects wages
by pushing workers out of the manufacturing sector to take lower-paying jobs
elsewhere. Using also CPS data, Liu and Trefler (2011) examine the impact of
trade in services with China and India on U.S. unemployment, occupational
switching, and earnings. They also find that routine occupations are the most
adversely affected by service imports. Along those lines, Oldenski (2012)
shows that U.S. firms are more likely to offshore routine tasks, while less
routine tasks are more likely to be performed in their U.S. headquarters. More
generally, we find that Chinese import exposure negatively affects employment
in lower-indexed occupations whether they are classified by wage, non-routine-
ness, or education.
Keller and Utar (2016) link Chinese import competition and occupational
employment. Using Danish employer-employee matched data from 1999 to
2009, they show that import competition from China explains a large part of
the increase in job polarization. They document the decline in employment in
mid-wage occupations as well as the rise in employment in both low-wage and
high-wage occupations. They also report that in the process of Danish job polar-
ization there is substantial worker reallocation from the manufacturing sector to
services. In contrast, in this chapter we find that Chinese import exposure
reduces employment in low-wage occupations in every sector, and there is not
statistically significant evidence of Chinese-induced job creation in the highest-
wage occupations. Hence, we do not find evidence of Chinese-induced job
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polarization based on the wage criterion. We find, however, evidence of strong
job destruction in mid-routine occupations in all sectors, which indicates
Chinese-induced polarization under the non-routineness criterion. The last
result points out that the adversely affected mid-routine occupations are more
related to low-wage (and low-education) occupations than to mid-wage
occupations.
Under the education criterion, this chapter finds that Chinese direct import
exposure yields net employment gains due to large job creation in high-education
occupations, which dominates the job destruction in low-education occupations.
Relatedly, Wright (2014) uses manufacturing data and finds that offshoring –
which we interpret as imports of intermediate inputs from China – reduces
low-skill employment but increases high-skill employment, with the net effect
being positive. Similar to our interpretation, he attributes these results to strong
productivity effects.
In terms of welfare, Artuç and McLaren (2015) estimate a dynamic structural
model using CPS data and find that an offshoring shock harms low-education
workers and benefits high-education workers. Using Danish data in the estimation
of a dynamic model of occupational choice, Traiber-man (2017) obtains similar evi-
dence for the effects of lower import prices on earnings of low- and high-education
workers. In a similar vein, Lee (2017) uses a multi-country Roy model and finds
that “China effects” – measured by decreases in trade costs with China and
increases in China’s productivity – increase between-educational-type inequality
in most of the 32 countries in her sample.
3. Data and overview
Our analysis for the impact of Chinese import exposure on U.S. occupational
employment relies on data from several sources. We obtain (i) occupational
wage and employment data from the Occupational Employment Statistics
(OES) database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), (ii) data on occupation
characteristics from the O*NET database, (iii) data on trade flows from the
United Nations Comtrade database and (iv) U.S. national and industry data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
This section describes the construction of our occupational employment and
Chinese import penetration variables, and provides an overview of their evolution
during our period of study (2002–2014).
3.1. Occupational employment and occupation characteristics
The OES database provides yearly occupational employment and mean hourly
wage at the four-digit NAICS level. Although the classification of occupations
changes across years, the BLS provides concordance tables that allow us to
obtain 810 occupations at the six-digit 2010 Standard Occupational Classification
(SOC) for the period 2002–2014. We also aggregate the data to 60 industries
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according to a three-digit NAICS classification of the BEA (see Table 11.A1 in
the appendix for the list of industries). In the end, our employment-wage data
is an industry-occupation panel for years 2002 to 2014.
We construct time-invariant rankings of occupations along three dimensions:
from low to high wage, from routine to non-routine, and from low to high edu-
cation. For the wage ranking, we first obtain the average yearly wage of each
occupation across all industries (weighted by employment), and then convert
wages to real terms using the BEA’s Personal Consumption Expenditure Price
Index (PCEPI). Last, we obtain each occupation’s median real wage throughout
the 2002–2014 period, and then rank all occupations from the lowest to the
highest median real wage.
The non-routineness and education rankings are based on O*NET data on
occupation characteristics. Based on Costinot, Oldenski, and Rauch (2011), the
non-routineness ranking is constructed from the O*NET’s rating (on a 0 to 100
scale) of the importance of “making decisions and solving problems” for each
occupation. On the other hand, the education ranking is created from the
O*NET’s “job zone” rating (on a 1 to 5 scale) of the level of preparation
needed to perform each occupation.3
Out of 810, we are able to sort 757 occupations using the wage ranking, and
749 occupations using the non-routineness and education rankings. For illustra-
tion and comparison purposes, we convert the three occupation rankings to per-
centile ranks – in the (0,1) interval – so that, for example, a percentile wage rank
of 0.4 for an occupation indicates that 40 per cent of occupations have a lower
median wage. Hence, for occupation i, we define wi as its percentile wage
rank, qi as its percentile non-routineness rank, and ei as its percentile education
rank. As expected, the correlation between the three percentile ranks is high
and positive: 0.65 between w and q, 0.75 between w and e, and 0.59 between
q and e.
Using our three sorting criteria, we can now look at changes in the composition
of U.S. occupational employment during our period of study. Let w-jt 2 ð0; 1Þ
denote the average real-wage index of industry j in year t, defined as !X L
w ijt-jt ¼ w ;L i
i jt
where Lijt is the total employment in occupation i in industry j at year t, and Ljt =
∑iLijt is total employment in industry j at year t (Lijt/Ljt is the employment share of
occupation i in industry j at year t). Note that an increase in w-jt indicates a higher
employment share of high-wage occupations in that industry, while the opposite
is true for a reduction in w-jt. With analogous definitions for q-jt and e-jt – the
average non-routineness index and the average education index of industry j
in year t – Figure 11.1 plots the 2014 values of our three average indexes
against their 2002 values for our 60 industries. Most 2014 values are above
the 45 degree line for each sorting criteria, showing a generalized change in
the composition of U.S. employment toward higher-indexed (higher wage, more
non-routine, higher education) occupations. These findings are consistent with
previous evidence by Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), who similarly
reported a shift in employment towards skilled labor in manufacturing during
the 1980s.
In addition, Figure 11.1 classifies our 60 industries into 16 categories. This
allows us to identify which industries are more intensive in lower-indexed or
higher-indexed occupations, and also to pinpoint similarities and differences
across the three indexes. Along the three dimensions, the industries that are inten-
sive in lower-indexed occupations are Recreation Services, Wholesale/Retail
Trade, Textile/Apparel/Leather, and Food/Tobacco; the industries that are inten-
sive in higher-indexed occupations are Finance and Media Services; and the
industries that are in the middle of the pack are in general manufacturing indus-
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Figure 11.1 Average industry-level composition of U.S. occupational employment in 2002
and 2014
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Figure 11.2 Distribution of U.S. occupational employment in 2002 and 2014 (by sorting
criterion)
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Plastic/Rubber, and Machines/Electrical. On the other hand, Transportation Ser-
vices is the most non-routine category, and while industries in this category
have in general mid-to-high average real wages, they have low average education
indexes.
Reinforcing the point of a generalized change in the composition of U.S.
employment toward higher-indexed occupations, Figure 11.2 shows the kernel
distributions of occupational employment in 2002 and 2014 under our three
sorting criteria. Figure 11.2a shows that the decline in the employment share
of lower-wage occupations occurs up to the 60th percentile, while Figure 11.2b
shows that the decline in the employment share of routine occupations occurs
up to the 40th percentile. An interesting fact from the distributions in
Figures 11.2a and 11.2b is that they evolved from slightly bimodal in 2002 to
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distinctly bimodal in 2014. This shows that polarization in the U.S. labor market
during the 2002–2014 period is mostly the result of an increase in relative
employment in occupations on the right side of the distribution, rather than in
occupations on the left side.
From Figure 11.2c we see that the kernel distribution of occupational employ-
ment based on the education ranking is not as smooth as the distributions based
on the wage and non-routineness rankings. This is simply a consequence of the
O*NET “job zone” rating, which clusters in integer values from 1 to 5 (corre-
sponding to values 0, 0.05, 0.39, 0.66 and 0.85 in the percentile education
rank, e). Nevertheless, the same story emerges: from 2002 to 2014 there has
been a change in the composition of employment in favor of occupations that
need a higher level of education.
3.2. Chinese import penetration
This section describes our measures of U.S. exposure to Chinese imports. First
we discuss the construction of the industry-level measures, and then show how
to construct from them the occupation-specific measures of Chinese import
penetration.
3.2.1. Industry-level Chinese import penetration
We use the industry-level Chinese import penetration variables of AADHP. The
differences are our industry classification, which is based on 60 BEA industries,
and our period of study.
AADHP define Chinese import penetration in industry j in year t as the ratio of
U.S. industry j’s real imports from China in year t to industry j’s real domestic
absorption in a base year. Taking 2000 as our base year, the Chinese import pen-
etration ratio in industry j in year t is given by
C
M





j00 þ j00 - j00
where CMjt are U.S. industry j’s real imports from China in year t, Y j00 is industry
j’s real gross output in 2000, Mj00 are industry j’s real total imports in 2000, and
Xj00 are industry j’s real total exports in 2000. Nominal U.S. imports from China
come from the United Nations Comtrade Database, while U.S. industry-level
gross output, total exports, and total imports come from the BEA’s Industry
and International Economic Accounts. All nominal values are converted to real
terms using the BEA’s PCE price index.4
AADHP are concerned about U.S. demand shocks possibly driving the
increase in U.S. imports from China. To isolate the supply-driven component
of the rise of China’s exports to the U.S., AADHP follow Autor, Dorn and
Hanson (2013) and instrument Chinese import penetration in the U.S. with
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Chinese exports to other developed economies. Hence, and in line with AADHP,





* ¼ ; 2
Y M X
ð Þ
j00 þ j00 - j00
where CM *jt is the sum of Chinese exports to Australia, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland in industry j at year t.
The data on Chinese exports to these countries is obtained from Comtrade (in
nominal U.S. dollars) and is deflated using the PCE price index.
Chinese import exposure may also affect an industry’s employment indirectly
through input-output linkages. Inspired by Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and
Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), AADHP define upstream import penetration as the import
effects flowing from directly impacted buying industries to their domestic supply-
ing industries, and downstream import penetration as the effects flowing from
directly impacted supplying industries to their domestic buying industries. While
the impact of upstream import exposure on employment is expected to be negative
(if buying industries shrink due to foreign competition, then their domestic provid-
ers will sell less and will shrink too), the impact of downstream import exposure on
employment may be positive or negative (if domestic providers shrink due to
foreign competition, then industries may contract due to less access to domestic
inputs, but may also expand due to access to cheaper inputs from abroad). In
this chapter we also take into account employment responses to Chinese import
exposure due to first-order upstream and downstream linkages.5
The upstream and downstream import penetration variables are weighted aver-
ages of the direct import penetration variable in equation (1), with weights
obtained from the BEA’s 2000 Input-Output Table.6 Let μgj denote the value of
industry j’s output purchased by industry g. Then, upstream weights are com-
U
P P
puted as og j ¼ mg j= g mg00 j for every g, where g0 mg0j is industry j’s total
output value. Therefore, the upstream import penetration from China for industry
j is given byX
UIP Ujt ¼ ogj IPgt: ð3Þ
g
Likewise, downstream weights for industry j are calculated as oD
P
jg ¼ m =P jg g0 mjg0
for every g, where g0 mjg0 is the value of industry j’s total purchases; hence,
downstream import penetration from China for industry j isX
DIP oDjt ¼ jgIPgt: ð4Þ
g P
Using (2), we construct the instruments for UIP DIPjt as UIPjt
* ¼ g oUgj IPP jt and gt*
and DIPjt
* D *¼ g ojgIPgt.
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3.2.2. Occupation-specific Chinese import penetration
Occupations vary in their degree of exposure to Chinese imports. For example, an
occupation that is mainly employed in the computer and electronics industry is
more exposed to Chinese imports than an occupation mainly employed in the
real estate industry. To account for this, we construct occupation-specific mea-
sures of Chinese import exposure using the industry-level import penetration var-
iables from the previous section.
Similar to Ebenstein, Harrison and McMillan (2015), the occupation-specific
trade variables are weighted averages of the industry-level trade variables, with
weights determined by each industry’s share in the occupation’s total employ-
ment. Using weights from 2002, which is the first year in our occupational
employment data, we define the Chinese import penetration for occupation i as( )X L
IP ij02it ¼ IPL jt; ð5Þ
j i02
where Lij02 is the employment of occupation i in industry j in 2002, Li02 = ∑jLij02
is the total employment in occupation i in 2002, and IPjt is the Chinese import
penetration in industry j in year t as described in (1). As weights may respond
endogenously to changes in Chinese import penetration – which may lead to
selection bias in a measure with changing weights – the best approach in the con-
struction of occupation-specific variables is to use the same weights throughout
our period of study.7 We follow the same formula (and weights) from (5) to con-
struct occupation-specific upstream and downstream Chinese import penetration





We can now look at the evolution of occupation-specific variables during our
period of study. For the 671 occupations that report employment in every year,
Figure 11.3 shows the values in 2002 of the direct import penetration, IPit, and
the combined import penetration, IPit + UIPit + DIPit, against their values in
2014. Two of our econometric specifications in Section 4 classify occupations
into tertiles (low, middle, high) for each of our sorting criteria (wage, non-
routineness, and education). In line with this, the graphics in the left side of
Figure 11.3 show the same plot of direct import penetration, but differ in their
sorting criteria, while the graphics on the right side do the same for the combined
measure of import exposure. Occupations marked with a circle denote the lowest-
tertile occupations (low wage, routine, low-education), those marked with a
square denote the middle-tertile occupations (mid-wage, mid-routine, mid-
education), and those marked with a triangle denote the highest-tertile occupa-
tions (high wage, non-routine, high-education).
First, note that the vast majority of occupations are well above the 45 degree
line for both types of Chinese import penetration (direct and combined), indicat-
ing extensive occupational exposure to Chinese imports during the period. For
the combined import penetration measure, for example, only six occupations
(a) Direct import penetration – Wage (b) Combined import penetration – Wage
(c) Direct import penetration – Non-routineness (d) Combined import penetration – Non-routineness
(e) Direct import penetration – Education (f) Combined import penetration – Education
Figure 11.3 Occupation-specific import penetration measures in 2002 and 2014 under
three sorting criteria (wage, non-routineness, education): o lowest tertile,
□ middle tertile, 4 highest tertile
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(out of 671) had a decline in Chinese import exposure from 2002 to 2014.
Second, note that across the three sorting criteria and for both measures of
import penetration, lowest-indexed occupations are the most exposed to
Chinese import competition, while the highest-indexed occupations are the
least exposed. This highlights the strong heterogeneity in the exposure of differ-
ent occupations to Chinese import competition.
3.3. Occupation-specific capital exposure controls
To control for automation forces, which may substitute workers of some occupa-
tions but may complement workers in other occupations, in our specifications
below we include occupation-specific measures of capital exposure as regressors.
Given that changes in capital stock throughout the period are likely to be endog-
enous, our time-invariant capital-exposure measures are based on 2002 data,
which is the first year in our sample.
From the BEA’s Fixed Assets accounts, we obtain the quantity index for net
capital stock by asset type for each of our industries in 2002. Eden and Gaggl
(2015) argue that information and communication technology (ICT) capital –
which is related to software and computer equipment – is a closer to substitute
to routine occupations than non-ICT capital (equipment, structures, and intellec-
tual property) and suggest to distinguish between them. Following their classifi-
cation, each asset is labeled as either ICT capital or non-ICT capital.8 Then, an
industry’s ICT capital stock index is the weighted average of the industry’s
ICT-assets quantity indexes, with the weight of each asset determined by the
ratio of the asset’s current-cost value to the total current-cost of ICT assets in
the industry. We follow an analogous procedure to calculate the non-ICT
capital stock index.
Let KIj02 denote the ICT capital stock index for industry j in 2002, and let K
N
j02
denote the non-ICT capital stock index for industry j in 2002. Hence, similar to
the construction of the occupation-specific import penetration variables in (5), the
index of ICT capital exposure for occupation i is given by( )X
KI
Lij02 KIi ¼ ;L j02 ð6Þ
j i02
with a similar definition for KNi , which is occupation i’s index of non-ICT capital
exposure based on 2002 data.
4. Responses of U.S. occupational employment
to Chinese import exposure
This section estimates the effects of Chinese import exposure on U.S. occupa-
tional employment. Given that the effects of import exposure may take some
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time before they are reflected in employment, we focus our analysis on a panel
with three-year changes. Thus, we use periods 2002–2005, 2005–2008, 2008–
2011, and 2011–2014. Following AADHP, we use the operator “Δ” to denote
annualized changes times 100 so that for any variable Xit, we define ΔXit as
100
DXit = 3 ½ ]Xit - Xit-3 :
We refer to ΔXit as the “annualized change” in X between t − 3 and t.
4.1. Employment responses without occupational sorting
We start by ignoring occupational sorting. Hence, our specification to estimate the
average impact of Chinese import exposure on occupational employment is
D ln Lit ¼ at þ bDIPit þ gZi þ εit; ð7Þ
where for occupation i and between t − 3 and t, Δln Lit is the annualized change in
log employment, ΔIPit is the annualized change in Chinese import exposure, αt is
a time fixed effect, and εit is an error term. For each occupation i, the term Zi is a
vector of time-invariant production controls that includes the 2002 values of the
log average real wage, and the log of the ICT and non-ICT capital-stock indexes
(KIi and K
N
i ). Our coefficient of interest is β, which represents the semi-elasticity
of occupational employment to Chinese import exposure.
Table 11.1 presents the results of the estimation of the specification in (7). All
regressions in Table 11.1, as well as all the following regressions, are weighted by
2002 employment and show standard errors clustered at the occupation level.
Columns 1–3 use as main regressor the annualized change in direct import pen-
etration as defined in (5), while columns 4 and 5 use instead annualized changes
of combined import penetration measures. The first combined measure adds the
direct and upstream measures (IPit + UIPit), while the second combined measure
adds the direct, upstream, and downstream measures (IPit + UIPit + DIPit). Con-
sequently, in the instrumental variables (IV) regressions, the instrument in
columns 2–3 is DIPit
*, the instrument in column 4 is D it
* þ UIPit*ðIP Þ, and the
instrument in column 5 is D it þ DIPit*ðIPit* þ UIP* Þ.
All the estimates for β in the five columns of Table 11.1 are negative and sta-
tistically significant at least at the 5 per cent level, showing that – as found by
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) at the commuting-zone level and by AADHP
at the industry level – Chinese import exposure is associated with job losses in
the United States. Column 1 presents the OLS estimation without production con-
trols, and column 2 presents the analogous IV estimation. Note that the estimate
for β in column 2 is almost twice as large as the coefficient in column 1, which
highlights the importance of the IV approach to take care of a strong endogeneity
bias. Columns 3–5 include production controls. Comparing columns 2 and 3,
notice that the magnitude of the estimate for β declines by almost 40 per cent
Table 11.1 Estimation of U.S. occupational employment responses to Chinese import exposure
OLS IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Direct import exposure −0.97*** −1.91*** −1.16***
(0.34) (0.37) (0.40)
Combined import exposure I −0.83**
(direct + upstream) (0.38)
Combined import exposure II −0.69**
(direct + upstream + downstream) (0.30)
Production controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,672 2,672 2,444 2,444 2,444
Notes: All regressions include time-fixed affects (not reported) and are weighted by 2002 employment. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the occupation
level. The coefficients are statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
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(the coefficient changes from −1.91 to −1.16), which indicates that the exclusion
of production controls leads to an overestimation of the negative impact of
Chinese imports on U.S. employment.
From column 4, note that the coefficient on import exposure declines in mag-
nitude if we use instead the combined measure of direct plus upstream import
penetration (the coefficient changes from −1.16 to −0.83). This, however, does
not imply that the negative effects of Chinese import exposure on U.S. occupa-
tional employment are smaller when we consider upstream input-output linkages.
To know this, we need to separately calculate the 2002–2014 predicted employ-
ment losses from columns 3 and 4. Following Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013)
and AADHP, the formula to calculate column 4’s predicted employment
changes from Chinese import exposure from 2002 to 2014 isX h i
^
Predicted employment change ¼ 1 -brð ÞIPi14-IPi02- e Li14; ð8Þ
i
where ρ = 0.78 is the partial R-squared from the first-stage regression of ΔIPit on
DIPit
* from the specification in column 2. We derive a similar expression to cal-
culate column 4’s predicted losses, with the value of ρ kept constant at 0.78.
Predicted employment losses from 2002 to 2014 are 1.05 million from direct
exposure (column 3) and 1.51 million from the combined direct and upstream
exposure (column 4). Therefore, upstream input-output links further reduce
U.S. employment by about 0.46 million jobs. Column 5 adds downstream expo-
sure to the combined measure and reports a smaller estimate for β (−0.69), but
again, we need to calculate predicted employment losses because changes in
the combined exposure measure are likely to be larger. Indeed, column 5’s pre-
dicted employment losses from Chinese exposure are 2.12 million, so that
about 0.61 million jobs (2.12 million minus 1.51 million) are lost due to down-
stream input-output linkages.9
4.2. Employment responses with occupational sorting
The main contribution of this chapter is that we can analyze the effects of Chinese
import exposure on different types of occupations classified by either wage level,
degree of non-routineness, or required education. For each of these criteria, we
sort occupations into tertiles (low, middle and high) using the percentile ranks
described in Section 3.1. Thus, the econometric specification with occupational
sorting is X3 h i
D ln L
‘





kZi 1ifTkg þ εit; ð9Þ
k¼1
where ℓ 2 {w, q, e} denotes the sorting criteria (wage, non-routineness, or edu-
cation), k 2 {1, 2, 3} indicates the tertile (from low to high), 1 ‘ifTkg is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if occupation i belongs to tertile k under criteria
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ℓ, and a
‘
kt accounts for tertile-time fixed effects. This specification is esti-
mated separately for each sorting criteria. Hence, for each ℓ 2 {w, q, e},
the coefficients interest are b
‘ ‘ ‘
of 1, b2 and b3, which indicate the employment
semi-elasticity to Chinese import exposure for each occupational tertile.
Table 11.2 shows our IV estimation of (9) for the impact of direct import expo-
sure. Production controls are included in even columns and excluded in odd
columns. All six columns show strong and highly significant negative effects
of direct Chinese import exposure on the lowest occupational tertiles (low-
wage, routine, low-education occupations). Therefore, Chinese import exposure
is related to job losses in all kinds of lower-indexed occupations, suggesting
that a high content of these types of occupations is embodied in U.S. imports
from China. As well, columns 3–4 show statistically significant evidence of
Chinese-induced job losses in mid-routine occupations.
Under the education-sorting criterion with production controls, column 6
shows a positive and mildly significant coefficient for the impact of direct
import exposure on high-education occupations. The predicted employment
expansion in high-education occupations – while employment declines in occu-
pations in the lowest tertiles – can be the result of (i) reallocation of workers
from low- to high-education occupations, (ii) strong productivity effects in the
presence of complementarities between low- and high-education occupations,
or (iii) Melitz-type reallocation of markets shares from low-productivity firms
to high-productivity firms.
The first scenario is, however, unlikely, as released low-educated workers
would have to retool themselves with college degrees, or a large number of
highly educated workers would have to be employed in low-education occupa-
tions in the first place. Regarding the second scenario, and as discussed by Gross-
man and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Groizard, Ranjan and Rodriguez-Lopez
(2014), the offshoring of lower-indexed occupations allows firms to reduce mar-
ginal costs (so that productivity increases), which allows them to set lower prices
and capture larger market shares; this translates to higher employment in occupa-
tions that remain inside the firm, with larger employment gains if there is
complementarity across occupations.10 Last, the third scenario requires that con-
tracting or dying firms have a disproportionately large share of low-educated
workers, while expanding high-productivity firms either upgrade their labor
force or have a disproportionately large share of highly-educated workers.11
The most plausible mechanism for the results in column 6 is a combination of
the second and third scenarios.
Table 11.3 considers the occupational employment effects of combined import
exposure. For both combined measures, the implications described from direct
import exposure on lower-indexed occupations remain robust: there is Chinese-
induced job destruction in low-wage, routine and mid-routine, and low-education
occupations when we consider input-output linkages across industries. Similar to
what we observed in Table 11.1, the import-exposure estimates decline in mag-
nitude when we use the combined measures. However, this does not imply
Table 11.2 IV estimation of U.S. occupational employment responses to Chinese direct import exposure: by tertiles based on three occupation-sorting
criteria
Wage Non-routineness Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Direct import exposure
Lowest tertile −2.42*** −1.81*** −2.07*** −1.46*** −2.19*** −1.63***
(0.60) (0.55) (0.52) (0.43) (0.52) (0.50)
Middle tertile 0.14 0.91 −2.73*** −2.25*** −0.78 −0.04
(0.75) (1.01) (0.46) (0.71) (0.87) (1.12)
Highest tertile −0.21 2.35 0.63 3.42 3.40 7.08*
(2.16) (2.64) (1.80) (2.47) (2.85) (4.21)
Production controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,460 2,444 2,660 2,436 2,660 2,436
Notes: All regressions include tertile-time fixed affects (not reported). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the occupation level. The coefficients are
statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
Table 11.3 IV estimation of U.S. occupational employment responses to Chinese combined import exposure: by tertiles based on three occupation-
sorting criteria
Wage Non-routineness Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Combined import exposure I (direct + upstream)
Lowest tertile −2.00*** −1.47***
(0.46) (0.42)
Middle tertile 0.06 0.62
(0.55) (0.77)
Highest tertile −0.37 1.76
(1.62) (2.12)
B. Combined import exposure II (direct + upstream + downstream)
Lowest tertile −1.55*** −1.12***
(0.37) (0.34)
Middle tertile −0.13 0.17
(0.45) (0.60)
Highest tertile −0.36 1.08
(1.41) (1.70)


























































Notes: All regressions include tertile-time fixed affects (not reported). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the occupation level. The coefficients are
statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
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smaller employment effects because changes in the combined import-exposure
measures are likely to be larger. To shed light on this, we need to calculate pre-
dicted employment changes for each occupational tertile (under each sorting cri-
teria) using formulas that are analogous to equation (8).
Table 11.4 presents the predicted employment changes from Chinese import
exposure based on the regressions with production controls (in the even
columns) of Tables 11.2 and 11.3, as well as for other specifications described
below. For our three sorting criteria, the first three rows of Table 11.4 show
that predicted employment losses for occupations in the lowest tertile are
between 0.6 and 0.8 million due to direct exposure, are between 1.1 and
1.3 million when we consider upstream links, and further increase to between
1.43 and 1.75 million if we also consider downstream links. These losses are
the main component of the average employment losses reported in the previous
section. In addition, the statistically significant predicted job losses in mid-routine
occupations range between 0.5 million from direct exposure to about 0.9 million
when considering upstream and downstream linkages.
Column 6 in Table 11.2 shows a strong positive effect of direct import expo-
sure on high-education occupations, with the first row of Table 11.4 showing that
the 1.2 million predicted job gains in high-education occupations more than make
up for the 0.8 million job losses in low-education occupations. However, column
6 of Table 11.3 shows that the high-education import exposure coefficient loses
its statistical significance once we consider input-output linkages (for both com-
bined measures). Hence, although the second and third row of Table 11.4 show
predicted job gains in high-education occupations that continue to be larger
than job losses in low-education occupations, these job gains are no longer sta-
tistically significant. Thus, the Chinese-induced positive productivity effects on
U.S. firms occur through direct exposure, and not through input-output linkages.
The results of Tables 11.2, 11.3 and the first three rows of Table 11.4 suggest,
not surprisingly, substantial overlap in the employment losses of low-wage,
routine and low-education occupations. They also suggest an overlap between
mid-routine occupations and low-wage, low-education occupations. Moreover,
although there are always predicted job gains in the highest-tertile occupations
along the three criteria, they are only significant for direct exposure in high-
education occupations. This indicates either that (i) high-education occupations
that benefit from Chinese exposure are not necessarily concentrated in non-
routine, high-wage occupations, or that (ii) there is a large fraction of Chinese-
impacted low-education occupations that are non-routine or high-wage, which
average out employment gains in other higher wage and non-routine occupations,
or (iii) a combination of both.
4.3. Employment responses by sector exposure
The last part of our empirical analysis expands the specification in equation (9) to
account for different impacts of Chinese import exposure across occupational
employment in different sectors. This exercise is motivated by AADHP, who
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Table 11.4 Predicted employment changes (in thousands) from Chinese import exposure (2002–2014)
Wage Non-routineness Education
Lowest Middle Highest Lowest Middle Highest Lowest Middle Highest
tertile tertile tertile tertile tertile tertile tertile tertile tertile
Table 11.2
Direct import exposure −731 205 606 −602 −497 876 −794 −9 1,227
Table 11.3, panel A
Direct + upstream −1,292 266 813 −1,101 −609 1,352 −1,216 −56 1,580
Table 11.3, panel B
Direct + upstream+downstream −1,751 112 811 −1,429 −907 1,526 −1,662 −66 2,097
Table 11.5
Direct import exposure
Exposed −380 122 2,187 −243 −257 1,954 −401 42 2,248
Non-exposed tradable −23 25 5 −22 −17 17 −32 16 10
Non-exposed non-tradable −289 117 −126 −119 −247 249 −216 −27 117
Table 11.6, panel A
Direct + upstream
Exposed −530 199 3,083 −293 −290 2,464 −508 98 2,991
Non-exposed tradable −36 38 13 −32 −18 23 −46 20 17
Non-exposed non-tradable −448 81 −453 −448 −323 565 −148 −201 −122
Table 11.6, panel B
Direct + upstream + downstream
Exposed −720 181 3,311 −421 −381 2,627 −705 67 3,277
Non-exposed tradable −40 45 19 −36 −20 29 −51 23 19
Non-exposed non-tradable 209 −28 −871 −253 −801 1,070 94 −161 −282
Notes: Reported quantities represent the change in employment attributed to instrumented changes in import exposure in all specifications reported in Tables 11.2–11.5
with wage and capital controls. Negative values indicate that import exposure reduces employment. Equation (8) shows the general formula to calculate predicted
employment changes. The numbers in bold denote predicted changes corresponding to statistically significant coefficients in Tables 11.2–11.5. The predicted
employment changes changes from Table 11.1 are −1,051,651 for the direct effect, −1,512,415 for the direct and upstream combined effect and -2,122,630 for the
direct, upstream and downstream combined effect of import exposure.
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classify industries into three sectors – exposed, non-exposed tradable, and non-
exposed non-tradable – according to industry-level measures of (direct and
upstream) Chinese import exposure, to investigate different sectoral employment
responses within a local-labor-market analysis, as well as to look for evidence of
employment reallocation across sectors.12
As in AADHP, we begin by dividing our 60 industries into three sectors, s 2
{1, 2, 3}, with ‘1’ denoting the exposed sector, ‘2’ denoting the non-exposed
tradable sector and ‘3’ denoting the non-exposed non-tradable sector.13 The sec-




ist ¼ ½akst þ bk1DIPit x 1sf1g þ bk2DIPit ð10Þ
k¼1
2 b
‘x1sf g þ k3DIP
‘
it x 1sf3g þ g
‘
ksZis]1ifTkg þ εist;
where, between t − 3 and t, Δln List is the annualized change in log employment of
occupation i in sector s, ΔIPit is the annualized change in Chinese import exposure
of occupation i, and Zis is a vector of time-invariant production controls of occu-
pation i in sector s.14 Also, 1s{S} is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if
s = S, for S , and 1ifT ‘2 {1, 2, 3} kg is a dummy variable taking the value
of 1 if occupation i belongs to tertile k under sorting criterion ℓ 2 {w, q, e}.
The term αkst denotes a tertile-sector-time fixed effect and εist is the error
term.
Table 11.5 shows the results from the estimation of equation (10) for the impact
of Chinese direct import exposure on U.S. occupational-sectoral employment.
Columns 1 and 2 use the occupation-sorting criterion based on wage,
columns 3 and 4 use the non-routineness criterion, and columns 5 and 6 use
the education criterion. Regressions in even columns include production controls,
and regressions in odd columns do not include them. Note that each column
reports estimates for nine β-coefficients: one coefficient for each tertile (low,
middle, high) in each of the three sectors.
For the exposed sector, Table 11.5 shows that direct import exposure has neg-
ative and statistically significant effects in lower-indexed occupations under the
three criteria, as well as on mid-routine occupations. Indeed, the job destruction
effect on mid-routine occupations is larger in magnitude than the impact on the
highly routine (lowest tertile) occupations, which suggests that an important frac-
tion of mid-routine occupations are low wage and low education. In contrast,
although there are large and positive coefficients for the higher-indexed occupa-
tions, none of them is statistically significant.
The non-exposed tradable sector also has statistically significant job destruc-
tion in lower-indexed (under the three criteria) and mid-routine occupations,
but also shows mildly significant evidence of job creation in mid-wage, mid-
education, and highly non-routine occupations. The implied job destruction in
a non-exposed sector is likely a consequence of local labor market effects, as
described by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013). The result that these job
Table 11.5 IV estimation of U.S. occupational employment responses to Chinese direct import exposure: by sector exposure under three occupation-
sorting criteria
Wage Non-routineness Education


























































































































Production controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,372 5,273 5,581 5,253 5,581 5,253
Notes: All regressions include tertile-sector-time fixed affects (not reported). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the occupation level. The coefficients are
statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
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destruction effects of direct exposure happen in the same types of occupations as
in the exposed sector, indicates a heavy regional concentration of lower-indexed
occupations.15 On the other hand, the implied job creation in mid-wage, mid-
education, highly non-routine occupations is evidence of job reallocation from
negatively affected lower-indexed occupations; that is, some released workers
are able to find better jobs in more sophisticated occupations.
The coefficients for the non-exposed non-tradable sector in Table 11.5 also
show evidence of job destruction in lower-indexed and mid-routine occupations,
which also points out toward the existence of local labor market effects under
heavy regional concentration of lower-indexed occupations. Note, however, that
the coefficients for the lower-indexed occupations under the non-routineness
and education criteria lose their statistical significance once production controls
are added to the regressions. Moreover, and in contrast to the findings for the
non-exposed tradable sector, there is no evidence of job reallocation from occupa-
tions with shrinking employment to occupations in the non-exposed non-tradable
sector.16
Table 11.6 considers the combined measures of Chinese import exposure.
Panel A shows the estimation results that use the measure that adds upstream
linkages and panel B shows the results that use the measure that adds upstream
and downstream linkages. As before, the magnitudes of the coefficients are in
general smaller when adding input-output linkages, but this is simply a conse-
quence of the rescaling of the import exposure measure. The results from both
panels are qualitatively similar to those discussed for direct import exposure
from Table 11.5, though our previous findings for the non-exposed non-tradable
sector become largely insignificant.
The only novelty for the non-exposed non-tradable sector comes from signifi-
cant and negative import-exposure coefficients for high-wage occupations in both
panels, which indicates Chinese-induced job destruction in high-wage occupa-
tions in this sector. This may be evidence of job reallocation of high-wage occu-
pations from the non-exposed to the exposed sector, with the latter sector
demanding more high-wage workers due to productivity effects. However, the
evidence is not conclusive because in spite of very large and positive coefficients
for high-wage occupations in the exposed sector (indicating a large expansion in
these occupations’ employment), they have large standard errors and are not sta-
tistically significant.
To gauge the importance of the effects obtained in our occupational-sectoral
estimation, the last nine rows of Table 11.4 present the 2002–2014 implied
employment changes from Tables 11.5 and 11.6 for the specifications including
production controls. The predicted changes from direct import exposure show
that the exposed sector accounts for the majority of the employment losses in
occupations in the lowest tertile: the share of the exposed sector in lowest-
tertile losses is 55 per cent under the wage criterion, 63 per cent under the
non-routineness criterion and 62 per cent under the education criterion. Thus,
between 38 and 45 per cent of predicted job losses in lower-indexed occupations
are likely the consequence of local-labor-market effects à la Autor, Dorn and




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Combined import exposure I (direct + upstream)
Exposed
−1.90*** −1.18*** −1.26*** −0.72* −1.73*** −0.90***
Lowest tertile
(0.51) (0.44) (0.46) (0.38) (0.43) (0.34)
0.18 0.85 −1.96*** −1.01 0.19 0.54
Middle tertile
(0.82) (0.84) (0.49) (0.69) (0.88) (0.94)
14.47 21.77 10.92 19.12 26.31 33.97
Highest tertile
(13.68) (17.88) (11.52) (16.00) (20.04) (23.43)
Non-exposed tradable
−1.21*** −0.86*** −1.09*** −0.75*** −1.16*** −0.82***
Lowest tertile
(0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20)
1.37* 2.32** −1.26** −0.90 1.86* 1.90*
Middle tertile
(0.82) (0.95) (0.56) (0.55) (1.08) (1.06)
1.12 0.89 1.93** 2.21** 2.76* 2.48
Highest tertile
(0.98) (1.14) (0.84) (1.00) (1.63) (1.61)
Non-exposed non-tradable
−1.44 −1.18 −2.22** −1.22 −1.15 −0.38
Lowest tertile
(1.39) (1.37) (1.03) (0.98) (1.32) (1.28)
0.64 0.49 −3.02* −1.60 −1.30 −0.99
Middle tertile
(1.15) (1.14) (1.59) (1.64) (1.11) (1.07)
−2.81** −1.78 1.65 2.52 −2.25 −0.58
Highest tertile




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
B. Combined import exposure II (direct + upstream + downstream)
Exposed
−1.70*** −1.18*** −1.14*** −0.74** −1.54*** −0.92***
Lowest tertile
(0.48) (0.44) (0.41) (0.34) (0.40) (0.33)
0.08 0.58 −1.70*** −0.99* 0.06 0.27
Middle tertile
(0.67) (0.68) (0.43) (0.57) (0.72) (0.75)
11.62 17.18 8.83 15.18 21.96 27.96
Highest tertile
(11.27) (14.49) (9.62) (13.20) (16.97) (19.57)
Non-exposed tradable
−0.93*** −0.68*** −0.82*** −0.59*** −0.89*** −0.64***
Lowest tertile
(0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
1.22* 1.93** −0.99** −0.72 1.56* 1.55*
Middle tertile
(0.71) (0.81) (0.44) (0.44) (0.86) (0.85)
1.20 1.02 1.85*** 2.10*** 2.25* 2.05
Highest tertile
(0.79) (0.93) (0.61) (0.77) (1.32) (1.29)
Non-exposed non-tradable
0.20 0.24 −0.82 −0.32 −0.31 0.12
Lowest tertile
(1.39) (1.41) (0.72) (0.78) (1.25) (1.26)
−0.03 −0.09 −3.29* −1.90 −0.55 −0.38
Middle tertile
(1.12) (1.11) (1.69) (1.70) (0.86) (0.88)
−2.53** −1.80* 2.10 2.62 −1.85 −0.70
Highest tertile
(1.11) (1.04) (2.32) (2.45) (1.41) (1.26)
Production controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,372 5,273 5,581 5,253 5,581 5,253
Notes: All regressions include tertile-sector-time fixed affects (not reported). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the occupation level. The coefficients are
statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
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Hanson (2013), which indicates – given the non-significant employment
responses of higher-indexed occupations – that employment in lower-indexed
occupations is heavily concentrated in particular regions.
Although the non-exposed tradable sector has statistically significant employ-
ment gains in mid-wage, mid-education, and highly non-routine occupations,
these are relatively small – between 16,000 jobs in mid-education occupations
and 25,000 jobs in mid-wage occupations – when compared to predicted
changes in the exposed and non-exposed non-tradable sectors. This is the case
because the non-exposed tradable sector is very small, accounting on average
for only 2.3 per cent of total employment per year. Thus, although these gains
are evidence of job reallocation toward better occupations, their overall impact
is very small.
Across our three sorting criteria, upstream and downstream linkages in occupa-
tional exposure to Chinese imports increase the exposed sector’s job losses in the
lowest occupational tertile – considering both types of linkages, job losses increase
89 per cent under the wage criterion, 73 per cent under the non-routineness
criterion and 76 per cent under the education criterion. Note that after adding
downstream linkages, the significant job losses in high-wage occupations in the
non-exposed non-tradable sector amount to 871,000 jobs (which is larger than
the 720,000 job losses in low-wage occupations in the exposed sector). Although
it is possible that this reflects job reallocation of high-wage occupations from the
non-exposed to the exposed sector, the lack of significance of the large predicted
gains in the latter sector does not allow us to reach a precise interpretation.17
5. Conclusion
Chinese import exposure has a differential impact in employment across occupa-
tions. After sorting occupations according to their real wages, degree of non-
routineness, and education requirements, we find that employment losses from
occupational-level Chinese import exposure are concentrated in low-wage,
routine, low-education occupations. These losses occur in both Chinese-trade
exposed and non-exposed sectors. Although the result of negative employment
effects in the exposed sector’s lower-indexed occupations is expected – these
U.S. occupations would be the most adversely affected in the influential offshor-
ing models of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) – our finding of employment reductions in lower-indexed occupations
in the non-exposed sectors is novel and does not have a straightforward
interpretation.
We argue that the latter result is a consequence of local labor market effects à la
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), in combination with a heavy concentration of
lower-indexed occupations in particular regions. In support of this interpretation,
exploratory analysis conducted by Van Dam and Ma (2016) using the Chinese
import-exposure data of AADHP and Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) shows
that the U.S. areas most affected by the China shock were “less educated,
older and poorer than most of the rest of America. 18”
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In a related paper, Asquith, Goswami, Neumark and Rodriguez-Lopez (2017)
find that deaths of establishments account for most of the Chinese-induced job
destruction in the United States. In conjuction with this chapter’s findings, this
implies that establishments that die due to the China shock have a larger propor-
tion of workers in lower-indexed occupations than surviving establishments.
Although this issue requires further investigation, previous work from Abowd,
McKinney and Vilhuber (2009) shows evidence in that direction. Using Longitu-
dinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data, they find that firms that
employ more workers from the lowest quartile of the human capital distribution
are much more likely to die, while firms that employ workers from the highest
quartile of the distribution are less likely to die.
We also find mild evidence that direct Chinese exposure drives an employment
expansion in high-education occupations. This suggests the existence of produc-
tivity effects as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), by which the replace-
ment of low-wage employment with imports from China allows U.S. firms to
reduce marginal costs and expand their markets shares; consequently, this leads
to higher employment in occupations that remain inside U.S. firms. Another pos-
sibility is the existence of effects à la Melitz (2003), by which low-productivity
firms exposed to Chinese competition die, with market shares being reallocated
toward more productive firms that use high-education occupations more inten-
sively. Disentangling these effects is another relevant research topic spanning
from our findings.
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1 For the 1999–2011 period, Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price (2016) attri-
bute to Chinese import exposure the loss of about 2.4 million jobs.
2 While Pierce and Schott (2016) use the U.S. policy change of granting Permanent
Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status to China as its measure of the China shock,
our empirical analysis uses AADHP’s measure of Chinese import exposure.
However, we are not able to perform a local-labor-market analysis as in AADHP
and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) because our occupational employment data
does not have geographical information.
3 According to the O*NET’s website (https://www.onetonline.org/help/online/zones),
occupations in job zone 1 need little or no preparation (some may require high
school), occupations in job zone 2 need some preparation (usually require high
school), occupations in job zone 3 need medium preparation (usually require voca-
tional school or an associate’s degree), occupations in job zone 4 need considerable
preparation (usually require a bachelor’s degree) and occupations in job zone 5
need extensive preparation (usually require a graduate degree).
4 The Comtrade annual trade data from 2000 to 2014 is at the ten-digit Harmonized
System (HS) product level. We then use the HS-NAICS crosswalk of Pierce and
Schott (2012), available up to 2009, to convert the trade data to six-digit NAICS
industries. For 2010 to 2014, we use the Foreign Trade Reference Codes from
the U.S. Census Bureau (available since 2006): we aggregate up to the level of
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six-digit HS codes and then use a unique mapping from six-digit HS codes to six-digit
NAICS codes. Lastly, we aggregate to the BEA three-digit NAICS classification
described in Table 11.A1.
5 AADHP also consider higher-order input-output linkages. We abstract from these
higher-order effects in this chapter.
6 First we obtain the BEA’s Use-of-Commodities-by-Industries Input-Output Table (in
producer’s prices) for 71 industries in the year 2000, and then we aggregate it to
our 60 industries in Table 11.A1.
7 If we allow weights to change, IPit may become irrelevant as a measure of occupation-
specific import penetration due to selection bias. For example, suppose that 95 per cent
of employment of an occupation is in the computer industry, and the remaining 5
per cent is in the food services industry. If Chinese import exposure depletes that occu-
pation’s employment in the computer industry but does not affect its employment in the
food services industry, with weights changing to 10 per cent in the computer industry
and 90 per cent in the other industry, the new import penetration measure for that occu-
pation will likely decline, misleadingly indicating a reduction in that occupation’s
exposure.
8 The BEA report 96 types of fixed private assets. Following Eden and Gaggl (2015), 23
of them are classified as ICT capital, and 73 as non-ICT capital.
9 These predicted losses are well in line with the industry-level numbers reported by
AADHP for the period from 1999 to 2011. They calculate direct losses of 0.56
million jobs, and combined direct and upstream losses of 1.58 million jobs. Consid-
ering higher-order upstream linkages – which we do not do – the losses increase to
1.98 million. AADHP do not report losses from downstream linkages because their
downstream import exposure coefficients are not statistically significant. We only
use combined measures of import exposure – instead of separately including them
in the regressions as AADHP do – because the correlation between them is very
high, which would highly reduce the precision of our estimation (the correlation is
0.63 between direct and upstream exposures, 0.61 between direct and downstream
exposures, and 0.59 between upstream and downstream exposures).
10 Groizard, Ranjan and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014) show that the productivity effect is a
source of job creation in offshoring firms even if tasks are substitutable (as long as
the elasticity of substitution across tasks is smaller than the elasticity of substitution
across goods), but the effect is stronger if tasks are complementary.
11 As mentioned below, Abowd, McKinney and Vilhuber (2009) show that U.S. firms
are more likely to die if they hire a disproportionately large share of workers from
the lowest quartile of the human capital distribution, and are less likely to die if
they disproportionately hire workers from the highest quartile.
12 Within local labor markets, AADHP find that from 1991 to 2011, U.S. employment
losses due to Chinese import exposure were concentrated in the exposed sector, and
find no evidence of employment reallocation toward the other sectors.
13 Following AADHP, we classify industries into exposed and non-exposed sectors
based on industry-level direct and upstream import penetration measures. First we cal-
culate the change in each type of import penetration from 2002 to 2014, and then we
classify as exposed those industries whose import penetration changes are equal or
above the mean for at least one of the measures. Similar to AADHP, tradable indus-
tries are those in agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and manufacturing.
14 Note that production controls are at the occupation-sectoral level, so that we allow for
an occupation i to be subject to different wages and capital exposures across sectors.
15 Unfortunately, we cannot directly verify this explanation because our occupational
employment data does not contain geographical information.
16 Ebenstein, Harrison, and McMillan (2015) find evidence of job reallocation of high-
wage workers in the manufacturing sector to lower-wage jobs in non-manufacturing.
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In contrast, we do not find evidence of Chinese-induced job destruction in high-wage
occupations (nor in non-routine or high-education occupations) in the exposed sector,
which includes most manufacturing industries.
17 Note, however, that the statistically significant creation of 1.2 million jobs in high-
education occupations reported in the first row of Table 11.4 (corresponding to the
results from Table 11.2) present indirect evidence of an active job reallocation
channel toward better occupations.
18 See http://graphics.wsj.com/china-exposure/ and http://chinashock.info/.
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Industry Three-digit Industry Three-digit
NAICS NAICS
20 Computer and 334 50 Administrative and support 561
electronic products services
21 Electrical equipment 335 51 Waste management and 562
remediation services
22 Transportation 336 52 Educational services 611
equipment
23 Furniture and related 337 53 Ambulatory health care 621
products services
24 Miscellaneous 339 54 Hospitals, nursing, and 622, 623
manufacturing residential care
25 Wholesale trade 423, 424, 425 55 Social assistance 624
26 Motor vehicle and part 441 56 Performing arts, spectator 711, 712
dealers sports, and museums
27 Food and beverage 445 57 Amusements, gambling, and 713
stores recreation
28 General merchandise 452 58 Accommodation 721
stores
59 Food services and drinking 722
442, 443, 444, 446,
places
29 Other retail 447, 448, 451, 453,
60 Other services, except 811, 812,
454
government 813, 814
30 Air transportation 481
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12 The ‘China shock’ in trade:
consequences for ASEAN
and East Asia
Robert Feenstra and Akira Sasahara
1. Introduction
Countries in East Asia have experienced significant economic integration since
1990s due to tariff cuts and a decline of non-tariff barriers, including a reduction
in tariffs with China since 2005 under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement.
This integration has contributed to economic efficiency by exploiting the compar-
ative advantage of countries in production (e.g., Ando and Kimura, 2005; Los
et al., 2015a). However, the impact of this economic integration on employment
has not received much attention. While a number of policy articles highlight the
role of China as an engine of global economic growth (e.g., World Bank, 2017;
IMF, 2017) the role of China in employment creation has not been assessed quan-
titatively. This chapter aims to quantify the employment creation effect of China
for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan (hereafter ASEAN + JKT).
We employ two different techniques in order to quantify the employment effect
of China. First, we use the technique proposed by Los, Timmer, and de Vries
(2015a), investigating the impact of China’s exports on employment creation in
China, which is called the demand-side analysis. This technique makes it possible
to quantify the employment compensation coming from foreign demand using a
Global Input-Output Table. Results from the analysis in this chapter suggests the
employment creation effect of China measured by USD value is growing at
annual growth rates of 11 per cent during the period 1990–2013 and is responsi-
ble for employment compensation of 234 billion USD in 2013, which is equiv-
alent to 6.5 per cent of the total employment compensation and 1.7 per cent of
the total GDP in the ASEAN + JKT area.
We also employ the hypothetical extraction technique proposed by Los,
Timmer, and de Vries (2016). We find that the employment effect due to
China’s final demand from this approach accounts for 5 per cent of employment
compensation. In the last exercise, we decompose the employment effect
obtained from the demand-side analysis by running a regression that uses the
actual tariff reductions from China on the ASEAN + JKT countries as well as
the growth in Chinese demand not associated with the tariff cuts, and other
controls.
DOI: 10.4324/9781351061544-12
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This chapter contributes to the literature investigating the employment effect of
international trade. Recent studies can be classified into two categories, depend-
ing upon methodologies they employ. One strand of recent literature conducts
regression analyses to investigate the impact of trade. A group of studies in
this literature quantifies the inverse effect of import penetration from China
and other low-wage developing countries (e.g., Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013,
2015; Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price, 2016, Pierce and Schott,
2016, for the U.S. economy; and Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum, 2014, for
Germany). Another group of studies in this literature argues that China has
been playing a central role in the world economic growth and remains a powerful
engine for growth even today (e.g., IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2017; Vianna, 2016;
Dauth et al., 2014). These studies estimate regressions to examine the impact of
exports on employment in source countries. Vianna (2016) estimates the impact
of exports to China on GDP growth in Latin American counties by employing a
panel estimation technique. He finds that exports to China have a positive effect
on GDP growth in Latin American countries during 1994–2013. Dauth et al.
(2014) examine the impact of trade with Eastern Europe and China on local
labor markets in Germany during 1988–2008 by exploiting regional variations
in industrial structure in the same spirit as Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013).
While they find a negative import competition effect in import competing indus-
tries, they also show that export-oriented industries experienced even stronger
employment gains and lower unemployment. Likewise, Feenstra, Ma and Xu
(2017) analyze the impact of Chinese imports and global exports from the U.S.
on its employment.
The second strand of literature employs Input-Output Tables, including
National Input-Output Tables (Feenstra and Hong, 2010; and see Baldwin,
1994, for a survey of earlier studies)1 and Global Input-Output Tables (Kiyota,
2016; Koopman et al., 2008, 2014; Los, Timmer, and de Vries, 2015a;
Timmer, Los, Stehrer, and de Vries, 2013; Timmer, Erumban, Los, Stehrer and
de Vries, 2014).2 For example, Kiyota (2016) examines the impact of exports
on employment in China, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea using the WIOD
Input-Output Table. He finds that, between 1995 and 2009, the employment cre-
ation effect of exports is increasing in the four countries. While prior literature
tends to employ the Input-Output Table from the WIOD database, we use the
EORA database (Lenzen et al., 2012 and Lenzen et al., 2013) because many of
the ASEAN countries are included as the “rest of the world” in WIOD and
unable to obtain country-specific effects for those countries. In addition to
China, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea included in the WIOD database, our
sample covers Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Taiwan, Thai-
land and Vietnam. Our analysis here is complementary to Feenstra and Sasahara
(2017), who focus on the impact of U.S. imports and global exports on U.S.
employment using an input-output analysis.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we follow the
method of Los, Timmer and de Vries (2015a), who measure the positive impact
of Chinese exports for job growth in that country, to infer the positive impact
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on employment in East Asia. In Section 3 we measure the employment effect of
China’s final demand per se by employing the technique by Los, Timmer and
de Vries (2016). Section 4 investigates the determinants of China’s employment
effect obtained from Section 2 and decompose it into contributions from tariff
cuts, China’s final demand per se, and other factors. Section 5 includes concluding
remarks. Further details of the dataset and techniques are in the appendixes.
2. Demand-side analysis
2.1. Structure of the Global Input-Output Table
In this section we employ the technique proposed by Los et al. (2015b) to quan-
tify the employment effect of China on the ASEAN + JKT economies. Before
describing the technique, we briefly discuss the structure of the IO table.
Figure 12.1 depicts a global IO table for a three country case – country A,
country B, and China (country C). The EORA IO table includes 26 sectors and
six final demand categories (see Appendix B for details) and Figure 12.1
shows the case where the six final demand categories are collapsed into one by
taking summation over the six final demand categories. The left half of the
matrix, denoted as Matrix T, portrays flows of intermediate goods across coun-
tries including domestic transactions. For example, the top left cell of matrix T
describes domestic intermediate good flows within country A and the top
center cell shows international intermediate good flows from country A to
country B. The right half of the matrix, denoted as matrix F, portrays final
good flows and the same structure applies as matrix T.
A mathematical representation of the simplified IO table Figure 12.1 is as
follows. Let mA,B(r,s) denote the value of intermediate goods produced in
sector r of country A and used by sector s of country B. Final good flows are
also described in a similar manner: fA,B(r) indicates the value of final good pro-
duced in sector r of country A and consumed in country B. The gross output
of sector s of country A, yA(s), is computed as the horizontal sum of numbers
in the corresponding row:XX X
yAðsÞ ¼ mA iðr; jÞ þ fAi ;iðrÞ:j i ;
By dividing the intermediate good flows by the gross output in the destination
sector of the destination country, we find Leontief coefficients (or input-output
coefficients):2 3
mA;Að1; 1Þ=yAð1Þ; mA;Að1; 2Þ=yAð2Þ; . . .; m 26 A;Cð1; 2Þ=yCð Þ76mA;Að2; 16 Þ=yAð1Þ; mA;Að2; 2Þ=yAð2Þ; . . .;mA;Cð2; 2Þ=yC6 ð2Þ 77A = 76 . . . . 76 . . . .. . . . 74 5
mC;Að2; 1Þ=yAð1Þ; mC;Að2; 2Þ=yAð2Þ; . . .;mC;Cð2; 2Þ=yCð2Þ
Country A Country B China
6 final demand 
categories
6 final demand 
categories
6 final demand 
categories
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Figure 12.1 The structure of the Global Input-Output Table: a three country case
Notes: The Global Input-Output Table comes from the EORA database. The original EORA table includes 189 countries. However, we re-construct the table with 52
countries including the rest of the world as one country. See Appendix A for the list of the countries. This figure shows the case with four countries for simplicity. Also,
there are 26 sectors and six final demand categories. A big sub-matrix in the left indicated by a red box (denoted as matrix T) is the matrix for intermediate good flows
and. Another big sub-matrix in the right (denoted as matrix F) is the matrix for final good flows. Diagonal boxes in matrices T and F indicate domestic transactions within
each country while the rest of the boxes are international transactions. See Lenzen et al. (2012) and Lenzen et al. (2013) for further details.
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Following Leontief (1936)’s idea and using this matrix A and the final demand
from a country, say country j, fj , gross production absorbed by country j is esti-
mated as
yj ¼ ðI- A -1Þ f j; ð1Þ
where I denotes a unit matrix. As noted in Johnson and Noguera (2012), (I − A)−1
is the “Leontief inverse” of the input-output matrix and it can be expressed as aX
geometric series: I- A -1Þ f 1 kð j ¼ A f j. The first term f j is the direct outputk 0
absorbed as final goods, and the second
¼
term Af j is the intermediate goods used to
produce that final goods, and the third term A2 f j includes the additional interme-
diate goods employed to produce the first round of intermediate goods Af j, and
so on.
2.2. Method to obtain the employment effect
We describe the technique proposed by Los et al. (2015b) to quantify the effect of
China’s final demand on the country’s employment compensation. For simplicity,
we define the “employment effect of China” as the impact of exports to China on
the exporting country’s employment compensation.3 Suppose now that there are a
number N of countries and each country comprised of a number S of sectors. We
also introduce year subscript t because IO tables are available at the annual fre-
quency. China is indicated by superscript C.
The employment effect driven by the final demand from China in year t,
denoted as kCt , is estimated by a similar method as equation (1) in the previous
subsection:
kC p̂ -1 Ct ¼ tðI- AtÞ f t ð2Þ
The only difference with equation (1) is that we post-multiply it by p̂t to obtain
the employment effect of China’s final demand, p̂t is a (N × S) × (N × S) diagonal
matrix containing the share of labor compensation to the total output in each
sector of each country. To be more precise, let yði;sÞ be the gross output in industry
s of country i, and let lði;sÞ the compensation for labor in this industry. Then we
can define pði;sÞ as the labor compensation required per dollar gross output in
industry s in country i, pði;sÞ ¼ lði;sÞ=yði;sÞ, and create the column vector p with
dimension (N × S) × 1 with the diagonal matrix p̂ with the elements of that
vector on the diagonal. We re-express equation (2) as follows:2 3 2
k1;C f 1;C
3
t t6 2;C 7 6 2;C 76 k 7 6 f6 t t 776 - 6 77 16 .4 . 75 ¼ p̂tðI- A Þ 7|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflt 6 3ffl} 6 .. 74 . 5 ð Þ. ðNxSÞxðNxSÞ
kN ;C fN ;C|fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflt ffl} |fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflt ffl}
ðNxSÞx1 ðNxSÞx1
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where ki;Ct is a S × 1 submatrix of k
C
t describing the employment effect (in USD
value) driven by China’s final demand on country i in year t; f i;Ct is a S × 1 sub-
matrix of fCt indicating final good flows from country i to China at year t. The
total employment effect of China (in USD value) on country i is calculated as
the sum of the employment effect on all of the S sectors, 10ki;Ct , where 1 is a
S × 1 vector of ones. It is important to note that the employment effect of final
demand from China estimated using this technique includes effects through
other foreign countries. For example, final demand from China to Thailand can
have impacts on Indonesia because Thailand purchases intermediate goods
from Indonesia to produce final goods exported to China. The employment
effect comes from not only bilateral trade but also trade with third countries.
This technique makes it possible to include such effects, which is one of the
advantages of using an input-output analysis.
Data: The Global Input-Output Table provided by the WIOD database
includes major countries in the world – 40 countries in the WIOD IO table we
use and 43 countries in the WIOD 2016 release. As a result, it is missing
many of East Asian countries that we are particularly interested. Therefore, we
employ the Global Input-Output Table from the EORA database, which includes
189 countries. We re-construct a new EORA including 40 WIOD countries and
10 countries from East Asia for computational simplicity.4
2.3. Results from the demand-side analysis
Results from the demand-side analysis are reported in Table 12.1, which shows that
the employment effect of China is growing strongly in all of the ASEAN + JKT
economies. On average, the employment effect of China is growing at an annual
growth rate of 11 per cent in the area during 1990–2013. With regard to the time
series variation, the highest growth rates are from 1990–1995 and 2005–2010
when the employment effect of China grew at a 15 per cent annual growth rate.
The growth rate is relatively low in 1995–2000 and 2010–2013 – 4 per cent and
8 per cent, respectively. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the 2008–2009
global financial crisis are likely to be responsible for the former and the latter, respec-
tively. The growth rate is particularly high for Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos – annual
average growth rates of 18 per cent, 22 per cent, and 19 per cent, respectively. The
lowest growth rate is observed from Taiwan, at 3 per cent. In the ASEAN + JKTarea
overall, the employment creation effect of China was USD 19.3 billion in 1990 and
it reached to USD 234.3 billion in 2013. These results show that China is playing an
increasingly important role in creating employment in the area.
One may argue, however, that this growing trend in the employment effect is
not unique to China as there is strong deepening in economic integration in the
East Asia during the period (see, for example, Ando and Kimura, 2005). To
investigate if it is the case, we find the share of China’s employment effect to
the employment effect driven by the total demand 10ki;Allt , which is the employ-
ment effect due to demand from all countries in the world including country i
itself.5 By looking at the share, 10ki;-i=10ki;Allt t , we can see whether the relative
Table 12.1 Employment effect of China on ASEAN + JKT countries, from the demand-side analysis
The employment effect of China (in million USD),10ki;C Growth rate of the employment effect of Chinat
(annual average)
5-year horizon (3-year horizon for 2010–2013)
1990– 1995– 2000– 2005– 2010– 1990–
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 2013
Brunei 4.3 10.8 22.8 63.2 168.3 239.5 19% 15% 20% 20% 12% 18%
Cambodia 0.5 7.3 11.8 34.4 48.2 70.3 54% 10% 21% 7% 13% 22%
Indonesia 230.6 774.8 984.6 2,148.4 7,213.1 10,243.0 24% 5% 16% 24% 12% 16%
Japan 8,474.5 22,571.0 25,622.0 45,607.0 94,611.0 111,370.0 20% 3% 12% 15% 5% 11%
Laos 0.6 2.4 3.9 9.1 37.0 55.0 27% 10% 17% 28% 13% 19%
Malaysia 511.4 1,342.8 1,451.9 3,345.8 9,790.6 13,339.0 19% 2% 17% 21% 10% 14%
Myanmar 11.0 26.8 60.8 65.8 242.1 379.8 18% 16% 2% 26% 15% 15%
Philippines 107.9 266.6 364.2 810.8 2,619.1 3,726.2 18% 6% 16% 23% 12% 15%
South Korea 1,530.7 5,060.4 6,745.2 16,342.0 42,540.0 59,195.0 24% 6% 18% 19% 11% 16%
Singapore 311.9 976.1 1,215.1 2,511.8 6,970.4 9,744.8 23% 4% 15% 20% 11% 15%
Taiwan 7,699.4 8,739.1 11,485.0 11,635.0 14,939.0 15,375.0 3% 5% 0% 5% 1% 3%
Thailand 296.7 870.7 1,007.6 2,286.8 5,426.4 8,126.5 22% 3% 16% 17% 13% 14%
Vietnam 96.1 266.4 562.9 1,149.3 1,848.3 2,419.4 20% 15% 14% 10% 9% 14%
ASEAN + JKT 19,275.6 40,915.2 49,537.7 86,009.4 186,453.6 234,283.5 15% 4% 11% 15% 8% 11%
(Sum)
Notes: The table shows 10ki;Ct for each country i (in million USD). The estimated employment effect is based on the data from the EORA Input-Output Table. The
employment effect is estimated for 26 EORA sectors and we aggregate the sectoral employment effects to find the overall effect on each country. The growth rate
is annualized (e.g., the annual average growth rate of the employment effect from 1990 to 1995 is g ln 10 ii;1990 1995 ¼ ½ ð k ;C1995Þ - ln 10ki;Cð 1990Þ]=5Þ.-
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importance of China in creating employment has increased or not. We also
compute the employment effect of China relative to country’s GDP,
10ki;-it =GDPi;t, in order to investigate the relative importance of China comparing
to country i’s market size.
Panel A of Figure 12.2 shows the employment effect of China relative to the
employment effect driven by the total demand 10ki;-i 0 i;Allt =1 kt for 1990 and 2013.
The share of China’s employment effect to the overall employment compensation
increased substantially in South Korea, Japan, Myanmar, and Vietnam – the
shares increased by 26.5, 19.4, 18.9 and 18.7 percentage points, respectively.
Cambodia and Taiwan have the smallest increase in the share of China’s employ-
ment effect to the total employment effect yet the numbers are positive – 5.9 and
7.6 percentage points increase for Cambodia and Taiwan, respectively. Panel B
describes the employment effect of China relative to country’s GDP. It shows
that the relative share of the China effect to GDP is increasing for all economies
except for Taiwan. The largest increase in the share of the China effect to GDP
comes from South Korea, Singapore, and Japan – 3.2, 2.5, and 2.2 percentage
points, respectively. We can compare our estimates to those in Los et al.
(2015b), who investigate the impact of foreign demand on China’s employment.
One issue is that the unit of the employment effect is different between this
chapter and Los et al. (2015b). While the employment effect is measured by
the number of workers in Los et al. (2015b), it is measured by employment com-
pensation (in USD value) in this chapter. The difference stems from the fact that
we use the Global Input-Output Table from the EORA Database while Los et al.
(2015b) use the one from the WIOD database.
In order to make our estimates compatible with Los et al. (2015b)’s estimates,
we compute the change in employment effect relative to the overall employment
effect at the end of a period. Table 12.2 shows the change of number of employees
induced by final demand from China reported in Table 1 of Los et al. (2015b).
Table 12.2 shows that, for example, between 1995 and 2009, foreign demand
created jobs for 31.2 million workers. This number is not compatible with our esti-
mates because it is given by the number of workers while our estimates are in
USD. Therefore, we normalize the employment effect by dividing by the total
employment at the end of the period, 2009. Because the total employment in
China in 2009 was 781.0 million, the change of employment induced by foreign
demand in China is 31.2/781.0 × 100 = 3.99% of the total employment in 2009.
We normalize our estimates of the employment effect by dividing by the
employment compensation at the end of a period.6 Table 12.3 presents our nor-
malized employment effects. It shows that the employment effect of China on
ASEAN + JKT economies takes values that are not very different from Los
et al. (2015b)’s estimates on the impact of foreign demand on China’s employ-
ment. For example, our result shows that, between 1995 and 2009, the overall
demand led to a 480.72 billion USD increase of employment compensation in
ASEAN + JKT economies. This is equivalent to 12.53 per cent of the total
employment compensation in the area at the end of the period, 2009 (3.8 trillion
USD). This number, 12.53 per cent, is very similar to the impact of the overall
Panel A: Relative to the Overall Effect, 100 × 1′kt
i,C / 1′kt
i,All



























































































































Figure 12.2 Employment effect of China on ASEAN + JKT countries in 1990 and 2013,
from the demand-side analysis
Notes: Panels A and B show 100x 10ki;Ct =10ki;Allt and 100x 10ki;Ct =GDPi;t , respectively, for each
country i. The estimated employment effect is based on the data from the EORA Input-Output
Table. The employment effect is estimated for 26 EORA sectors and sum of these are shown. The
unit for the vertical axis is %. ASEAN + JKT is the weighted average of the China effect on the
ASEAN + JKT economies.
Table 12.2 Change in number of workers induced by final demand (millions) in China
Domestic final demand for Foreign final demand All demand Total employment in
the end of the period
Merchandise Non-merchandise
Numbers without parentheses (million workers) DkDOMðMerchandiseÞ Dk
DOM ΔkFOR Δk EmpðNon-merchandiseÞ
Numbers with parentheses (%) Dk
DOM DkDOMðMerchandiseÞ ðNon-merchandiseÞ DkFOR Dk
Emp EmpEmp Emp
1995–2001 −14.7 68.9 −4.6 49.6
729.0
(−2.02%) (9.45%) (−0.63%) (6.80%)
2001–2006 −65.6 28.7 70.6 33.8
764.6
(−8.58%) (3.75%) (9.23%) (4.42%)
2006–2009 3.6 47.2 −34.8 16.0
781.0
(0.46%) (6.04%) (−4.46%) (2.05%)
1995–2009 −76.7 144.8 31.2 99.3
781.0
(−9.82%) (18.54%) (3.99%) (12.71%)
Source: Los et al. (2015b).
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Table 12.3 Change in the employment effect induced by final demand (billion USD) in the ASEAN + JKT area
Panel A: The employment effect on ASEAN + JKT countries
Foreign China All Total
Numbers without parentheses (billion USD) ΔkFOR ΔkC Δk EmpComp
Numbers in parentheses (%) DkFOR DkC Dk
EmpComp EmpComp EmpComp
1990–1995 122.04 21.64 1414.99
3,355.26
(3.63%) (0.64%) (42.17%)
1996–2000 46.97 8.62 −356.31
2,999.14
(1.57%) (0.29%) (-11.88%)
2001–2005 155.30 36.47 246.12
3,245.62
(4.78%) (1.12%) (7.58%)
2005–2010 261.27 100.44 1060.99
4,306.41
(6.07%) (2.33%) (24.64%)
2010–2013 110.12 47.83 39.81
4,346.13
(2.53%) (1.10%) (0.92%)
1995–2009 302.72 95.02 480.72
3,836.28
(7.89%) (2.48%) (12.53%)
1990–2013 617.05 200.40 1316.85
4,346.13
(14.20%) (4.61%) (30.30%)
Panel B: The employment effect on China implied from Los et al. (2015b)
Foreign All
1995–2009 (3.99%) (12.71%)
Notes: EmpComp denotes the employment compensation in billion USD. The data on employment compensation are directly obtained from the EORA database.
Numbers without parentheses are the employment effect induced by each category of demand (in billion USD). Numbers in parentheses are the change in the
employment effect relative to the overall employment at the end of the period.
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demand on China’s employment in the same period estimated by Los et al.
(2015b). They find that the overall demand increased employment by 99.3
million workers, which is equivalent to 12.71 per cent of the total employment
of 781.0 million workers at the end of the period, 2009.
Comparing Table 12.2 and Table 12.3 shows that the foreign demand is
roughly twice as important for ASEAN + JKT economies than for China.
Table 12.2 shows that, based on estimates by Los et al. (2015b), the foreign
demand contributed to 3.99 per cent of the overall employment during 1995–
2009 in China. Table 12.3 shows that that foreign demand contributed to 7.89
per cent of the overall employment compensation during the same period. Fur-
thermore, the result suggests that the majority of the foreign demand comes
from China – China contributed to 2.48 per cent of the overall employment com-
pensation, which accounts for 31 per cent of the total foreign contribution.
3. Hypothetical extraction exercise
3.1. Method
This section estimates the employment effect stemming from a rise in China’s
final demand by exploiting the idea of “hypothetical extraction” in Los et al.
(2016). The demand-side analysis conducted in the previous section quantifies
the employment compensation generated by contemporaneous exports to China
from each of ASEAN + JKT economies. The hypothetical extraction technique
presented this section quantifies the employment effect of export opportunities
to China relative to that from the base year, 1990. It is informative to know
which economies experienced the greatest growth in employment benefits from
China.
First, we find the employment effect due to the final demand from the world by
keeping China’s final demand at the 1990 level as:
kAll -* 1 All*t ¼ p̂tðI- AtÞ Ft ð5aÞ
where, 2 X 3
f 1; C k1990 þ f 1;6 tXk 6¼C 766 2; C f 2; 7f k6 1990 þ tkF 6¼C 7All* 7t ¼ 6 7. 7 ð5b6 Þ6 .. 74 5X
fN ; C C; k1990 þ f tk 6¼N
The final demand vector FAll*t makes it clear that China’s final demand is fixed at
the 1990 level. Each element is the sum of final good flows from each sector of
each country to all countries where the final good flows to China are fixed at the
1990 level while those to other countries are allowed to change over time. kAll*t is
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the employment effect due to the final demand from all countries in a hypothetical
world where China’s final demand did not grow at all since 1990.
Using (5) and the actual total employment effect from the previous section
10ki;Allt , the contribution of the final demand from China on employment in
country i, expressed in dollar value, is calculated as:
Emp Effect of China’s Final Demandi;t ¼ 10ki;Allt - 10ki;All *t ; ð6Þ
The difference between the two is the employment effect purely due to a change
in China’s final demand. Using (4) and (5), we can re-express kAll*t as
Emp Effect of China’s Final Demand Alli t 1
0p̂ -1 Allt
*
; ¼ ðI- AtÞ ðFt - F2 t Þ1 C 3f ;t - f 1;C6 1990 76 76 f 2;Ct - f 2;C6 1990 7 ð0¼ 1 p 1 7 7^ Þ-tðI- A Þ 6 7t 6 76 .6 . 7. 74 5
fN ;Ct - fN ;C1990
In other words, the results from the hypothetical extraction exercise will be
similar to that from the demand-side analysis, except that the hypothetical extrac-
tion exercise subtracts off final demand in China in 1990. The hypothetical
extraction exercise is therefore accounting for the growth in Chinese final
demand since 1990 rather than its level each year.
By scaling the dollar value of the employment effect (6) by the actual total
employment effect kAll*t , we find the ratio of the employment effect due to
China’s final demand to the actual total employment effect as:
% Emp Effect of China’s Final Demand 0- 1 kAll*t Þ=10kAllit ¼ 100x ð10kAllt t : ð8Þ
3.2. Results from the hypothetical extraction exercise
The calculated share of the employment effect with the base year 1990 based on
equation (8) is presented in Figure 12.3 for three years, 1993, 2003, and 2013.7 It
shows that the employment effect of the growth in China’s final demand since
1990 is increasing over time for all sample countries. The employment effect
of China increased the most in South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Singapore –
increased by 10.9, 7.6, 5.8, and 5.6 percentage points, respectively, from 1990
and 2013. In the ASEAN + JKT area overall, the employment effect increased
from 0.4 per cent to 4.6 per cent during the period. As expected, the share of
China’s employment effect implied from the demand-side analysis 100x
10ki;Ct =1
0ki;Allt is slightly greater than that implied by the hypothetical extraction
exercise 100x ð10ki;All 0 i;All*t - 1 k 10 i;Þ k Allt = t : the former is 6.4 per cent and the




























































Figure 12.3 Employment effect of China on the ASEAN + JKT area in 2013, from the
hypothetical extraction exercise, in 1993, 2003 and 2013, 100x ð10ki;Allt -
10ki;All*t Þ=10ki;Allt
Notes: The figure shows the employment effect driven by China’s final demand per se in percentage of
the actual employment effect of China, 100 0ki;All 0ki;All* 0ki;Allx ð1 t - 1 t Þ=1 t , from the hypothetical
extraction exercise for each country i. The estimated employment effect is based on the data from
the EORA Input-Output Table. The employment effect is estimated for 26 EORA sectors and we
aggregate the sectoral employment effects to find the employment effect on a country as a whole.
The unit for the vertical axis is %. ASEAN + JKT is the weighted average of the China effect on
the ASEAN + JKT economies.
comes from the fact that the demand-side analysis includes the employment effect
through changes in the labor share and input-output linkages while the hypothet-
ical extraction does not include these. The next section decomposes the employ-
ment effect of China from the demand-side analysis into that due to China’s final
demand per se and other factors.
4. Demand-side analysis versus hypothetical extraction
4.1. Decomposing the employment effect from the demand-side analysis
We next investigate the determinants of the employment effect of China from the
demand-side analysis. We are particularly interested in the impact of tariff cuts
and China’s final demand per se. Import tariff rates imposed by China have
been continuously falling since the 1990s. Table 12.4 shows the average tariff
rates imposed by China on each of the ASEAN + JKT economies. The table
shows that there is a continuous decline of tariff rates since 1990s. That final
year marks the remaining tariff cuts under the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
for the ASEAN 6 countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore
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and Thailand), whereas the other ASEAN countries that are party to that agree-
ment have had their tariffs eliminated by 2015. In order to investigate the
impact of these tariff cuts and other factors on the employment effect of
China, we estimate the following equation:
OLS : ln kði;sÞ;C b b ln Tariff ði;sÞ;Ct ¼ 0 þ 1 t þ Xði;sÞt β02 þ Xitβ ð03 þ φ i;sÞOLS þ εði;sÞOLS;t; ð9Þ
where kði;sÞ;Ct is the employment effect of China on sector s of country i in year t
from the demand-side analysis; Tariff ði;sÞ;Ct is one plus the tariff rate imposed by
China to sector s of country i in year t. We also include control variables that
potentially have impact on the employment effect of China: Xði;sÞt denotes a
vector of control variables varying at the country-level and the sectoral-level. It
includes log of total employment compensation, ln EmpCompi;st , capturing the
labor market condition of sector s of country i at year t. It also includes log of
sum of final good exports from the rest of the world to China, which we call
the multilateral demand from China, capturing China’s demand assumed to be
orthogonal to country i’s exports:( )X
ln MultiDði;sÞ;Ct ¼ ln xðk;sÞ;Ctk i ð10Þ6¼
where xðk;sÞ;Ct denotes the final good exports from sector s of country k to China in
year t. We take summation over all available 189 EORA countries in addition to
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Table 12.4 The average tariff rates imposed by China to the ASEAN + JKT economies
1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Brunei 38.4 25.3 14.3 9.5 8.5
Cambodia 35.1 23.6 19.3 13.1 10.1
Indonesia 35.5 32.4 17.2 11.1 9.9
Japan 40.0 32.4 16.8 10.5 9.7
Laos 41.9 27.7 16.5 10.9 8.1
Malaysia 35.5 32.7 17.2 10.6 9.0
Myanmar 33.8 29.1 14.6 8.7 9.1
Philippines 41.0 37.7 17.6 11.0 9.2
South Korea 42.3 32.2 16.8 10.8 9.9
Singapore 38.9 31.5 16.8 10.1 9.9
Taiwan 38.1 32.7 16.7 10.8 9.8
Thailand 37.8 28.7 18.1 10.7 9.9
Vietnam 23.9 28.9 17.7 11.7 9.9
Notes: The table shows the simple average of tariff rates (in per cent) imposed by China on each of the
ASEAN + JKT economies. The data on tariffs come from Caliendo et al. (2015). The original tariff
data are provided by SITC 4-digit level, and we match the tariff data to the 11 merchandise sectors
in EORA. See Appendix F for the crosswalk between SITC and EORA. The tariff rates shown in
the table are the simple average of the tariff rates in 11 EORA sectors.
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the ASEAN + JKT economies. This variable is expected to capture the impact of
China’s final demand per se. Therefore, estimated coefficient for (10) is inter-
preted as the impact of China’s demand per se on the employment effect of
China.
Because export flows to China can be increased by a decline in tariffs imposed
by China, (10) can be affected by tariff cuts. In order to control for that, it is
important to incorporate tariffs imposed by China on other countries by including
the following variable: 0 X 1
xðk;sÞ;Ct
ln MultiTariff ði;sÞ;C ¼ ln@X k 6¼i At s C 1 ;-Þ sð t Þ x Þ;C ð11Tariff k; s s Þð ; ðk;tk 6¼i
which is the weighted average of the inverse tariffs where the weights are export
flows xðk;sÞ;Ct . The elasticity of substitution ss acts as a scaling factor governing the
weight on tariffs relative to export flows.8 We set ss ¼ 6 for all sectors. Because
(11) is the weighted average of tariffs imposed by China to other countries, the
coefficient for the variable is expected to be positive and it is included in the con-
trols Xði;sÞt . Turning to the final variables in (9), X
i
t denotes a vector of country-
level control variable including source country’s GDP and source country k’s
nominal exchange rate against Chinese Yuan, E ði;sÞk=Yuan;t, while ϕOLS indicates the
country-sector fixed effects and εði;sÞOLS;t is the error term.
Empirical model: In order to isolate the impact of tariff cuts, we calculate pre-
dicted values using the estimated coefficients, the tariff level that are fixed at the
early 1990s level, and current values of other control variables as follows:
yði;s b̂^ Þ;C ^ i; Þ;¼ þ b ln Tariff ð s C þ Xði;sÞβ̂OLS t 0 β̂1 Xi1990 0 0; t 2 þ t 3 þ φ̂ði;sÞ i;sÞOLS þ ε̂ðOLS;t; ð12Þ
where a hat indicates that it is an estimated coefficient; Tariff ði;sÞ;C1990 denotes the
highest tariff level in the early 1990s, Tariff ði;sÞ;C max Tarifft
ði;sÞ;C
1990 ¼ t f jt ¼ 1990;
1991; ; 1995 , and ŷði. . . ;sÞ;Cg OLS;t denotes the predicted log employment effect of
China. The reason why we use the highest tariff level in the early 1990s is that
tariff levels were volatile in the early 1990s and we are interested in a hypothet-
ical situation in which tariff levels are fixed at the highest level. In equation (12),
even residuals are included in the prediction because we are particularly inter-
ested in isolating the impact of tariff cuts. Given the predictions (12), we
compute the aggregate predicted employment effect of China on country i in a
hypothetical world with tariff levels fixed at the early 1990s level:X11
10ki;COLS;t ¼ expðyði;sÞ;CÔLS;t Þ:s 1 ð13Þ¼
where we take sum over 11 merchandise sectors.
While the OLS estimates are employed as our benchmark, we also estimate the
regression using another technique for robustness. In the derivation from equation
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(8) to equation (13), we first transform kði;sÞ;Ct to a log form and estimate predic-
tions, and then we transform them back to the USD value form. In this calculation
procedure, we are concerned about loss of accuracy because Jensen’s inequality
implies that log of an average value is not equal to the average of log values. Fol-
lowing the estimation technique proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006),
we use the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator (hereafter PPML).
The hypothetical employment effect implied from PPML is denoted as 10ki;CPPML;t.
See Appendix H for further details. By calculating the difference between the
actual employment effect of China and the predictions from OLS and PPML,
respectively, we find the impact of tariff cuts on the employment effect of China:
Impact of Tariff Cutsi;C 0ki;OLS; 1
C 0 i;C
t ¼ Actual;t - 1 kOLS;t; ð14Þ
Impact of Tariff Cutsi;C 0 i;C 0 i;CPPML;t ¼ 1 kActual;t - 1 kPPML;t: ð15Þ
We are also interested in isolating the impact of China’s final demand per se.
Therefore, we conduct a similar exercise by calculating a hypothetical employ-
ment effect of China keeping the final demand from China at the early 1990s level:
ln Multi Dði;sÞ;C min ln Multi Dði;sÞ;C1990 ¼ f 1990 jt ¼ 1990; 1991; :::; 1995t g:
Data: The data on the employment effect of China come from the demand-side
analysis in this chapter. The country-sector level employment compensation data
are directly taken from the EORA database. The data on tariffs come from
Caliendo et al. (2015). The multilateral demand from China and the weighted
average of tariffs imposed by China to other countries are constructed based
on the final good flows from the EORA Global Input-Output Table and tariff
data from Caliendo et al. (2015). The other country-level control variables,
GDP and the nominal exchange rate are from the Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra
et al., 2015). The sample in this regression includes 13 countries: Brunei, Cam-
bodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. The sample period is from 1990 to 2011.
Also, only merchandise sectors, which are EORA sector 1 to EORA sector 11, are
included because tariff data are not available for non-merchandise sectors.
Regression results: Estimation results are presented in Table 12.5. The first
three columns report OLS estimation results while the last three columns describe
results from PPML. Column (1) regresses the log of the employment effect of
China on log of tariffs only. The estimated elasticity is −6.32 and highly signifi-
cant. The absolute value of the coefficient becomes even greater with PPML and
it is −8.77. Adding the total employment compensation in order to control for the
labor market conditions of each country-sector pair reduces the size of the tariff
coefficients substantially, to −2.33 and −5.29 for OLS and PPML, respectively
(see columns (2) and (5)). Columns (3) and (6) add more controls. These
columns show that the tariff coefficients are much smaller than the previous
columns but still significantly less than zero, at −0.49 and −1.15 for OLS and
415
Table 12.5 Regression result, the impact of tariff cuts and the final demand from China on the employment effect of China
Dep. Var. = In ði;sk Þ;Cð t Þ for OLS; kði;sÞ;Ct for PPML
OLS PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
−6.319*** −2.328*** −0.485** −8.766*** −5.285*** −1.152*
ln(tariff imposed by Chinais) (0.324) (0.235) (0.199) (0.850) (0.899) (0.620)
1.311*** 0.906*** 1.574*** 1.350***
ln(total emp. compensationis) (0.041) (0.084) (0.094) (0.181)
0.480*** 0.510***
ln(China’s final demandis) (0.052) (0.053)
0.213 0.372




ln(nominal exchange rate against Chinese Yuani) (0.033) (0.058)
Country-sector fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.949 0.986 0.990
# of observations 2,712 2,712 2,712 2,719 2,719 2,719
# of countries = 13, # of sectors = 11, the sample period = 1990–2011
***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The employment effect of China on Laos is zero for some sectors, which makes it
impossible to find the log(employment) effect. As a result, these observations are dropped from the OLS regression. However, these observations can be included in
PPML. Therefore, the number of observation is different between these two models.
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PPML, respectively. Total employment compensation and the multilateral
demand from China, measured by equation (9) and denoted by China’s final
demand, also make significant contributions to the regression.
The coefficients for the weighted average of tariffs have the expected sign but
these are insignificant. The log of GDP is insignificant in OLS and it is signifi-
cantly negative in PPML. The negative sign from PPML is presumably because
an increase in country’s GDP works to increase the total employment compensa-
tion and leads to a decline of the employment effect of China relative to overall
labor compensation. Also, the nominal exchange rate has a positive sign,
meaning that a depreciation of a country’s currency against Chinese Yuan works
to increase the employment effect of China. This makes sense because a depreci-
ation of a currency increases exports by reducing the relative price of exports.
Decomposition results: Figures 12.4 and 12.5 show the decomposition result
for the ASEAN + JKT economies, where the actual China’s employment effect is
different from the one from the demand side analysis because only 11 merchan-
dise sectors are included in this regression analysis. Figure 12.4 describes
the employment effect of China, holding tariffs at the early 1990s level, and
Figure 12.5 shows the one keeping China’s final demand constant at the early
1990s level. In Figure 12.4, the thick line with markers indicates the actual
employment effect of China on the ASEAN + JKT economies. The thinner
dashed line indicates the hypothetical employment effect of China when tariff
levels were fixed at the early 1990s level, based on OLS. The thicker solid
line indicates the hypothetical employment effect of China when tariff levels
were fixed at the early 1990s level, based on PPML. Average tariff rates
applied by China are shown by the dashed line with markers. The figure suggests
that declining tariffs imposed by China seem to be related with the increasing
employment effect of China. It also shows that the gap between the actual
employment effect of China and the one obtained by fixing the tariff levels at
the early 1990s becomes greater over time, regardless the two methods of estima-
tion, OLS and PPML.
Estimated impacts of tariff cuts on the employment effect of China are shown
in Table 12.6, for each of the Asian countries as well as for the area as a whole. It
shows that, in the ASEAN + JKT area overall in 2011, the OLS estimates imply
that tariff cuts account for 11.5 billion USD of China’s employment effect, which
is equivalent to 10.2 per cent of China’s employment effect. The PPML estimates
imply even greater contribution of tariff cuts, accounting for 25.0 billion USD of
China’s employment effect, which is 22.1 per cent of the total employment effect.
The decomposition results for each country are shown in Table 12.6. Tariff cuts
contributed the most for Brunei: 44.4 per cent and 42.5 per cent based on OLS
and PPML, respectively. The contribution of tariff cuts is almost the same for
the rest of the ASEAN + JKT economies: roughly 10 per cent and 20–25
per cent based on OLS and PPML, respectively.
Figure 12.4 The impact of tariff cuts on the “employment effect of China from the
demand-side analysis”, in the ASEAN + JKT area
Notes: The thick line with markers indicates the actual employment effect of China on the ASEAN +
JKT area, 0kASEANþJKT;C1 . The dashed line indicates the hypothetical employment effect of ChinaActual;t
when tariff levels were fixed at the early 1990s level, based on OLS reported in column (3) of
Table 12.5, ASEAN JKT;C10k þOLS t . The solid line without markers indicates the hypothetical employment;
effect of China when tariff levels were fixed at the early 1990s level, based on PPML reported in
column (6) of Table 12.5, 10kASEANþJKT;CPPML;t . The difference between the actual employment effect
ASEANþJKT;C
10k and the hypothetical employment effects 10kASEANþJKT;C ASEANOLS (and 1
0k þJKT;CActual;t ;t PPML;t ) is
the impact of tariff cuts on the employment effect of China. The simple average tariff rates
imposed by China to the ASEAN + JKT area are also shown.
The contribution of China’s final demand for the exports of the ASEAN + JKT
economies is described in Figure 12.5. Unlike the previous case, the implied
impact of China’s final demand is almost the same for the OLS and PPML esti-
mates. Table 12.7 shows that, in the ASEAN + JKT area overall in 2011, the OLS
estimates imply that China’s final demand per se accounts for 85.8 billion USD of
China’s employment effect, which is equivalent to 75.8 per cent of China’s
employment effect. The PPML estimates imply that China’s final demand contrib-
utes to 87.0 billion USD employment creation, which is 76.9 per cent of China’s
total employment effect.
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Figure 12.5 The impact of the final demand on the “employment effect of China from the
demand-side analysis”, in the ASEAN + JKT area
Notes: The thick line with markers indicate the actual employment effect of China on the ASEAN + JKT
area, 10kASEANþJKT;C. The dashed line indicates the hypothetical employment effect of China whenActual;t
China’s final demand were fixed at the early 1990s level, based on OLS reported in column (3) of
Table 12.5, 10kASEANþJKT;COLS t . The solid line without markers indicates the hypothetical employment;
effect of China when China’s final demand were fixed at the early 1990s level, based on PPML reported
in column (6) of Table 12.5, 10kASEANþJKT;CPPML;t . The difference between the actual employment effect
10kASEANþJKT;C and the hypothetical employment effects 0kASEANþJKT;C (and 0kASEAN JK1Actual;t OLS;t 1
þ T;C
PPML;t ) is
the impact of China’s final demand per se on the employment effect of China.
Table 12.6 Contribution of tariff cuts on the employment effect of China implied by the
demand-side analysis
Panel A: Based on the OLS estimates
The impact of tariff cuts on the % to the actual employment
employment effect of China (million USD) effect of China
1996 2001 2006 2011 1996 2001 2006 2011
Brunei − 3.54 12.29 35.95 − 48.38 45.59 44.44
Cambodia − 1.23 0.50 1.46 − 42.46 6.94 9.11
Indonesia 17.88 43.13 165.92 597.82 3.97 7.64 9.96 10.28
Japan 387.98 1,032.82 2,515.74 6,104.96 3.60 7.42 9.72 9.95
Laos 0.12 0.30 0.72 3.29 7.78 16.49 11.09 11.86
Malaysia 23.87 65.33 236.55 769.85 3.97 8.09 10.56 11.06
Myanmar 3.75 2.17 3.86 17.19 24.17 8.62 9.94 10.72
Philippines 6.35 16.94 63.69 221.72 4.33 8.19 10.47 10.87
South Korea 85.85 245.75 859.73 2,289.91 4.04 7.84 9.92 10.27
Singapore 16.49 44.03 138.26 402.86 4.02 7.92 10.19 10.33
Taiwan 114.74 240.56 408.16 551.87 3.62 7.51 9.68 10.01
Thailand 10.54 42.53 151.55 340.79 2.45 8.01 10.44 10.84
Vietnam 8.90 22.77 81.45 149.85 3.38 5.45 7.79 8.11
ASEAN + JKT 681.34 1,761.08 4,638.42 11,487.52 3.70 7.53 9.82 10.15
Panel B: Based on the PPML estimates
Brunei − 3.91 11.93 34.36 − 53.46 44.27 42.47
Cambodia − 1.46 1.21 3.13 − 50.66 16.88 19.50
Indonesia 49.38 78.13 402.40 1,152.77 10.96 13.84 24.17 19.82
Japan 987.27 2,310.03 5,109.58 13,464.12 9.15 16.59 19.74 21.94
Laos 0.33 0.37 1.55 6.62 22.35 20.82 24.02 23.91
Malaysia 67.30 144.12 527.18 1,600.66 11.20 17.84 23.53 22 99
Myanmar 4.43 2.97 6.54 39.74 28.50 11.81 16.83 24.79
Philippines 11.04 32.05 154.11 485.82 7.51 15.49 25.33 23.82
South Korea 277.38 573.52 1,916.51 4,596.01 13.06 18.30 22.10 20.62
Singapore 38.91 89.41 298.40 906.44 9.49 16.09 21.99 23.24
Taiwan 210.47 529.69 993.23 1,619.70 6.64 16.53 23.55 29.38
Thailand 25.71 82.67 342.75 784.27 5.97 15.58 23.61 24.95
Vietnam 24.77 47.78 179.75 330.03 9.41 11.44 17.19 17.87
ASEAN + JKT 1,702.14 3,896.11 9,945.15 25,023.67 9.25 16.66 21.06 22.11
Notes: The table shows contributions of tariff cuts on the employment effect of China implied from the
demand-side analysis. Panel A shows the contribution of tariff cuts based on the regression result
reported in column (3) of Table 12.5, estimated by OLS. Panel B reports the one based on the
result shown in column (6) of Table 12.5, estimated by PPML. Missing numbers for Brunei and
Cambodia in 1996 are due to inadequate observations on tariffs.
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Table 12.7 Contribution of the final demand from China on the employment effect of China implied by the demand-side analysis
Panel A: Based on the OLS estimates
The impact of China’s final demand on the employment effect of
% to the actual employment effect of China
China (million USD)
1996 2001 2006 2011 1996 2001 2006 2011
Brunei − 3.69 17.49 62.89 − 50.47 64.89 77.73
Cambodia − 1.55 3.91 11.26 − 53.49 54.73 70.15
Indonesia 102.72 173.50 855.15 4,054.59 22.80 30.74 51.36 69.73
Japan 3,516.91 6,366.54 16,315.87 47,115.40 32.61 45.72 63.02 76.78
Laos 0.42 0.80 3.52 19.34 28.13 44.17 54.36 69.81
Malaysia 188.17 349.38 1,367.45 5,262.84 31.30 43.24 61.04 75.60
Myanmar 6.96 8.14 19.88 110.84 44.83 32.40 51.15 69.13
Philippines 47.86 94.31 382.90 1,570.70 32.59 45.60 62.94 77.02
South Korea 678.62 1,379.83 5,343.10 16,916.73 31.94 44.03 61.62 75.90
Singapore 133.16 249.37 843.37 2,979.50 32.48 44.87 62.16 76.39
Taiwan 1,008.03 1,406.24 2,617.45 4,207.36 31.81 43.88 62.06 76.31
Thailand 125.85 206.81 821.19 2,278.44 29.23 38.97 56.56 72.48
Vietnam 46.28 98.53 469.24 1,207.34 17.59 23.60 44.87 65.35
ASEAN + JKT 5,859.70 10,338.69 29,060.50 85,797.22 31.84 44.21 61.54 75.82
Panel B: Based on the PPML estimates
Brunei − 4.21 15.97 55.05 − 57.56 59.28 68.05
Cambodia − 1.36 3.35 13.15 − 47.01 46.98 81.95
Indonesia 118.64 148.58 982.49 3,656.00 26.34 26.32 59.00 62.87
Japan 4,037.36 6,600.07 15,477.36 48,182.28 37.44 47.40 59.79 78.52
Laos 0.64 0.65 3.79 19.19 43.09 36.31 58.51 69.27
Malaysia 236.89 361.43 1,441.68 5,125.29 39.41 44.73 64.36 73.62
Myanmar 9.05 4.65 15.84 126.04 58.25 18.50 40.77 78.60
Philippines 36.08 82.72 438.91 1,603.94 24.57 39.99 72.14 78.65
South Korea 1,007.58 1,521.72 5,558.01 15,738.74 47.42 48.56 64.10 70.61
Singapore 145.68 241.22 857.92 3,096.58 35 53 43.40 63.24 79.39
Taiwan 833.66 1,451.70 2,981.76 5,742.02 26.31 45.29 70.70 104.15
Thailand 118.20 189.38 878.67 2,453.60 27.45 35.68 60.52 78.05
Vietnam 51.46 95.61 479.62 1,238.79 19.55 22.90 45.86 67.06
ASEAN + JKT 6,600.32 10,703.30 29,135.36 87,050.67 35.87 45.77 61.70 76.93
Notes: The table shows contribution of China’s final demand on the employment effect of China implied from the demand-side analysis. Panel A shows the contribution
of the final demand from China based on the regression result reported in column (3) of Table 12.5, estimated by OLS. Panel B reports the one based on the result shown
in column (6) of Table 12.5, estimated by PPML. Missing numbers for Brunei and Cambodia in 1996 are due to inadequate observations on tariffs. The number can be
greater than 100% because the predicted employment effect of China can be greater than the actual employment effect of China.
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5. Conclusions
The empirical results presented in this chapter highlight positive employment cre-
ation effects of China on the ASEAN and other East Asian countries by providing
export opportunities to these countries. We have quantified the employment effect
of China on the ASEAN + JKT during 1990–2013 using the global IO table from
the EORA database. We employ the two different techniques: the demand-side
analysis from Los et al. (2015b) and the hypothetical extraction technique from
Los et al. (2016). The two techniques yield large and strongly growing employ-
ment effects of China during the period. According to the results from the former
technique, the employment creation effect of China on the ASEAN + JKT area
overall is 19 billion and 234 billion USD in 1990 and 2013, respectively,
meaning that the employment effect grew at an annual rate of 11 per cent. The
China effect accounts for 6.5 per cent of the employment effect driven by the
total demand in 2013, versus merely 1 per cent in 1990.
While this exercise is highly informative, it includes the employment effect
through changes in tariffs such as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement
and through changes in China’s final demand per se together. So we have also
used a regression technique to decompose the portion of the employment creation
that is due to each of these two sources, and we find that tariff cuts by China
account for 10–25 per cent of the employment effect, with the remainder due
to the expansion of Chinese demand per se. Through both its tariff liberalization
and through its growth of final demand, therefore, China plays an important role
in creating employment in the ASEAN and other East Asian countries.
Notes
Acknowledgement: The authors would like to thank Marcel P. Timmer, Robert C. Johnson,
Ayumu Tanaka, Zadia M. Feliciano, Jung Hur, and participants at the Groningen Growth
and Development Centre (GGDC) 25th Anniversary Conference and the Robert E. Lipsey
Memorial Panel Sessions at the Western Economic Association International 2018 for their
helpful suggestions.
1 Feenstra and Hong (2010) estimate the impact of export growth on China’s employ-
ment using China’s Input-Output Table. They find that export growth over 1997–
2002 contributed to at most 2.5 million jobs per year where the total number of jobs
increased by 7.5–8 million jobs per year.
2 Los, Timmer and de Vries (2015a) investigate the impact of China’s exports on
employment creation in China using the Global Input-Output Table from the WIOD
database. They find that, between 2001 and 2006, Chinese exports added approxi-
mately 70 million jobs to the Chinese economy.
3 In an integrated global economy, it is also possible to consider third country effects. For
example, increasing export opportunities to China from country A may have an impact
on employment in country B through various linkages. However, this chapter focuses
on the direct effect of export opportunities to China on the exporting country.
4 The advantages of employing the EORA database are as follows. First, and most
important, it includes a number of ASEAN and East Asian countries that are not
included in WIOD (see Appendix A). Second, the EORA database provides data on
labor compensation rather than only the number of workers employed. Third, a
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longer time-series, from 1990 to 2013, is available from the EORA database while the
WIOD database covers 1995 to 2011.
5 See Appendix D for detailed derivation.
6 See Appendix D for details of our calculation.
7 Unlike the previous section, the share of China’s employment effect in 1990 is not
shown because it is zero by construction.
8 This multilateral tariff term can be derived more formally from a CES framework.
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Our re-constructed EORA Input-Output Table includes 51 countries besides the
rest of the world as one economy. The 51 countries include 40 WIOD countries
and additional 11 economies from ASEAN and East Asia. The list of the coun-
tries is as follows. * indicates newly added non-WIOD countries and ISO Alpha 3
codes are in parentheses.
Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Brazil (BRA), Brunei
(BRN)*, Bulgaria (BGR), Cambodia (KHM)*, Canada (CAN), China
(CHN), Cyprus (CYP), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia
(EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC),
Hong Kong (HKG)*, Hungary (HUN), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN),
Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Laos (LAO)*, Latvia (LVA), Lithu-
ania (LTU), Luxembourg (LUX), Macao SAR (MAC)*, Malaysia (MYS)*,
Malta (MLT), Mexico (MEX), Myanmar (MMR)*, Netherlands (NLD), Phil-
ippines (PHL)*, Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), South Korea (KOR),
Romania (ROU), Russia (RUS), Singapore (SGP)*, Slovakia (SVK), Slove-
nia (SVN), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Taiwan (TWN), Thailand (THA)*,






List of sectors and final demand categories
Our Input-Output Table includes 26 sectors as in the one from the EORA Data-
base. The list of the sectors is as follows.
1. Agriculture, 2. Fishing, 3. Mining and Quarrying, 4. Food and Beverages,
5. Textiles and Wearing Apparel, 6. Wood and Paper, 7. Petroleum, Chemical
and Non-Metallic Mineral Products, 8. Metal Products, 9. Electrical Machin-
ery, 10. Transport Equipment, 11. Other Manufacturing, 12. Recycling, 13.
Electricity, Gas and Water, 14. Construction, 15. Maintenance and Repair,
16. Wholesale Trade, 17. Retail Trade, 18. Hotels and Restaurants, 19. Trans-
port, 20. Post and Telecommunications, 21. Financial Intermediation and
Business Activities, 22. Public Administration, 23. Private Households, 25.
Others, 26. Re-export and Re-import
There six final demand categories. The list of the categories is as follows.
1. Household final consumption, 2. Non-profit institutions serving house-
holds, 3. Government final consumption, 4. Gross fixed capital formation,
5. Changes in inventories, and 6. Acquisitions less disposals of valuables
Our Global Input-Output Table includes Hong Kong and Macau. These two econ-
omies are first treated as different from China. However, after computing the
employment effects due to the final demand from Hong Kong and Macau,
these two employment effects are aggregated into the employment effect of the
mainland China. We clarify this by showing the equations below.
First, compute the employment effects due to the final demand from mainland
China, Hong Kong, and Macau as follows:
kMailand Chinat ¼ p̂tðI- A -1tÞ f Mailand Chinat ;
kHong Kong p̂ I A -1f Hong Kongt ¼ tð - tÞ t ;
kMacaut ¼ p̂tðI -1 Macau- AtÞ f t ;
where f MainlandChinat , f
HongKong Macau
t , and f t are ðS x CÞ x 1 matrices of the final
demand from the mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau, respectively. The
same notations follow as the main text for the rest of the matrices. After
finding the employment effects from the three economies, kMailandChinat , k
HongKong
t ,
and kMacaut , we take sum of these to find the employment from China as follows:
kChina Mailandt ¼ k Chinat þ kHong Kongt þ kMacaut :
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Appendix C
How to treat Hong Kong and Macau
Appendix D
Appendix to the demand-side analysis: the
foreign effect and the total effect
This section presents mathematical details to estimate the employment effect due
to total demand in the demand-side analysis. This employment effect is estimated
as:
kAllt ¼ p̂tðI- A -1tÞ fAllt ; ðA1Þ
where kAllt is an ðN x SÞ x 1 vector describing the employment effect driven by
demand from overall demand. fAllt denotes the final good flows to all countries,
and can be written as follows:2X
f 1; k
36 tXk 766 f 2; k 7t 7k
fAll 6 7t ¼ 6 7:6 . 76 .4 . 75X
fN ; ktk X
For example, the first element of fAllt , f
1;k
t , is the value of final good flowsk
from country 1 to all over the world including country 1 itself. The estimated




t66 k2;All 7t 7
kAll 6 7t ¼ 6 7:6 .4 . 7. 5
kN ;Allt
The employment effect of total demand on country is estimated as the sum of
numbers in ki;Allt , which is written as 1
0ki;Allt .
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The employment effect on country i driven by final demand in China relative to
the employment effect driven by final demand from all countries is computed as
China Effect relative to Total Effect ii
0 ;C
t
0 ;¼ 100 i All; x 1 kt =1 kt : ðA2Þ
Another way to normalize the employment effect of China is to compute the ratio
to country’s GDP:
China Effect relative to GDP i;Ci;t ¼ 100x 1kt =GDPi;t:
Appendix E
Appendix to the demand-side analysis: the
comparison with Los et al. (2015b)
This section gives more details regarding the calculation procedure for the
numbers reported in Table 12.3. The employment effect induced by the foreignX X
demand from year t to year t+h 10ki;-i -ti2fASEAN þh - 1
0ki; it isþ3g i2fASEANþJKTg
divided by the overall employment compensation at year t+h,X
EmpCompi hi2f þJKT ;t , which leads to:XASEAN þg X
10ki;-iti þh2fASEANþJKT - 1
0ki;-iX tg i2fASEANþJKTg ;
EmpCompii ASEAN þþJKT ; t h2f g
where {ASEAN+JKT} is a set of the ASEAN+JKT economies; h is a time
horizon; EmpCompi;t denotes the total employment compensation in country i
in year t. A similar calculation applies to the employment effects induced by
China’s demand and the total demand. These are calculated as follows:X X
1ki;C 1ki;C
i2fASEANX tþJKT -þh tg i2fASEANþJKTg ;
EmpCompii2fASEANþJKT ; tþhX g X
1ki;Allt h - 1ki;Alli2fASEANXþJKT þ tg i2fASEANþJKTg ;
EmpCompii ASEAN JKT ; tþh2f þ g
respectively, where C indicates China and All indicates all countries including
country i itself.
The tariff data from Caliendo et al. (2015) are given in 4-digit SITC classification.
We match the tariff data with the 11 merchandise sectors from EORA. The cross-
walk between SITC and EORA sectors is shown in Table 12.A1.
Table 12.A1 Crosswalk between EORA sectors and SITC code
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Sectoral crosswalk between EORA
and SITC
Table 12.A1 (Continued)
EORA no. EORA sectors SITC code
23 Education, Health and Other Services
24 Private Households
25 Others
26 Re-export & Re-import
Notes: The table shows the correspondence between 11 EORA merchandise sectors and SITC 2 digit
classification code employed in order to match the tariff data from Caliendo et al. (2015) with the
EORA sectors.
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Appendix G
Summary statistics
Summary statistics for the variables employed in the regression analysis are pre-
sented in Table 12.A2.
Table 12.A2 Summary statistics for variables in regression analysis
# of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
ln(employment effect of China) 3,126 2.40 3.11 −4.61 10.45
ln(l+tariff/100) 2,719 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.82
ln(total emp. compensation) 3,146 6.02 2.52 −0.69 12.35
ln(multilateral final demand from China) 3,024 3.60 1.34 0.99 6.82
ln(weighted average of tariffs imposed by 3,024 0.21 0.24 0.01 1.48
China)
ln(GDP) 3,024 12.23 1.77 8.64 15.32
ln(nominal exchange rate against Chinese 3,146 2.94 3.07 −1.77 8.06
Yuan)
Notes: See the main text for data sources.
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Appendix H
Decomposition exercise using estimates
from PPML
In Section 4, we estimate a regression equation in order to investigate the deter-
minants of the employment effect of China using OLS and the Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. This section provides mathematical
details in order to calculate the prediction based on the PPML estimator. We
first estimate the following equation:
PPML : kði;sÞ;Ct ¼ expfg0 þ g i1 ln Tariff ð ;sÞ;Ct ðA3Þ
X i;s g Xig φði;sÞ0þ t εð Þð Þ 0 i;st 2 þ 3 þ PPMLg þ PPML;t
where kt
ði;sÞ;C is the USD value of the employment effect of China on sector s of
country i in year t; Tariff i;st
ð Þ;C denotes the tariff rate imposed by China on sector s
of country i; Xði;sÞt is a vector of control variables varying at the country-level and
the sector-level including total employment compensation, multilateral demand
from China, and the weighted average of tariff rates imposed by China to
other countries (see the main text for the definition of these variables). Xit is a
vector of control variables varying at the country-level including GDP and the
nominal exchange rate against China. φði;sÞPPML denotes country fixed effects and
εði;sÞPPML;t indicates the error term. g0 and g1 are scalar parameters to be estimated
and g2 and g3 are vectors of parameters to be estimated.
Predictions from equation (A3) are in USD value:
yði;sÞ;C exp g ln Tariff ði^ ĝ ^ ;sÞ;C Xði;sÞĝ0 Xi ði; Þ ð ÞPPML
0 s i;s
;t ¼ f 0 þ 1 1990 þ t 2 þ tĝ 3 þ φ̂PPMLg þ ε̂PPML;t: ðA4Þ
where a hat indicates estimated coefficients or prediction. Using the prediction
from (A4), we compute the aggregate predicted employment effect on country
i as follows: X11
10ki; CPPML;t ¼ ŷði;sÞ;CPPML;t:s¼1
13 Modern spatial economics: a primer
Treb Allen and Costas Arkolakis
1. Introduction
Space: Economic Science’s final frontier. Over the past twenty years a revolution
in the exploration of space in Economics led by a combined effort from geogra-
phers, trade, and urban economists has finally brought the required technology to
analyze space in all its glory: An armada of tools from mathematics, physics, car-
tography, and computer science has gradually formed the necessary equipment to
explore space and its consequence for growth and allocation of economic activity.
Spearheading this exploration is spatial theory’s dreadnought: The gravity
model. This mathematical design strikes a careful balance between two key ingre-
dients behind any successful theory. It is intuitive and pedagogical while at the
same time rich enough to provide an incredibly good fit to the empirical obser-
vations. In other words, it is beautiful and it works like a charm!
The key force that spatial models with mobility of goods and people need to
harness is space itself. In an environment with N locations, mobility of goods
and people implies that N2 number of trade interactions and N2 migration
flows have to be modeled. These many complex interactions could potentially
obscure the main forces that determine economic activity across space. The res-
olution that the gravity model provides cuts right through these complexities: It
allows for as many (exogenous) frictions as relationships, but assumes that the
elasticity of the flows to (endogenous) push and pull factors are governed by
only a single parameter. This lets the theory capture the first-order impacts of
the effects of geography on economic outcomes while ignoring the (potentially)
less important impact of varying bilateral elasticities.
To understand the model and the impact of space on economic activity we
present a generalized, yet simple, version of the gravity model that allows for
mobility of goods and people across space limited by frictions specific to these
flows.1 In particular, we employ an extension of the Allen and Arkolakis
(2014) framework with an exogenous population in each location and mobility
frictions across locations. Variations of this extension have been more formally
modeled by Tombe, Zhu et al. (2015), Bryan and Morten (2015), Caliendo,
Dvorkin and Parro (2015), Desmet, Nagy and Rossi-Hansberg (2016),
Faber and Gaubert (2016), Allen, Morten and Dobbin (2017) and Allen and
DOI: 10.4324/9781351061544-13
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Donaldson (2017). Within this environment we can answer a number of impor-
tant questions: What is the allocation of economic activity across space and
how is it determined by location fundamentals or bilateral frictions of mobility.
When does a solution of the model exists and when is it unique? Do different
assumptions on the frictions of moving goods and people imply that policies
have different implications?
Finally, we should note that the brief literature review of gravity models above
is by no means complete and refer the interested reader to the excellent review
articles by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), Head and Mayer (2013), Costinot and
Rodríguez-Clare (2013) and Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017), where the
latter two focus especially on quantitative spatial models.
2. Gravity: the evidence
We begin by explaining and documenting the “gravity” relationship. Empirically,
the notion of gravity introduced by Tinbergen (1962) postulates that flows decline
with distance. We illustrate that both the flow of goods (trade) and people (migra-
tion) exhibit gravity. Moreover, this gravity relationship is robust to different
scales of distance: it is prevalent for the flow of people and goods both across
countries and within countries. Finally, gravity has been present in the data for
(at least) the past fifty years, and shows no signs of attenuating over time.
2.1. Gravity in the flow of goods
We first examine the flow of goods (trade). We use two different data sets: the
first, from Head, Mayer and Ries (2010), comprise the value of trade between
between countries from 1948 to 2006; the second, from CFS (2007, 2012), are
the Commodity Flow Surveys, comprise the value of trade between U.S. states
for 2007 and 2012. To reduce concerns of selection bias, we constrain each
sample to be balanced by only including origin-destination pairs that reported
positive trade flows for each year in the sample; moreover, to avoid having to
take a stand on what constitutes the “distance-to-self”, in each sample we
exclude own trade flows.
Let Xijt be the value of trade flows from location i to location j in time t. The
gravity relationship postulates that the (log) of the value of trade flows declines in
the distance between locations, conditional on (endogenous) origin-specific push
factors gT Tit and destination-specific pull factors djt :
ln Xijt ¼ f ðln dist T TijÞ þ git þ djt ; ð1Þ
where @f
ln dist
< 0. Figure 13.1 overlays a non-parametric function f ( on top of a
@ ij
.)
scatter plot of the relationship between log trade flows and log distance after par-
titioning out the origin-year and destination-year fixed effects for international
trade in both 1950 and 2000; as is evident, there is a strong negative (and approx-
imately log-linear) relationship in both years, with the negative effect being
especially pronounced in the year 2000. In Figure 13.2, we impose a linear func-
tion f (ln distij) = γt ln distij and estimate the coefficient γt separately for each year;
we find a precisely estimated negative relationship that appears to be getting
stronger over time, with a coefficient γt of between −0.5 and −1.5.
This strong gravity relationship in the flow of goods is also prevalent within
countries. Figure 13.3 is the analog of Figure 13.1 for trade between U.S.
states. In both 2007 and 2012 there is a strong negative (and approximately
log-linear) relationship between log trade flows and log distance. As with the
international trade flows, the trade coefficient is about −1, showing that the
effect of distance is similar within and across countries.
We can also examine how the origin push factor γit and destination pull factor
δjt are correlated with various observables. Figure 13.4 shows that both the push
and pull factors in international trade are strongly positively correlated with GDP –
even after partitioning out time-invariant country effects and country-invariant year
effects. Put another way, changes in GDP within a country over time (relative
to total world GDP) are strongly positively correlated with both a country’s















−3 −2 −1 0 1 2
log distance
1950 2000
Figure 13.1 Across country gravity: trade flows between countries over time
Notes: Data are from Head, Mayer and Ries (2010). Only bilateral pairs with observed trade flows in
both 1950 and 2000 are included. The thick lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanech-
nikov kernel and bandwidth of 0.5 after partitioning out the origin-year and destination-year fixed
effects.
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Figure 13.2 Across country trade gravity: the gravity coefficient over time
Notes: Data are from Head, Mayer and Ries (2010). This figure plots the estimated coefficient of dis-
tance in a trade gravity regression with origin-year and destination-year fixed effects over time. The
bars indicate the 95 per cent confidence interval, where the standard errors are two-way clustered by





















Figure 13.3 Within country gravity: trade flows between U.S. states
Notes: Data are from 2007 and 2012 Commodity flow surveys CFS (2007, 2012). The figure excludes
trade flows within each state. The thick lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanechnikov
kernel and bandwidth of 0.5 after partitioning out the origin-year and destination-year fixed effects.
country trade flows, as is evident in Figure 13.5. Moreover, Figures 13.6 and 13.7
show a strong positive correlation between the push and pull factors both across
and within countries. As we will see below, this positive correlation will be pre-
dicted by a gravity spatial model with balanced trade and symmetric trade costs.
2.2. Gravity in the flow of people
The flow of labor (migration) exhibits similar – but not identical – patterns as the
flow of goods. We analyze the flow of labor both across and within countries. For
international migration, we turn to the WBG (2011) dataset, which provides bilat-
eral flows of people across countries every ten years from 1960 to 2010. For
intranational migration, we construct flows of people across U.S. states using
their state of birth and current location for each decennial census from 1850 to
2000 from Ruggles, Fitch, Kelly Hall and Sobek (2000). As with the trade
data, we consider a balanced sample of location pairs for which there is a positive
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Figure 13.4 Location size and gravity fixed effects: trade flows between countries
Notes: Data are from Head, Mayer and Ries (2010). The country-year fixed effects are from a series
gravity regression of trade flows on distance x year and origin-year and destination-year fixed effects.
The thick lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth of 0.5
after partitioning out both a country and year fixed effect.






































Figure 13.5 Location size and gravity fixed effects: trade flows between U.S. states
Notes: Data are from 2007 and 2012 Commodity flow surveys (CFS, 2007, 2012). Fixed effects are
from a gravity regression of trade flows on distance and origin and destination fixed effects within
year. Total sales (purchases) are caculated by summing trade flows across all destinations (origins).
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Figure 13.6 Origin and destination fixed effects: trade flows between countries
Notes: Data are from Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010). The country-year fixed effects are from a gravity
regression of trade flows on distance x year and origin-year and destination-year fixed effects for each
year. The thick lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth of
0.5 after partitioning out both a country and year fixed effect.
As with the flow of goods, we can construct a simple empirical gravity speci-
fication for the flow of people from location i to location j at time t, Lijt:
ln Lijt ¼ gðln distijÞ þ gLit þ dLjt; ð2Þ
where gravity implies @g
@ ln dist
< 0. Figure 13.8 overlays a non-parametric function
ij
g(.) on top of a scatter plot of the relationship between log migration flows and
log distance after partitioning out the origin-year and destination-year fixed
effects for international migration in both 1960 and 2010; like with the flow of
goods, there is a strong negative (and approximately log-linear) relationship in
both years. In Figure 13.9, we impose a linear function g (ln distij) = γt ln distij
and estimate the coefficient γt separately for each year of data; again, as with
the flow of goods, we find a precisely estimated negative relationship with a coef-
ficient γt of between −1 and −2.
Figure 13.10 shows that the gravity relationship also exists for within country
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Figure 13.7 Origin and destination fixed effects: trade flows between U.S. states
Notes: Data are from 2007 and 2012 Commodity flow surveys (CFS, 2007, 2012). Fixed effects are
from a gravity regression of trade flows on distance and origin and destination fixed effects within
year. The thick lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth
of 0.5.
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Figure 13.8 Across country gravity: migration flows between countries over time
Notes: Data are from Yeats (1998). Excludes own country population shares (i.e. nonmigrants). The
thick lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth of 0.5 after
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Figure 13.9 Across country gravity: the migration gravity coefficient over time
Notes: Data are from Yeats (1998). This figure plots the estimated coefficient of distance in a gravity
migration regression with origin-year and destination-year fixed effects over time. The bars indicate
the 95% confidence interval, where the standard errors are two-way clustered by country of origin
and country of destination.
Figure 13.11 illustrates, the effect of distance on the flow of people is nearly
identical within the United States as it is across countries, with a coefficient hov-
ering of about −1.5. (It is interesting to note that unlike for the flow of goods, the
gravity coefficient of migration shows no evidence of getting more negative over
time.)
While the gravity relationship with distance is quite similar for trade and
migration, the “push L” and “pull” factors (gLit and djt, respectively) are substantially
different for migration. Figure 13.12 shows that there is no systematic relation-
ship between population and either the push or pull factor across countries;
within the United States, however, Figure 13.13 shows the lagged population
is strongly correlated with the push factor and the contemporaneous population
is strongly correlated with the pull factors. Unlike the flow of goods, there is
no systematic correlation between the push and pull factors across countries
(Figure 13.14), but there is a negative correlation between push and pull
factors across U.S. states (Figure 13.15). As we will see below, this is consistent
with a theoretical model of migration when the population is not in a steady state
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Figure 13.10 Within country gravity: migration flows between U.S. states
Notes: Data are from the 1850 and 2000 U.S. Censuses Ruggles, Fitch, Kelly Hall and Sobek (2000),
where migration flows are comparing current state of residence of 25–34 year olds to their state of
birth. The thick lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth
of 0.5 after partitioning out the origin-year and destination-year fixed effects.
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Figure 13.11 Within country gravity: the migration gravity coefficient over time
Notes: Data are from the U.S. Censuses from 1850 to 2000 Ruggles, Fitch, Kelly Hall and Sobek
(2000), where migration flows are comparing current state of residence of 25–34 year olds to their
state of birth. This figure plots the estimated coefficient of distance in a gravity migration regression
with origin-year and destination-year fixed effects over time. The bars indicate the 95% confidence
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Figure 13.12 Location population and gravity fixed effects: migration flows between
countries
Notes: Data are from Yeats (1998). The country-year fixed effects are from a gravity regression of
migration flows on distance x year and origin-year and destination-year fixed effects. The thick
lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth of 0.5 after par-
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Figure 13.13 Location size and gravity fixed effects: migration flows between U.S. states
Notes: Data are from the U.S. Censuses from 1850 to 2000 Ruggles, Fitch, Kelly Hall and Sobek
(2000), where migration flows are comparing current state of residence of 25–34 year olds to their
state of birth. The state-year fixed effects are from a series gravity regression of migration flows on
distance x year and origin-year and destination-year fixed effects. The thick lines are from a non para-
metric regression with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth of 0.5 after partitioning out both a state
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Figure 13.14 Origin and destination fixed effects: migration flows between countries
Notes: Data are from Yeats (1998). The country-year fixed effects are from a gravity regression of
migration flows on distance x year and origin-year and destination-year fixed effects. The thick
lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth of 0.5 after par-
titioning out both a country and year fixed effect.
3. Gravity: a simple framework
We now introduce a simple model that can generate the prevalence of gravity in
the data. Suppose there are N locations, where in what follows we define the set
S = {1, …, N}, each producing a differentiated good. The only factor is labor,
and we denote the allocation of labor in location i 2 S as LX i and assume the
total world labor endowment is Li Li S ¼ -. Given the evidence from the previ-
ous section that gravity holds both within
2
and across countries, locations can be
interpreted as either regions within a country or countries themselves.
3.1. Demand for goods: gravity on trade flows
We assume that workers have identical Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
preferences over the differentiated varieties produced in each different location.
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Figure 13.15 Origin and destination fixed effects: migration flows between U.S. states
Notes: Data are from the U.S. Censuses from 1850 to 2000 Ruggles, Fitch, Kelly Hall and Sobek (2000),
where migration flows are comparing current state of residence of 25–34 year olds to their state of birth.
Fixed effects are from a gravity regression of migration flows on distance x year and origin-year and
destination-year fixed effects. The thick lines are from a non parametric regression with Epanechnikov
kernel and bandwidth of 0.5 after partitioning out both a state and year fixed effect.
446 Treb Allen and Costas Arkolakis 446
447 Modern spatial economics: a primer 447
where qsi is the per-capita quantity of the variety produced in location s and con-
sumed in location i, σ 2 (1, 1) is the elasticity of substitution between goods ω,
and ui is the local amenity, discussed below.
2
Each worker in location i earns a wage wi and thus the budget constraint isX
pjiqji ¼ wi ð4Þ
j
where pji is the price of good from location j in i. Optimization of the worker
utility, equation (3), subject to the budget constraint, equation (4), yields the
total expenditure in location j on the differentiated variety from location i:
Xij ¼ ðp 1-sij Ps-1Þ j wjLj for all j ð5Þ
where Lj is the total number of workers residing in location j (determined endog-X
enously below) P -s
1
and 1 1 sj -= ð iðpijÞ Þ is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index.
The production function of each variety is linear in labor and the productivity
in location i is denoted by Ai. Thus, the cost of producing variety i is pi = wi/Ai.
Shipping the good from i to final destination j incurs an “iceberg” trade friction,
where τij > 1 units must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive. Thus, the price
faced by location j for a factor from i can be written as:
w
p iij ¼ τA ij; ð6Þi
where τij are bilateral trade frictions. Substituting this solution to equation (5) and
rearranging we obtain( )1-s
X τ 1-s
wi s
ij ¼ ð ij -1Þ P wA j jLj: ð7Þi
This equation is the modern version of a gravity equation initially derived by
Anderson (1979) and is ubiquitous in modern work in international trade. It is
characterized by a bilateral term that is a combination of model parameters,
trade costs and the trade elasticity, and origin and destination specific terms
which are combinations of endogenous variables and parameters.
More recent work provides a wealth of microfoundations for this structural
equation based on comparative advantage, increasing returns, or firm heterogene-
ity (see, for example, Eaton and Kortum (2002); Chaney (2008); Eaton, Kortum
and Kramarz (2011); Arkolakis (2010); Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare
(2012); Allen and Arkolakis (2014); Redding (2016) among others). Taking log
of this equation generates the empirical gravity trade equation (1) presented in
Section 13.2.
To incorporate agglomeration forces in production – which Allen and Arkola-
kis (2014) show creates an isomorphism with the monopolistic competition
models with free entry as in Krugman (1980) – we assume that the productivity
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of a location is subject to spillovers: A ai ¼ A-iLi where A-i is the exogenous produc-
tivity.3 We focus on the empirically relevant cases of α > 0, capturing among
others agglomeration externalities due to endogenous entry and scale effects.
3.2. Demand for labor: gravity on worker flows
We next determine the allocation of labor across location. We assume that there is
an initial (exogenous) distribution of workers across all locations i denoted by L0i ,
from which all workers choose where to live subject to migration frictions. In par-
ticular, the indirect utility function of an owner of one unit of aggregate factor
originating from location i and moving to location j is equal to the product of
the utility realized in the destination and a bilateral migration disutility νij:
w






ij ¼ depends both on an (exogenous) iceberg migration frictionmij
µij > 1 and on the (endogenous) number of migrating workers Lij. The parameter
β > 0 governs the extent to which migration flows create congestion externalities.
In equilibrium, labor mobility implies that the utility of all agents originating
from i is equalized:
w u-
W j j L b¼ =L0 -i : 8Pj m
ð ij i Þ ð Þ
ij
Inverting this expression, we obtain the number of workers that migrate from i
to j: ( )1
w u- bj j
P m
L j ij 0ij ¼ 1 Li : ð9Þ
W bi
Equation (9) is a gravity equation on worker flows as it determines the share of
workers in location i as a function of the real wage in location i. By taking logs, it
provides a theoretical justification of the empirical gravity specification for the
flow of people in equation (2) in Section 2.
We should at this point note that when modeling bilateral migration flows
many authors choose alternative, possibly more intuitive, formulations. These
formulations yield the same functional form as (8) but capture a variety of micro-
foundations such as competition for an immobile factor (e.g., land or housing
markets) or heterogeneous location preferences across workers. In this latter
approach, an agent’s utility in location j is the product of the local real wage
times a heterogeneous component. This heterogeneity results to different
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decisions for otherwise identical agents. Assuming a Frechet distribution for this
heterogeneity following Eaton and Kortum (2002); Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm and
Wolf (2015); Redding (2016) leads to a similar formulation to equation (9), as
discussed in Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
3.3. Closing the model
To close the model we need to satisfy four equilibrium conditions. The first two
are associated with the flow of goods. First, the total amount of labor used for the
production of goods for all countries equals the labor available in each country i.
Written in terms of labor payments, this implies that the total payments accrued to
labor in location i must equal to the sales of this location to all the locations in the
world, including i,X
wiLi ¼ Xij: ð10Þ
j
The second equilibrium condition is that total expenditure equals total
labor payments and in turn this equals total payments for goods produced for
location j, X
Ej ¼ wjLj ¼ Xij: ð11Þ
i
Using equation (7) this expression can be written,( ) ( )X -
1 w
1 s X 1-s i s 1 s 1-s w -sw ijL 1j ðτ ij -¼ Þ P w L P - τ ; 12A i j j ) i ¼ ð ijÞ ð Þi Ai i i
which is the expression for the Dixit-Stiglitz price index defined above.
The third and fourth equilibrium conditions are associated with the flow of
labor. The third condition is that the initial population in location i is equal to
the total flows of persons from location i, i.e.:X
L0i ¼ Lij: ð13Þ
j
Combined with the migration gravity equation (9) above allows us to write equi-
librium welfare of migrants from location i Wi as the CES aggregate of their bilat-





j W j iji
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Substituting this expression for welfare back into the migration gravity equation
then allows us to write migration shares of people analogously to expenditure
shares on goods:( )1
w u bj -j
P m




Finally, the fourth equilibrium condition requires that the in-flow of migrants to
location i is equal to its total population:X
Lj ¼ Lij: ð16Þ
i2S
Define the geography of the economy as the set of trade costs {τij}, migration
frictions {μ } productivities fA-ij ig, amenities fu- 0ig, and initial population fLi g.
For any set of elasticities {σ,α,β} and any geography, an equilibrium is defined
as a set of wages, labor allocations, price index, and welfare, that satisfy the fol-
lowing four equations:( )X 1
w L τ 1-s











( )X 1w b1 1
L ibi m
-¼ ð jiÞ u- 0bi ðW - Lj ð19P jÞ Þ
j2S i
0  !11bX w b
W @ j u-j Ai ¼ m ð20P Þ
j j ij
This yields a system of 4 × N equations and 4 × N unknowns (with one equation
being redundant from Walras’ Law and one price being pinned down by a nor-
malization). Note the symmetry of the labor and goods market clearing condi-
tions: each consists of one market clearing condition and one composite “price
index”: Pi for goods and Wi for labor.
Precise restrictions that guarantee existence and uniqueness are provided by
Allen and Donaldson (2017). Product differentiation implies that there are
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gains to moving to locations with low population in order to provide labor for the
global demand of the local good. In addition agglomeration and dispersion forces
act upon this basic mechanism. Intuitively, the agglomeration forces, governed by
parameter α, imply increased concentration of economic activity. Dispersion
forces, governed by parameter β, imply dispersion of economic activities away
from locations with large populations. When agglomeration forces are stronger
than dispersion forces the possibility of multiple equilibria arises. In these
cases agglomeration may act as a self-sustaining force and equilibria where dif-
ferent locations are the ones with the largest population can arise, similar to the
spatial models of Krugman (1991); Helpman (1998); Fujita, Krugman and Ven-
ables (1999). In fact, in the version of the model where migration costs are infi-
nite, this happens exactly at α > β, as discussed in Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
Existence of equilibria with positive population is always guaranteed.
However, when the agglomeration forces are very strong black hole equilibria
with all the activity concentrated in one point may be the only ones that satisfy
some refined notion of equilibrium related to stability.4
Finally, it may be apparent from the above discussion that particular micro-
foundations of the two key gravity equations do not play a key role in determin-
ing many of the properties of the model. A long tradition on modeling gravity in
international trade flows is summarized in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-
Clare (2012) (see discussion in Proposition 2) by a class of models governed
by a single parameter, the elasticity of trade, hereby captured by 1 − σ. In addi-
tion, more recently, microfoundations for the migration gravity equation have
been provided as well. It can be shown that, as far as it concerns the positive
properties and the counterfactuals of this expanded class of models, with
respect to wages and labor, two composite parameters (in this case functions of
the three parameters α, β and σ) determine all its predictions. This class of
models that includes geography models with labor mobility, intermediate
inputs, non-traded goods and other economic forces is discussed in Allen, Arko-
lakis and Takahashi (2014).
4. Model characterization
We proceed next to characterize this setup by imposing assumptions on the geog-
raphy of trade costs, τij, and the geography of fundamentals, i.e. productivities
and amenities, A-i, ūi.
4.1. Geography and the distribution of economic activity
We first provide intuition about how geography shapes the spatial distribution of
economic activity; these results build upon Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Allen,
Arkolakis and Takahashi (2014) and Allen and Donaldson (2017).
Suppose that trade costs are bilaterally symmetric, i.e. τij = τji for all i and j.
Then the goods gravity equation (7), and two equilibrium conditions, equations
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(10) and (11), together imply that the origin and destination fixed effects of the
trade gravity equation are equal up to scale, i.e.:( )
w 1-si Ps-1/ i wiL- 8i 2 SA a ð21ÞiL ii
This accords well with the finding in Section 2.1 that the origin and destination
fixed effects of the trade gravity equation are strongly correlated.
What about on the migration side? Suppose that migration costs are bilaterally
symmetric, i.e., µij = µji for all i and j. One might wonder if this symmetry, along
with the labor gravity equation (9), and the two labor adding up conditions, equa-
tions (14) and (16) correspondingly imply that the origin and destination specific
terms of the labor gravity equation are equal up to scale. It turns out that the
answer in general is no, unless the population distribution is in a steady state
where L0i ¼ Li. In that case (and only in that case) we have:( )1
w b 1i u-i i Li 8i 2 S ð22P / W
-b Þ
i
Recall from Section 2.2 that we empirically find virtually no correlation in the
origin and destination fixed effects in the migration gravity equation both
across countries and across states within the U.S., suggesting that we are either
far from a steady state or migration costs are asymmetric (or both). Combining
equations (21) and (22), we can express the equilibrium steady-state population
and wage of each location solely as a function of that location’s productivity,
amenity, and geographic location (with the effect of trade costs being summarized
by Pi and the effect of migration costs being summarized by Wi):
1 s s 2s 1
g ln Li ¼ ðs 1 ln A-
-
b
- Þ i þ ln u-i ln W ln Pb þ i þ Cb i - b 1 ð23Þ
s
sg ln wi ¼ sðs- 1Þ ln A-i þ ðaðs- 1( )( )Þ - 1Þ ln u-b i þ ðaðs- 1Þ - 1Þ ð24Þ
s a 1
ln Wi - s ðs- 1Þ 1- - ln Pb i Cb b þ 2( )
where g = s 1þ ð1- aðs- 1ÞÞ , C1 is a constant determined by the size of theb
aggregate labor market and C2 is a constant determined by the choice of numer-
aire. Focusing on the equilibrium distribution of population and assuming
a < 1 As-1, we can see that more productive places (higher
-
i), higher amenity
places (higher u-i), places with lower migration costs (higher Wi), and places
with lower trade costs (lower Pi) all have higher populations, with the responsive-
ness of the population to the geography governed by the strength of spillovers
through the composite term γ.5
4.2. Special cases
We now illustrate a number of interesting special cases of this general framework.
First, consider the case where workers cannot move from their original location,
i.e. where µij = 1 for all i 6¼ j. This is an assumption maintained in gravity trade
models such as Anderson (1979); Eaton and Kortum (2002); Chaney (2008);
Arkolakis (2010); Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012); Costinot
and Rodríguez-Clare (2013); Allen, Arkolakis and Takahashi (2014). Since
labor is fixed, we can determine the wage and the price index, wi and Pi by
using equations (17) and (18), equation (19) implies Li ¼ L0i , and equation (20)
simplifies to W wii ¼ P u-i.i
Second, consider the case where there are no migration frictions, i.e. µij =1 for
all i 6¼ j. This is an assumption maintained in economic geography models such as
Krugman (1991); Helpman (1998); Redding and Sturm (2008) and in the gravity
new economic geography models of Allen and Arkolakis (2014); Redding (2016).
In this case, equation (20) implies welfare is equalized across locations,
W ¼ Wi ¼ wi=Pi;








- ¼X i( ) :L 1=b ð25Þwi0 u-
i0 iPi0
A third special case is where there is both free trade and free migration, i.e. µij,
τij = 1 for all i 6¼ j. This setup is the celebrated Rosen-Roback (1982) model put to
use in a number of urban applications (see Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) and
Moretti (2011) for review of applications of this model). With free labor mobility,
equation (20) again implies that Wi = W while with free goods mobility, equation
(18) implies that the price index equalizes across locations Pi = P .
6 Notice that in
this special case equations (23) and (24) give an explicit solution of wages and
labor in terms of geography of each location. These solutions are intuitive
(e.g., under reasonable restrictions labor is increasing in productivities and ame-
nities) and have been heavily exploited by the urban literature.
4.3. Analytical solutions
In this section, we provide analytical solutions for the equilibrium above for two
simple geographies. (Note that the characterization of the equilibrium from equa-
tions (23) and (24) provide only partial characterization in the case with positive
trade or migration frictions as they are functions of two equilibrium objects,
namely the price index and the expected welfare of a location.)
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4.3.1. Two countries
In the special case of two countries we assume that the population is fully mobile
across locations so that utility equalization holds. Here we do not impose any
restriction on the geography of trade costs but we do impose the assumption of
symmetry in the geography of productivities and amenities so that A-i ¼ u-i ¼ 1




i i Li þ τ1-sw1-sw jPs-1¼ ij i jL j , ð26Þ
L w1-s 1 si ¼ ij w si Ps-1 -i Li þ τ -i w sjL 1jP -j

















Using the definition of the price index we have that
 !  !1








ð-1 ) ¼ Þ
j ji þ i wi wj τ ij
Combining the two results yields:( )( )s
L W- 1
w-s Li þ τ1 s ji -¼ ij Lj :wi
Now take the ratio of the two region’s populations:
( )s ( ) ( )s
L












τs ji Lj 1 1 s 1 jiji
- L L
τ ji i j
τ i jij
þ τ ji- τ ij Lj þ
In other words, if country j is more open than country i, τij < τji, then the popu-
lation in country i is smaller but wages are higher.
4.3.2. The line
We now assume that the topography of the world is described by a line, largerly
drawing from the analysis of Allen and Arkolakis (2014). Let space S be the
[−π, π] interval and suppose that α = β = 0 and A-i ¼ u-i ¼ 1, i.e. there are no spill-
overs and all locations have homogeneous exogenous productivities and ameni-
ties. Suppose that trade costs are instantaneous and apart from a border b in the
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middle of the line at location 0; that is, trade costs between locations on the same
side of the line are τ eτ~ji-sj and those on different sides are τ ebþτ~ j i-s 7is ¼ is j¼ .
Taking logs of equation (23) and differentiating yields the following differen-
tial equation:









¼ τ~ in the two edges of the line and
@ ln P0
i
¼ τ~ð1- eð1-sÞb =ð1þ eð1-sÞbÞ Þ in the location of the border which gives us
@
boundary conditions for the value of the differential equation at locations
i = −π,0,π. Intuitively, moving rightward while on the far left of the line
reduces the distance to all other locations by τ, thereby reducing the (log) price
index by τ. To obtain a closed form solution to equation (29), we differentiate





¼ k1Li for i 2 ð-p; 0Þ [ ð0; pÞ; ð30Þ
where s s 1 ð2s- 1s 2~ 2 1-s= ð - Þ= Þ and k1 = ð1- sÞ τ þ 2ð1- sÞτW can be
shown to be negative. Given the boundary conditions above, the equilibrium dis-
tribution of labor in both intervals is characterized by the weighted sum of the
cosine and sine functions (see example 2.1.2.1 in Polyanin and Zaitsev (2002)):pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Ls~i ¼ k2cosði -k1Þ þ k3jsinði -k1Þj:
The values of k1 and the ratio of k2 to k3 can be determined using the boundary
conditions. Given this ratio, the aggregate labor clearing condition determines
their levels.8 Notice that in the case of no border or an infinite border, the solution
is the simple cosine function or two cosine functions one in each side of the
border, respectively, and k3 = 0, so that the aggregate labor clearing condition
directly solves for k2.
9
Figure 13.16 depicts the equilibrium labor allocation in this simple case for dif-
ferent values of the instantaneous trade cost but no border. As the instantaneous
trade cost increases, the population concentrates in the middle of the interval
where the locations are less economically remote. The lower the trade costs,
the less concentrated the population; in the extreme where τ = 0, labor is
equally allocated across space. With symmetric exogenous productivities and
amenities, wages are lower in the middle of the line to compensate for the
lower price index. Figure 13.17 shows how a border affects the equilibrium pop-
ulation distribution with a positive instantaneous trade cost. As is evident, the
larger the border, the more economic activity moves toward the middle of each
side in the line; in the limit where crossing the border is infinitely costly, it is
as if the two line segments existed in isolation.
Figure 13.16 Economic activity on a line: trade costs
Notes: This figure shows how the equilibrium distribution of population along a line is affected by
changes in the trade cost. When trade is costless, the population is equal along the entire line. As
trade becomes more costly, the population becomes increasingly concentrated in the center of the
line where the consumption bundle is cheapest.
Source: Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
Figure 13.17 Economic activity on a line: border costs
Notes: This figure shows how the equilibrium distribution of population along a line is affected by the
presence of a border in the center of the line. As crossing the border becomes increasingly costly, the
equilibrium distribution of population moves toward the center of each half of the line.
Source: Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
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Differences in exogenous productivities, amenities and the spillovers also
play a key role in determining the equilibrium allocation of labor and wages.
The numerical solutions for these cases can be found in Allen and Arkolakis
(2014).
5. Taking the model to the data
In this section, we discuss how one can estimate the parameters of the structural
model from the previous section and use the model to perform counterfactuals.
We conclude the section by illustrating how different assumptions regarding
the mobility of goods and labor affects such counterfactual results.
5.1. Estimation
We first discuss how to estimate all the model parameters using readily available
data. One particular highlight of the methodology that follows is that it does not
require observing all bilateral flows of goods and labor. This is helpful, as often-
times (especially in sub-national data) such bilateral data is unavailable.
5.1.1. Estimating bilateral frictions
Assume that the log of the trade and migration bilateral frictions (to the power of
1
their 1 respective elasticities, i.e., τ1ij
-s and mbij) are functions of observables (e.g.
distance), i.e. ð1 s X T- ð ij ; gT and 1Þ ln τ ij ¼ f Þ ln mij ¼ g ;b ðX L Lij g Þ, where f (.) and
g (.) are functions known up to a vector of parameters γT and γL, respectively.
Then taking logs of the goods and labor gravity equations (7) and (9) yield:
ln X f X T ; gT gT dT εTij ¼ ð ij Þ þ i þ j þ ij ð31Þ
ln L Lij ¼ gðXij ; gLÞ þ gL dL Li þ j þ εij; ð32Þ
where gTi and g
L
i are the origin fixed effects of the trade and labor gravity equa-
tions, dTj and d
L
j are the respective destination fixed effects, and we interpret ε
T
ij
and εLij as measurement error in the observed bilateral flows. Note that equations
(31) and (32) are virtually identical to the empirical gravity equations (1) and (2)
presented in Section 2; the key difference is we have now provided a theoretical
justification for them.
By far the most common assumption in the literature is that bilateral frictions are
increasing in bilateral distance distij, i.e. f (
T.) = γ ln distij and g (.) = γL ln distij.
However, several recent innovations have allowed researchers to go beyond
simply using straight-line distances between locations. Donaldson and Hornbeck
(2012); Donaldson (forthcoming) uses Dijkstra’s algorithm to calculate the least
cost route between locations on a graph of the transportation network. Allen and
Arkolakis (2014) apply the Fast Marching Method to calculate the least cost route
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between locations over a continuous geography. Both these methods rely on algo-
rithms originally developed in computer science, leaving f (.) and g (.) implicit
functions of the underlying geography. More recently Allen and Arkolakis
(2017) derive a closed form solution for f (.) and g (.) as a function of the under-
lying transportation network assuming that many heterogeneous traders each
choose the least cost route over the network.
Regardless of the choice of f (.) and g (.), the fixed effects regression only
recovers estimates of the combination of the bilateral frictions and their respective
1
elasticities, i.e. τ1-sij and m
-b
ij . However, as we will see, this is all that is needed to
recover the remainder of the parameters and conduct counterfactuals. To make
1
this clear, define T 1 s
-b
ij ij
-= τ and Mij = mij for what follows. Moreover, note
that estimation can be accomplished even if bilateral flow data is only available
for a subset of location pairs, as long as the observables are available for all bilat-
eral pairs. This is helpful, for example, if trade flow data is only available for a
subset of countries, but one wishes to construct a model for the entire world.
5.1.2. Recovering location fundamentals and estimating model elasticities
1
Given estimates of Tij τ
1-s -b= ij and Mij = mij , we can use the equilibrium structure
of the model to recover information about endogenous outcomes in each location,
namely the productivities Ai, the amenities ui, the price index Pi, and the
welfare Wi.
To see this, we re-write the equilibrium equations (17)–(20) as follows:( )X Y
ps-1 T j s¼ P -1i ij Y i ð33Þ
j i
-1 XðPs-1 s --1 1i Þ ¼ Tjiðpj Þ ð34Þ
j




i ¼ Mji WL j ð35Þ
j i
1 X 1
W bi ¼ Mijobj ð36Þ
j
where p wi wii = A-La is the price of a good produced in location i and oi = P u-i is thei i i
welfare of residents residing in location i. Since {Tij} and {Mij} were estimated in
the previous step and assuming the income Yi, initial population L0i ¼ Li and
current population Li are all observed in the data, it can be shown (see Allen
and Donaldson (2017)) that there exists a unique (to-scale) set ofn o1 1
ps-1;Ps-1 W bi i ;o
b
i ; i that are consistent with equations (33)–(36). That is, the
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equilibrium structure of the model allows one to uniquely invert the model to
recover these parameters for each location.
There are three important things to note about this inversion procedure. First,
the inversion itself does not require knowledge of the any model elasticities, i.e.
conditional on the bilateral frictions {T and {Mij}, the choice of σ, β, or α doesn oij} 1 1
not affect the equilibrium ps-1 Ps b bi ;
1
i
- ;oi ;Wi Second, if one does know the
values of σ, β, and α one can identify the exogenous productivity and amenity
of each location, since:






i ¼ ln u- ; 38b P þ b i ð Þi
1
where the left hand side of both equations (ln ps-1i and ln o
b
i ) are values recov-
ered from the inversion and the right hand side are either observed in the data (the
ln w ln Li), are recovered from the inversion (the ln Ps 1i and i
- ) or are the exoge-
nous productivities and amenities (the ln A-i and ln u-i).
Third, and perhaps most importantly, note that equations (37) and (38) are esti-
mating equations that allow one to recover the model elasticities σ, α, and β. Spe-
cifically, one can regress the ln ps-1i recovered from the model inversion on the
observed wages ln wi and population ln Li to recover estimates of σ and α.
Given the estimate of σ, one can construct Pi from the model inversion of Ps-1i
1
and then regress ln obi on the observed real wage to recover β. Crucially,
because the exogenous productivity and amenity of each location are the residuals
of these two equations – and the model tells us that the wage and population will be
correlated with the exogenous productivities and amenities (see equations (23) and
(24)), ordinary least squares estimation will yield biased estimates. Instead, estima-
tion of the structural parameters requires valid instruments for the wage (both real
and nominal) and population that are both correlated with the observed wage and
population but uncorrelated with the fundamental productivity and amenity of a
location. Two plausible sets of instruments are as follows. First, Allen, Arkolakis
and Takahashi (2014) suggest that the model structure could be used to generate
instruments. In particular, the authors calculate the equilibrium wages, price
indices, and populations of a hypothetical world where bilateral frictions are a
solely a function of observed bilateral distance and local characteristics (e.g., pro-
ductivity and amenities) are solely a function of known geographic variables (e.g.,
distance to coast, ruggedness, soil quality, etc.). One could then use these equilib-
rium variables as instruments for the actual wages, price indices, and populations.
This procedure is valid as long as the geographic variables used are also controlled
for directly in the regression; indeed, Adao, Arkolakis and Esposito (2017) show
that a two-stage procedure using such a model implied instrument is optimal in
the sense that it minimizes the variance of the estimates. An alternative approach
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would be to use a shock to either trade or migration costs; for example Allen,
Morten and Dobbin (2017) use the construction of wall segments along the
border between the U.S. and Mexico as a shock to migration costs. This can be
implemented either in a reduced form way (e.g., instrumenting for wages, popula-
tions, and the price indices using distance to the border wall, as in Ahlfeldt,
Redding, Sturm and Wolf (2015)) or by using the structure of the model to
predict how the trade cost shock changes each of the endogenous variables and
using these model-predicted changes in wages, populations, and price indices




Given estimates of T τ1
-
ij ij
-s= and M bij = mij and the structural elasticities σ, α and
β from the previous section, it is straightforward to use the equilibrium structure
of the model to conduct counterfactuals. Consider any counterfactual change in
the bilateral frictions that change {Tij, Mij} to fT 0ij;M 0 ijg. Following Dekle,
Eaton, and Kortum (2008), we can express the equilibrium system using the
“exact hat algebra” approach where the notation x̂ x
0=
x
is the ratio of the counter-
factual value of a variable its current value. We start by writing equilibrium equa-
tions (17)–(20) for the future period and using the the identity x0 ¼ x̂x x as
follows: X
Ŷ i ¼ p T̂ 1ijp̂ sP̂s-1ij -i i ð39Þ
j
X
P̂1-s w T̂ p̂1ji
-s





i ¼ r ^jiM ô Ŵji i j ð41Þ
j2S
1 X 1













trade import share, r ji j j
oi Lji
ji = L is the in-migration share, andi ¼ Li





ij = 0 ¼ 0 is the out migration share. There are several important thingsL L
i i
to note about the system of equations (39)–(42). First, the kernel of each equation
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– i.e., πij, χji, ρji, and υij – are solely a function of observed variables (income Yi,
initial and final populations Li and L0i ), estimated variables (the bilateral frictions




i i ). Moreover, no element of the kernel requires any knowledge
of the model elasticities to recover. Hence, even if the bilateral shares are not
directly observed, all necessary components of the shares are observed so that
the kernels of each equation can be treated as observable. This shows that the
“exact hat algebra” approach of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008) does not
require observing bilateral trade or migration flows to implement. Second, the
change in bilateral frictions M̂ ^ij and Tij depend on the counterfactual of interest,
so they are known as well. Hence, equations (39)–(42) comprise 4N equationsn o1 1




-1; ôb;Ŵ bi j .
Since the 4N equations in the system (39)–(42) do not depend on any of the
model elasticities {σ,α,β}, one might reasonably ask how these elasticities
affect the counterfactuals. The answer is that the choice of model elasticities
affects how one can express the changes in incomes Ŷ i and populations L̂i as a
function of the changes in the other endogenous variablesn o1 1
p̂1-s; P̂s-1; ôb;Ŵ
-b
i i i j . Taking first differences of equations (37) and (38) –






i - ln P̂s-1
1 1
i ¼ a s 1 i - ln p̂
-s
a a s 1 ið - Þ ð - Þ
b 1
Li ln ô






að - 1 -Þ að1 iþ aÞðs- 1Þ
which allows us to re-write equations the 4N equations in the system (39)–(42) as





ôb - 1 1 --s 1 p T̂ p̂1 1að i ðs Þ Þð i Þ ¼ ij ij -s^i Psi -- aðs-Þ i ð43Þ
j
X-- 1 ^ ^ -sðP̂s 1 1i Þ ¼ wjiT jipj ð44Þ
j
( )b1 a X 1 11 1
ôb ^i P
s a s-1Þ p̂
a1 -ð s -a --- 1 - b b
i i
ð1þaÞðs-1Þð Þ ð Þ ¼ r ^jiM jiô ^iW j ð45Þ
j2S
( )1 1- X
Ŵ
-1
b ¼ u ^j ijM ijôbj ; ð46Þ
j
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and a normalization on prices. These four equations can then be solved to deter-
mine the effect of the counterfactual on all endogenous variables.
5.3. An example: the Interstate Highway System
Finally, we illustrate the procedure above with a counterfactual based on Allen
and Arkolakis (2014): the effect of the construction of the Interstate Highway
System (IHS). In particular, we consider five different versions of that counterfac-
tual with different assumptions regarding the mobility of goods and labor: First,
we consider a “trade” model where labor is fixed in each location and the move-
ment of goods is costly; second, we consider the reverse where each location is in
autarky (trade costs are infinite) but migration is possible (but costly); third, we
consider an “economic geography” model where trade is costly but the movement
of labor is costless; fourth, we consider a “labor” model where trade is costless
but the movement of labor is costly; and finally we consider the full model
where both labor and trade are mobile but subject to bilateral frictions.
For each version of the model, we use data on the wage and population from
the 2000 Census as in Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and invert the model using the
methodology discussed in Section 5.1 to recover the unique set of variables for
each location so that the model exactly matches the data given assumptions on
labor and goods mobility.10 (For models with labor mobility, we assume that
the population in the 2000 Census is the steady state population.) We use the esti-
mates of the removal of the IHS from Allen and Arkolakis (2014) to construct T̂ ij
and M̂ ij (assuming migration costs and trade costs are affected equally) and apply
the counterfactual procedure from Section 5.2 to calculate the change in populations
L̂i and real wages
ŵi
^ in each location. For all simulations, we set σ = 4, α = 0.1, andPi
β = 0.25, which are (roughly) in line with estimates from the existing literature, see
e.g. Simonovska and Waugh (2014) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004).
Figures 13.18 through 13.22 present the results; each figure shows the spatial
distribution in the change in population and real wage across all U.S. counties by
decile, with white indicating the greatest decline and black indicating the greatest
increase. The most important thing to see from the simulations is that the assump-
tions regarding the mobility of goods and people play a hugely important role in
dictating the effects of the removal of the IHS. For example, in the first counter-
factual, there is zero correlation between the change in population and the change
in real wages – for the simple reason that the population is assumed to be immo-
bile (see Figure 13.18). Contrast this with the second counterfactual, where there
is a perfect correlation between the (log) change in population and the (log)
change in real wages – for the simple reason that the change in real wages is
determined solely by the change in the location population when each location
is in autarky (see Figure 13.19). This is also true when trade is costly but migra-
tion is costless (as is assumed in Allen and Arkolakis (2014)), as welfare will be
equalized across all locations (see Figure 13.20). However, when migration is
costly (and trade is possible), the correlation between the change in population
Change in real wage
Figure 13.18 Effect of removing the Interstate Highway System: no migration, costly
trade
Change in population
Notes: These maps show the predicted change in population and real wage in every county from
removing the Interstate Highway System under the assumption that migration is infinitely costly
and trade is costly. The model is calibrated to match the observed population and income in each
county from the 2000 Census. The effect of the IHS on trade costs are taken from Allen and Arkolakis
(2014). The model parameters assumed are an elasticity of substitution (σ) of 5, a productivity spil-
lover (α) of 0.1 and a disamenity spillover (β) of 0.25, yielding trade and migration elasticities of
4. The shading of a county indicates its decile, with white indicating the greatest decline and black
indicating the greatest increase.
and the change in real wages is far from perfect, as Figures 13.21 and 13.22
highlight.
Table 13.1 depicts the pair-wise correlations in predicted changes in real wages
and populations across the different model variants. It is somewhat surprising to
see how varied the predictions for population changes are: for example, the
463 Modern spatial economics: a primer 463
Change in real wage
Figure 13.19 Effect of removing the Interstate Highway System: no trade, costly
migration
Change in population
Notes: These maps show the predicted change in population and real wage in every county from
removing the Interstate Highway System under the assumption that migration is costly and trade is
infinitely costly. The model is calibrated to match the observed population and income in each
county from the 2000 Census. The effect of the IHS on migration costs are set equal to the change
in trade costs estimated in Allen and Arkolakis (2014). The model parameters assumed are an elastic-
ity of substitution (σ) of 5, a productivity spillover (α) of 0.1 and a disamenity spillover (β) of 0.25,
yielding trade and migration elasticities of 4. The shading of a county indicates its decile, with white
indicating the greatest decline and black indicating the greatest increase.
predictions of model variant #2 (no trade, costly migration) is strongly negatively
correlated with the other model variants. Even across the other model variants
with labor mobility, the correlation in predicted labor changes is as low as 0.74
(comparing costly trade, free migration to costly trade, costly migration). In con-
trast, the model variants (with the exception of variant #2) largely agree on the
change in real wages, with all pair-wise correlations exceeding 0.95.
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Change in population
Change in real wage
Figure 13.20 Effect of removing the Interstate Highway System: costly trade, free
migration
Notes: These maps show the predicted change in population and real wage in every county from
removing the Interstate Highway System under the assumption that migration is costless and trade
is costly. The model is calibrated to match the observed population and income in each county
from the 2000 Census. The effect of the IHS on trade costs are equal to those estimated in Allen
and Arkolakis (2014). The model parameters assumed are an elasticity of substitution (σ) of 5, a pro-
ductivity spillover (α) of 0.1 and a disamenity spillover (β) of 0.25, yielding trade and migration elas-
ticities of 4. The shading of a county indicates its decile, with white indicating the greatest decline and
black indicating the greatest increase.
Change in population
Change in real wage
Figure 13.21 Effect of removing the Interstate Highway System: free trade, costly
migration
Notes: These maps show the predicted change in population and real wage in every county from
removing the Interstate Highway System under the assumption that migration is costly and trade is
costless. The model is calibrated to match the observed population and income in each county
from the 2000 Census. The effect of the IHS on migration costs are equal to those estimated for
the change in trade costs in Allen and Arkolakis (2014). The model parameters assumed are an elas-
ticity of substitution (σ) of 5, a productivity spillover (α) of 0.1 and a disamenity spillover (β) of 0.25,
yielding trade and migration elasticities of 4. The shading of a county indicates its decile, with white
indicating the greatest decline and black indicating the greatest increase.
Change in population
Change in real wage
Figure 13.22 Effect of removing the Interstate Highway System: costly trade, costly
migration
Notes: These maps show the predicted change in population and real wage in every county from
removing the Interstate Highway System under the assumption that both migration and trade are
costly. The model is calibrated to match the observed population and income in each county from
the 2000 Census. The effect of the IHS on both migration and trade costs are equal to those estimated
for the change in trade costs in Allen and Arkolakis (2014). The model parameters assumed are an
elasticity of substitution (σ) of 5, a productivity spillover (α) of 0.1 and a disamenity spillover (β)
of 0.25, yielding trade and migration elasticities of 4. The shading of a county indicates its decile,
with white indicating the greatest decline and black indicating the greatest increase.
Table 13.1 Correlation of counterfactual predictions across different model specifications
Population
Costly trade, no No trade, costly Costly trade, free Free trade, costly Costly trade and
migration migration migration migration migration
Costly trade, no migration N/A
No trade, costly migration N/A 1
Costly trade, free migration N/A −0.6104 1
Free trade, costly migration N/A −0.0945 0.8216 1
Costly trade and migration N/A 0.0244 0.742 0.9852 1
Real wage
Costly trade, no No trade, costly Costly trade, free Free trade, costly Costly trade and
migration migration migration migration migration
Costly trade, no migration 1
No trade, costly migration −0.5083 1
Costly trade, free migration 0.9949 −0.5886 1
Free trade, costly migration 0.9555 −0.7301 0.9787 1
Costly trade and migration 0.9841 −0.6506 0.996 0.99 1
Notes: This table shows the pair wise correlations in changes in real income (top) and population (bottom) across the five different model specifications. The shock
considered is the removal of the Interstate Highway System (IHS). The models differ only in their assumptions regarding the mobility of goods and labor; when
trade and/or migration is “costly”, the change in the costs due to the destruction of the Interstate Highway System are those estimated for trade costs in Allen and
Arkolakis (2014). Each model is calibrated to exactly match the county level population and income data from the 2000 Census given assumed bilateral trade and
migration costs. The model parameters assumed are an elasticity of substitution (σ) of 5, a productivity spillover (α) of 0.1 and a disamenity spillover (β) of 0.25,
yielding trade and migration elasticities of 4.
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6. Conclusion
In this primer, we present a review of the simple gravity framework that nests
many leading spatial economic models, succinctly incorporates a rich real
world geography and matches a number of important empirical patterns in the
flow of people and goods. Using a set of newly developed solution techniques
and mathematical methods the model can be solved efficiently and be used to
conduct relevant policy experiments. Within this environment, the analysis of
the economic impact of the interstate highway network highlights the importance
of the assumptions on the mobility of labor and goods for evaluating infrastruc-
ture policies. We expect that these new tools will further advance the way econ-
omists conduct the exploration of space – Economic Science’s final frontier.
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1 Examples of gravity trade models included in our framework are perfect competition
models such as Anderson (1979), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and Caliendo and Parro (2015); for monopolistic competition
models such as Krugman (1980), Melitz (2003) as specified by Chaney (2008), Arko-
lakis, Demidova, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2008), Di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2008) and Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2008); and the Bertrand competition model
of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003). Economic geography models incorpo-
rated in our framework include Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Redding (2016) and
the geography-trade framework of Allen, Arkolakis and Takahashi (2014).
2 While the model attains a non-trivial solution even for σ 2 (0,1), we focus on the case
where σ > 1 so that the elasticity of trade flows to trade costs is negative.
3 See Allen and Arkolakis (2014) for a precise discussion of the various isomorphisms
to this formulation.
4 The system of equations has the form of the multi-equation multi-location gravity
system analyzed by Allen, Arkolakis and Li (2014). Using their approach equilibrium
existence and uniqueness can be characterized in generalized gravity systems. In addi-
tion, their approach provides algorithms to compute the equilibrium of these multi-
equation systems efficiently. Refined notions of stability are discussed in Allen and
Arkolakis (2014).
5 When a 1>
1
, the only type of stable equilibria possible is a black-hole equilibriums
where all the
-
population is concentrated in a single location; see Allen and Arkolakis
(2014) for an in-depth discussion and formal definition of “stability” in this context.
6 In fact, the baseline Rosen-Roback (1982) framework also imposes that elasticity of
substitution is infinite across goods, i.e., the goods are perfect substitutes. The assump-
tion is not essential for what is obtained below.
7 This border cost is reminiscent of the one considered in Rossi-Hansberg (2005). As in
that model, our model predicts that increases in the border cost will increase trade
between locations that are not separated by border and decrease trade between loca-
tions separated by the border. Unlike Rossi-Hansberg (2005), however, in our
model the border does not affect what good is produced (since each location produces
a distinct differentiated variety) nor is there an amplification effect through spillovers
(since spillovers are assumed to be local).
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8 More general formulations of the exogenous productivity or amenity functions result to
more general specifications of the second order differential equation illustrated above
(see Polyanin and Zaitsev (2002) section 2.1.2 for a number of tractable examples).
9 Mossay and Picard (2011) obtain a characterization of the population based on the
cosine function in a model where there is no trade but agglomeration of population
arises due to social interactions that decline linearly with distance. In their case, pop-
ulation density may be zero in some locations while in our case the CES Armington
assumption generates a strong dispersion force that guarantees that the equilibrium is
regular when agglomeration forces are not too strong, as discussed in Theorem 2.
10 To ease computation, we approximate the model variants with “infinitely” costly trade
or migration with very large (but finite) trade or migration costs, respectively. Simi-
larly, we approximate model variants with “costless” trade or migration with very
small (but positive) trade or migration costs, respectively.
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